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At least 271 records · Page 15

Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems for Post-closure Waste Site Maintenance and Surveillance - 20143

The P- and R-Area Reactor buildings, located at SRS near Aiken, SC, were in-situ decommissioned by grouting below-grade portions of the buildings and demolishing some above-grade structures to grade level. Other reactor building structures were left above-grade and sealed to prevent human or animal access. Because the above grade-structures are expected to continue in their present state for hundreds of years, the condition of the building roofs is critical to mitigate rainwater intrusion. For this reason, building roof areas were strengthened with high strength concrete to ensure the long-term integrity of the roof structure. Periodic inspections of the roof structures are required to ensure that the roofs are functioning properly and to identify damage areas. The traditional method of inspecting closed reactor buildings requires the use of a helicopter and photographer to generate photographs and videos for review. This method proved sufficient but lacked the resolution and clarity that is required for a thorough inspection of the building structure. Fortunately, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has established a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) program using commercially available and custom-built remote-controlled aircraft. EC and ACP contacted the SRNL program to evaluate whether the sUAS technology could be employed for periodic reactor building inspections. The sUAS can fly within a few meters of the reactor buildings and hover, allowing for a more thorough aerial inspection. The initial sUAS inspection of the P-Area Reactor building was completed in February 2018 and at the R-Area Reactor building in August 2018 and were successful in providing higher resolution photos and videos. The sUAS inspections also revealed that vegetation had begun to grow on the roofs that could potentially damage the structure integrity. SRNL partnered with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University to build a custom heavy lift sUAS that could be equipped with herbicides to remotely treat the vegetative growth. Herbicides were successfully applied to the R-Area Reactor building roof using the custom sUAS in September 2018. The use of unmanned aircraft systems at SRS to perform aerial inspections and herbicide treatment in otherwise inaccessible areas has proven to be an efficient and cost-effective technology that provides high value, increases knowledge of facility conditions, and provides for early detection of damage. Periodic inspections of the reactor building roofs using sUAS technology are performed safely, efficiently, and at a significant cost and schedule savings while reducing emissions, noise, and fossil fuel use. The use of sUAS equipment for building inspections and herbicide application at SRS is unique within the DOE complex. The goal of SRS is to apply this remote technology to other waste unit operations and maintenance activities in the future. (authors)

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Flowsheet Evaluation of Dissolving Used Nuclear Fuel in PUREX Solvent

This study explores the potential benefit to the used nuclear fuel actinide recovery flowsheet of a process simplification and establish the experimental work needed to develop the simplified flowsheet. The simplification is based on replacing acid dissolution of used nuclear fuel with dissolution in the tri-butyl phosphate solvent used in the industrially mature Plutonium Uranium Reduction Extraction flowsheet. Though characterized by considerable uncertainty, simplified flowsheets appear feasible and potentially offer significant reductions in process complexity, nitrate inventory, secondary liquid effluent generation and plant footprint. Initial development of the technology should focus on key fission product and actinide dissolution as a function of process conditions and understanding the fundamental chemistry of tri-butyl phosphate solvent chemistry. Development of ancillary technologies for minor actinide separations and fuel pretreatment for tritium management is also recommended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2020. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2020 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act↗

NRIC Final Water Management Options

The purpose of this paper is to inform advanced reactor developers of the conditions and requirements needed to manage the water used to reject heat from advanced reactor demonstrations at the INL. While there are many advanced reactor concepts, all of them require heat rejection, and some plan to use water for hear rejection. Cooling water for heat rejection is frequently the largest fresh-water load for a nuclear reactor, and therefore the focus of water management. The type of reactor and its purpose, the physical conditions at the INL, and the regulatory structure of the demonstration also influence the optimal method of heat rejection. Choosing the best method of rejecting heat will significantly influence the cost and probability of success for any advanced reactor demonstration. One of the important considerations in the deployment of demonstration plants at the INL site is water use and its implications. Advanced reactor developers need to consider the limitations of the water consumption based on the state and federal regulations. The water consumption may become a limitation when the demonstration reactor capacities reach to conventional nuclear power plants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Power and Energy Storage Systems Toolbox -- PSTess v.1.0

