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Hardware Development Process for Human Research Facility Applications

The simple goal of the Human Research Facility (HRF) is to conduct human research experiments on the International Space Station (ISS) astronauts during long-duration missions. This is accomplished by providing integration and operation of the necessary hardware and software capabilities. A typical hardware development flow consists of five stages: functional inputs and requirements definition, market research, design life cycle through hardware delivery, crew training, and mission support. The purpose of this presentation is to guide the audience through the early hardware development process: requirement definition through selecting a development path. Specific HRF equipment is used to illustrate the hardware development paths. The source of hardware requirements is the science community and HRF program. The HRF Science Working Group, consisting of SCientists from various medical disciplines, defined a basic set of equipment with functional requirements. This established the performance requirements of the hardware. HRF program requirements focus on making the hardware safe and operational in a space environment. This includes structural, thermal, human factors, and material requirements. Science and HRF program requirements are defined in a hardware requirements document which includes verification methods. Once the hardware is fabricated, requirements are verified by inspection, test, analysis, or demonstration. All data is compiled and reviewed to certify the hardware for flight. Obviously, the basis for all hardware development activities is requirement definition. Full and complete requirement definition is ideal prior to initiating the hardware development. However, this is generally not the case, but the hardware team typically has functional inputs as a guide. The first step is for engineers to conduct market research based on the functional inputs provided by scientists. CommerCially available products are evaluated against the science requirements as well as modifications needed to meet program requirements. Options are consolidated and the hardware development team reaches a hardware development decision point. Within budget and schedule constraints, the team must decide whether or not to complete the hardware as an in-house, subcontract with vendor, or commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) development. An in-house development indicates NASA personnel or a contractor builds the hardware at a NASA site. A subcontract development is completed off-site by a commercial company. A COTS item is a vendor product available by ordering a specific part number. The team evaluates the pros and cons of each development path. For example, in-bouse developments utilize existing corporate knowledge regarding bow to build equipment for use in space. However, technical expertise would be required to fully understand the medical equipment capabilities, such as for an ultrasound system. It may require additional time and funding to gain the expertise that commercially exists. The major benefit of subcontracting a hardware development is the product is delivered as an end-item and commercial expertise is utilized. On the other hand, NASA has limited control over schedule delays. The final option of COTS or modified COTS equipment is a compromise between in-house and subcontracts. A vendor product may exist that meets all functional requirements but req uires in-house modifications for successful operation in a space environment. The HRF utilizes equipment developed using all of the paths described: inhouse, subcontract, and modified COTS.

Bauer, Liz↗

Monte Carlo mixture model of lifetime cancer incidence risk from radiation exposure on shuttle and international space station

Estimating uncertainty in lifetime cancer risk for human exposure to space radiation is a unique challenge. Conventional risk assessment with low-linear-energy-transfer (LET)-based risk from Japanese atomic bomb survivor studies may be inappropriate for relativistic protons and nuclei in space due to track structure effects. This paper develops a Monte Carlo mixture model (MCMM) for transferring additive, National Institutes of Health multiplicative, and multiplicative excess cancer incidence risks based on Japanese atomic bomb survivor data to determine excess incidence risk for various US astronaut exposure profiles. The MCMM serves as an anchor point for future risk projection methods involving biophysical models of DNA damage from space radiation. Lifetime incidence risks of radiation-induced cancer for the MCMM based on low-LET Japanese data for nonleukemia (all cancers except leukemia) were 2.77 (90% confidence limit, 0.75-11.34) for males exposed to 1 Sv at age 45 and 2.20 (90% confidence limit, 0.59-10.12) for males exposed at age 55. For females, mixture model risks for nonleukemia exposed separately to 1 Sv at ages of 45 and 55 were 2.98 (90% confidence limit, 0.90-11.70) and 2.44 (90% confidence limit, 0.70-10.30), respectively. Risks for high-LET 200 MeV protons (LET=0.45 keV/micrometer), 1 MeV alpha-particles (LET=100 keV/micrometer), and 600 MeV iron particles (LET=180 keV/micrometer) were scored on a per particle basis by determining the particle fluence required for an average of one particle per cell nucleus of area 100 micrometer(2). Lifetime risk per proton was 2.68x10(-2)% (90% confidence limit, 0.79x10(-3)%-0. 514x10(-2)%). For alpha-particles, lifetime risk was 14.2% (90% confidence limit, 2.5%-31.2%). Conversely, lifetime risk per iron particle was 23.7% (90% confidence limit, 4.5%-53.0%). Uncertainty in the DDREF for high-LET particles may be less than that for low-LET radiation because typically there is very little dose-rate dependence. Probability density functions for high-LET radiation quality and dose-rate may be preferable to conventional risk assessment approaches. Nuclear reactions and track structure effects in tissue may not be properly estimated by existing data using in vitro models for estimating RBEs. The method used here is being extended to estimate uncertainty in spacecraft shielding effectiveness in various space radiation environments.

