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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing a Motion-Based System for Lunar Vehicle Handling Qualities Testing

— Motion and visual cue influences are critical in any simulator system, as they impact multiple aspects of the human’s neurovestibular and visual systems. Cues of real motion proceeds to the brain before cues of visual change. It is important therefore for simulator motion cues to exist and to match those realistically with those of the real vehicle to provide transferable training of the activity for operations. The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine (1989)[1] stated that motion platforms are the only simulation devices capable of fully stimulating the body motion sensors. They confirmed that motion platforms can impart accelerations to the whole body and therefore exercise the automatic motion feedback-loop that operators are used to. With both visual and motion cues handling the vehicle becomes more realistic. Strachan (2019)[1] confirms motion cueing from a well set-up motion platform has been found to be important especially in conditions such as night or reduced visibility where motion cues may be more relied upon. As of this writing, the only lunar rover motion simulator is housed at the General Motors (GM) Milford Proving Ground, which only simulates the motions of a traditional car. A NASA Test Team proposed to complete a motion-based simulation system for NASA’s Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) which resides at Johnson Space Center’s Systems Engineering Simulator facility. This activity integrated existing fixed base simulation capabilities with a newly procured six-degree of freedom motion base platform for the design, development, evaluation, and training associated with the LTV project. This would incorporate a South Pole Lunar virtual reality simulation using Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 5m/pixel high-resolution imagery and Unreal 5.2 Virtual Shadow Maps, combined with a virtual reality (VR) headset, integrated within a rover cockpit on a Mikrolar Motion Platform for evaluating human performance and vehicle handling qualities for concept roving vehicle designs. The motion-based system received its Human Rating Certification on March 2023. To begin testing the new facility, a preliminary handling qualities study was conducted. The objectives were to determine if there is a correlation amongst three handling quality methods of performance for a lunar vehicle and to understand the effects of a simulated 1/6-g loads and visuals with a motion platform on the operator while in a 1-g physical environment. The capability this system provides directly benefits the NASA’s Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility Program and NASA’s Flight Operations Directorate in evaluating the driving qualities of vehicle concepts, human performance related to the operating of a lunar surface vehicle, and assessment of suit related driving impacts. It would also provide direct operational benefit by providing a first-in class and unique simulation platform for the lunar astronaut training curriculum. The empirical knowledge of rover and human performance on this scale is paramount as there is currently no other lunar surface simulator with these capabilities. The result of this study ensures a broadly applicable method of testing for shirtsleeve, unpressurized and pressurized suited rover handling qualities.

Test Track↗
NASA NTRS1997

Wings: A New Paradigm in Human-Centered Design

Many aircraft accidents/incidents investigations cite crew error as a causal factor (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 1996). Human factors experts suggest that crew error has many underlying causes and should be the start of an accident investigation and not the end. One of those causes, the flight deck design, is correctable. If a flight deck design does not accommodate the human's unique abilities and deficits, crew error may simply be the manifestation of this mismatch. Pilots repeatedly report that they are "behind the aircraft" , i.e., they do not know what the automated aircraft is doing or how the aircraft is doing it until after the fact. Billings (1991) promotes the concept of "human-centered automation"; calling on designers to allocate appropriate control and information to the human. However, there is much ambiguity regarding what it mean's to be human-centered. What often are labeled as "human-centered designs" are actually designs where a human factors expert has been involved in the design process or designs where tests have shown that humans can operate them. While such designs may be excellent, they do not represent designs that are systematically produced according to some set of prescribed methods and procedures. This paper describes a design concept, called Wings, that offers a clearer definition for human-centered design. This new design concept is radically different from current design processes in that the design begins with the human and uses the human body as a metaphor for designing the aircraft. This is not because the human is the most important part of the aircraft (certainly the aircraft would be useless without lift and thrust), but because he is the least understood, the least programmable, and one of the more critical elements. The Wings design concept has three properties: a reversal in the design process, from aerodynamics-, structures-, and propulsion-centered to truly human-centered; a design metaphor that guides function allocation and control and display design; and a deliberate distinction between two fundamental functions of design, to complement and to interpret human performance. The complementary function extends the human's capabilities beyond his or her current limitations - this includes sensing, computation, memory, physical force, and human decision making styles and skills. The interpretive (or hermeneutic, Hollnagel 1991) function translates information, functionality, and commands between the human and the aircraft. The Wings design concept allows the human to remain aware of the aircraft through natural interpretation. It also affords great improvements in system performance by maximizing the human's natural abilities and complementing the human's skills in a natural way. This paper will discuss the Wings design concept by describing the reversal in the traditional design process, the function allocation strategy of Wings, and the functions of complementing and interpreting the human.

