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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Dynamic Communication Resource Negotiations

Today's advanced network management systems can automate many aspects of the tactical networking operations within a military domain. However, automation of joint and coalition tactical networking across multiple domains remains challenging. Due to potentially conflicting goals and priorities, human agreement is often required before implementation into the network operations. This is further complicated by incompatible network management systems and security policies, rendering it difficult to implement automatic network management, thus requiring manual human intervention to the communication protocols used at various network routers and endpoints. This process of manual human intervention is tedious, error-prone, and slow. In order to facilitate a better solution, we are pursuing a technology which makes network management automated, reliable, and fast. Automating the negotiation of the common network communication parameters between different parties is the subject of this paper. We present the technology that enables inter-force dynamic communication resource negotiations to enable ad-hoc inter-operation in the field between force domains, without pre-planning. It also will enable a dynamic response to changing conditions within the area of operations. Our solution enables the rapid blending of intra-domain policies so that the forces involved are able to inter-operate effectively without overwhelming each other's networks with in-appropriate or un-warranted traffic. It will evaluate the policy rules and configuration data for each of the domains, then generate a compatible inter-domain policy and configuration that will update the gateway systems between the two domains.

policy negotiation↗
DOE OSTI2026

Assessing Energy Infrastructure Devices for Vulnerabilities

Industrial control systems prove to be vital to the health and security of the nation in our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure includes the most foundational systems to support modern civilization which includes water and wastewater systems, communications, and the electricity we use to name a few sectors. However, these devices' overall composition remains largely unknown and are untested from a cyber security perspective. As part of the Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems (CyTRICS) program, I analyzed one such energy infrastructure device to better understand how it functions, what hardware and software components are present within it, and assess it for security vulnerabilities. To achieve this, I reverse engineered binary files using Ghidra to understand system functionality and learned more about how to collaborate with other researchers on a shared Ghidra project. I learned more about how web sockets function and how to interact with them through Python to test if they are secure or not. This work led me to assess possible vulnerabilities in this device and provide a better understanding of its composition and function, which are essential to INL's mission of securing our nation's energy infrastructure.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Medical System Requirements Development for Lunar Operations

The major health hazards of spaceflight include higher levels of damaging radiation, altered gravity, extended periods of isolation and confinement, a closed and potentially hostile living environment, and the stress associated with being a long distance from Earth. As we increase the duration of lunar stays with foreseeable communication latencies and disruptions, there will be a progressive need for crew to maintain their own health and independently respond to critical medical events. The Exploration Medical Capability element of the NASA Human Research Program is developing a set of Medical System requirements for lunar transit and surface operations. These requirements specify the capabilities, processes and procedures of a habitat Medical System needed for a range of conditions known to occur during spaceflight. Requirement text is written so as not to constrain innovative design solutions necessary for a resilient system. The requirement set includes attributes and functions the Medical System imposes on eight additional habitat systems. A key property of the Medical System is the provision of medical knowledge that will be stored, updated, analyzed, and secured within a Habitat Data System. A Task Performance Support System will aid in medical data acquisition and interpretation, crew training, medical condition prevention, diagnosis and treatment, provide interactive procedures, and track medical inventory. A Wellness System will focus on the provision of countermeasures to prevent, mitigate or treat adverse physical and behavioral health effects while the Medical System recommends adjustments to these countermeasures to maintain crew health. An Environmental Monitoring System will share out-of-bounds readings of air and water quality, acoustics, and radiation exposure levels with the Medical System to help identify issues before they affect crew health and performance. A Communications System will provide secured and private consultations between crew and the ground medical team and their loved ones on Earth. The Medical System also imposes requirements on a Research & Testbed System, fostering advanced medical science such as human research. A Waste Management System provides biohazard waste containment and waste disposal options (recycle and reuse). An Extravehicular Activity System supports crew health during lunar surface activities. And finally, a Maintenance Support System ensures that medical equipment is performing as expected. These requirements are being specifically developed for lunar surface operations but could help to identify Medical System requirements for any space habitat (e.g., I-Hab, commercial endeavors, etc.).