NASA Center LaRC↗

Predicting cancer rates in astronauts from animal carcinogenesis studies and cellular markers

The radiation space environment includes particles such as protons and multiple species of heavy ions, with much of the exposure to these radiations occurring at extremely low average dose-rates. Limitations in databases needed to predict cancer hazards in human beings from such radiations are significant and currently do not provide confidence that such predictions are acceptably precise or accurate. In this article, we outline the need for animal carcinogenesis data based on a more sophisticated understanding of the dose-response relationship for induction of cancer and correlative cellular endpoints by representative space radiations. We stress the need for a model that can interrelate human and animal carcinogenesis data with cellular mechanisms. Using a broad model for dose-response patterns which we term the "subalpha-alpha-omega (SAO) model", we explore examples in the literature for radiation-induced cancer and for radiation-induced cellular events to illustrate the need for data that define the dose-response patterns more precisely over specific dose ranges, with special attention to low dose, low dose-rate exposure. We present data for multiple endpoints in cells, which vary in their radiosensitivity, that also support the proposed model. We have measured induction of complex chromosome aberrations in multiple cell types by two space radiations, Fe-ions and protons, and compared these to photons delivered at high dose-rate or low dose-rate. Our data demonstrate that at least three factors modulate the relative efficacy of Fe-ions compared to photons: (i) intrinsic radiosensitivity of irradiated cells; (ii) dose-rate; and (iii) another unspecified effect perhaps related to reparability of DNA lesions. These factors can produce respectively up to at least 7-, 6- and 3-fold variability. These data demonstrate the need to understand better the role of intrinsic radiosensitivity and dose-rate effects in mammalian cell response to ionizing radiation. Such understanding is critical in extrapolating databases between cellular response, animal carcinogenesis and human carcinogenesis, and we suggest that the SAO model is a useful tool for such extrapolation.

Non-NASA Center↗

Human and Robotic Space Mission Use Cases for High-Performance Spaceflight Computing

Spaceflight computing is a key resource in NASA space missions and a core determining factor of spacecraft capability, with ripple effects throughout the spacecraft, end-to-end system, and mission. Onboard computing can be aptly viewed as a "technology multiplier" in that advances provide direct dramatic improvements in flight functions and capabilities across the NASA mission classes, and enable new flight capabilities and mission scenarios, increasing science and exploration return. Space-qualified computing technology, however, has not advanced significantly in well over ten years and the current state of the practice fails to meet the near- to mid-term needs of NASA missions. Recognizing this gap, the NASA Game Changing Development Program (GCDP), under the auspices of the NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate, commissioned a study on space-based computing needs, looking out 15-20 years. The study resulted in a recommendation to pursue high-performance spaceflight computing (HPSC) for next-generation missions, and a decision to partner with the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) in this development.