Schutte, Paul C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Planetary Suit Hip Bearing Model for Predicting Design vs. Performance

Designing a planetary suit is very complex and often requires difficult trade-offs between performance, cost, mass, and system complexity. In order to verifying that new suit designs meet requirements, full prototypes must eventually be built and tested with human subjects. Using computer models early in the design phase of new hardware development can be advantageous, allowing virtual prototyping to take place. Having easily modifiable models of the suit hard sections may reduce the time it takes to make changes to the hardware designs and then to understand their impact on suit and human performance. A virtual design environment gives designers the ability to think outside the box and exhaust design possibilities before building and testing physical prototypes with human subjects. Reductions in prototyping and testing may eventually reduce development costs. This study is an attempt to develop computer models of the hard components of the suit with known physical characteristics, supplemented with human subject performance data. Objectives: The primary objective was to develop an articulating solid model of the Mark III hip bearings to be used for evaluating suit design performance of the hip joint. Methods: Solid models of a planetary prototype (Mark III) suit s hip bearings and brief section were reverse-engineered from the prototype. The performance of the models was then compared by evaluating the mobility performance differences between the nominal hardware configuration and hardware modifications. This was accomplished by gathering data from specific suited tasks. Subjects performed maximum flexion and abduction tasks while in a nominal suit bearing configuration and in three off-nominal configurations. Performance data for the hip were recorded using state-of-the-art motion capture technology. Results: The results demonstrate that solid models of planetary suit hard segments for use as a performance design tool is feasible. From a general trend perspective, the suited performance trends were comparable between the model and the suited subjects. With the three off-nominal bearing configurations compared to the nominal bearing configurations, human subjects showed decreases in hip flexion of 64%, 6%, and 13% and in hip abduction of 59%, 2%, and 20%. Likewise the solid model showed decreases in hip flexion of 58%, 1%, and 25% and in hip abduction of 56%, 0%, and 30%, under the same condition changes from the nominal configuration. Differences seen between the model predictions and the human subject performance data could be attributed to the model lacking dynamic elements and performing kinematic analysis only, the level of fit of the subjects with the suit, the levels of the subject s suit experience.

Cowley, Matthew S.↗
NASA NTRS2014

EMU Suit Performance Simulation

Introduction: Designing a planetary suit is very complex and often requires difficult trade‐offs between performance, cost, mass, and system complexity. To verify that new suit designs meet requirements, full prototypes must be built and tested with human subjects. However, numerous design iterations will occur before the hardware meets those requirements. Traditional draw‐prototype‐test paradigms for research and development are prohibitively expensive with today's shrinking Government budgets. Personnel at NASA are developing modern simulation techniques that focus on a human‐centric design paradigm. These new techniques make use of virtual prototype simulations and fully adjustable physical prototypes of suit hardware. This is extremely advantageous and enables comprehensive design down‐selections to be made early in the design process. Objectives: The primary objective was to test modern simulation techniques for evaluating the human performance component of two EMU suit concepts, pivoted and planar style hard upper torso (HUT). Methods: This project simulated variations in EVA suit shoulder joint design and subject anthropometry and then measured the differences in shoulder mobility caused by the modifications. These estimations were compared to human‐in‐the‐loop test data gathered during past suited testing using four subjects (two large males, two small females). Results: Results demonstrated that EVA suit modeling and simulation are feasible design tools for evaluating and optimizing suit design based on simulated performance. The suit simulation model was found to be advantageous in its ability to visually represent complex motions and volumetric reach zones in three dimensions, giving designers a faster and deeper comprehension of suit component performance vs. human performance. Suit models were able to discern differing movement capabilities between EMU HUT configurations, generic suit fit concerns, and specific suit fit concerns for crewmembers based on individual anthropometry

Cowley, Matthew S.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Man-Machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) v5: Augmentations, Motivations, and Directions for Aeronautics Applications

As automation and advanced technologies are introduced into transport systems ranging from the Next Generation Air Transportation System termed NextGen, to the advanced surface transportation systems as exemplified by the Intelligent Transportations Systems, to future systems designed for space exploration, there is an increased need to validly predict how the future systems will be vulnerable to error given the demands imposed by the assistive technologies. One formalized approach to study the impact of assistive technologies on the human operator in a safe and non-obtrusive manner is through the use of human performance models (HPMs). HPMs play an integral role when complex human-system designs are proposed, developed, and tested. One HPM tool termed the Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (MIDAS) is a NASA Ames Research Center HPM software tool that has been applied to predict human-system performance in various domains since 1986. MIDAS is a dynamic, integrated HPM and simulation environment that facilitates the design, visualization, and computational evaluation of complex man-machine system concepts in simulated operational environments. The paper will discuss a range of aviation specific applications including an approach used to model human error for NASA s Aviation Safety Program, and what-if analyses to evaluate flight deck technologies for NextGen operations. This chapter will culminate by raising two challenges for the field of predictive HPMs for complex human-system designs that evaluate assistive technologies: that of (1) model transparency and (2) model validation.

Gore, Brian F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Expanding Our Understanding of What Constitutes a Safety-Relevant Occurrence

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. The study of human contributions to safety represents a vast and largely unexplored opportunity to learn. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform system design, safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety producing behaviors in addition to safety reducing behaviors.