The Power and Energy Storage Systems Toolbox (PSTess) is a MATLAB-based computing package for dynamic simulation and analysis of utility-scale battery storage systems. This codebase is a fork of the Power Systems Toolbox Version 3.0, developed at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and Cherry Tree Scientific Software. While PSTess shares a common lineage with PST, it is a substantially different application. As the name implies, the main distinguishing characteristic of PSTess is its ability to model inverter-based energy storage systems (ESS). The model that enables this is called ess.m, and it serves the dual role of representing ESS operational constraints and the generator/converter interface. With PSTess, the generator/converter interface is modeled as a controllable current source with the ability to modulate both active and reactive current. The model ess.m permits four-quadrant modulation, which allows it to represent a wide variety of inverter-based resources beyond energy storage when paired with an appropriate supplemental control model. Examples include utility-scale photovoltaic (PV) power plants, type 4 wind plants, and static synchronous compensators (STATCOM). This capability is especially useful for modeling hybrid plants that combine energy storage with renewable resources. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-8322 O

Elliott, RyanT.↗

Virtual Resource Management Framework (CRADA Final Report)

There is a need for advanced and widespread business automation within the nuclear industry to drive down operational costs while sustaining or improving safe operations. While there are many business process automation platforms commercially available, the difficulty is that business processes typically rely on a mixture of resource types to accomplish the desired activities and there is no universal software framework virtualizing diverse resource types for the purpose of automation. In this context, we are referring to any capability, physical or intangible, that can be used by an organization to achieve its objectives as a resource. To deploy business automation broadly and enable integrated operations for nuclear (ION), a framework is needed to represent all resource types and their associated disparate data within a plant and to enable seamless flow of resource information to the technologies used for process automation and resource optimization.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2021

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2021. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2021 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vadose Zone Model for B Complex for Composite Analysis

The objectives of the vadose modeling for the updated Hanford Site composite analysis (CA) are to simulate the flow and transport of water and radionuclide releases from the surface to the water table and to provide radionuclide transfer rates for the plateau to river (P2R) model, version 8.3. Water additions include natural recharge and water discharged to the ground as a result of industrial processes associated with Hanford Site operations. Contaminant sources include radionuclides in water discharged to the ground during operations and radionuclides disposed “dry” in solid waste burial grounds or other means. The simulation time starts in 1943 and ends at 12070, which is 10,000 years after assumed Hanford Site closure in 2070. The scope of this ECF is to document the development and results of the B Complex vadose zone model. The B Complex model encompasses the region around single-shell tank farms 241-B, 241-BX, and 241-BY, and adjacent cribs, trenches, and burial grounds in the northwestern part of the 200 East Area. Sources of waste to this area were primarily from B Plant (221-B) and U Plant (221-U).

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Estimation of pipe failure frequencies in the absence of operational experience data: A pilot study

Probabilistic failure metrics such as leak frequency and rupture frequency are commonly used to characterize piping reliability. The methodologies for calculating the failure metrics rely on a complex set of input parameters. Operating experience data and experimental data play an important role in informing the different input parameters. The paper describes results and conclusions of a coordinated research project to benchmark three different reliability models using a four-step procedure: reference case definition of relevance to advanced reactor designs, input parameter calibration, validation of results, and application of different methodologies upon completion of the calibration and validation steps. The reference case is a weld consisting of nickel-base alloy 152/52 and located within a primary pressure boundary of an advanced reactor. This alloy is a class of structural materials known to be highly resistant to stress corrosion cracking. Synergies between the different methods are noted and the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach to input parameter development is underscored. A key conclusion is that the three methods are equally suitable for estimating failure frequencies. In any specific application, a selection of the most practical or effective computational tool can be considered. The comparison of alternative models confirms and helps to gain confidence in the computed failure frequency estimates. The study was part of a coordinated research project organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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Savannah River Site H-Canyon Process Exhaust Tunnel Inspection Crawler Development - 20036

