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At least 253 records · Page 14

Leveraging AI and Spatial Data to Unlock Pipeline Integrity Insights: NETL’s Advanced Infrastructure Integrity Model (AIIM)

Maintaining the integrity of natural gas infrastructure plays a critical role in ensuring energy security. Robust, data-driven foundational AI models for pipeline integrity can help address risk management and mitigation issues. Trusted foundational models can help with industry adoption and accelerate innovation by enhancing integrity predictions, reduce costs, and informing infrastructure build-out. The AIIM dashboard was released in 2022 and utilizes multi-ML models for ensemble-type insights. It was expanded to include analytics on reported incidents. It was developed as an ESRI Dashboard to support data visualization & interrogation and contains pipeline data and model results.

Advanced Infrastructure Integrity Model (AIIM)↗

Utilizing AI and Spatial Data to Identify & Rapidly Disseminate Energy Infrastructure Insights

GeoGov Summit Final Presentation entitled "Utilizing AI and Spatial Data to Identify & Rapidly Disseminate Energy Infrastructure Insights". Maintaining the integrity of energy infrastructure plays a critical role in ensuring energy security. Robust foundational AI models using data from federal, state, industry, and other sources can help address integrity risk management & mitigation issues as well as evaluate extended use strategies. Trusted foundational models can help with industry adoption and accelerate innovation by enhancing integrity predictions, reduce costs, and informing infrastructure build-out. Coordination, collaboration & data sharing to develop robust models to aid in: Optimizing operations; Minimizing costs; Ensuring energy security.

Advanced Infrastructure Integrity Model (AIIM)↗

Cyber Conservative Operations

In an era of increasingly sophisticated and pervasive cyber threats, robust cyber resilience strategies are more critical than ever. This paper introduces the concept of Cyber Conservative Operations, a proactive approach designed to assist critical infrastructure owners and operators in managing risk and maintaining resilience in the face of imminent, yet not occurring, cyber events. By leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and the energy sector’s practice of conservative operations, Cyber Conservative Operations offer a framework for planning and executing coordinated active defense and resilience-oriented actions ahead of cyber events. This approach aims to minimize the consequences of digitally-enabled hazards and ensure swift recovery from anticipated cyber threats. Cyber Conservative Operations enhance the ability of owners and operators to execute pre-planned defense and resilience actions, thereby reducing the impact of digitally-enabled hazards. These operations are crucial for addressing impacts that cannot be precisely quantified or forecasted and for preparing organizations for rapid recovery from imminent digital threats. The paper begins with a discussion of conservative operations as applied to the bulk power system (BPS), a current mechanism allowing BPS entities to enact defensive operating plans to mitigate impending grid unreliability. Building on this model, we present a concept for implementing cyber conservative operations at asset owner facilities. The paper concludes with two case studies of cyber conservative operations drawn from high-profile cyber events, illustrating the practical application and benefits of this proactive approach.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Energy Storage Siting and Permitting Outreach Workshop Report

On March 24th, 2026, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff hosted the Energy Storage Siting & Permitting Outreach Workshop at PNNL’s Grid Storage Launchpad (GSL) facility in Richland, Washington. The workshop convened a cohort of state and regional stakeholders from across the country to build a shared understanding of energy storage technologies, regulatory frameworks, and best practices for engaging in the permitting process. Participants left with a deeper understanding of energy storage technologies, grid uses and benefits, interconnection and regulatory processes, battery safety standards and risk management, and local engagement strategies and approaches. The workshop concluded with a guided tour of the GSL for hands-on exposure to energy storage research and development. The workshop had 17 external participants. The attendees represented a range of backgrounds, including state and local governments, nonprofits or other local organizations, project developers, and utility stakeholders.

