Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “security operations”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14

Transmission and Distribution Real-Time Analysis Software for Monitoring and Control: Design and Simulation Testing

The US electric grid is facing operational, stability, and security challenges. Transmission system operators need some measure of visibility into distribution system renewable generation. Distribution system generation needs to support transmission system voltage. The grid is experiencing an expansion in measurement systems. How to take full advantage of this expansion and defend against attacks, both cyber and physical, poses additional challenges. This paper introduces software designed to meet these challenges. At the center of the software is an Integrated System Model (ISM) that spans from transmission to secondary distribution. The ISM is employed in real-time abnormality detection, voltage stability forecasting, and multi-mode control. The software architecture along with selected analysis modules is presented. Testing results are presented for: 1—attacks on utility infrastructure; 2—energy savings from optimal control; 3—distribution system control response during a low voltage transmission system event; 4—cyber-attacks on PV inverters, where physical inverters are used in hardware-in-the-simulation-loop studies. Contributions of this work include real-time analysis that spans from three-phase transmission through secondary distribution; an approach for detecting abnormalities that employs measurements from three independent measurement systems; and a multi-mode distribution system control that responds to cyber-attacks, physical attacks, equipment failures, and transmission system needs.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Online Condition Monitoring to Enable Extended Operation of Nuclear Power Plants

Safe, secure, and economic operation of nuclear power plants will remain of strategic significance. New and improved monitoring will likely have increased significance in the post-Fukushima world. Prior to Fukushima, many activities were already underway globally to facilitate operation of nuclear power plants beyond their initial licensing periods. Decisions to shut down a nuclear power plant are mostly driven by economic considerations. Online condition monitoring is a means to improve both the safety and economics of extending the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants, enabling adoption of proactive aging management. With regard to active components (e.g., pumps, valves, motors, etc.), significant experience in other industries has been leveraged to build the science base to support adoption for online condition-based maintenance and proactive aging management in the nuclear industry. Many of the research needs are associated with enabling proactive management of aging in passive components (e.g., pipes, vessels, cables, containment structures, etc.). This paper provides an overview of online condition monitoring for the nuclear power industry with an emphasis on passive components. Following the overview, several technology/knowledge gaps are identified, which require addressing to facilitate widespread online condition monitoring of passive components.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Volatile Memory Extraction- Based Approach for Level 0-1 CPS Forensics

Most security analyzers operate on system state that is far removed from end-point components in cyber-physical systems (CPS) identified as level 0-1 in the Purdue Architecture Reference Architecture (PERA) [1]. For example, many operate on system logs and other data dumps to disks. Tremendous value that can be gained in cyber security forensics if low level details such as dynamic changes to volatile memory can be extracted and provided to more sophisticated analysis tools. However, obtaining detailed and dynamic system state at the level of volatile memory is extremely challenging [2]. Here, we attempt to apply IT memory forensic mechanisms to CPS end-point devices and statistically evaluate them. Our focus is to extract volatile and dynamically changing internal information form CPS 0-1 level devices, and design preliminary schemes to exploit that extracted information. This new capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. As a case study for our ongoing research, we apply the proposed methodology to Modicon PLC using Modbus protocol. We extract the memory layout and subject the device to read operations at the most critical regions of memory. Similarly, write operations are initiated to carefully determine memory locations (for example, bytes that hold the firmware version number). This capability of generating a sequence of volatile memory snapshots for offline, detailed and sophisticated analysis opens a new class of cyber security schemes for CPS forensic analysis. Also, the ability to dynamically make controlled modifications to specific memory locations opens the potential for new mechanisms such as taint analysis and watermarking.