This paper covers development of a remote crawler used to inspect a subterranean radiochemical process ventilation tunnel located at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, SC. The purpose of the inspection was to ascertain the apparent structural condition of the tunnel with video footage. Manned entry is prohibited due to the hazardous environment requiring a fully-remote approach. The inspection system used high-definition cameras to archive over 1000 linear feet in the tunnel. While previous inspections had been undertaken, this crawler was developed to overcome obstacles that had put tunnel regions out of reach of prior inspection platforms. (authors)

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Determining Cs-137 Background body burdens for Wild Pigs At Savannah River Site

Savannah River Site (SRS) is a unique U.S. Department of Energy facility in that most of the 310-square miles of land has not be industrialized since operations began in 1953. This has allowed abundant, undisturbed vegetation structure to exists as well as an increase in herd sizes among wildlife populations onsite. Cs-137 is widespread across SRS due to the production of nuclear materials, but is mostly from global atmospheric fallout from nuclear weapons testing. Due to most of SRS being undisturbed land, the concentrations of Cs-137 are higher on site than off site. The SRS began conducting annual deer harvests that were open to the public beginning in 1965. All animals harvested during these hunts are monitored for Cs-137, which is measured using a Sodium Iodide detector. There has been an effective method for calculating the background Cs-137 body burden for the deer population at the SRS, developed by Gaines and Novak using data collected during hunts and gamma overflight data to determine the areas contaminated by site activities. For animals that have a Cs-137 concentration above the established background level, a dose is assigned to the hunter. By applying the same method for wild pigs using data collected from hunts, gamma overflight, and developing a site-specific home range of wild pigs, we were able to calculate the Cs-137 background body burden concentrations of wild pigs on site. Objectives: Develop site-specific home range for wild pigs at SRS; Determine the average concentrations of Cs-137 in wild pigs from background; Use Gaines and Novak method for determining background Cs-137 body burdens wild pigs on SRS. Methods and Materials: Development of site-specific home range of wild pigs was determined to be 2.5 miles using: Four studies conducted between 1969 and 1992 for the SRS wild pig population. (Mayer and Brisbin) The background compartments were determined using: Gamma overflight data showing contaminated areas; Site-specific home range of the wild pigs. Results and Conclusion: All data were generated through the JMP software to provide a histogram and summary statistics. The estimate of an upper tolerance limit for the background contamination with 95% confidence is 1.965 pCi/g for the wild pigs. This means that for wild pigs on SRS from the background compartments are expected to have Cs-137 concentrations of less than 1.965 pCi/g. The current background for the deer is 2.59 pCi/g. For the background compartments Cs-137 concentrations from 2012-2018: Mean: 0.815 pCi/g, Maximum: 2.341 pCi/g, Minimum: -0.704 pCi/g.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Panel Session 55: US DOE Savannah River Operations Office: Liquid Waste Progress

This panel provided an overview of the SRS HLW Liquid Waste Program (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) including discussions of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Tank Closures, Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit, Tank Closure Cesium Removal, and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Panelists with presentations: SRS Liquid Waste Program (James Folk); SRS Liquid Waste Progress (Mark Schmitz); Salt Waste Processing Facility (Frank Sheppard)

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Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

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Numerical modeling of Joule heated ceramic melter

Computational fluid dynamics and heat transfer models of waste glass melters are being developed to support the vitrification campaign at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) as part of the United States nuclear waste stewardship and environmental protection programs. The WTP mission aims to achieve the stable and durable processing of vitrified waste in the safest, most efficient, and economical manner possible. Hanford’s tank waste is far more complex and varied than the waste treated by other vitrification facilities and both startup and long-term operational challenges are likely to be even greater than prior experience has shown. There are thousands of different waste compositions, which makes processing the waste a complex and challenging task. Models of test melters, pilot-scale, and full-scale melters have been developed to provide understanding and insight into the various physical and chemical phenomena occurring during vitrification. So the results of these modeling activities will be used to support the WTP operations to process legacy nuclear waste into a stable form for disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vitrification of Hanford Tank 241-AP-107 with Recycled Condensate