technology↗
NASA NTRS2013

Spectrum for UAS Control and Non-Payload Communications

There is an increasing need to fly UAS in the NAS to perform missions of vital importance to National Security and Defense, Emergency Management, and Science as well as commercial applications (e.g. cargo transport). To enable integration of UAS into the National Airspace System, several critical technical barriers must be eliminated, including: Separation Assurance/Sense and Avoid - the uncertainty surrounding the ability to interoperate in ATC environments and maintain safe separation from other aircraft in the absence of an on-board pilot. Human Systems Integration - lack of standards and guidelines with respect to UAS display information as well as lack of Ground Control Station (GCS) design requirements to operate in the NAS. Certification - lack of airworthiness requirements and safety-related data specific to the full range of UAS, or for their avionics systems or other components. Communications - lack of standard, certifiable data links and aviation safety spectrum to operate such links for civil UAS control communications.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Needs for Remote Microreactor Operations

As the nuclear industry develops new advanced reactor technologies, many companies are embracing this advancement by pursuing the development of microreactors. The term microreactor generally refers to a nuclear reactor with an operating power of 20 MW(thermal) or less. The power range of microreactors makes them appealing for many use cases, such as powering remote communities, mining sites, and military bases. Most of the microreactor designs being pursued are expected to incorporate remote facility operations into the final product. However, no framework has yet been developed to determine what remote operations systems require for reliable, resilient, and secure operation of a microreactor. Here, this work identifies the research needs for challenges that are unique to remote operations and monitoring for microreactors, specifically regarding instrumentation and control, communication methods, regulatory requirements, and operational policies. The types of commands and sensor measurements that must be transmitted between the facilities, as well as methods for verifying the trustworthiness of these signals, are assessed. This work evaluates the security, reliability, and performance requirements that must be met when considering the selection of communication hardware and protocols for use in remote operations. Also, an assessment was performed to study how remote operations fit within current regulatory requirements and what may need to be updated in regulatory policy to allow for remote operation. Finally, the operational contingencies unique to remote operations that must be in place for responses to abnormal events are identified. This paper identifies the challenges and research opportunities within the areas of importance for the design of remote operation systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Secure State Estimation with Asynchronous Measurements for Coordinated Cyber Attack Detection in Active Distribution Systems

Coordinated cyber attacks tamper with measurement data to disrupt the situational awareness of active distribution systems. Various sensors report measurements asynchronously at different rates, which introduces challenges during state estimation. In addition, this forces cyber intruders to exert greater effort to compromise multiple communication channels and launch coordinated attacks. Therefore, multi-channel and asynchronous measurements could be harnessed to develop more secure cyber defense strategies. In this paper, a prediction-correction-based multi-rate observer is designed to exploit the value of asynchronous measurements for the detection of coordinated false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, a time-function-dependent prediction-correction strategy is proposed to adjust the sampling interval for each sensor’s measurement. Then, an observer is designed based on the trade-off between estimation error and the optimal period of the most recent sampling instant, with the convergence of estimation error with the maximum permitted sampling interval. Moreover, the conditions for exponential stability are developed using the Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional technique. Next, a coordinated FDI attack detection strategy is developed based on the dual nonlinear minimization problem. The proposed attack detection and secure state estimation strategies are tested on the IEEE 13-node system. Simulation results show that these schemes are effective in enhancing attack detection based on asynchronous measurements or compromised data.

asynchronous measurements↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1994

SLR 2000

SLR 2000 is a concept for a totally automated subcentimeter SLR system presently being studied at GSFC. If funding permits, a prototype would be installed and tested at the Goddard Geophysical and Astronomical Observatory (GCAO) in FY98 and a small number of automated stations would be fielded by the year 2000. Unlike present systems, the "SLR 2000" system is being designed to: 1) operate autonomously without the need for onsite operators; 2) present no hazards (i.e., optical, electrical, and/or chemical) to personnel in the vicinity or to overflying aircraft; and 3) have a mean time between failures (MTBF) of at least three months. It is assumed that the systems are located at "friendly" sites where some level of security is provided and where certain low level service functions (e.g. commercial power, communications, heat pump service cleaning, etc.) are available or can be contracted for locally on an as-needed basis. The main system consists of two parts - an optical head and electronics rack. The optical head contains the laser transmitter and power supply, transmit/receive switch, optical telescope, tracking angle sensor (intensified CCD camera), detector and power supply, two angular encoders, azimuth and elevation motors, and a protective dome. The optical head mounts directly to the top of a concrete pier which contains the geodetic monument and forms part of the environmental housing for the hardware and servicing personnel. It is equipped with electronic levels for leveling the mount and monitoring its stability.