Asmar Awad, Rima↗

Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance Indicators and Stakeholder Mission

Good security metrics are required to make good decisions about how to design security countermeasures, to choose between alternative security architectures, and to improve security during operations. Therefore, in essence, measurement can be viewed as a decision aid. The lack of sound practical security metrics is severely hampering progress in the development of secure systems. The Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) offers the following advantages over traditional measurement systems: (1) CSES reflects the variances that exist amongst different stakeholders of the same system. Different stakeholders will typically attach different stakes to the same requirement or service (e.g., a service may be provided by an information technology system or process control system, etc.). (2) For a given stakeholder, CSES reflects the variance that may exist among the stakes she/he attaches to meeting each requirement. The same stakeholder may attach different stakes to satisfying different requirements within the overall system specification. (3) For a given compound specification (e.g., combination(s) of commercial off the shelf software and/or hardware), CSES reflects the variance that may exist amongst the levels of verification and validation (i.e., certification) performed on components of the specification. The certification activity may produce higher levels of assurance across different components of the specification than others. Consequently, this paper introduces the basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs and the basic structural and mathematical underpinnings.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure, Autonomous, Intelligent Controller for Integrating Distributed Emergency Response Satellite Operations

This report describes a Secure, Autonomous, and Intelligent Controller for Integrating Distributed Emergency Response Satellite Operations. It includes a description of current improvements to existing Virtual Mission Operations Center technology being used by US Department of Defense and originally developed under NASA funding. The report also highlights a technology demonstration performed in partnership with the United States Geological Service for Earth Resources Observation and Science using DigitalGlobe(Registered TradeMark) satellites to obtain space-based sensor data.

Ivancic, William D.↗

A near infra-red video system as a protective diagnostic for electron cyclotron resonance heating operation in the Wendelstein 7-X stellarator

The Wendelstein 7-X stellarator is a large nuclear fusion device based at Max-Planck-Institut für Plasmaphysik in Greifswald in Germany. The main plasma heating system for steady state operation in W7-X is electron cyclotron resonance heating (ECRH). During operation, part of plama facing components will be directly heated by the non-absorbed power of 1 MW rf beams of ECRH. In order to avoid damages of such components made of graphite tiles during the first operational phase, a near infra-red video system has been developed as a protective diagnostic for safe and secure ECRH operation. Both the mechanical design housing the camera and the optical system are very flexible and respect the requirements of steady state operation. The full system including data acquisition and control system has been successfully tested in the vacuum vessel, including on-line visualization and data storage of the four cameras equipping the ECRH equatorial launchers of W7-X.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Underground nuclear energy complexes - technical and economic advantages

Underground nuclear power plant parks have been projected to be economically feasible compared to above ground instalIations. This paper includes a thorough cost analysis of the savings, compared to above ground facilities, resulting from in-place entombment (decommissioning) of facilities at the end of their life. reduced costs of security for the lifetime of the various facilities in the underground park. reduced transportation costs. and reduced costs in the operation of the waste storage complex (also underground). compared to the fair share of the costs of operating a national waste repository.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Secure environment establishment for FPGA-based safety-critical systems: quality management system context - 159

The paper discusses importance of secure development and operational environment establishment process, its particular stages, including security-oriented analysis and assessment of safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. Two particular aspects are covered - security assessment and security assurance related to processes established by Quality Management System (QMS). One of the underlying ideas for the security assessment approach is in performance of gap analysis. Such analysis considers influence of all different factors within I and C system development process, and further application of Intrusion Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (IMECA) technique. It makes the approach applicable to various safety-critical systems, considering underlying technologies (for example, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Nowadays FPGA technology is often used in wide spectrum of hardware devices - from personal devices to complex I and C systems for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The problem of cyber security assessment and assurance for FPGA technology in general and its application in safety-critical I and C systems in particular is not completely solved due to several reasons that cover regulations, QMS processes, implementation of development and verification activities, etc. The paper overviews existing regulations, which cover various aspects of NPP I and C systems development and operation, FPGA technology implementation, and secure development and operational environment establishment and assurance. The paper also emphasizes that complex approach should be used to identify and mitigate all specific vulnerabilities thorough the whole life cycle on the basis on Intrusion Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis technique. The paper also proposes approach to the development of safety-critical I and C systems in the scope of cyber security assurance process at developer site. Secure development environment is described as a key factor during the development process and the paper also discusses establishment and maintenance of such environment as a part of company's Nuclear Quality Assurance's QMS. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Governance and Resilience: A Holistic Approach to Systems Security in Complex and Chaotic Environments