During the vitrification of nuclear waste at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) – the primary mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection – the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, a test apparatus was designed to mimic the EMF evaporator and used to concentrate a volume of condensate that had been previously produced during the vitrification of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The test apparatus successfully concentrated the AP-107 condensate by a factor of 10 while retaining over 90 % of the technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), Cs, and I inventory. A second portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, given to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and combined with the AP-107 condensate concentrate after undergoing solids filtration and cesium removal by ion exchange. This combination served to approximate the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. After the addition of glass-forming chemicals (GFCs), the combined AP-107 waste and AP-107 condensate concentrate were processed in the CLSM to produce a glass, called AP-107-1R, that was designed to satisfy the WTP baseline requirements (Kim et al. 2012). During the 8.87 hours of processing, 7.27 kg of AP-107-1R glass were produced for an average glass production rate of 1739 kg m 2 d -1 . Compared to the previous run in the CLSM without recycled condensate, the run with the recycle had a greater average glass production rate, but the rate was within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. The glass produced from the AP-107 recycle run in the CLSM was within 10 % of the target AP-107-1R glass composition with respect to the primary glass components. Analysis of the minor component impurities revealed that their content in the glass product had approached their nominal target after 2 turnovers of the glass inventory in the CLSM while the activity of the minor radionuclides was retained in the glass product. The 99 Tc and total cesium content in the combined AP-107 waste and recycled condensate were maintained at concentrations expected to be experienced at the WTP. During processing in the CLSM, at discrete sampling time periods, the target 99 Tc/Cs mass ratio in the glass formulation varied from 0.9 to 62.9. Across this range, the Cs retention in the glass ranged from 53 to 60 %, while the retention from the entire runtime totaled 68 %, values which align with Cs retention in other scaled melter systems while processing LAW melter feeds at 99 Tc/Cs mass ratios ranging from 1 to 100. The 99 Tc retention in the glass ranged from 22 to 32 %, primarily due to the cold-cap coverage on the glass melt surface, the area covered by reacting melter feed, varying from ~80 % to ~95 % during processing, demonstrating greater volatility of 99 Tc from the glass while more surface was exposed, as expected based on previous 99 Tc volatility studies.

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Development of a Regulatory Strategy for Post Operational Clean Out Activities at Sellafield Limited Nuclear Licensed Site - 20273

The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at the Sellafield nuclear licensed site carried out its final commercial shear of spent nuclear fuel in November 2018, since when the facility has undergone rundown prior to cessation of operations. The Magnox Reprocessing Facility (MRF) is also due to cease operating, around the end of 2020. Following the cessation of spent fuel reprocessing, the facilities and supporting infrastructure will transition into Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), which will become an increasingly significant portion of Sellafield Limited's (SL) activities. POCO is defined as the set of activities undertaken directly after a nuclear facility comes to the end of its operational life, in order to place the plant in a suitable state for the subsequent decommissioning steps. The decommissioning strategy at SL is for deferred dismantling of these facilities, which will be subject to a period of Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M) following completion of POCO. This paper outlines the development and implementation of a regulatory strategy for POCO activities at the Sellafield site by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the independent nuclear safety, transport and security regulator in the United Kingdom. The paper also describes how this regulatory strategy is applied to nuclear installations undergoing transition into POCO and subsequent decommissioning. ONR works jointly with the Environment Agency, as the environmental regulators in England, to ensure that matters relevant to them have been duly considered. In developing a regulatory strategy, ONR has taken a site-wide approach, moving away from regulation on a facility-by-facility basis, to promote consistency, as well as maximising efficiency and effectiveness. The aim of this integrated approach was to prevent complications during future decommissioning and dismantling that have been experienced previously at similar facilities in France. The strategy recognised that once reprocessing operations are concluded, the hazard present will be reduced significantly, which provides the opportunity for ONR to consider how best to deliver a proportionate approach to regulatory interventions. Once POCO has been completed and the facility has transitioned into a period of S and M, the scale and frequency of ONR's interventions will reduce, commensurate with the safety case covering the remaining hazard and activities associated with maintaining the facility prior to final decommissioning. This approach allows ONR to consider risks holistically, considering the full life cycle of the facility and by taking due account of the interdependencies between facilities across the site. The strategy also aligns with existing regulation of high hazard and risk reduction activities, which remain ONR's top priority. As SL progresses with POCO activities in THORP and across the rest of the site, ONR will review its regulatory strategy to ensure that the intended safety benefits are realised. (authors)