Battery Energy Storage↗

MSD CoP Webinar: Accounting for distributive justice in model-based decision support

Context: This webinar was hosted by the MultiSector Dynamics Community of Practice (MSD CoP; https://multisectordynamics.org). Abstract: Model-based analyses play an ever-increasing role in informing policy and decision-making. However, many large-scale societal challenges unavoidably involve questions about the fair distribution of positive and negative consequences. How are the costs of the energy transition distributed over households and businesses? How are flood risks redistributed under different flood risk management plans? How are the impacts of climate change and climate mitigation distributed over different parts of the world?These kinds of questions play an important role when deliberating public policy, and the lack, in many cases, of clear answers becomes an obstacle to decision-making. At recent COPs, for example, wicked questions about loss and damages and the phase-out versus phase-down of coal became obstacles to global climate action, illustrating the misalignment of the direction of scientific research and decision-makers' information needs. In this talk, I'll explore advances that are being made that enable analysts to start providing grounded model-based answers to questions of distributive justice, as well as argue that analysts should embrace and explicate the normative nature of their work instead of hiding behind the purported neutrality of science. Presenters: Dr. Jan Kwakkel (Delft University of Technology) Moderator(s): Rebecca Saari (MSD CoP Working Group Co-Chair; Univ. of Waterloo), Matt Sparks (Univ. of Waterloo); Sarah Fletcher (MSD CoP Working Group Co-Chair; Stanford University), Juan Moreno-Cruz (Univ. of Waterloo), Patrick Reed (MSD CoP Facilitation Team Member, Moderator and Organizer) This webinar was held on: November 13, 2024 from 1 PM - 2:15 PM ET

Kwakkel, Jan H.↗

Resilience Metrics and Framework for Distributed Wind Presentation

This presentation communicates information about the MIRACL project Resilience Metrics report and Resilience Framework report. It was created for the 2021 MIRACL advisory board meeting. We propose a three-tiered approach for the resilience framework. At the top level, we consider the time horizons on which resilience will be evaluated and executed. At the middle level, we consider the core functions of resilience, which span across the time horizons. At the lower level, we consider the process steps that correspond to implementing practices for resilience in each of the core functions. The framework considers three time horizons in order to enable organizations to assess and improve their system’s resilience throughout its lifecycle. We call these time horizons the planning, operational, and future stages. The planning stage uses organizational needs and current system evaluation to prepare for potential hazards. The operational stage seeks to execute responses to hazards as prudently and efficiently as possible to maintain system resilience. The future stage seeks to improve on current system resilience and feeds back into the planning stage to promote continuous improvement. While all three time horizons are important when considering a specific topic, the planning and evaluation phase (i.e., what is done in advance of the event) is critical in defining a system’s resilience characteristics and in outlining how a system responds to an event. This framework intentionally emphasizes the planning stage to highlight the overarching emphasis of this effort, not to imply that the other two time-related horizons (i.e., operational and change the future) are less important. The core functions in the framework are identify, prepare, detect, adapt, and recover. These five functions stem from a rigorous analysis of definitions used across the industry, and they represent the core capabilities that an organization must have to enable lifecycle resilience. Within each core function, process steps are described that help walk an organization through the information gathering, evaluation, decision-making, and implementation processes they will need to ensure their resilience goals are maintained throughout the system and the system lifecycle. Also highlighted in the figure is the concept that a resilience framework should be cyclical in nature. Because a system’s resilience is based on finite resources and time, it must continually evolve through this framework’s risk management and capital investment steps at an appropriate level of scope and pace.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Integrating Cybersecurity with System Operations and Restoration

This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First is discussion of a number of fundamental concepts for system operators - organizational division of responsibilities, human and machine cooperation, goals, and priorities. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains different risk management approaches based on the consequence and frequency of events. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid categorized by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is discussed to present recommendations and ideas for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

