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At least 271 records · Page 15

LightForce Photon-Pressure Collision Avoidance: Efficiency Assessment on an Entire Catalogue of Space Debris

The potential to perturb debris orbits using photon pressure from ground-based lasers has been confirmed by independent research teams. Two useful applications of this scheme are protecting space assets from impacts with debris and stabilizing the orbital debris environment, both relying on collision avoidance rather than de-orbiting debris. This paper presents the results of a new assessment method to analyze the efficiency of the concept for collision avoidance. Earlier research concluded that one ground based system consisting of a 10 kW class laser, directed by a 1.5 m telescope with adaptive optics, can prevent a significant fraction of debris-debris collisions in low Earth orbit. That research used in-track displacement to measure efficiency and restricted itself to an analysis of a limited number of objects. As orbit prediction error is dependent on debris object properties, a static displacement threshold should be complemented with another measure to assess the efficiency of the scheme. In this paper we present the results of an approach using probability of collision. Using a least-squares fitting method, we improve the quality of the original TLE catalogue in terms of state and co-state accuracy. We then calculate collision probabilities for all the objects in the catalogue. The conjunctions with the highest risk of collision are then engaged by a simulated network of laser ground stations. After those engagements, the perturbed orbits are used to re-assess the collision probability in a 20 minute window around the original conjunction. We then use different criteria to evaluate the utility of the laser-based collision avoidance scheme and assess the number of base-line ground stations needed to mitigate a significant number of high probability conjunctions. Finally, we also give an account how a laser ground station can be used for both orbit deflection and debris tracking.

laser↗

Advanced spacecraft tracking techniques using the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System /TDRSS/

The TDRSS will consist initially of two geosynchronous satellites and a common ground station at White Sands, New Mexico. According to current schedules, operations are to begin in November 1980. The overall TDRSS will provide high and low bit-rate telemetry, commands, and satellite-to-satellite tracking services. Each Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) will have four antenna systems for NASA use. The common ground station at White Sands will have three 18-meter K-band antennas. The tracking equipment at the ground station is required to meet the following specifications: (1) 0.1-radian root-mean-square (rms) phase noise on nondestruct Doppler measurements; (2) 10-nanosecond rms range noise; (3) 50-nanosecond maximum systematic range error. Attention is given to two-way range and Doppler measurements, the bilateration tracking of TDRS, and an experiment using differenced one-way Doppler measurements.

Teles, J.↗

Space Optical Communications Using Laser Beams

A system for communicating between an object in space and a ground station, between objects in space, or between ground stations, includes a telecentric lens. Photodetectors positioned upon a focal plane of the telecentric lens detect an inbound light beam, received from a source, that has passed through the telecentric lens to the focal plane. Lasers positioned upon the focal plane transmit light beams from the focal plane through the telecentric lens to an area that includes the source of the inbound light beam. A processor detect signals from individual photodetectors corresponding to light detected, and selectively signals individual lasers that are close to those photodetectors, resulting in a returning beam that arrives close to the source, and which carries encoded data.

Goorjian, Peter M.↗

Rest architecture for link analysis tools portal

A web portal is under development to improve overall services provided by NASA networks that support near-­‐Earth missions. These networks are managed by Space Communication and Navigation (SCaN) Program of NASA and include the following: Deep Space Network (DSN), Space Network (SN), and Near-­‐Earth Network (NEN). DSN is a network of antennas located in three longitudinally separated sites and supports interplanetary spacecraft missions, radio science, and radar astronomy observations. SN consists of a number of geostationary Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) and associated ground stations. NEN consists of both NASA-­‐owned ground stations and those owned by international, commercial, and academic partners. This study investigates different web access techniques for mission users to use link analysis tools that aid in operating NASA networks. We developed a web portal prototype following principles of Representational state transfer (REST) architecture to leverage scalability, independent deployment of tools, and generic interfaces. In REST architectures, requests and responses between clients and servers are built around transferring representations of resources that can be addressed in memory. We demonstrate the feasibility of using REST architecture to facilitate web-­‐service transactions via web-­‐portal.

