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A Notional Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration Package (ArLSEP) based on the Gandalf Staff Platform

Introduction: The Artemis program is planning to deliver crew and cargo to the lunar surface, but there is no current package for supporting lunar in-struments and experiments similar to the Apollo Lunar Surface Exploration Package (ALSEP). This abstract provides a possible concept for such a package using the Gandalf Staff Platform as a common core. Gandalf Staff: The Gandalf Staff is an early prototype system developed over FY’21/FY’22 using NASA Science Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Center Information Fund (CIF) grants to de-sign, build and test “proof-of-concept” components. These components include a 24v battery powered monopole that powers a suite of subsystems, including a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for crew, surface voice and data communications, Lunar Search and Rescue (LunaSAR) navigation and communications, LiDAR, field site external lighting, 360-degree camera, and a geothermal instrument for measuring sub-surface temperature gradient. The staff can be carried independently by an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) astronaut, or can be mounted into a tripod for “hands free” support at a surface site being investigated. The staff can be attached to an external solar array and power storage system for long-duration operations. [1,2] ALSEP: An ASLEP flew on each mission Apollo 12 to Apollo 17. For Apollo 11, a simplified packaged called the Early Apollo Scientific Experiments Pack-age (EASEP) was flown. Each package included a “Central Station” that provided the power and communications connected to a variety of instruments and sensors. The power was provided by a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) fueled by Plutoni-um-238 generating 70 watts of power (initially, decayed over time) [3]. The communications system provide for direct to Earth data transfer from the lunar surface. Each pack-age was stowed externally in the Lunar Module (LM) Scientific Equipment (SEQ) bay with a mass up to 163 kg (Apollo 17). The crew unloaded the ALSEP from the LM and deployed the instruments on the lunar surface. Although designed to operate for only 1 year, many sites operated for up to 8 years successfully [4]. The Active Seismic Experiment (ASE) included 3 geophones for detecting seismic waves created by mortars and thumpers deployed by the crew. Other active experiments measured the lunar atmosphere, the heat flow in the subsurface, the lunar gravity and potential gravity waves, the lunar magnetic field, the solar wind and plasma interactions in cislunar space. Passive experiments included collectors for dust and cosmic rays, and retroreflectors for precise measurements of distance using a laser from Earth. The ALSEP program continues to generate insights into lunar formation and evolution. ArLSEP Concepts: The lunar surface science package for the Artemis program will hopefully exceed the capability of the ALSEP. There are multiple issues for discussion leading to the design of a new ArLSEP, needing requirements definition from the science community, NASA mission architecture, and NASA budget planners. 1. Delivery Mechanism Two possible projects currently provide capability to deliver scientific cargo to the lunar surface: 1) the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) [5] and the Human Landing System (HLS) [6, 7]. Each project is controlled by a different organization within NASA and budgeted with different criteria although both support lunar exploration. The HLS system delivers crew (and potentially cargo) to human landing sites. If an ArLSEP is “predeployed” to such a site, the design must include power (either from the vehicle or independently) to keep the electronics functioning until deployed by the crew. If an ArLSEP is delivered on a vehicle after the crew is present on the lunar surface, safety protocols require adequate distance from the humans for impact from descent propelled sur-face regolith ejecta. This distance can not exceed the capability of the crew to walk (if no rover) to the vehicle for ArLSEP deployment. 2. Overall Guidelines The general design of ArLSEP will likely follow the ALSEP with a common system for communications and power; however, significant architecture differences between Apollo and Artemis exist. Power: The RTG will not be available for early Artemis missions nor likely follow-on Lunar Exploration Transportation Services (LETS) missions [8]. Thus, ArLSEP power must be supplied by solar arrays with sufficient battery capability to “keep alive” necessary electronics during any lunar surface eclipse period. Communication: The Artemis program is developing a series of communications satellites for lunar orbit to provide surface transmission of data and voice to Earth. Called “LunaNET”, this network is component useful for ArLSEP since south polar locations may not always have direct “line-of-sight” to Earth [9]. 3. Concept of Operations (ConOps) The general ConOps for ArLSEP is to deliver the package to lunar surface before the crew arrives, and then have the crew deploy the package after some period of time. This requires coordinated design (for power systems) and launch window (for schedule) on both the cargo and crew missions. Once the ArLSEP is deployed, it will operate autonomously for a number of years. It should be designed to be EVA compatible for crew maintenance and upgrade. 4. Notional Design (for discussion purpose only) The landing site near the South Pole is expected to have no eclipse cycle exceeding 5 days, so the “keep alive” power is 144 hours (6 days to include margin). A 12v ArLSEP will use rechargeable LiFePO4 cells, which are common in the Electric Vehicle (EV) industry. With a current of 5 amps and a 125 watt system, the mass is about 90kg. The comm. system and structure adds another 10kg, thus the “Central Station” is approximately 100kg. The solar power is collected on four arrays (each 2m above the surface), and the entire ArLSEP is designed to stow in a 2m x 1m x 1m volume. The experiment and instrument design will vary for each installation and add mass to the total (although they are expected to fit within the 2m3 volume). Seismic wave generation will likely not be provided with mortars, thus an electric “thumper” will be required. Active instruments such as imaging systems and sensing instruments will benefit from the additional power and communication capability provided by ArLSEP. Passive systems such as retroreflectors, witness plates, and cosmic dust collectors can be added to either the landing vehicle and/or the ArLSEP. With repeated HLS missions to the same human site, the ArLSEP can be expanded and easily maintained for long duration science collection on the lunar surface.