Degnan, John J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NAND Flash Qualification Guideline

Better performing Forward Error Correction on the forward link along with adequate power in the data open an uplink operations trade space that enable missions to: Command to greater distances in deep space (increased uplink margin). Increase the size of the payload data (latency may be a factor). Provides space for the security header/trailer of the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol. Note: These higher rates could be used for relief of emergency communication margins/rates and not limited to improving top-end rate performance. A higher performance uplink could also reduce the requirements on flight emergency antenna size and/or the performance required from ground stations. Use of a selective repeat ARQ protocol may increase the uplink design requirements but the resultant development is deemed acceptable, due the factor of 4 to 8 potential increase in uplink data rate.

Floating Gate Memory↗
NASA NTRS2012

Replacing the CCSDS Telecommand Protocol with Next Generation Uplink

Better performing Forward Error Correction on the forward link along with adequate power in the data open an uplink operations trade space that enable missions to: Command to greater distances in deep space (increased uplink margin) Increase the size of the payload data (latency may be a factor) Provides space for the security header/trailer of the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol Note: These higher rates could be used for relief of emergency communication margins/rates and not limited to improving top-end rate performance. A higher performance uplink could also reduce the requirements on flight emergency antenna size and/or the performance required from ground stations. Use of a selective repeat ARQ protocol may increase the uplink design requirements but the resultant development is deemed acceptable, due the factor of 4 to 8 potential increase in uplink data rate.

Low Density Parity Check (LDPC)↗
NASA NTRS1995

The Next Generation of Space Telemetry and Telecommand Standards

New standards for space/ground communications protocols are suggested for the following areas: a) file transfer based on the Internet, b) transport based on the Internet TCP/UDP, c) security derived from the ISO NLSP, a new space network, and a new space data link.

spacecraft communications telemetry standards tele↗
NASA NTRS1991

Sample holder support for microscopes

A sample filter holder is disclosed for use with a microscope for holding the filter in a planar condition on the stage of the microscope so that automatic focusing of the microscope can be performed on particle samples dispersed on the filter. The holder includes a base having a well that communicates with an inlet port which is connected to a suction pump. A screen assembly is positioned within the well. The screen assembly includes a disk having a screen positioned on its top surface and secured to the disk at the peripheral edge of the screen. Small bores allow the outer surface of the screen to communicate with the well. The filter is placed on the screen and is held in a flat disposition by the suction forces.

Berry, Anthony↗
DOE OSTI2025

Implementation and Demonstration of the Digital Twin Certification System Remote Operations Framework

Microreactors are one promising advanced-reactor concept being pursued by the nuclear industry. They are distinguished by a relatively low power output of 20 MWth or less. These microreactors are intended for deployment in applications where conventional small-capacity power solutions, such as diesel generators, are either economically unfeasible or logistically challenging. Such applications include providing electric power and/or heat for remote communities, mining sites, defense installations, and humanitarian and disaster-relief missions. An important feature for the successful deployment of microreactors is their capability to be operated remotely. This capability can significantly reduce staffing costs by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be physically present at each reactor site. Instead, operators can be centralized in a single remote operations center placed in an economically advantageous location, thereby optimizing resources by consolidating expertise and enhancing operational efficiency. However, the implementation of a remote operation system for nuclear reactors raises new concerns regarding the security, reliability, and resilience of such a system. One way in which remote operations can be supported in a manner that maintains system security, reliability, and resilience is through the use of digital twins in a novel framework designed to verify and validate sensor data and commands communicated between the remote operations center and reactor. This framework, known as the Digital Twin Certification System (DTCS), has previously been proposed as an operations architecture that can bring security and resiliency levels of remote nuclear-reactor operations to a level acceptable for commercial deployment. This paper moves the proposed DTCS architecture from concept to reality by presenting the implementation and testing of the system. The rationale and implementation of the DTCS using tools such as DeepLynx and Apache Airflow, is covered in-depth. This is followed by a demonstration of the DTCS by applying the implemented system architecture to the Single Primary Heat Extraction and Removal Emulator, a small-scale non-nuclear test bed that emulates thermal behavior of a microreactor. The demonstration includes both normal and abnormal operating scenarios to highlight how the DTCS can increase the security, reliability, and resilience of a remote operations system.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Implementation and Demonstration of the Digital Twin Certification System Remote Operations Framework