Lee, Carlyn-­‐Ann↗

The State of Cryptolib – The Open-Source Satellite Cryptography Library

What state would the world be in if all internet traffic was unencrypted? Imagine an alternate universe where you can plug a packet sniffing device into your home internet and capture the web traffic of the entire world. It seems obvious that this scenario is less than desirable. If we would not allow this for the internet, why would we allow this in the space domain? With the advent of open-source ground stations, commercial off the shelf hardware, and ground stations as a service, the barrier to entry for space communications is rapidly lowering. New players enter the space realm everydayevery day, and the presence of tools to allow apprentice evildoers the ability to exploit satellite communications is on the horizon. Not only are legacy missions at risk, but future missions are as well - particularly lower budget science missions with more stringent sciencesize, weight, and power constraints. that may find it difficult to utilize hardware-based encryption solutions. In terms of Civilian Aerospace, NASA Standard 1006 generally directs that missions "shall protect the command stack with encryption that meets or exceeds Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140". Fortunately, the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has published an international standard on Space Data Link Security. The combination of these two forces has resulted in CryptoLib - an open-source, C-based, encryption library that aims to be CCSDS SDLS compliant. CryptoLib is designed to support smaller missions on a tight budget that may be subject to the more stringent command link encryption requirements. Additionally, CryptoLib serves as an underpinning in JPL's Key Management & Cryptography (KMC) suite and is also designed to function as a 'drop-in' for smaller missions. CryptoLib is in active development and currently provides Telecommand (TC), Telemetry (TM), and Advanced Orbiting Systems (AOS) encryption and decryption capabilities with a variety of encryption and authentication schemes. This presentation will report the latest features, current status, and future plans for CryptoLib.

open-source encryption↗

The State of CryptoLib – The Open-Source Satellite Cryptography Library

What state would the world be in if all internet traffic was unencrypted? Imagine an alternate universe where you can plug a packet sniffing device into your home internet and capture the web traffic of the entire world. It seems obvious that this scenario is less than desirable. If we would not allow this for the internet, why would we allow this in the space domain? With the advent of open-source ground stations, commercial off the shelf hardware, and ground stations as a service, the barrier to entry for space communications is rapidly lowering. New players enter the space realm everydayevery day, and the presence of tools to allow apprentice evildoers the ability to exploit satellite communications is on the horizon. Not only are legacy missions at risk, but future missions are as well - particularly lower budget science missions with more stringent sciencesize, weight, and power constraints. that may find it difficult to utilize hardware-based encryption solutions. In terms of Civilian Aerospace, NASA Standard 1006 generally directs that missions "shall protect the command stack with encryption that meets or exceeds Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140". Fortunately, the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has published an international standard on Space Data Link Security. The combination of these two forces has resulted in CryptoLib - an open-source, C-based, encryption library that aims to be CCSDS SDLS compliant. CryptoLib is designed to support smaller missions on a tight budget that may be subject to the more stringent command link encryption requirements. Additionally, CryptoLib serves as an underpinning in JPL's Key Management & Cryptography (KMC) suite and is also designed to function as a 'drop-in' for smaller missions. CryptoLib is in active development and currently provides Telecommand (TC), Telemetry (TM), and Advanced Orbiting Systems (AOS) encryption and decryption capabilities with a variety of encryption and authentication schemes. This presentation will report the latest features, current status, and future plans for CryptoLib.

open-source encryption↗

Cubesat system

Small cubesat systems may be available for a lower cost, have a higher reliability, and be much simpler to use than conventional cubesats. A complete turnkey system solution may be provided, including the ground station and remote field units. The satellite, ground station, and field unit may be provided separately as kits that are ready to go out-of-the-box as soon as they arrive. This enables universities, researchers, and hobbyists to obtain and deploy their own functional satellites. Furthermore, theoretical designs and functionality may be rapidly prototyped and demonstrated, which allows for proof-of-concept without needing to build a larger, more expensive satellite system and hope that the new design or functionality works as intended.

Judd, Stephen↗

A Human-Autonomy Teaming Approach for a Flight-Following Task

Human involvement with increasingly autonomous systems must adjust to allow for a more dynamic relationship involving cooperation and teamwork. As part of an ongoing project to develop a framework for human autonomy teaming (HAT) in aviation, a study was conducted to evaluate proposed tenets of HAT. Participants performed a flight-following task at a ground station both with and without HAT features enabled. Overall, participants preferred the ground station with HAT features enabled over the station without the HAT features. Participants reported that the HAT displays and automation were preferred for keeping up with operationally important issues. Additionally, participants reported that the HAT displays and automation provided enough situation awareness to complete the task, reduced the necessary workload and were efficient. Overall, there was general agreement that HAT features supported teaming with the automation. These results will be used to refine and expand our proposed framework for human-autonomy teaming.

Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT)↗

Instrument Display Visual Angles for Conventional Aircraft and the MQ-9 Ground Control Station

Aircraft instrument panels should be designed such that primary displays are in optimal viewing location to minimize pilot perception and response time. Human Factors engineers define three zones (i.e. "cones") of visual location: 1) "Easy Eye Movement" (foveal vision); 2) "Maximum Eye Movement" (peripheral vision with saccades), and 3) "Head Movement" (head movement required). Instrument display visual angles were measured to determine how well conventional aircraft (T-34, T-38, F- 15B, F-16XL, F/A-18A, U-2D, ER-2, King Air, G-III, B-52H, DC-10, B747-SCA) and the MQ-9 ground control station (GCS) complied with these standards, and how they compared with each other. Methods: Selected instrument parameters included: attitude, pitch, bank, power, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, heading, turn rate, slip/skid, AOA, flight path, latitude, longitude, course, bearing, range and time. Vertical and horizontal visual angles for each component were measured from the pilot s eye position in each system. Results: The vertical visual angles of displays in conventional aircraft lay within the cone of "Easy Eye Movement" for all but three of the parameters measured, and almost all of the horizontal visual angles fell within this range. All conventional vertical and horizontal visual angles lay within the cone of "Maximum Eye Movement". However, most instrument vertical visual angles of the MQ-9 GCS lay outside the cone of "Easy Eye Movement", though all were within the cone of "Maximum Eye Movement". All the horizontal visual angles for the MQ-9 GCS were within the cone of "Easy Eye Movement". Discussion: Most instrument displays in conventional aircraft lay within the cone of "Easy Eye Movement", though mission-critical instruments sometimes displaced less important instruments outside this area. Many of the MQ-9 GCS systems lay outside this area. Specific training for MQ-9 pilots may be needed to avoid increased response time and potential error during flight.

Bendrick, Gregg A.↗

Instrument Display Visual Angles for Conventional Aircraft and the MQ-9 Ground Control Station

Aircraft instrument panels should be designed such that primary displays are in optimal viewing location to minimize pilot perception and response time. Human Factors engineers define three zones (i.e. cones ) of visual location: 1) "Easy Eye Movement" (foveal vision); 2) "Maximum Eye Movement" (peripheral vision with saccades), and 3) "Head Movement (head movement required). Instrument display visual angles were measured to determine how well conventional aircraft (T-34, T-38, F- 15B, F-16XL, F/A-18A, U-2D, ER-2, King Air, G-III, B-52H, DC-10, B747-SCA) and the MQ-9 ground control station (GCS) complied with these standards, and how they compared with each other. Selected instrument parameters included: attitude, pitch, bank, power, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, heading, turn rate, slip/skid, AOA, flight path, latitude, longitude, course, bearing, range and time. Vertical and horizontal visual angles for each component were measured from the pilot s eye position in each system. The vertical visual angles of displays in conventional aircraft lay within the cone of "Easy Eye Movement" for all but three of the parameters measured, and almost all of the horizontal visual angles fell within this range. All conventional vertical and horizontal visual angles lay within the cone of Maximum Eye Movement. However, most instrument vertical visual angles of the MQ-9 GCS lay outside the cone of Easy Eye Movement, though all were within the cone of Maximum Eye Movement. All the horizontal visual angles for the MQ-9 GCS were within the cone of "Easy Eye Movement". Most instrument displays in conventional aircraft lay within the cone of Easy Eye Movement, though mission-critical instruments sometimes displaced less important instruments outside this area. Many of the MQ-9 GCS systems lay outside this area. Specific training for MQ-9 pilots may be needed to avoid increased response time and potential error during flight. The learning objectives include: 1) Know three physiologic cones of eye/head movement; 2) Understand how instrument displays comply with these design principles in conventional aircraft and an uninhabited aerial vehicle system. Which of the following is NOT a recognized physiologic principle of instrument display design? Cone of Easy Eye Movement 2) Cone of Binocular Eye Movement 3) Cone of Maximum Eye Movement 4) Cone of Head Movement 5) None of the above. Answer: # 2) Cone of Binocular Eye Movement

Kamine, Tovy Haber↗

Tracking Data Certification for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter

This paper details the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) tracking data certification effort of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Space Communications Network (SCN) complement of tracking stations consisting of the NASA White Sands 1 antenna (WS1), and the commercial provider Universal Space Network (USN) antennas at South Point, Hawaii; Dongara Australia; Weilheim, Germany; and Kiruna, Sweden. Certification assessment required the cooperation and coordination of parties not under the control of either the LRO project or ground stations as uplinks on cooperating spacecraft were necessary. The LRO range-tracking requirement of 10m 1 sigma could be satisfactorily demonstrated using any typical spacecraft capable of range tracking. Though typical Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) or Geosynchronous Earth Orbiting (GEO) spacecraft may be adequate for range certification, their measurement dynamics and noise would be unacceptable for proper Doppler certification of 1-3mm/sec 1 sigma. As LRO will orbit the Moon, it was imperative that a suitable target spacecraft be utilized which can closely mimic the expected lunar orbital Doppler dynamics of +/-1.6km/sec and +/-1.5m/sq sec to +/-0.15m/sq sec, is in view of the ground stations, supports coherent S-Band Doppler tracking measurements, and can be modeled by the FDF. In order to meet the LRO metric tracking data specifications, the SCN ground stations employed previously uncertified numerically controlled tracking receivers. Initial certification testing revealed certain characteristics of the units that required resolution before being granted certification.

Morinelli, Patrick J.↗

Tracking and data relay satellite system configuration and tradeoff study. Volume 4: TDRS system operation and control and telecommunications service system, part 1

Major study areas treated in this volume are: 1) operations and control and 2) the telecommunication service system. The TDRS orbit selection, orbital deployment, ground station visibility, sequence of events from launch to final orbit position, and TDRS control center functions required for stationkeeping, repositioning, attitude control, and antenna pointing are briefly treated as part of the operations and control section. The last topic of this section concerns the operations required for efficiently providing the TDRSS user telecommunication services. The discussion treats functions of the GSFC control and data processing facility, ground station, and TDRS control center. The second major portion of this volume deals with the Telecommunication Service System (TSS) which consists of the ground station, TDRS communication equipment and the user transceiver. A summary of the requirements and objectives for the telecommunication services and a brief summary of the TSS capabilities is followed by communication system analysis, signal design, and equipment design. Finally, descriptions of the three TSS elements are presented.

Source record↗

Filter Tuning Using the Chi-Squared Statistic

The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) performs orbit determination (OD) for the Aqua and Aura satellites. Both satellites are located in low Earth orbit (LEO), and are part of what is considered the A-Train satellite constellation. Both spacecraft are currently in the science phase of their respective missions. The FDF has recently been tasked with delivering definitive covariance for each satellite.The main source of orbit determination used for these missions is the Orbit Determination Toolkit developed by Analytical Graphics Inc. (AGI). This software uses an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) to estimate the states of both spacecraft. The filter incorporates force modelling, ground station and space network measurements to determine spacecraft states. It also generates a covariance at each measurement. This covariance can be useful for evaluating the overall performance of the tracking data measurements and the filter itself. An accurate covariance is also useful for covariance propagation which is utilized in collision avoidance operations. It is also valuable when attempting to determine if the current orbital solution will meet mission requirements in the future.This paper examines the use of the Chi-square statistic as a means of evaluating filter performance. The Chi-square statistic is calculated to determine the realism of a covariance based on the prediction accuracy and the covariance values at a given point in time. Once calculated, it is the distribution of this statistic that provides insight on the accuracy of the covariance.For the EKF to correctly calculate the covariance, error models associated with tracking data measurements must be accurately tuned. Over estimating or under estimating these error values can have detrimental effects on the overall filter performance. The filter incorporates ground station measurements, which can be tuned based on the accuracy of the individual ground stations. It also includes measurements from the NASA space network (SN), which can be affected by the assumed accuracy of the TDRS satellite state at the time of the measurement.The force modelling in the EKF is also an important factor that affects the propagation accuracy and covariance sizing. The dominant force in the LEO orbit regime is the drag force caused by atmospheric drag. Accurate accounting of the drag force is especially important for the accuracy of the propagated state. The implementation of a box and wing model to improve drag estimation accuracy, and its overall effect on the covariance state is explored.The process of tuning the EKF for Aqua and Aura support is described, including examination of the measurement errors of available observation types (Doppler and range), and methods of dealing with potentially volatile atmospheric drag modeling. Predictive accuracy and the distribution of the Chi-square statistic, calculated based of the ODTK EKF solutions, are assessed versus accepted norms for the orbit regime.

Covariance Analysis↗

Space Station Freedom ground systems program - A survey

The key facilities identified to support Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) integrated operations and their SSFP roles are described in detail. The ground infrastructure, which must be able to support both assembly and long-term operations, will consist of ground facilities, support systems, and the associated planning and management procedures. During 1992 the SSFP is conducting a major program review of the ground infrastructure including the definition of all facility and support system functional capabilities, interfaces, and data-flow requirements. Operations functionality and interface verification tests are being identified, and operations readiness dates are being set.

Accola, A.↗

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