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NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Loads and Structural Dynamics Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware

The purpose of this document is to establish requirements relating to the loads and structural dynamics technical discipline for NASA and commercial spaceflight launch vehicle and spacecraft hardware. Requirements are defined for the development of structural design loads and recommendations regarding methodologies and practices for the conduct of load analyses are provided. As such, this document represents an implementation of NASA STD-5002. Requirements are also defined for structural mathematical model development and verification to ensure sufficient accuracy of predicted responses. Finally, requirements for model/data delivery and exchange are specified to facilitate interactions between Launch Vehicle Providers (LVPs), Spacecraft Providers (SCPs), and the NASA Technical Authority (TA) providing insight/oversight and serving in the Independent Verification and Validation role. In addition to the analysis-related requirements described above, a set of requirements are established concerning coupling phenomena or other interaction between structural dynamics and aerodynamic environments or control or propulsion system elements. Such requirements may reasonably be considered structure or control system design criteria, since good engineering practice dictates consideration of and/or elimination of the identified conditions in the development of those subsystems. The requirements are included here, however, to ensure that such considerations are captured in the design space for launch vehicles (LV), spacecraft (SC) and the Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV). The requirements in this document are focused on analyses to be performed to develop data needed to support structural verification. As described in JSC 65828, Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, implementation of the structural verification requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The requirement for and expected contents of the SVP are defined in JSC 65828. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with Technical Authority approval.

George James↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X: First Step in a New Era of Exploration

Since 2005, NASA's Constellation Program has been designing, building, and testing the next generation of launch and space vehicles to carry humans beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO). On October 28, 2009, the Ares Projects successfully launched the first suborbital development flight test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle, Ares I-X, from Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Although the final Constellation Program architecture is under review, data and lessons obtained from Ares I-X can be applied to any launch vehicle. This presentation will discuss the mission background and future impacts of the flight. Ares I is designed to carry up to four astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). It also can be used with the Ares V cargo launch vehicle for a variety of missions beyond LEO. The Ares I-X development flight test was conceived in 2006 to acquire early engineering, operations, and environment data during liftoff, ascent, and first stage recovery. Engineers are using the test flight data to improve the Ares I design before its critical design review the final review before manufacturing of the flight vehicle begins. The Ares I-X flight test vehicle incorporated a mix of flight and mockup hardware, reflecting a similar length and mass to the operational vehicle. It was powered by a four-segment SRB from the Space Shuttle inventory, and was modified to include a fifth, spacer segment that made the booster approximately the same size as the five-segment SRB. The Ares I-X flight closely approximated flight conditions the Ares I will experience through Mach 4.5, performing a first stage separation at an altitude of 125,000 feet and reaching a maximum dynamic pressure ("Max Q") of approximately 850 pounds per square foot. The Ares I-X Mission Management Office (MMO) was organized functionally to address all the major test elements, including: first stage, avionics, and roll control (Marshall Space Flight Center); upper stage simulator (Glenn Research Center); crew module/launch abort system simulator (Langley Research Center); and ground systems and operations (KSC). Interfaces between vehicle elements and vehicle-ground elements, as well as environment analyses were performed by a systems engineering and integration team at Langley. Experience and lessons learned from these integrated product teams area are already being integrated into the Ares Projects to support the next generation of exploration launch vehicles.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Preliminary structural evaluation and design of the HL-20

Several concepts have been proposed to meet the requirements of a Personnel Launch System. A lifting body concept, the HL-20, was designed at NASA Langley Research Center. A structural analysis of a proposed HL-20 configuration with a cylindrical pressurized crew cabin is presented in this paper. Loads for the vehicle are assembled from mission loading conditions such as abort, on-orbit pressurization, blast overpressure, aerodynamic maneuver, and touchdown. The critical loading conditions are identified and resultant loads mapped onto the structure in order to review the effects of the mission loading conditions. The HL-20 structural concept is sized for the mission loads and the resulting structural weights are calculated.

