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Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects

Antineutrinos are electrically neutral, nearly massless fundamental particles produced in large numbers in the cores of nuclear reactors and in nuclear explosions. In the half century since their discovery, major advances in the understanding of their properties, and in detector technology, have opened the door to a new discipline—Applied Antineutrino Physics. Because antineutrinos are inextricably linked to the process of nuclear fission, there are many applications of interest in nuclear nonproliferation. This work presents a comprehensive survey of applied antineutrino physics relevant for nonproliferation, summarizes recent advances in the field, describes the overlap of this nascent discipline with other ongoing fundamental and applied antineutrino research, and charts a course for research and development for future applications. It is intended as a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the wider nuclear nonproliferation community.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to two weeks to streamline the material, standardize NGSI course length, and draw in a larger applicant pool. ?The international and interdisciplinary mix of students attending the course encourages discussions of the topics presented during the course. Information about the course is available at https://www.bnl.gov/nnsscourse/. While a complete analysis of course students has not been undertaken, BNL is aware of three individuals who worked at national laboratories after attending the NNSS course, one who worked at a national laboratory prior to attending NNSS, two who worked as federal employees after attending NNSS, three who were Nonproliferation Graduate Fellows before or after attending NNSS, and three who have participated in other NGSI activities.?Design Information Verification is an IAEA inspection activity that is implemented for the purpose of ensuring that the facility design is consistent with the declared use of a facility.

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Russian University Education in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

As safeguards and security (S&S) systems are installed and upgraded in nuclear facilities throughout Russia, it becomes increasingly important to develop mechanisms for educating future Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in the technologies and methodologies of physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A). As part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) program to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Education Project supports technical S&S degree programs at key Russian universities and nonproliferation education initiatives throughout the Russian Federation that are necessary to achieve the overall objective of fostering qualified and vigilant Russian S&S personnel. The Education Project supports major educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU). The S&S Graduate Program is available only at MEPhI and is the world’s first S&S degree program. Ten classes of students have graduated with a total of 79 Masters Degrees as of early 2009. At least 84% of the graduates over the ten years are still working in the S&S field. Most work at government agencies or research organizations, and some are pursuing their PhD. A 5½ year Engineering Degree Program (EDP) in S&S is currently under development at MEPhI and TPU. The EDP is more tailored to the needs of nuclear facilities. The program’s first students (14) graduated from MEPhI in February 2007. Similar-sized classes are graduating from MEPhI each February. All of the EDP graduates are working in the S&S field, many at nuclear facilities. TPU also established an EDP and graduated its first class of approximately 18 students in February 2009. For each of these degree programs, the American project team works with MEPhI and TPU to develop appropriate curriculum, identify and acquire various training aids, develop and publish textbooks, and strengthen instructor skills. The project has also supported the instruction of policy-oriented nonproliferation courses at various Russian universities. These courses are targeted towards future workers in the nuclear field to help build an effective nonproliferation awareness within the nuclear complex. A long-range goal of this project is to assist the educational programs at MEPhI and TPU in becoming self-sustainable and therefore able to maintain the three degree programs without DOE support. This paper describes current development of these education programs and new initiatives. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical S&S degree programs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Second Report of the Nuclear Data Subcommittee of the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee

The central importance of the nuclear data curated by the US Nuclear Data Program (USNDP) for clean energy generation, national security, nonproliferation, medical applications, and space exploration as well as basic science was described in a prior report issued by the DOE/NSF Nuclear Science Advisory Committee subcommittee on Nuclear Data (NSAC-ND) in September 2022. In this report, we present a set of fourteen (14) recommendations that will enhance and advance DOE-NP's stewardship of nuclear data. The first three recommendations focus on the existing core USNDP capabilities, namely: 1) Support the nuclear structure evaluation workforce to improve the currency, consistency, and accessibility of the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF); 2) Enhance nuclear reaction evaluation within the USNDP in support of the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) through expansion of the workforce and integration of high-performance computing, automation, and machine learning and; 3) Continue atomic mass evaluation in support AME and NUBASE databases. This is followed by eight (8) recommendations representing new cross-cutting initiatives involving both measurement and evaluation to address outstanding nuclear data needs. These new initiatives require a highly trained, diverse workforce that includes personnel with expertise from both inside and outside the nuclear physics community from which evaluators have traditionally been recruited. As such, many of these initiatives are accomplished via a Topical Nuclear Data Collaborations (TNDC). A TNDC is made up of domestic and international stakeholders, subject matter and nuclear data experts, and nuclear data evaluators and features a workforce development plan to ensure that nuclear data evaluators maintain currency in the relevant applications and are seen as equity partners in the endeavor. These include: 1) Establish a coordinated effort to improve evaluation and modeling in nuclear astrophysics for stellar dynamics, multi-messenger astronomy and nucleosynthesis; 2) Initiate a TNDC to develop and maintain nuclear structure evaluation beyond discrete states, including nuclear level densities, photon strength functions and photonuclear data for improved reaction modeling, and exploring nuclear structure at finite temperature; 3) Create a TNDC to perform correlated fission data evaluation, including cross sections, fragment yields, v(A), v(E n ) for nuclear energy, national security, nonproliferation and basic science; 4) From a panel of subject matter experts to establish and annually update a roster of key decay data to nurture its accelerated dissemination including both measurement and evaluation for targeted high-value nuclides for national security, nonproliferation and medical applications; 5) Comprehensive, consistent neutron-induced structure and reaction data for nuclear energy, national security, nonproliferation and planetary nuclear spectroscopy; 6) Charged-particle stopping powers for detector design, space effects and ion beam therapy; 7) High-energy reactions for space exploration and medical nuclide production, and; 8) The creation of an infrastructure for open data and data preservation for use by the entire nuclear physics community. All told, these initiatives require approximately $6.5M increase in NP support of the USNDP in fiscal year 2023 dollars and would require at least 3-5 years to carry out due to the length of time needed to recruit and train new nuclear data researchers. This relatively modest investment would help ensure that the fruits of the nuclear data research carried out by DOE-NP and its collaborators would be brought to bear to address some of the most important needs of our nation and the world. To ensure effective execution of this plan, we present an overview of recruitment, training, and retention goals for the USNDP, the centerpiece of which is a mutually agreed upon code of conduct. Finally, we identify the facility and instrumentation needed to perform the recommended experimental activities. This includes a short review of target fabrication capabilities, reactors, neutron beam, light- and heavy-stable ion, gamma-ray, high-energy and radioactive ion beam facilities. Lastly, a more complete appendix of experimental facilities previously compiled is included with new input provided for 6 facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A Practical Approach to a Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Sustained Nuclear Energy - 12383