Here, a systems governance approach emphasizes a holistic perspective that identifies and navigates the interdependencies and conflicts between security and operational needs. Governance is defined as a collection of metasystems that provide the necessary constraints and processes to support, steer, adapt, transform, and sustain a system (Keating et al. 2022). Utilizing the Cynefin framework, which distinguishes between simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic environments (Snowden and Boone 2007), the article highlights the challenges faced by nuclear power plants in predatory contexts and the importance of integrating security objectives into governance frameworks. By incorporating security as a fundamental aspect of governance, the article underscores its significance for persistence, adaptation, and transformation in the face of uncertainty. Additionally, it introduces key heuristics of systems security, such as the importance of context, knowledge‐based decision‐making, and organization‐specific sociological factors (Williams and Caskey 2024). Ultimately, this work provides valuable insights into enhancing resilient operations in complex environments by reinforcing the connection between effective governance and security in systems engineering.

Caskey, Susan A. [Sandia National Laboratories (SN↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An Innovative Secure mmWave M2M Communication Network for Operating Drones

Analyze RF (Radio Frequency) coverage in the sky with the innovative use of mmWave phased arrays aimed towards the drone corridor to harness the power of 5G – multiplicative improvement in data throughput & reduction in latency, and support of massive M2M communications. Apply MA (Multiple Access) technology to increase the spectral efficiency by covering a swarm of drones with a single mmWave beam and associated radio resources. Design energy efficient low-bit quantization to form mmWave beams for drone operation. Use drones’ navigation capabilities to significantly improve security by e.g. evading attackers. Utilize intra-drone communication to improve reliability as well as security. Demonstrate the simulated recovery of a critical infrastructure such as a power grid that requires a black restart with mmWave modeling and experiments .

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Adopting Internet Standards for Orbital Use

After a year of testing and demonstrating a Cisco mobile access router intended for terrestrial use onboard the low-Earth-orbiting UK-DMC satellite as part of a larger merged ground/space IP-based internetwork, we reflect on and discuss the benefits and drawbacks of integration and standards reuse for small satellite missions. Benefits include ease of operation and the ability to leverage existing systems and infrastructure designed for general use, as well as reuse of existing, known, and well-understood security and operational models. Drawbacks include cases where integration work was needed to bridge the gaps in assumptions between different systems, and where performance considerations outweighed the benefits of reuse of pre-existing file transfer protocols. We find similarities with the terrestrial IP networks whose technologies we have adopted and also some significant differences in operational models and assumptions that must be considered.

Wood, Lloyd↗

Demonstration of a Novel Synchrophasor-based Situational Awareness System: Wide Area Power System Visualization, On-line Event Replay and Early Warning of Grid Problems

Since the large North Eastern power system blackout on August 14, 2003, U.S. electric utilities have spent lot of effort on preventing power system cascading outages. Two of the main causes of the August 14, 2003 blackout were inadequate situational awareness and inadequate operator training In addition to the enhancements of the infrastructure of the interconnected power systems, more research and development of advanced power system applications are required for improving the wide-area security monitoring, operation and planning in order to prevent large- scale cascading outages of interconnected power systems. It is critically important for improving the wide-area situation awareness of the operators or operational engineers and regional reliability coordinators of large interconnected systems. With the installation of large number of phasor measurement units (PMU) and the related communication infrastructure, it will be possible to improve the operators’ situation awareness and to quickly identify the sequence of events during a large system disturbance for the post-event analysis using the real-time or historical synchrophasor data. The purpose of this project was to develop and demonstrate a novel synchrophasor-based comprehensive situational awareness system for control centers of power transmission systems. The developed system named WASA (Wide Area Situation Awareness) is intended to improve situational awareness at control centers of the power system operators and regional reliability coordinators. It consists of following main software modules: • Wide-area visualizations of real-time frequency, voltage, and phase angle measurements and their contour displays for security monitoring. • Online detection and location of a major event (location, time, size, and type, such as generator or line outage). • Near-real-time event replay (in seconds) after a major event occurs. • Early warning of potential wide-area stability problems. The system has been deployed and demonstrated at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and ISO New England system using real-time synchrophasor data from openPDC. Apart from the software product, the outcome of this project consists of a set of technical reports and papers describing the mathematical foundations and computational approaches of different tools and modules, implementation issues and considerations, lessons learned, and the results of lidation processes.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