use cases↗

Enhancing the Human Factors Engineering Role in an Austere Fiscal Environment

An austere fiscal environment in the aerospace community creates pressures to reduce program costs, often minimizing or sometimes even deleting the human interface requirements from the design process. With an assumption that the flight crew can recover real time from a poorly human factored space vehicle design, the classical crew interface requirements have been either not included in the design or not properly funded, though carried as requirements. Cost cuts have also affected quality of retained human factors engineering personnel. In response to this concern, planning is ongoing to correct the acting issues. Herein are techniques for ensuring that human interface requirements are integrated into a flight design, from proposal through verification and launch activation. This includes human factors requirements refinement and consolidation across flight programs; keyword phrases in the proposals; closer ties with systems engineering and other classical disciplines; early planning for crew-interface verification; and an Agency integrated human factors verification program, under the One NASA theme. Importance is given to communication within the aerospace human factors discipline, and utilizing the strengths of all government, industry, and academic human factors organizations in an unified research and engineering approach. A list of recommendations and concerns are provided in closing.

Stokes, Jack W.↗

2015 Advanced Environmental Health/Advanced Food Technology Standing Review Panel

The 2015 Advanced Environmental Health/Advanced Food Technology (AEH/AFT) Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) met for a site visit in Houston, TX on December 14 - 15, 2015. The SRP met with representatives from the Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) Element and members of the Human Research Program (HRP) to review the updated research plans for the Risk of Adverse Health Effects Due to Host-Microorganism Interactions (MicroHost Risk) and the Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness due to an Inadequate Food System (Food Risk). During the meeting, the SRP also met with the vehicle engineers to discuss possible food storage options. The SRP would like to commend Dr. Oubre and Dr. Douglas for their detailed presentations, as well the frank, refreshing, and comprehensive engineering presentation. This gave much needed perspective to the food storage issues and reassured the committee about NASA's approach to the problem. In terms of critiques, the SRP remains unconvinced about the rationale for probiotic use other than for specific applications supported by the literature. It is not clear what gap or problem is being addressed by the use of probiotics, and the rationale for their use needs to be clearly rooted in the available literature. The SRP thinks that if low-Earth orbit is associated with immune system impairment, then there may additional risks linked with the use of probiotics. It is not clear to the SRP how NASA will determine if probiotics are having their intended beneficial effect. A similar concern is raised as to what gaps or problems are being addressed by "functional foods". Mixed infections, rather than single species infections, which can augment severity of disease, also represent a significant concern. Overall, the SRP considers this to be a strong program that is well-organized, well-coordinated and generates valuable data.

Steinberg, Susan↗

Implementation of Human Systems Integration Technical and Management Process for the Lunar Gateway Program

NASA recognizes Human Systems Integration (HSI) as part of the overall systems engineering and acquisition strategy for space systems. The Lunar Gateway Program is implementing HSI technical and management process across the lifecycle of the mission, as required by NPR 7123.1C NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, and led by the Gateway HSI team as required by NPR 8705.2C Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, now HEOMD-003 Crewed Deep Space Systems Human Rating Certification Requirements and Standards for NASA Missions. NASA has been using HSI principles for many years and has applied them to many of its previous human spaceflight Programs. As NASA returns to the Moon in a more sustainable manner, the Gateway Program is maturing the application of HSI by implementing it more visibly as part of Artemis, with guidance from the NASA/SP-20210010952 NASA HSI Handbook. This paper discusses how HSI is being implemented in the Gateway Program, challenges faced with its implementation during the development phase, and strategies/approaches used to overcome those. The paper also covers HSI implementation for flight systems, vehicle processing, and interfaces across the six identified NASA HSI Domains: human factors engineering, operations, safety, training, maintainability and supportability, habitability and environment. The goal is to provide an overview of the implementation process of HSI in the Gateway Program as an example for other Programs/Projects/Missionsthat are looking to implement HSI.