ALSEP↗
DOE OSTI2019

Federal Emergency Management Agency Mobile Housing Unit Running Gear Testing (Final Report)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) stages manufactured housing units (MHUs) at key locations to be used during disasters when other housing accommodations cannot be arranged for individuals or families. Due to the unpredictability of natural disasters and the limitations of the manufactured housing industry to produce large numbers of MHUs in very short periods of time, it is necessary for FEMA to store a large number of units for many months or years. With these long storage periods come degradation issues with frames, tires, bearing, and braking systems. These types of issues are also of interest to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) because regulated carriers normally transport these units and 49 CFR 393.75 Tires specifies tire loading restrictions for manufactured homes. To compare the running gear (tires, brakes, drums, bearings, axles, springs, and spring mounting hardware) currently specified in the 2014 Rugged Based Performance Requirements (RBPR) and the newly recommended running gear specified in the upcoming revision to the RBPR, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) outlined a Longevity Test Plan, which focused on the assessment of component longevity (failure rates by component type). The Test Plan also studied the forces imparted to the MHU from the running gear from interaction with the roadway for both the running gear in the 2014 RBPR and the running gear specified in the upcoming RBPR revision. Since the assessment of component longevity and failures are also issues of concern for FMCSA, both agencies collaborated to support the research presented in this report. The tests and data collection were conducted at the Navistar Proving Grounds (NPG) in New Carlisle (near South Bend), Indiana, during the May-November 2018 period. Four alternatives for the suspension system of a typical three-bedroom MHU were considered in this test. Alternative 0 was the MHU that was selected from the FEMA staging area in Selma, Alabama. Empirical data had shown that, on average, this alternative experiences one tire failure every 150 miles (or 0.0067 tire failures per mile traveled). Before testing, Alternative 0 was equipped with similar running gear hardware, although in new condition and installed following the manufacturer’s specifications. This became the Baseline Unit, or Alternative 1. Another unit, also selected from the FEMA staging area in Selma, Alabama, was equipped with better axles (i.e., axles that were rated for 7,000lbs as opposed to 6,000lbs for the Baseline Unit) and better tires. This became the Upgrade Unit, or Alternative 2. At the end of the Longevity Test, the Upgrade Unit was mounted with radial tires. This became Alternative 3.Alternative 1 (Baseline Unit) had, on average, one tire failure every 251 miles (or 0.0040 tire failures per mile traveled). So, by simply following the correct manufacturer’s specifications for the assembly of the transportation system, a reduction of 41% in the per mile tire failure was achieved. In the same test, Alternative 2 (Upgrade Unit) showed, on average, one tire failure every 728 miles traveled (or 0.0014 tire failure s per mile traveled). When the Upgrade Unit was mounted with radial tires in the last part of the test, no tire failures were observed for the 2,400 miles tested. That is, in the case of the radial tires (Alternative 3) the tire failure was less than one per 2,400 miles traveled (or less than 0.0004 tire failures per mile traveled). The data collected for the Longevity Test showed that the maximum accelerations were registered in all cases at the center of the MHU in the vertical direction. The overall maximum was registered by the Baseline Unit, Alternative 1. If that value is normalized to 100%, then the Upgrade Unit (Alternative 2) showed, on average, 81% at the same location, and Alternative 3 (radial-tire test) 59%. That is, the upgraded transportation system showed a reduction of 19% and 41% in the vertical accelerations transmitted to MHU at its center when regular and radial tires, respectively, were used. As part of the Test Protocol, NPG conducted a visual inspection of the MHUs and transportation system at the end of each test day. ORNL reviewed all the inspection reports in an attempt to determine if there was any difference in the damage that the Baseline and Upgrade MHUs showed during the test. The Upgrade Unit always showed lower accelerations transmitted to the MHU than the Baseline Unit. In most cases, these differences were statistically significant. The FEMA inspection report, conducted by a FEMA certified inspector at the end of the tests, included a shorter list of damaged items for the Baseline Unit than for the Upgrade Unit, although similar type of damages was described for both units. This may be an indication that, although lower than those of the Baseline Unit, the accelerations transmitted by the Upgrade Unit were above the threshold at which MHU elements start to fail.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2012

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Innovating the next generation of commercial smart building software

Nearly 30% of commercial building energy use is wasted due to equipment faults and HVAC controls problems. The result is increased emissions, compromised comfort and productivity, and less reliable coordination of building power needs with a clean grid. The energy impact alone represents $17 billion in potential savings. Today’s smart building software provides a robust solution to address these operational deficiencies. Energy management and information systems (EMIS) are saving up to 9% on average, with two-year paybacks. They are being incorporated into energy management processes, commissioning services, and utility programs. As effective as they are, two barriers prevent even deeper benefits; limited personnel to fix problems once they are identified, and the expense and time to manually implement changes in control systems. In partnership with the research community, the EMIS industry is developing new capabilities to overcome these barriers. Moving beyond siloed products for either fault detection and diagnostics, or optimal control, these new capabilities empower users to not only automatically identify faults, but also to push corrective action, and control improvements to their buildings. In this paper, several areas for enhancements are documented: ‘one-time’ correction of faults such as setpoints, schedules, and economizer lockouts; short-term active testing for automated proportional integral derivative (PID) loop tuning and functional testing; and continuous supervisory control for demand flexibility and year-round efficiency. Results are presented from a pair of partner implementations out of a dozen providers integrating these enhancements into their products, including field tests from across the country, and insights into operator acceptance and integration into operations and maintenance practices.

Casillas, Armando↗