Bush, Lance B.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Optimization of Second Fault Detection Thresholds to Maximize Mission Probability of Success

In order to support manned spaceflight safety requirements, the Space Launch System (SLS) has defined program-level requirements for key systems to ensure successful operation under single fault conditions. The SLS program has also levied requirements relating to the capability of the Inertial Navigation System to detect a second fault. This detection functionality is required in order to feed abort analysis and ensure crew safety. Increases in navigation state error due to sensor faults in a purely inertial system can drive the vehicle outside of its operational as-designed environmental and performance envelope. As this performance outside of first fault detections is defined and controlled at the vehicle level, it allows for the use of system level margins to increase probability of mission success on the operational edges of the design. A top-down approach is utilized to assess vehicle sensitivity to second sensor faults. A wide range of failure scenarios in terms of both fault magnitude and time is used for assessment. The approach also utilizes a schedule to change fault detection thresholds autonomously. These individual values are optimized along a nominal trajectory in order to maximize probability of mission success in terms of system-level insertion requirements while minimizing the probability of false positives. This paper will describe an approach integrating Genetic Algorithms and Monte Carlo analysis to tune the threshold parameters to maximize vehicle resilience to second fault events over an ascent mission profile. The analysis approach and performance assessment and verification will be presented to demonstrate the applicability of this approach to second fault detection optimization to maximize mission probability of success through taking advantage of existing margin.

Anzalone, Evan J.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Asteroid Crewed Segment Mission Lean Development

The next generation of human spaceflight missions presents numerous challenges to designers that must be addressed to produce a feasible concept. The specific challenges of designing an exploration mission utilizing the Space Launch System and the Orion spacecraft to carry astronauts beyond earth orbit to explore an asteroid stored in a distant retrograde orbit around the moon will be addressed. Mission designers must carefully balance competing constraints including cost, schedule, risk, and numerous spacecraft performance metrics including launch mass, nominal landed mass, abort landed mass, mission duration, consumable limits and many others. The Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission will be described along with results from the concurrent mission design trades that led to its formulation. While the trades presented are specific to this mission, the integrated process is applicable to any potential future mission. The following trades were critical in the mission formulation and will be described in detail: 1) crew size, 2) mission duration, 3) trajectory design, 4) docking vs grapple, 5) extravehicular activity tasks, 6) launch mass and integrated vehicle performance, 7) contingency performance, 8) crew consumables including food, clothing, oxygen, nitrogen and water, and 9) mission risk. The additional Orion functionality required to perform the Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission and how it is incorporated while minimizing cost, schedule and mass impacts will be identified. Existing investments in the NASA technology portfolio were leveraged to provide the added functionality that will be beneficial to future exploration missions. Mission kits are utilized to augment Orion with the necessary functionality without introducing costly new requirements to the mature Orion spacecraft design effort. The Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission provides an exciting early mission for the Orion and SLS while providing a stepping stone to even more ambitious missions in the future.

Gard, Joe↗

NASA NTRS2016

Evolution of Orion Mission Design for Exploration Mission 1 and 2

The evolving mission design and concepts of NASA's next steps have shaped Orion into the spacecraft that it is today. Since the initial inception of Orion, through the Constellation Program, and now in the Exploration Mission frame-work with the Space Launch System (SLS), each mission design concept and program goal have left Orion with a set of capabilities that can be utilized in many different mission types. Exploration Missions 1 and 2 (EM-1 and EM-2) have now been at the forefront of the mission design focus for the last several years. During that time, different Design Reference Missions (DRMs) were built, analyzed, and modified to solve or mitigate enterprise level design trades to ensure a viable mission from launch to landing. The resulting DRMs for EM-1 and EM-2 were then expanded into multi-year trajectory scans to characterize vehicle performance and Earth-Moon geometry trends. This provides Orion's subsystems with stressing reference trajectories to help design their system. Now that Orion has progressed through the Preliminary and Critical Design Re-views (PDR and CDR) there is a general shift in the focus of mission design from aiding the vehicle design to providing mission specific products needed for pre-flight and real time operations. Some of the mission specific products need-ed include analysis of steering law performance, inputs into navigational accura-cy assessments, abort options at any point in the mission for each valid trajecto-ry in the launch window, recontact avoidance between the upper stage and Orion post nominal separation, etc.

Gutkowski, Jeffrey P.↗

NASA NTRS1971

Development of control systems for space shuttle vehicles. Volume 2: Appendixes

A launch phase random normal wind model is presented for delta wing, two-stage, space shuttle control system studies. Equations, data, and simulations for conventional launch studies are given as well as pitch and lateral equations and data for covariance analyses of the launch phase of MSFC vehicle B. Lateral equations and data for North American 130G and 134D are also included along with a high-altitude abort simulation.

