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At least 271 records · Page 15

Evaluation of Building 23-620, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J-3 Office, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Gandolinium poison solubility testing for the downstream impacts from accelerated basin de-inventory

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Disposition mission. Spent fuel will be dissolved in H-Canyon without recovery of uranium. The dissolver solutions will be temporarily stored, pH-adjusted to excess hydroxide (which will facilitate precipitation of metal oxides/hydroxides), transferred to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF), and subsequently immobilized in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) during planned sludge batch campaigns. ABD accelerates basin closure, significantly reduces programmatic risk, and greatly reduces the lifecycle budget requirements for the site by eliminating the need for a SNF drying and packaging capability. The ABD approach represents a significant change to the clean-up approach for the SRS. However, the increased fissile loading in sludge batches, due to the dissolver solutions, requires investigation to ensure fissile limits are efficiently and safely managed; higher fissile loadings in the glass are projected to be two to three times higher than the current fissile concentration limit of 897 g/m 3 and will be addressed in a future report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CIO Cloud Strategy

The purpose of the Sandia CIO Cloud Strategy is to establish the strategic direction for the adoption of cloud services and technologies as the prevailing IT solution for Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) will champion unified, site-wide adoption of cloud and will amplify business and mission impacts across the Labs. Sandia’s CIO Cloud Strategy aligns to the Federal Cloud Computing Strategy1 (Cloud Smart) and the Sandia Management and Operating Contract (Prime Contract).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-113, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-113 in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15236), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition of Building 23-113 is part of the long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury on the NNSS for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (the Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-113 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. Therefore, the purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-113 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that although Building 23-113 is significant at the local level for its important role as a recreational facility on the NNSS, the building lacks sufficient integrity to convey its significance. It is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP at any level. The building remains eligible as a contributing element to the MHD.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Building 23-702, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory H-8 Foil Handling Building, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-702, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) H-8 Foil Handling Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15278) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. As part of the modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement Between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-702 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-702 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-702 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Hanford Site Roadside Bird Surveys Report for Calendar Years 2021-2023

The U.S. Department of Energy, Hanford Field Office (HFO) conducts ecological monitoring on the Hanford Site to collect and track data needed to ensure compliance with an array of environmental laws, regulations, and policies governing HFO activities. Ecological monitoring data provide baseline information about the plants, animals, and habitats under HFO stewardship at Hanford which is required for decision-making under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The Hanford Site Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP, DOE/EIS-0222-F), which is the Environmental Impact Statement for Hanford Site activities, helps ensure that HFO, its contractors, and other entities conducting activities on the Hanford Site are in compliance with NEPA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Microcontroller-based aerosol jet printer control software

This software is used with a microcontroller to control an aerosol jet printing system. It was written for a 32-bit ARM microcontroller, providing greater processing speed and complexity relative to more conventional low-cost printer controllers. The microcontroller software was written using a real-time operating system (FreeRTOS), which simplifies parallel operation of multiple functions and further customization. It supports simultaneous motion planning, pulse generation for stepper motors, reading encoder feedback, communicating with multiple mass flow controllers, controlling solid state relays, handling a software-based emergency stop, and sending data to the client PC. The program is written in C and communicates with the client PC via USB connection. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-0436 O

Secor, EthanBenjamin↗

Ghent Generating Station Nuclear Study: Siting Evaluation

The purpose of this initial siting evaluation is to assess the suitability of the PPL Corporation (PPL) owned land at/near the Kentucky Utilities Ghent Generating Station (GGS) for the deployment of advanced nuclear reactors and to determine if there are any exclusionary or avoidance factors associated with siting nuclear power at GGS. The formal siting process for a nuclear reactor requires a great level of time (i.e., multiple years), effort, and detail. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) estimates the formal siting process could take a dedicated team between one and three years to complete. This initial siting evaluation considers several characteristics (e.g., environmental conditions, seismic concerns, footprint, water use, etc.) and highlights favorable/preferred characteristics as well as potential risks to feasibility. Potential risks were explored in greater detail to provide PPL with additional insights to support decision planning. The results indicate the strengths and weaknesses associated with the GGS site as a location for a nuclear generating station and are intended to inform PPL’s next steps. The results of this initial siting evaluation will also inform the selection of candidate nuclear technologies for the GGS site that align with PPL’s mission and business objectives.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Exploiting timing capabilities of the CHEOPS mission with warm-Jupiter planets