Microreactors are one promising advanced-reactor concept being pursued by the nuclear industry. They are distinguished by a relatively low power output of 20 MWth or less. These microreactors are intended for deployment in applications where conventional small-capacity power solutions, such as diesel generators, are either economically unfeasible or logistically challenging. Such applications include providing electric power and/or heat for remote communities, mining sites, defense installations, and humanitarian and disaster-relief missions. An important feature for the successful deployment of microreactors is their capability to be operated remotely. This capability can significantly reduce staffing costs by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be physically present at each reactor site. Instead, operators can be centralized in a single remote operations center placed in an economically advantageous location, thereby optimizing resources by consolidating expertise and enhancing operational efficiency. However, the implementation of a remote operation system for nuclear reactors raises new concerns regarding the security, reliability, and resilience of such a system. One way in which remote operations can be supported in a manner that maintains system security, reliability, and resilience is through the use of digital twins in a novel framework designed to verify and validate sensor data and commands communicated between the remote operations center and reactor. This framework, known as the Digital Twin Certification System (DTCS), has previously been proposed as an operations architecture that can bring security and resiliency levels of remote nuclear-reactor operations to a level acceptable for commercial deployment. This paper moves the proposed DTCS architecture from concept to reality by presenting the implementation and testing of the system. The rationale and implementation of the DTCS using tools such as DeepLynx and Apache Airflow, is covered in-depth. This is followed by a demonstration of the DTCS by applying the implemented system architecture to the Single Primary Heat Extraction and Removal Emulator, a small-scale non-nuclear test bed that emulates thermal behavior of a microreactor. The demonstration includes both normal and abnormal operating scenarios to highlight how the DTCS can increase the security, reliability, and resilience of a remote operations system.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Network Security Challenges and Countermeasures for Software-Defined Smart Grids: A Survey

The rise of grid modernization has been prompted by the escalating demand for power, the deteriorating state of infrastructure, and the growing concern regarding the reliability of electric utilities. The smart grid encompasses recent advancements in electronics, technology, telecommunications, and computer capabilities. Smart grid telecommunication frameworks provide bidirectional communication to facilitate grid operations. Software-defined networking (SDN) is a proposed approach for monitoring and regulating telecommunication networks, which allows for enhanced visibility, control, and security in smart grid systems. Nevertheless, the integration of telecommunications infrastructure exposes smart grid networks to potential cyberattacks. Unauthorized individuals may exploit unauthorized access to intercept communications, introduce fabricated data into system measurements, overwhelm communication channels with false data packets, or attack centralized controllers to disable network control. An ongoing, thorough examination of cyber attacks and protection strategies for smart grid networks is essential due to the ever-changing nature of these threats. Previous surveys on smart grid security lack modern methodologies and, to the best of our knowledge, most, if not all, focus on only one sort of attack or protection. This survey examines the most recent security techniques, simultaneous multi-pronged cyber attacks, and defense utilities in order to address the challenges of future SDN smart grid research. The objective is to identify future research requirements, describe the existing security challenges, and highlight emerging threats and their potential impact on the deployment of software-defined smart grid (SD-SG).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS1982

Communications, tracking, and docking on the Space Station

Many of the communications, tracking, and docking functions on a large manned orbiting Space Station - one that is modular and made of metal - will have to be performed by optical systems out of necessity. This paper discusses four practical approaches to accomplishing Space Station functions using optical communications technology. It also provides the results of preliminary experiments involved in the design of particular systems. Major operational factors considered in each system design include: (a) electromagnetic interference problems, (b) data bandwidth requirements, (c) zero-gravity operations, (d) free-space operations, (e) data security, and (f) modular expansion of the Space Station structure. The technologies discussed are the following: (a) local infrared communications, (b) optical tracking and docking techniques, (c) long distance free space optical communications, and (d) local area optical networks.

Erwin, H. O.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Weather Information Communications (WINCOMM) Project: Dissemination of Weather Information for the Reduction of Aviation Weather-Related Accident Causal Factors

Weather Information Communications (WINCOMM) is part of the Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) Project, which is part of the NASA's Aviation Safety and Security Program. The goals of WINCOMM are to facilitate the exchange of tactical and strategic weather information between air and ground. This viewgraph presentation provides information on data link decision factors, architectures, validation goals. WINCOMM is capable of providing en-route communication air-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-air, even on international or intercontinental flights. The presentation also includes information on the capacity, cost, and development of data links.

Jarrell, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