Stone, C. R.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Personnel launch system (PLS) lifting body and low lift-to-drag (L/D)

The Personnel Launch System (PLS) is a small transportation system designed to transport people, but no cargo, to and from low-earth orbit. The PLS is being considered as an addition to the manned launch capability of the United States for three main reasons: (1) to assure manned access to space, (2) to achieve a first-stage abort ability, and (3) to reduce operations costs. To those ends, two designs are being considered for the PLS that differ in their lift-to-drag (L/D) ratio. The Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center was assigned the task of examining low L/D capsules with no wings and a parachute landing capability. The Langley Research Center is studying a higher L/D PLS with wings and runway landings. Whichever design is selected, the PLS will act as a complement to the Space Shuttle fleet and will enhance the ability of our Nation to achieve reliable, safe, and cost-effective access to space flight, thus furthering the goals of the U.S. space program and increasing the safety of the human crews manning a future space station.

Erwin, Harry O.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Liquid Rocket Boosters for Shuttle

The Liquid Rocket Booster study was initiated by NASA to define an alternative to the Solid Rocket Boosters used on the STS. These studies have involved MSFC, JSC and KSC and their contractors. The prime study contractors, Martin Marietta Corporation and General Dynamics Space Systems, have identified Liquid Booster configurations which would replace the SRB's in the Shuttle stack. The Liquid Rocket Booster increases Shuttle performance to 70 K LBS, provides improved reliability, hold down and verification prior to vehicle release, engine out and improved abort capability, and is phased into the STS launch operations without adversely affecting flight rate.

Hughes, James E.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Evaluation of the Emergency Response Dose Assessment System(ERDAS)

The emergency response dose assessment system (ERDAS) is a protype software and hardware system configured to produce routine mesoscale meteorological forecasts and enhanced dispersion estimates on an operational basis for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC)/Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) region. ERDAS provides emergency response guidance to operations at KSC/CCAS in the case of an accidental hazardous material release or an aborted vehicle launch. This report describes the evaluation of ERDAS including: evaluation of sea breeze predictions, comparison of launch plume location and concentration predictions, case study of a toxic release, evaluation of model sensitivity to varying input parameters, evaluation of the user interface, assessment of ERDA's operational capabilities, and a comparison of ERDAS models to the ocean breeze dry gultch diffusion model.

Evans, Randolph J.↗

NASA NTRS1974

Asymmetrical booster ascent guidance and control system design study. Volume 5: Space shuttle powered explicit guidance

An optimum powered explicit guidance algorithm capable of handling all space shuttle exoatospheric maneuvers is presented. The theoretical and practical basis for the currently baselined space shuttle powered flight guidance equations and logic is documented. Detailed flow diagrams for implementing the steering computations for all shuttle phases, including powered return to launch site (RTLS) abort, are also presented. Derivation of the powered RTLS algorithm is provided, as well as detailed flow diagrams for implementing the option. The flow diagrams and equations are compatible with the current powered flight documentation.

Jaggers, R. F.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Delta Advanced Reusable Transport (DART): An alternative manned spacecraft

Although the current U.S. Space Transportation System (STS) has proven successful in many applications, the truth remains that the space shuttle is not as reliable or economical as was once hoped. In fact, the Augustine Commission on the future of the U.S. Space Program has recommended that the space shuttle only be used on missions directly requiring human capabilities on-orbit and that the shuttle program should eventually be phased out. This poses a great dilemma since the shuttle provides the only current or planned U.S. means for human access to space at the same time that NASA is building toward a permanent manned presence. As a possible solution to this dilemma, it is proposed that the U.S. begin development of an Alternative Manned Spacecraft (AMS). This spacecraft would not only provide follow-on capability for maintaining human space flight, but would also provide redundancy and enhanced capability in the near future. Design requirements for the AMS studied include: (1) capability of launching on one of the current or planned U.S. expendable launch vehicles (baseline McDonnell Douglas Delta II model 7920 expendable booster); (2) application to a wide variety of missions including autonomous operations, space station support, and access to orbits and inclinations beyond those of the space shuttle; (3) low enough costing to fly regularly in augmentation of space shuttle capabilities; (4) production surge capabilities to replace the shuttle if events require it; (5) intact abort capability in all flight regimes since the planned launch vehicles are not man-rated; (6) technology cut-off date of 1990; and (7) initial operational capability in 1995. In addition, the design of the AMS would take advantage of scientific advances made in the 20 years since the space shuttle was first conceived. These advances are in such technologies as composite materials, propulsion systems, avionics, and hypersonics.