Recent systems analysis studies at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have shown that sufficient information is available from previous research and development (R and D), industrial experience, and current studies to make rational decisions on a practical approach to a closed nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. These studies show that a near-term decision is needed to recycle used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States, to encourage public recognition that a practical solution to disposal of nuclear energy wastes, primarily UNF, is achievable, and to ensure a focus on essential near-term actions and future R and D. Recognition of the importance of time factors is essential, including the multi-decade time period required to implement industrial-scale fuel recycle at the capacity needed, and the effects of radioactive decay on proliferation resistance, recycling complexity, radioactive emissions, and high-level-waste storage, disposal form development, and eventual emplacement in a geologic repository. Analysis of time factors led to identification of the benefits of processing older fuel and an 'optimum decay storage time'. Further benefits of focused R and D can ensure more complete recycling of UNF components and minimize wastes requiring disposal. Analysis of recycling costs and nonproliferation requirements, which are often cited as reasons for delaying a decision to recycle, shows that (1) the differences in costs of nuclear energy with open or closed fuel cycles are insignificant and (2) nonproliferation requirements can be met by a combination of 'safeguards-by-design' co-location of back-end fuel cycle facilities, and applied engineered safeguards and monitoring. The study shows why different methods of separating and recycling used fuel components do not have a significant effect on nonproliferation requirements and can be selected on other bases, such as process efficiency, maturity, and cost-effectiveness. Finally, the study concludes that continued storage of UNF without a decision to recycle is not a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal, but can be a deterrent to public confidence in nuclear energy. In summary, our studies have shown, in contrast to findings of the more prominent studies, that today we do have sufficient knowledge to make informed choices for the values and essential methods of UNF recycling, based on previous research, industrial experience, and current analyses. We have shown the significant importance of time factors, including the benefits of an optimum decay storage time on deploying effective nonproliferation safeguards, enabling reduced recycling complexity and environmental emissions, and optimizing waste management and disposal. Together with the multi-decade time required to implement industrial-scale UNF recycle at the capacity needed to match generation rate, our conclusion is that a near-term decision to recycle as many UNF components as possible is vitally needed. Further indecision and procrastination can lead to a loss of public confidence and favorable perception of nuclear energy. With no near-term decision, the path forward for UNF disposal will remain uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered and no possible focus on a practical solution to the problem. However, a near-term decision to recycle UNF fuel and to take advantage of processing UNF and surface storing HLW, together with development and incorporation of more-complete recycling of UNF components, can provide the focus needed for a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal. (authors)

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SNM Radiation Signature Classification Using Different Semi-Supervised Machine Learning Models

The timely detection of special nuclear material (SNM) transfers between nuclear facilities is an important monitoring objective in nuclear nonproliferation. Persistent monitoring enabled by successful detection and characterization of radiological material movements could greatly enhance the nuclear nonproliferation mission in a range of applications. Supervised machine learning can be used to signal detections when material is present if a model is trained on sufficient volumes of labeled measurements. However, the nuclear monitoring data needed to train robust machine learning models can be costly to label since radiation spectra may require strict scrutiny for characterization. Therefore, this work investigates the application of semi-supervised learning to utilize both labeled and unlabeled data. As a demonstration experiment, radiation measurements from sodium iodide (NaI) detectors are provided by the Multi-Informatics for Nuclear Operating Scenarios (MINOS) venture at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as sample data. Anomalous measurements are identified using a method of statistical hypothesis testing. After background estimation, an energy-dependent spectroscopic analysis is used to characterize an anomaly based on its radiation signatures. In the absence of ground-truth information, a labeling heuristic provides data necessary for training and testing machine learning models. Supervised logistic regression serves as a baseline to compare three semi-supervised machine learning models: co-training, label propagation, and a convolutional neural network (CNN). In each case, the semi-supervised models outperform logistic regression, suggesting that unlabeled data can be valuable when training and demonstrating value in semi-supervised nonproliferation implementations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Alternate Funding Sources for the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has worked to ensure the safe and responsible promotion of nuclear technology throughout the world. The IAEA operates at the intersection of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s (NPT) fourth and third articles, which guarantee Parties to the Treaty the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, provided those activities are placed under safeguards verified by the IAEA. However, while the IAEA has enjoyed substantial success and prestige in the international community, there is a concern that its resources are being stretched to a point where it may no longer be possible to execute its multifaceted mission in its entirety. As noted by the Director General (DG) in 2008, demographics suggest that every aspect of the IAEA’s operations will be in higher demand due to increasing reliance on non-carbon-based energy and the concomitant nonproliferation, safety, and security risks that growth entails. In addition to these nuclear energy concerns, the demand for technical developmental assistance in the fields of food security, resource conservation, and human health is also predicted to increase as the rest of the world develops. Even with a 100% value-for-money rating by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and being described as an “extraordinary bargain” by the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, real budget growth at the Agency has been limited to zero-real growth for a better part of the last two decades. Although the 2012 regular budget (RB) received a small increase for most programs, the 2013 RB has been set at zero-real growth. As a result, the IAEA has had to defer infrastructure investments, which has hindered its ability to provide the public goods its Members seek, decreased global security and development opportunities, and functionally transformed the IAEA into a charity, dependent on extrabudgetary (EB) contributions to sustain its mission and capabilities. To resolve these resource constraints, we recommend the creation of an endowment, funded entirely through private contributions. Our initial estimates for the endowment are that a €2B principal. This level of capitalization could provide significant support to all aspects of the IAEA’s mission, including Capital Investment and Innovation; Technical Cooperation; as well as incentivizing the policy and technology entrepreneurship that will be necessary for the future health of the nonproliferation regime. Given this potential, our future efforts will focus on a more rigorous assessment of the financial requirements, while simultaneously creating the beginnings of a functional organization. These include: organizational structure, metrics for grant-making and performance evaluation, and outreach and fundraising strategies. At the end of this process, there should be sufficient information and engagement to begin to operationalize the endowment through external funding sources.