ABSTRACT We present 17 transit light curves of seven known warm-Jupiters observed with the CHaracterising ExOPlanet Satellite (CHEOPS). The light curves have been collected as part of the CHEOPS Guaranteed Time Observation (GTO) program that searches for transit-timing variation (TTV) of warm-Jupiters induced by a possible external perturber to shed light on the evolution path of such planetary systems. We describe the CHEOPS observation process, from the planning to the data analysis. In this work, we focused on the timing performance of CHEOPS, the impact of the sampling of the transit phases, and the improvement we can obtain by combining multiple transits together. We reached the highest precision on the transit time of about 13–16 s for the brightest target (WASP-38, G = 9.2) in our sample. From the combined analysis of multiple transits of fainter targets with G ≥ 11, we obtained a timing precision of ∼2 min. Additional observations with CHEOPS, covering a longer temporal baseline, will further improve the precision on the transit times and will allow us to detect possible TTV signals induced by an external perturber.

Borsato, L. (ORCID:0000000300669268)↗

2018 LDRD Annual Report (Argonne National Laboratory)

Argonne National Laboratory’s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program encourages the development of novel technical concepts, enhances the Laboratory’s research and development (R&D) capabilities, and enables pursuit of strategic laboratory goals. Argonne’s LDRD projects are proposal based and peer reviewed, supporting ideas that require advanced exploration so they can be sufficiently developed to pursue support through normal programmatic channels. Among the aims of the projects supported by the LDRD program are the establishment of engineering proofs of principle, assessment of design feasibility for prospective facilities, development of instrumentation or computational methods or systems, and discoveries in fundamental science and exploratory development. All LDRD projects have demonstrable ties to one or more of the science, energy, environment, and national security missions of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and many are also relevant to the missions of other federal agencies that sponsor work at Argonne. A natural consequence of the more “applied” type projects is their concurrent relevance to industry. The LDRD program is managed in overarching portfolios, each containing multiple projects each fiscal year. The LDRD Prime portfolio is further divided into strategic focus areas aligned with Argonne’s strategic plan. The largest component of Argonne’s program is LDRD Prime, which emphasizes R&D explicitly aligned with Laboratory major initiatives in support of Argonne’s strategic plan. The choice of Focus Areas under the LDRD Prime component reflects the major initiatives; the state of development of relevant technical fields; the potential value of advancing those fields to DOE/NNSA and the nation; and the compatibility of the fields with existing facilities, capabilities, and staff expertise at Argonne. Focus Areas with projects that ended in FY18 are: Advanced Computing, Biological and Environmental Science Capability Development, Energy Manufacturing Science and Engineering, Hard X-ray Sciences, Materials and Chemistry, Securing Energy and Critical Resources, and The Universe as Our Laboratory (ULab).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NNSA Minority Serving Institute Partnership Program (MSIPP)— Advanced Synergistic Program for Indigenous Research in Engineering (ASPIRE) (FY22 Q1 Progress Report)

In 2016, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) initiated the Minority Serving Institution Partnership Plan (MSIPP) targeting Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs) to offer programs that will prepare students for technical careers in NNSA’s laboratories and production plants. The MSIPP consortium’s approach is as follows: 1) align investments at the college and university level to develop a curriculum and workforce needed to support NNSA’s nuclear weapon enterprise mission, and 2) to enhance research and education at under-represented colleges and universities. The first TCU consortium that MSIPP launched was known as the Advanced Manufacturing Network Initiative (AMNI) whose purpose was to develop additive manufacturing (AM) learning opportunities. The AMNI consortium consisted of Bay Mills Community College, Cankdeska Cikana Community College, Navajo Tech University, Salish Kootenai Community College, Turtle Mountain Community College, and United Tribes Technical College. In 2016, the American Indian Higher Education Consortium (AIHEC), the AMNI consortium and the Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute (SIPI), in collaboration with Sandia National Labs, using a grant by NNSA hosted the first TCU Advanced Manufacturing Technology Summer Institute (TCU AMTSI). The AMNI consortium will officially end Sept. 2022. However, building on the successes of AMNI, in FY22 NNSA’s MSIPP launched three additional consortiums: (1) the Indigenous Mutual Partnership to Advanced Cybersecurity Technology (IMPACT), which focuses on STEM and cybersecurity, (2) the Advanced Synergistic Program for Indigenous Research in Engineering (ASPIRE), which focuses on STEM and the electrical and mechanical engineering skills set needed for renewable and distributed energy systems, and (3) the Partnership for Advanced Manufacturing Education and Research (PAMER), which focuses on developing and maintaining a sustainable pathway for a highly trained, next-generation additive manufacturing workforce and a corresponding community of subject matter experts for NNSA enterprises. The following report summarizes the status update during this quarter for the ASPIRE program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