Jackelynne Silva-Martinez↗

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗

Astronaut Clothing for Exploration Missions

Astronaut clothes for exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit need to satisfy several challenges not met by the currently-used mostly-cotton clothing. A laundering system is not expected to be available, and thus soiled garments must be trashed. Jettisoning waste does not seem feasible at this time. The cabin oxygen concentration is expected to be higher than standard, and thus fabrics must better resist ignition and burning. Fabrics need to be identified that reduce logistical mass, that can be worn longer before disposal, that are at least as comfortable as cotton, and that resist ignition or that char immediately after ignition. Human factors and psychology indicate that crew well-being and morale require a variety of colors and styles to accommodate personal identity and preferences. Over the past four years, the Logistics Reduction Project under NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems Program has sponsored the Advanced Clothing System Task to conduct several ground studies and one ISS study. These studies have evaluated length of wear and personal preferences of commercially-available exercise- and routine-wear garments made from several fabrics (cotton, polyester, Merino wool, and modacrylic), woven and knitted. Note that Merino wool and modacrylic char like cotton in ambient air, while polyester unacceptably melts. This paper focuses on the two components of an International Space Station study, onboard and on the ground, with astronauts and cosmonauts. Fabrics were randomized to participants. Length of wear was assessed by statistical survival analysis, and preference by exact binomial confidence limits. Merino wool and modacrylic t-shirts were worn longer on average than polyester t-shirts. Interestingly, self-assessed preferences were inconsistent with length-of-wear behavior, as polyester was preferred to Merino wool and modacrylic.

Poritz, Darwin H.↗

Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as 'before return to flight.' These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not 'before return to flight' recommendations, they can be viewed as 'continuing to fly' recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term. These recommendations reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human space-flight, is a developmental activity with high inherent risks.

SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA↗

Design Concepts for a Small Space-Based GEO Relay Satellite for Missions Between Low Earth and near Earth Orbits

The main purpose of the Small Space-Based Geosynchronous Earth orbiting (GEO) satellite is to provide a space link to the user mission spacecraft for relaying data through ground networks to user Mission Control Centers. The Small Space Based Satellite (SSBS) will provide services comparable to those of a NASA Tracking Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) for the same type of links. The SSBS services will keep the user burden the same or lower than for TDRS and will support the same or higher data rates than those currently supported by TDRS. At present, TDRSS provides links and coverage below GEO; however, SSBS links and coverage capability to above GEO missions are being considered for the future, especially for Human Space Flight Missions (HSF). There is also a rising need for the capability to support high data rate links (exceeding 1 Gbps) for imaging applications. The communication payload on the SSBS will provide S/Ka-band single access links to the mission and a Ku-band link to the ground, with an optical communication payload as an option. To design the communication payload, various link budgets were analyzed and many possible operational scenarios examined. To reduce user burden, using a larger-sized antenna than is currently in use by TDRS was considered. Because of the SSBS design size, it was found that a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket could deliver three SSBSs to GEO. This will greatly reduce the launch costs per satellite. Using electric propulsion was also evaluated versus using chemical propulsion; the power system size and time to orbit for various power systems were also considered. This paper will describe how the SSBS will meet future service requirements, concept of operations, and the design to meet NASA users' needs for below and above GEO missions. These users' needs not only address the observational mission requirements but also possible HSF missions to the year 2030. We will provide the trade-off analysis of the communication payload design in terms of the number of links looking above and below GEO; the detailed design of a GEO SSBS spacecraft bus and its accommodation of the communication payload, and a summary of the trade study that resulted in the selection of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle to deploy the SSBS and its impact on cost reductions per satellite. ======================================================================== Several initiatives have taken place within NASA1 and international space agencies2 to create a human exploration strategy for expanding human presence into the solar system; these initiatives have been driven by multiple factors to benefit Earth. Of the many elements in the strategy one stands out: to send robotic and human missions to destinations beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), including cis-lunar space, Near-Earth Asteroids (NEAs), the Moon, and Mars and its moons.3, 4 The time frame for human exploration to various destinations, based on the public information available,1,4 is shown in Figure 1. Advance planning is needed to define how future space communications services will be provided in the new budget environment to meet future space communications needs. The spacecraft for these missions can be dispersed anywhere from below LEO to beyond GEO, and to various destinations within the solar system. NASA's Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) program office provides communication and tracking services to space missions during launch, in-orbit testing, and operation phases. Currently, SCaN's space networking relay satellites mainly provide services to users below GEO, at Near Earth Orbit (NEO), below LEO, and in deep space. The potential exists for using a space-based relay satellite, located in the vicinity of various solar system destinations, to provide communication space links to missions both below and above its orbit. Such relays can meet the needs of human exploration missions for maximum connectivity to Earth locations and for reduced latency. In the past, several studies assessed the ability of satellite-based relays working above GEO in conjunction with Earth ground stations. Many of these focused on the trade between space relay and direct-to-Earth station links5,6,7. Several others focused on top-level architecture based on relays at various destinations8,9,10,11,12. Much has changed in terms of microwave and optical technology since the publication of the referenced papers; Ka-band communication systems are being deployed, optical communication is being demonstrated, and spacecraft buses are becoming increasingly more functional and operational. A design concept study was undertaken to access the potential for deploying a Small Space-Based Satellite (SSBS) relay capable of serving missions between LEO and NEO. The needs of future human exploration missions were analyzed, and a notional relay-based architecture concept was generated as shown in Fig. 1. Relay satellites in Earth through cis-Lunar orbits are normally located in stable orbits requiring low fuel consumption. Relay satellites for Mars orbit are normally selected based on the mission requirement and projected fuel consumption. Relay satellites have extreme commonalities of functions between them, differing only in the redundancy and frequencies used; therefore, the relay satellite in GEO was selected for further analysis since it will be the first step in achieving a relay-based architecture for human exploration missions (see Fig.Figure 2). The mission design methodology developed by the Collaborative Modeling for Parametric Assessment of Space Systems (COMPASS) team13 was used to produce the satellite relay design and to perform various design trades. At the start of the activity, the team was provided with the detailed concept of the notional architecture and the system and communication payload drivers.