An introduction to financial option pricing on a qudit-based quantum computer

The financial sector is anticipated to be one of the first industries to benefit from the increased computational power of quantum computers, in areas such as portfolio optimisation and risk management to financial derivative pricing. Financial mathematics, and derivative pricing in particular, are not areas quantum physicists are traditionally trained in despite the fact that they often have the raw technical skills needed to understand such topics. On the other hand, most quantum algorithms have largely focused on qubits, which are comprised of two discrete states, as the information carriers. However, discrete higher-dimensional qudits, in addition to possibly possessing increased noise robustness and allowing for novel error correction protocols in certain hardware implementations, also have logarithmically greater information storage and processing capacity. In the current NISQ era of quantum computing, a wide array of hardware paradigms are still being studied and any potential advantage a platform offers is worth exploring. Here we introduce the basic concepts behind financial derivatives for the unfamiliar enthusiast as well as outline in great detail the quantum algorithm routines needed to price a European option, the simplest derivative. This is done within the context of a quantum computer comprised of qudits and employing the natural higher-dimensional analogue of a qubit-based pricing algorithm with its various subroutines. From these pieces, one should relatively easily be able to tailor the scheme to more complex, realistic financial derivatives. Finally, the entire stack is numerically simulated with the results demonstrating how the qudit-based scheme's payoff quickly approaches that of both a similarly-resourced classical computer as well as the true payoff, within error, for a modest increase in qudit dimension.

Bornman, Nicholas↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Overview: Joint NERC/INL/E-ISAC Webinar

In July, NERC, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) will host a joint informational webinar to highlight areas focused on integrating cyber and physical security with conventional engineering practices (security integration). NERC's work on these topics represents one of the first focused applications of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of CIE, a discussion of how NERC's work represents one of the first new discipline-specific applications of CIE, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Design and Operations

Pursuant to the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy published in 2022, INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of why we need CIE and what it is, a discussion of the major implications of CIE for electric power systems design and operations, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hydrogen Leak Modeling for Development of Smart Distributed Monitoring Under Unintended Releases

Hydrogen is a versatile and clean energy carrier that can be produced from various renewable sources such as wind, solar, and hydropower. Hydrogen has the potential to play a crucial role in decarbonizing industrial processes that are currently reliant on fossil fuels and provide long-duration and/or seasonal energy storage to enable electricity decarbonization. Hydrogen can also be used as a fuel for fuel cell vehicles, providing a zero-emission alternative to traditional internal combustion engines. DOE launched the Hydrogen Energy Earthshot (Hydrogen Shot) in June 2021 to reduce the cost of clean hydrogen by 80% to $1 per 1 kilogram in 1 decade ("1 1 1"). While promising, Hydrogen is highly-flammable, and in the presence of oxygen, it can form explosive mixtures. . Therefore, understanding leak scenarios is essential to evaluate and mitigate the safety risks associated with potential hydrogen leaks. An increased understanding of leak behavior, and having tools to model leaks, can help assess how hydrogen would disperse in different environments, influencing emergency response plans and safety measures, and identify potential issues with materials and design systems that can withstand the challenges posed by hydrogen. Recently, researchers have attempted to study hydrogen leaks for development of risk management strategies. However, the focus has been on closed or semi-closed spaces like storage rooms, vehicles, garages, and fueling stations - all promising locations for future hydrogen infrastructure. In this presentation, the modeling environment extends the span of research further by modeling hydrogen leak in an outdoor, open space. We will present the key challenges with modeling hydrogen leaks in an uncontrollable environment, how they were handled, and how modeling results informed sensor selection and placement. A Hydrogen research facility at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) was used as a case study to model hydrogen leaks. In the future, Hydrogen wide area detection methodologies will be developed and tested at this site to monitor for unintended and operational hydrogen releases. The data generated from modeling will be used to develop a predictive model to detect hydrogen leak location based on concentration measured by sensors in this open space. Furthermore, the facility was also chosen because controlled hydrogen releases can be performed. A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based modeling approach was taken to model hydrogen leak. The full-scale hydrogen facility was modeled with a large ambient domain. The electrolyzer at the facility can produce a controlled release rate of 27 kg-H2/hr. Site-specific atmospheric and weather condition data such as wind direction, wind speed at various altitudes, and temperature were used as inputs to the model. To capture the variability of weather conditions, a subset of the weather conditions experienced during daytime hours without precipitation over the course of three months was generated; using established data clustering techniques, a total of 100 condition sets were chosen. The results show statistical distributions and ranges of hydrogen concentrations at locations throughout the domain. These distributions are compared to experimental data from a constant mass flow, controlled hydrogen release at the facility. The stochastic wind conditions of the release make direct validation difficult, therefore, statistical comparison approaches were used. Wind conditions are found to significantly impact the release behavior, including direction and concentration. Sensor selection and placement is proposed for the facility and is now based on release behavior predicted for the facility given its weather patterns; this is much more informed than without the modeling results. The methodology and analysis procedure can be translated to other facilities using modified geometries and site-specific weather conditions. Hydrogen holds great promise as a renewable energy fuel, but ensuring safety in its production, storage, and use is paramount. Studying potential leak scenarios in an open space will help develop sensors to detect hydrogen on a large spectrum of concentration and eventually build a smart distributed monitoring system.