LANL Critical Benchmark Comparison Study and Subsequent Revision for Cases Involving LEU and MIX

As part of an international collaboration within the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP), LANL is involved in a comparison study to quantify differences in k-effective results from neutron transport simulations of critical benchmark experiments. The DOE NCSP Mission and Vision details the activity in which the French Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) leads the study with LANL, ORNL, and LLNL to compare results of various neutron transport codes and nuclear data libraries for ICSBEP benchmarks held in common by the entities. The task statement from the DOE NCSP Five-Year Execution Plan is given as: "The proposal is for IRSN to lead a new intercomparison based on the MORET code with the latest JEFF-3.3 data and ENDF/B-VIII.0 data, when available, using their existing comprehensive selection of 2,714 benchmarks and collate their results together with those from LLNL (COG), LANL (MCNP) and ORNL (SCALE). Due to the large number of benchmarks involved, this effort is envisioned to take three years with an additional year for IRSN to complete a summary report. The benchmark development will be performed independently to minimize modeling errors through discovery and resolution of discrepant results. A summary report will be generated (led by IRSN) to document the results of this study." This report documents results obtained for revisions made to cases involving Intermediate Enriched Uranium (IEU) and a mixture of Pu and Uranium (MIX), with a focus on the changes made to LANL benchmarks modeled with MCNP6 using ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data that appeared to have discrepant results when compared with results of other codes. Feedback was used to pinpoint review of particular benchmark input files and to revise them when necessary. This report documents the results of review and revision of specific benchmarks highlighted as possibly discrepant in the comparison study. In addition, there is an effort tied to this work involving collaboration between LANL XCP and NCS Divisions in the development of a shared review/revision procedure and use of a new benchmark repository.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements

Next-generation reactors will be able to use risk to inform and performance base the licensing of many aspects of the reactor, facility, and site design, including attributes of physical security. There are several factors related to security, including site topography, reactor design, and physical protection system components, to consider when designing the physical protection system into the overall facility design and plan of operation. With the versatility of advanced reactors, especially micro reactors, methods are needed to simplify and quickly evaluate potential timelines for designing a site configuration. This report describes an approach to generate qualitative and quantitative insights using a risk-informed simulation. The modeling process is described in detail, focusing on three aspects: (1) the facility mission time (the time required to control the plant until safe), (2) the attacker timeline (the time to potential sabotage), and (3) the response timeline (the time to counter the facility attack). The modeling capabilities also are extended to include facility physical phenomena such as thermal-hydraulics and heat transfer to capture realistic representation of dynamic changes to a facility. While the plant models and examples are hypothetical and do not represent a real facility, these modeling approaches could be used for future security-by-design engineering in advanced reactors. The outputs and insights from the modeling approach may be used to modify and optimize the security posture of a facility by efficiently making modifications to the model and seeing the overall impact from the modification. Lastly, use of the approach described in this report can also provide the technical basis for a physical protection program, describing how the facility and security strategy will cope with off-normal events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Performance Analysis and Simulaion of the Hydraulic Scram System in TREAT Reactor

The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) serves a vital role in nuclear fuel safety research, enabling transient experiments that simulate reactivity excursions and accident scenarios. Central to these operations is the transient control rod drive system (TCRDS), which drives rapid motion of the transient control rods such that TREAT can simulate rapid power changes typical of reactor accidents. The reliability and performance of this system are critical for protecting both fuel specimens and reactor infrastructure. This study presents the initial phase of a two-year investigation into the dynamics and reliability of the TREAT hydraulic TCRDS. Conducted in collaboration with INL, the research employs a combined computational and experimental approach to analyze the system's response time, pressure transients, and potential failure modes. Emphasis is placed on understanding how fluid characteristics influence the TCRDS’s ability to achieve both rapid power changes and mechanical stability. The TRDS and the skid that powers it will be analyzed throughout this investigation. Computational modeling using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) will simulate the hydraulic response under varying conditions. In parallel, experimental testing planned at INL will validate these models and capture key performance metrics. This paper outlines the system design, analytical framework, and modeling strategies that form the foundation for later testing. Ultimately, this work aims to support improvements to the TCRDS’s design and reliability, contributing to the broader goal of enhancing nuclear fuel safety and sustaining TREAT’s mission as a premier nuclear fuel test facility.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Physics Division Strategic Plan: Science Drivers