Relay Satellites↗

Structural Requirements for the Space Propulsion Engine Systems

In January 2004, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was given a vision for Space Exploration by President Bush, setting our sight on a bold new path to go back to the Moon, then to Mars and beyond. As NASA gets ready to meet the vision set by President Bush, failures are not an option. Reliability of the propulsion engine systems will play an important role in establishing an overall safe and reliable operation of these new space systems. A new standard, NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment for Space Propulsion System Engines, has been developed to provide structural requirements for assessment of the propulsion systems engine. This standard is a complement to the current NASA-wide standard NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, which excluded the requirement for the engine systems (rotatory structures) along with pressure vessels. As developed, this document builds on the heritage of the multiple industrial standards related to strength and life assessment of the structures. For assuring a safe and reliable operation of a product and/or mission, establishing a set of structural assessment requirements is a key ingredient. Hence, a concentrated effort was made to improve the requirements where there are known lessons learned during the design, test, and operation phases of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and other engine development programs. Requirements delineated in this standard are also applicable for the reusable and/or human missions. It shall be noted that "reliability of a system cannot be tested and inspected but can only be achieved if it is first designed into a system." Hence, these strength and life assessment requirements for the space propulsion system engines shall be used along with other good engineering practices, requirements, and policies.

Aggarwal, Pravin K.↗

Expert systems and imaging - NASA's start-up work in intelligent image management

The problem of image management for NASA's Space Shuttle program and the future role of expert systems are considered. The difficulties involved in the storage and retrieval of the estimated 100,000 color photographs used for verification of essential installation, test, and repair procedures for Space Shuttle prelaunch are discussed. It is noted that the collection, classification, storage, and retrieval of high-quality pictoral images is possible through the use of pixels and an expert systems-assisted relational data base management system. The development of a query by pictorial example process is discussed. The NASA Intelligent Interactive Visual Data Base Management Systems project is detailed. It aims to conduct a systems analysis of a large-scale traditional image processing operation, collect data on critical human performance factors in the areas of image creation, processing, classification, storage, and retreival, and validate the attributes identified through the creation and testing of prototype models.