CFD↗

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary 2025

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the ARC-100, a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) being developed by ARC Clean Technology, Inc (ARC). The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, used fuel assembly wash station, cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks, used fuel dry storage facility, damaged fuel storage facility, and radioactive waste building. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Modernizing the Legacy Fission Wire Measurement System for the Advanced Test Reactor-Critical Facility

Operational lifetime extensions of existing research reactors have emphasized the need for refurbishment, replacements, and upgrades to supporting equipment and instrumentation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), which entered service in 1967, has recently completed the sixth core internals change-out and has scheduled operations until at least 2040. Reactor maintenance and operational risk management is critically important in the research reactor community, however supporting measurement systems sometimes get overlooked when maintenance is planned. The Fission Wire Measurement System (FWMS) is a custom measurement system designed in the 1960s to measure the beta-particle activity of irradiated uranium-aluminum fission wires. This measurement is conducted to determine the fission rate profile of the Advanced Reactor Test Critical (ATR-C) facility. The ATR-C is an open-pool, low-power test reactor that was purpose driven to resemble ATR and is used to qualify experiment configurations and verify core models prior to full-power experiment irradiations in ATR. A power distribution measurement in ATR-C uses uranium-aluminum wires that are distributed throughout the ATR-C core to validate simulation and modeling results. These measurements require 340 to 1500 wires to be irradiated and measured within a 12-hour window. The activity of the wires is measured in the required time with the FWMS, which was put into service in 1965 at the Radiation Measurements Laboratory (RML). The system consists of 4 measurement channels and one reference channel, each with a 2-pi proportional gas flow detector and the measurement channels each have an automated sample changer. This legacy system is crucial to the continued operations of ATR and has undergone some minor hardware upgrades since 1965, however the system presently relies on custom control boards, custom gas ion chambers, analog amplifiers/discriminators, and a user interface (UI) for the system written in outdated code. Much of the equipment and software is custom with no commercial replacements or support and limited documentation. The existing control software requires an operating system that is no longer supported, creating more vulnerabilities to continued operations. A project is underway with a third-party vendor to design, build, and document a new control and data acquisition system (CDAS) for the FWMS. The new upgrade will replace the control system, computer, UI, sample changer motors, and main power supply while maintaining the interface with existing detector hardware. The upgraded system will be operated in parallel with the current hardware and software to conduct validation testing. This equipment upgrade demonstrates the commitment at ATR to ensuring successful operations and potential future research reactors at INL.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Risk Informed Timelines (RIT) v.1.0

Risk Informed Timelines (RIT) is a more modern and holistic method for understanding how access delay timelines are developed and utilized in physical security system evaluations. The software utilizes Bayesian methods to combine subject matter expert judgement and small performance test datasets in a consistent and defensible way. It allows a more holistic view of delay performance that provides distributions of task times and task success probabilities to account for tasks that, if failed, would result in failure of the attack. The RIT methodology is meant to enable security risk managers to begin the transition into more comprehensive delay timeline analysis. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-8294 O