Toomey, Christopher M.↗

DOE/NNSA Next‐Generation Safeguards Initiative: Presentations by MIIS-LLNL Safeguards Policy Interns

As part of its Next‐Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), DOE/NNSA’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security has funded each year since 2008 a summer internship program in International Safeguards Policy jointly organized by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Graduate students selected for the program first attend an intensive one‐week course in Monterey on International Safeguards Policy and then, with NNSA‐funded stipend support from MIIS, spend a 10‐week internship at LLNL learning more about international nuclear safeguards and interacting with LLNL mentors and other Laboratory staff. As one component of the internship experience, each intern undertakes a project designed to expand knowledge of international safeguards or other relevant nuclear nonproliferation topics, culminating in a final presentation and paper. Attached are slides from this year’s intern project presentations, held August 16, 2013 at LLNL and attended by LLNL staff and by Bryan Lee from CNS. In the course of their work at LLNL, students had access only to unclassified, open source information, and no classified or controlled information was used in their projects. The views and recommendations in the slides are strictly their own, and should not be construed to represent views or conclusions of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Department of Energy, the U.S. Government, or the MIIS James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Reasoner: PNNL FY12 Report

Building on previous internal investments and leveraging ongoing advancements in semantic technologies, PNNL implemented a formal reasoning framework and applied it to a specific challenge in nuclear nonproliferation. The Semantic Nonproliferation Analysis Platform (SNAP) was developed as a preliminary graphical user interface to demonstrate the potential power of the underlying semantic technologies to analyze and explore facts and relationships relating to the nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). In developing this proof of concept prototype, the utility and relevancy of semantic technologies to the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) has been better understood.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CENC PSN VOID FY20 Report

Maritime trade accounts for approximately 80 percent of international commerce. The high volume of vessels traversing domestic and international ports makes port areas prime targets for terrorism as well as illegal trafficking of drugs and arms (conventional or nuclear). Port security is therefore a worldwide concern affecting global economies, freedom of movement, and national security. However, extensive port monitoring is inherently complex and time consuming — making it truly viable only via an automated framework that can detect potential illicit activity and alert authorities in a timely manner. The development of image processing algorithms for this purpose requires access to large, labeled datasets that cover the breadth of targets of interest as well as the environments that they are observed within. Curated and labeled datasets of this nature are of enormous value to Sandia's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and National Security Program portfolios, as well as to Sandia's machine learning/automatic target recognition (ML/ATR) algorithm development and R&D communities. The goal of this project is to create a commercial satellite imagery dataset of labeled maritime vessels in port areas to support the development of ML/ATR algorithms for port security nonproliferation purposes. This dataset — Port Security Nonproliferation Vessel Overhead Imagery Dataset (PSN VOID) — has the potential to support a variety of other ancillary missions, such as maritime domain awareness, domestic and international security, drug interdiction, and weapons trafficking.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The future of the NPT: REVCON and beyond

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains the agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.

Eipeldauer, Mary D↗

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

automated, nondestructive assay verification techn↗

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