Lewerenz, T.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM). This methodology and corresponding model, known as a Goal-Function Tree (GFT), provides a means to represent, decompose, and elaborate system goals and functions in a rigorous manner that connects directly to design through use of state variables that translate natural language requirements and goals into logical-physical state language. The state variable-based approach also provides the means to directly connect FM to the design, by specifying the range in which state variables must be controlled to achieve goals, and conversely, the failures that exist if system behavior go out-of-range. This in turn allows for the systems engineers and SHM/FM engineers to determine which state variables to monitor, and what action(s) to take should the system fail to achieve that goal. In sum, the GFT representation provides a unified approach to early-phase SE and FM development. This representation and methodology has been successfully developed and implemented using Systems Modeling Language (SysML) on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) Program. It enabled early design trade studies of failure detection coverage to ensure complete detection coverage of all crew-threatening failures. The representation maps directly both to FM algorithm designs, and to failure scenario definitions needed for design analysis and testing. The GFT representation provided the basis for mapping of abort triggers into scenarios, both needed for initial, and successful quantitative analyses of abort effectiveness (detection and response to crew-threatening events).

Patterson, Jonathan D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mitigation of Electrostatic Hazards on Spacecraft

Spacecraft are complex systems operating in challenging environments that require customized testing procedures designed to mitigate the unique hazards of a space launch environment. As an example of those testing procedures, we describe the test methodology and recommendations developed to mitigate electrostatic discharges that could have triggered an explosion of the Space Shuttle during launch, return to launch site, abort after one orbit, or during normal landing.

Calle, C. I.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Space Shuttle development update

The development efforts, since the STS-4 flight, in the Space Shuttle (SS) program are presented. The SS improvements introduced in the last two years include lower-weight loads, communication through the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite, expanded extravehicular activity capability, a maneuvering backpack and the manipulator foot restraint, the improvements in thermal projection system, the 'optional terminal area management targeting' guidance software, a rendezvous system with radar and star tracker sensors, and improved on-orbit living conditions. The flight demonstrations include advanced launch techniques (e.g., night launch and direct insertion to orbit); the on-orbit demonstrations; and added entry and launching capabilities. The entry aerodynamic analysis and entry flight control fine tuning are described. Reusability, improved ascent performance, intact abort and landing flexibility, rollout control, and 'smart speedbrakes' are among the many improvements planned for the future.

Brand, V.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Nuclear electric propulsion: A better, safer, cheaper transportation system for human exploration of Mars

NASA has completed a preliminary mission and systems study of nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) systems for 'split-sprint' human exploration and related robotic cargo missions to Mars. This paper describes the study, the mission architecture selected, the NEP system and technology development needs, proposed development schedules, and estimated development costs. Since current administration policy makers have delayed funding for key technology development activities that could make Mars exploration missions a reality in the near future, NASA will have time to evaluate various alternate mission options, and it appears prudent to ensure that Mars mission plans focus on astronaut and mission safety, while reducing costs to acceptable levels. The split-sprint nuclear electric propulsion system offers trip times comparable to nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) systems, while providing mission abort opportunities that are not possible with 'reference' mission architectures. Thus, NEP systems offer short transit times for the astronauts, reducing the exposure of the crew to intergalactic cosmic radiation. The high specific impulse of the NEP system, which leads to very low propellant requirements, results in significantly lower 'initial mass in low earth orbit' (IMLEO). Launch vehicle packaging studies show that the NEP system can be launched, assembled, and deployed, with about one less 240-metric-ton heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) per mission opportunity - a very Technology development cost of the nuclear reactor for an NEP system would be shared with the proposed nuclear surface power systems, since nuclear systems will be required to provide substantial electrical power on the surface of Mars. The NEP development project plan proposed includes evolutionary technology development for nuclear electric propulsion systems that expands upon SP-100 (Space Power - 100 kw(e)) technology that has been developed for lunar and Mars surface nuclear power, and small NEP systems for interplanetary probes. System upgrades are expected to evolve that will result in even shorter trip times, improved payload capabilities, and enhanced safety and reliability.

Clark, John S.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

Sauvageau, Donald R.↗