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Prognostic model and failure mechanisms of steam generators in Sodium-Cooled fast reactors

This paper presents a prognostic model for sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) steam generators (SGs). Here, the purpose of the model is to estimate the remaining useful life of SFR SGs and thus to support the decision-making of autonomous control. SFR SGs are of great interest for plant integrity due to their harsh operation environment. They operate at higher temperatures and higher coolant-to-steam pressure differences than those of current light water reactors (LWR). The severity of the SFR SG failure consequences, which include water-sodium contact, is another reason. Understanding its failure mechanisms is important for the development of its prognostic model. Based on our literature review and physics-based analysis, we concluded that creep would be a dominant degradation mode of SFR SGs due to SFR’s high-temperature and high-pressure environment. Thus, creep is the focus of the prognostic model. Various other failure modes were also investigated in this study. The mechanical fatigue due to flow-induced vibration is usually observed in early developmental phases and would not be an important issue during normal operation. The thermal fatigue due to thermal stripping is occasionally observed in other components in SFRs but does not affect SG integrity. Pure water stress corrosive crack, fretting, and so on are commonly observed in LWR SGs but are significantly less important in SFR SGs because of the high temperatures, high pressure differences, and chemical properties of liquid sodium. Based on these investigations, a prognostic model focusing on creep failures was developed. It estimates the failure probability profile by sampling the Larson-Miller parameter (LMP) and temperature and associated uncertainties through Monte Carlo methods. Two case studies were presented. The first one demonstrated the model’s capability to calculate the failure probability for a new specimen within a given time. If the tube is working under temperatures of 500C ± 3 and pressures of 15.2 MPa, which leads to LMP of 20,100 ± 50, the failure probabilities within 50, 70, and 90 years are approximately 0.1 %, 3.2 %, and 17.5 %. The second demonstrated how adjusting the workload can help to protect the integrity of the component. For an old tube reaching 99 % of its lifespan, continuing to run at temperatures of 500C ± 3 and LMP of 20,100 ± 50 leads to a failure probability of about 29.0 % within a year. If the temperature is reduced by 5C, the failure probability can be reduced to 2.5 %, and, if the pressure is also reduced such that the LMP is increased by 100, the failure probability can further be reduced to 0.12 %.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Accident event progression, gaps, and key performance indicators for steam generator tube rupture events in water-cooled SMRs: A review

According to historical records of reactor-related incidents, a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) is one of the most common occurrences at operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Such design-basis accidents (DBAs) could lead to a direct path for radionuclides to be released to the atmosphere via the safety and relief valves, making assessments of radionuclide discharge from operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) into the environment crucial for ensuring safety. In such analyses, the primary focus has been on the extent of radioactive release, not the potential damage to the core. Moreover, significant and timely intervention by operators is needed during the initial stages of SGTRs in order to avert overfilling of the SGs, as well as to restrict the dissemination of radioactive materials. Determining the event sequence and phases that occur during an SGTR incident in an advanced passive (e.g., AP1000) water-cooled nuclear reactor is crucial for implementing effective passive safety systems (PSSs) for a specific water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) design. Here this study provides a comprehensive review of the accident event progression, associated physical phenomena, knowledge gaps, and key performance indicators that must be evaluated and assessed in thermal-hydraulics models, based on relevant test data, respectively.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