SSBRP User Operations Facility (UOF) Overview and Development Strategy

This paper will present the Space Station Biological Research Project (SSBRP) User Operations Facility (UOF) architecture and development strategy. A major element of the UOF at NASA Ames Research Center, the Communication and Data System (CDS) will be the primary focus of the discussions. CDS operational, telescience, security, and development objectives will be discussed along with CDS implementation strategy. The implementation strategy discussions will include: Object Oriented Analysis & Design, System & Software Prototyping, and Technology Utilization. A CDS design overview that includes: CDS Context Diagram, CDS Architecture, Object Models, Use Cases, and User Interfaces will also be presented. CDS development brings together "cutting edge" technologies and techniques such as: object oriented development, network security, multimedia networking, web-based data distribution, JAVA, and graphical user interfaces. Use of these "cutting edge" technologies and techniques translates directly to lower development and operations costs.

Picinich, Lou↗

Big data analytics in smart grids: state-of-the-art, challenges, opportunities, and future directions

Big data has a potential to unlock novel groundbreaking opportunities in the power grid sector that enhances a multitude of technical, social, and economic gains. The currently untapped potential of applying the science of big data for better planning and operation of the power grid is a very challenging task and needs significant efforts all-around. As power grid technologies evolve in conjunction with measurement and communication technologies, this results in unprecedented amount of heterogeneous big data sets from diverse sources. In particular, computational complexity, data security, and operational integration of big data into utility decision frameworks are the key challenges to transform the heterogeneous large dataset into actionable outcomes. Moreover, due to the complex nature of power grids along with the need to balance power in real time, seamless integration of big data into utility operations is very critical. In this context, big data analytics combined with grid visualization can lead to better situational awareness and predictive decisions. This paper presents a comprehensive state-of-the-art review of big data analytics and its applications in power grids, and also identifies challenges and opportunities from utility, industry, and research perspectives. The paper analyzes research gaps and presents insights on future research directions to integrate big data analytics into electric utility decision framework. Detailed information for utilities looking to apply big data analytics and details insights on how utilities can enhance revenue streams and bring disruptive innovation in the industry are discussed. More importantly, general guidelines for utilities to make the right investment in the adoption of big data analytics by unveiling interdependencies among critical infrastructures and operations are also provided.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Cyber Security Primer for DER Vendors Aggregators and Grid Operators

This report provides an introduction to cyber security for distributed energy resources (DER) - such as photovoltaic (PV) inverters and energy storage systems (ESS). This material is motivated by the need to assist DER vendors, aggregators, grid operators, and broader PV industry with cyber security resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. The report outlines basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Example cyber security attacks, including eavesdropping, masquerading, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, and denial-of-service are also described. A survey of communication protocols and cyber security recommendations used by the DER and power system industry are included to elucidate the cyber security standards landscape. Lastly, a roadmap is presented to harden end-to-end communications for DER with research and industry engagement.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

'I’m here because I want to make a difference.’

If you're at Los Alamos National Laboratory and happen to encounter Matt Johnson, don't be surprised if this busy leader smiles and stops to ask you how he can help. That’s the essence of the type of manager—and person—he is. As the leader of the Pit Technologies division at the Lab, Matt oversees six groups that cover national security manufacturing, operations and professional support. Matt started his career at the Lab in 2002. His first assignments included work with confinement vessels used at firing sites such as Nevada National Security Site. Matt's deep knowledge of high-strength steel made him a perfect fit for the research and fabrication of these explosive-proof containers. Shortly after joining the Lab, Matt accepted the position as the Welding and Joining team leader supporting national security manufacturing, the hydrotest program and welding efforts across the NNSA complex. Over time, Matt made his way across many programs at the Laboratory.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