Noel, ToddG.↗

NRAP-open-IAM: A flexible open-source integrated-assessment-model for geologic carbon storage risk assessment and management

Large-scale implementation of geologic carbon storage (GCS) to help reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions requires stakeholder confidence that injected CO2 will remain contained and that potential subsurface environmental risks are acceptably small and manageable. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) has developed an open-source integrated assessment model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to help address questions about a potential GCS site’s ability to effectively contain injected CO 2 and protect groundwater and other overlying environmentally sensitive receptors. NRAP-Open-IAM allows a user to: (1) incorporate relevant site geologic and injection scenario data; (2) characterize important site features and events;(3) couple fast prediction models of various system components of the engineered geologic system; and (4) execute stochastic, dynamic simulation of whole GCS system performance, leakage risk assessment, and uncertainty quantification. NRAP-Open-IAM is available on GitLab (https://gitlab.com/NRAP/OpenIAM), and is accompanied by multiple application examples and detailed user and developer guides.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Accelerated Materials Deployment in Advanced Nuclear Power Plants

The purpose of this report is to begin the development of a maximally efficient process for licensing and deploying new materials in Advanced Non-Light-Water Reactors (ANLWRs). Some new materials that are to be used in some new plants are seen as possibly introducing risks, because our understanding of those new materials’ behavior in the conditions generated by some novel plant designs is less complete than our understanding of the behavior of materials with long use histories in existing designs. In these cases, an approved code/standard or a code case to support the use of these materials in the novel design’s safety case may not exist for the regulator to utilize as part of the licensing determination. This circumstance creates the potential for an extremely long licensing process for new designs using new materials. The present strategy is to show how to manage these risks proactively, in such a way as to permit licensing decisions to be made in a timely manner, based on this risk management process. The present report outlines the gaps in the current codes to support deployment and use of novel materials and begins the development of the necessary risk management framework that is focused on the subject materials issues; it is based on risk-informed in-service surveillance practices, carried out in such a way as to compensate for current limitations in our state of knowledge. This development will enable licensing and deployment of the subject materials, conditional on the proactive surveillance process to be established. While this report is occasioned by limitations in our knowledge of certain materials issues that may arise in advanced designs, in-service surveillance is always done in order to compensate for a lack of knowledge: if we knew that components were not already failed and not trending toward failure, we would not perform surveillance, even in current-generation plants (except that prescriptive requirements would force us to do so). What is different about the surveillance program discussed here is that the issues are newer and the relevant experience base is less complete, so the surveillance presently contemplated may need to measure new things and/or measure them more often than has been traditional for surveillance coupons. The present report is devoted to the risk management framework and applies American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI, Division [1] to establish the structure of a protocol for carrying out the necessary surveillance. These documents are generic: they do not tell us how often to surveille, or what to surveille, or what to measure, but rather how to determine those things, given certain technical inputs. The Regulatory Development R&D Program [2] is currently developing the companion supporting technical basis for the materials surveillance technology that, when completed and validated, can be used by owner/operator and NRC to implement a materials degradation management program for ANLWRs. This report also outlines salient points of discussion, positive potential outcomes, and potential concerns from industry and the USNRC. These aspects of the report intend to inform future work to develop a proposed technical process for adoption by the industry and endorsement by the USNRC to allow developers to propose a risk informed and conservative approach for the use of materials where operating experience/data and codes and standards may not exist for use of a novel material in an operating reactor environment. Additionally, such a technology could be leveraged to potentially reduce part of the upfront materials data requirements from ongoing long-term materials testing so that early action on license application could be undertaken by NRC, in parallel with the continuation of long-term data collection. This could accelerate the schedule for a first-of-a-kind ANLWR deployment or a nth-of-a-kind new materials insertion for established ANLWR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