The Physics Division Science Drivers articulate the overarching scientific objectives that we seek to address and that form the lifeblood of our Division. While many physics subfields are represented in the Physics Division’s scientific portfolio, we strive to maintain or achieve excellence and international leadership in only a few areas. While diversity of science and engineering efforts is strongly supported and provides the fertile soil for innovation, there are dominating areas in which we must excel to accomplish our mission that is stated as: “We design, execute and analyze experiments that challenge, improve and validate our understanding of fundamental physics underpinning LANL’s national security mission.”

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School: Fiscal Year 2024 Report

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosts the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security (RDNS) Summer School. This unique course provides students with an overview of nuclear security missions, the technical foundation of applied radiation detection technology, and interactive demonstrations and exercises to connect theory to practice in an evolving research and development area. Fiscal year 2024, an off-year year for the school, included reviewing course content, and sharing about the school in a student engagement session at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. Planning is underway for the 10 th RDNS summer school is planned for the summer of 2025.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

This document details the strategy proposed to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requirement for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility Sustainment and Modernization projects identified in multiple NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) reports to Congress [NNSA, 2020; 2021; 2022; 2023; 2024]. DARHT has become indispensable for the certification of the primaries of U.S. nuclear weapons since the current U.S. moratorium halted underground nuclear testing more than 30 years ago. However, aging facilities, evolving technology, and other issues are limiting or threatening the capability of DARHT to meet NNSA’s expanding mission needs now and into the future. This DARHT Capability eXpansion (DCX) strategy was developed to address NNSA needs by extending DARHT’s reliability and resilience, increasing the quality and quantity of DARHT data, and enabling hydrodynamic measurements in complex environments. The strategy can be implemented through integration of line-item projects, acquisition of major items of equipment, and other actions coordinated with the execution of the SSMP. This strategy document is intended for U.S. Government officials, particularly authorizers, appropriators, and program leaders. It may also be furnished to DARHT users, customers, collaborators, stakeholders, and visitors as needed

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Implications of Non-Bingham Rheology

One of the key challenges now facing the US Department of Energy (DOE) is the fate of radioactive waste remaining from World War II and the Cold War which is stored underground in tanks some 75 feet in diameter and over 30 feet tall. Over time, the waste has segmented into multiple layers with sludges and slurries at the bottom with salt crust layers often at the top and liquid in between. DOE’s current official baseline plans call for remaining sludges and slurries to be removed from the tanks and converted into a more stable glass waste form. Minimizing worker exposure to radiation drives DOE to use slurry processing techniques to suspend, mobilize, transport, mix, and process the waste. Therefore, a clear and quantitative understanding of Hanford waste rheology is essential for the success of the DOE mission. Historically much of the waste has been characterized using Eugene Bingham’s model more than a century old that provides a straight line fit to higher shear rate data with the intercept suggesting a yield stress and the slope providing the consistency. Yet, Bingham fits overestimate the shear stress at a given shear rate for low to intermediate shear rates, exactly the range of shear rates typically encountered in pipe flow, where shear rates peak along the pipe wall and vanish in the center. This model produces a fictitious yield stress for some of the wastes that do not exhibit yield phenomena. While over estimating the yield stress may be prudent, safe, and conservative for some applications (e.g., pump sizing to ensure that pumps can handle yield stresses), over estimating the rheology may be inaccurate and non-conservative for other applications (e.g., eroding settled particle beds). Therefore, this paper evaluates the slurry rheology of Hanford and Savannah River wastes using a more modern rheological model that fits the full range of experimental data. Although a bias has been recognized and alternative models proposed, the magnitude of this bias and the implications for tank waste have only been qualitatively suggested. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively implications of the poor quality of fit between a Bingham model for rheology and experimental data at modest shear rates. We first demonstrate the magnitude of the bias between the data and the Bingham extrapolation. We then evaluate quantitatively the velocity profile under laminar conditions. This analysis shows that the bias may be large (hundreds of percent or more) at modest shear rates and that modest shear rates dominate pipe velocity profiles.

Rheology, Radioactive waste↗