Jon B Holbrook↗
NASA NTRS1992

Telerobotic system performance measurement - Motivation and methods

A systems performance-based strategy for modeling and conducting experiments relevant to the design and performance characterization of telerobotic systems is described. A developmental testbed consisting of a distributed telerobotics network and initial efforts to implement the strategy described is presented. Consideration is given to the general systems performance theory (GSPT) to tackle human performance problems as a basis for: measurement of overall telerobotic system (TRS) performance; task decomposition; development of a generic TRS model; and the characterization of performance of subsystems comprising the generic model. GSPT employs a resource construct to model performance and resource economic principles to govern the interface of systems to tasks. It provides a comprehensive modeling/measurement strategy applicable to complex systems including both human and artificial components. Application is presented within the framework of a distributed telerobotics network as a testbed. Insight into the design of test protocols which elicit application-independent data is described.

Kondraske, George V.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Systems Integration (HSI) Framework and Training - Shifting the View of HSI for Better Implementation

The Implementation of Human Systems Integration (HSI) presents challenges within the acquisition community for two reasons. The first is that misconceptions of HSI still exist, with many Program Managers (PMs) and leadership uncertain of the value or where to begin. The second is due to an unbalanced approach to HSI in its own framework. These implementation challenges lead to barriers in the early prevention of mishaps. Understanding HSI practices and how they should be implemented in the Acquisition Product Life Cycle (PLC) has been a challenge across the government, leaving the value of HSI unknown and misunderstood with Program Managers. In the case for many acquisition programs, HSI is not implemented in early design, losing the perspective on human capabilities and limitations, creating impacts on human-centered design. Expectations in human performance are not clearly set and operations are baselined with no margin for changes in technology and processes that will affect system performance. The HSI framework addresses total system performance holistically using collaboration as the primary tool. The goal is to create a system with efficiencies while minimizing risk to the operators, maintainers, and support personnel, as well as any collateral personnel and systems. To accomplish this, HSI should be implemented as part of preemptive measures to minimize potential human error and mishaps during the operation phase. Investigative and assessment tools exist that consider events, issues, and other outside influences of a system that may not fall under the current construct of the HSI domains, leaving gaps in early HSI implementation and affecting the prevention of human errors and mishaps. This presentation will outline what NASA HSI is doing to support Early HSI implementation and Operational Performance shifts that affect human performance.

Anthony T Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2017

Playbook Data Analysis Tool: Collecting Interaction Data from Extremely Remote Users

Typically, user tests for software tools are conducted in person. At NASA, the users may be located at the bottom of the ocean in a pressurized habitat, above the atmosphere in the International Space Station, or in an isolated capsule on a simulated asteroid mission. The Playbook Data Analysis Tool (P-DAT) is a human-computer interaction (HCI) evaluation tool that the NASA Ames HCI Group has developed to record user interactions with Playbook, the group's existing planning-and-execution software application. Once the remotely collected user interaction data makes its way back to Earth, researchers can use P-DAT for in-depth analysis. Since a critical component of the Playbook project is to understand how to develop more intuitive software tools for astronauts to plan in space, P-DAT helps guide us in the development of additional easy-to-use features for Playbook, informing the design of future crew autonomy tools.P-DAT has demonstrated the capability of discreetly capturing usability data in amanner that is transparent to Playbook’s end-users. In our experience, P-DAT data hasalready shown its utility, revealing potential usability patterns, helping diagnose softwarebugs, and identifying metrics and events that are pertinent to Playbook usage aswell as spaceflight operations. As we continue to develop this analysis tool, P-DATmay yet provide a method for long-duration, unobtrusive human performance collectionand evaluation for mission controllers back on Earth and researchers investigatingthe effects and mitigations related to future human spaceflight performance.

in-flight monitoring↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploring Methods to Collect and Analyze Data on Human Contributions to Aviation Safety: A Panel Discussion

Focusing on undesired operator behaviors is pervasive in system design and safety management cultures in aviation. This focus limits the data that are collected, the questions that are asked during data analysis, and therefore our understanding of what operators do in everyday work. Human performance represents a significant source of aviation safety data that includes both desired and undesired actions. When safety is characterized only in terms of errors and failures, the vast majority of human impacts on system safety and performance are ignored. The outcomes of safety data analyses dictate what is learned from those data, which in turn informs safety policies and safety-related decision making. When learning opportunities are systematically restricted by focusing only on rare failure events, not only do we learn less (and less often), but we can draw misleading conclusions by relying on a non-representative sample of human performance data. Changes in how we define and think about safety can highlight new opportunities for collection and analysis of safety-relevant data. Developing an integrated safety picture to better inform safety-related decision making and policies depends upon identifying, collecting, and interpreting safety-producing behaviors in addition to safety-reducing behaviors. Opportunities and challenges in collecting and analyzing the largely unexploited data on desired, safety-producing operator behaviors are discussed.

Aviation Safety↗