Ragusa, James M.↗

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment: Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Decision Making in the Airplane

The Importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful In improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking In response to a problem, This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Advances in Design Capabilities for Planetary Missions from the NASA Entry Systems Modeling and Instrumentation Portfolio

The Entry Systems Modeling project (ESM) is supported by both the NASA Space Technology and the Science Mission Directorates and focuses on developing simulation tools and validated models for characterizing the performance of entry systems tailored to planetary destinations across the Solar System. ESM is organized into six technical capability areas that together address all relevant factors related to spacecraft entry, as well as some aspects of descent: Thermal Protection System (TPS) Materials; Aerothermodynamics; Entry & Descent Vehicle Dynamics; Guidance, Navigation, and Control; Vehicle Systems Analysis; and Advanced Tools and Numerical Methods. Development within the capability areas is undertaken explicitly with a focus on transition and infusion to science missions, human exploration missions, and commercial space activities. The present talk details developments that specifically impact science missions, including simulation tool capabilities that aid in mission design and model development to understand entry system performance at a given destination. Examples of the successful infusion and transition of such project outcomes to science missions also are provided. Several simulation tool development efforts within ESM have resulted in new design capabilities for missions. One such outcome is improved toolsets for mission trajectory and concept of operations design. Specifically, an initiative to couple a leading tool for entry, ascent/descent, and orbital trajectory optimization (Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II or POST2) to those used within the Agency for interplanetary trajectory optimization (Copernicus and Monte) has made substantial progress, with the outcomes to date promising to allow efficient trajectory optimization across mission phases. Additionally, toolchains for the evaluation of vehicle performance during entry and descent have been developed that allow assessment of multi-dimensional aeroheating on detailed vehicle geometries, characterization of deployment and inflation of parachutes, and assessment of vehicle dynamic stability during descent. These capabilities are achieved by coupling diverse sets of physics together – material response, computational fluid dynamics, radiation, and vehicle dynamics – to suitably describe complex entry and descent phenomena. Several model development and validation efforts for specific destinations and entry regimes also are underway within the ESM project. For instance, new experimental capabilities to validate radiation models at low densities/high altitudes recently have been established with project support, specifically the Low-Density Shock Tube (LDST) at the NASA Ames Research Center Electric Arc Shock Tube (EAST) facility. The LDST is being leveraged to develop improved models of shock layer kinetics and radiation in Titan atmospheres, while future studies will be conducted in the LDST and the existing high velocity shock tube to provide validation data for radiation models of Venus, Ice Giants, and Mars atmospheres. Models describing the aerothermal and thermo-structural performance of Thermal Protection System (TPS) materials has been another focus, with multiscale modeling activities on-going for the two leading TPS materials applicable to a range of entry conditions and science missions: the Phenolic-Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA) and woven materials like 3D Mid-Density Carbon Phenolic (3MDCP). A continual effort is made to infuse and transition outcomes from ESM simulation tool and model development activities into relevant science missions. Significant progress has been made on this front, with missions such as Dragonfly, DAVINCI, and Mars Missions benefitting from project outcomes. The groundwork also is being laid to provide insights into forward looking missions to Gas/Ice Giants as well as for potential sample returns.

Justin Haskins↗

The Psychology of Cost Estimating

Cost estimation for large (and even not so large) government programs is a challenge. The number and magnitude of cost overruns associated with large Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs highlight the difficulties in developing and promulgating accurate cost estimates. These overruns can be the result of inadequate technology readiness or requirements definition, the whims of politicians or government bureaucrats, or even as failures of the cost estimating profession itself. However, there may be another reason for cost overruns that is right in front of us, but only recently have we begun to grasp it: the fact that cost estimators and their customers are human. The last 70+ years of research into human psychology and behavioral economics have yielded amazing findings into how we humans process and use information to make judgments and decisions. What these scientists have uncovered is surprising: humans are often irrational and illogical beings, making decisions based on factors such as emotion and perception, rather than facts and data. These built-in biases to our thinking directly affect how we develop our cost estimates and how those cost estimates are used. We cost estimators can use this knowledge of biases to improve our cost estimates and also to improve how we communicate and work with our customers. By understanding how our customers think, and more importantly, why they think the way they do, we can have more productive relationships and greater influence. By using psychology to our advantage, we can more effectively help the decision maker and our organizations make fact-based decisions.

Price, Andy↗