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At least 271 records · Page 15

Radioactive Decay Computation with a Graph Approach for Solving a Linear Dynamic System

ABSTRACT: This article gives two graph-based algorithms for radioactive decay computation. The first algorithm identifies the connected components of the graph induced from the given radioactive decay dynamics to reduce the size of the problem. The solutions are derived over the precalculated connected components, respectively and independently. The second algorithm utilizes acyclic structure of radioactive decay dynamics. The algorithm evaluates the reachable vertices of the induced system graph from the initially activated vertices and finds the minimal set of starting vertices populating the entire reachable vertices. Then, the decay calculations are performed over the reachable vertices from the identified minimal starting vertices, respectively, with the partitioned initial value over the reachable vertices. A formal argument is given to show that the proposed graph inspired divide and conquer calculation methods perform the intended radioactive decay calculation. Empirical efforts comparing the proposed radioactive decay calculation algorithms are presented.

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MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗

Systems and methods for assaying a radioactive gas, and related scintillation cells

A radioactive gas assay system comprises a scintillation cell production assembly, a detector assembly, a computer assembly, and a scintillation cell destruction assembly. The scintillation cell production assembly is configured to produce a scintillation cell comprising a glass scintillator shell containing a volume of radioactive gas. The detector assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to detect photons emitted thereby. The computer assembly is configured to receive data from the detector assembly to automatically calculate an absolute activity of the volume of radioactive gas of the scintillation cell and radiation detection efficiencies of the detector assembly. The scintillation cell destruction assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to rupture the substantially non-porous glass scintillator shell to release the volume of radioactive gas. A method of assaying a radioactive gas, and a scintillation cell are also described.

Robinson, Troy A.↗

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗

Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Discharges in 2017

This report documents radioactive discharges from the TA50 Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) during calendar year 2017. During 2017, all treated water was fed to the effluent evaporator. The evaporator was operated 3574 hours on 224 days, primarily in one-burner mode (63% of the time). A total of 3.42 million liters of treated water were fed to the evaporator, and 3.36 million liters were discharged to the environment as steam from the evaporator stack. Evaporator operation continued the single-tank feed mode that was begun in 2014. Specifically, when a Frac tank was filled with treated water, contents of the tank were mixed; a representative sample was collected; and the sample was analyzed to assess water quality. A total of 49 tanks of treated water were sampled, analyzed, and then fed to the evaporator during 2017. Tank samples were analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, tritium, and a few inorganic parameters such as nitrate and dissolved solids. Frac tank samples of evaporator feed were held, then composited at the end of each month. Each monthly composite sample was then analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, tritium, and 36 radioisotopes (eight alpha-emitting isotopes, 28 beta emitters). Samples were also collected of water drained from the evaporator. These samples, analyzed for alpha, beta, and tritium concentrations, were then used to estimate radioactive quantities present in evaporator drain water. The difference, rad fed less rad drained, yielded quantities of radioactivity discharged through the stack into the environment . Table 1 summarizes this information.

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2nd Quarter Transportation Report FY2016: Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2016.

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Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex (4th Quarter / Annual Transportation Report FY2015)

This report satisfies the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste shipments and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter or during FY 2015.

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4 th Quarter / Annual Transportation Report FY16: Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes both the 4th quarter and fiscal year (FY) 2016 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY 2016.

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3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY16: Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2016 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment from a NNSS facility and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2016.

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Radioactive Waste Management Basis (Rev.6)

This Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents radioactive waste management practices adopted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) pursuant to Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The purpose of this RWMB is to ensure that LLNL manages radioactive waste in a safe and environmentally-compliant manner, protective of worker and public safety.

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Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

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2008 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) for each of the facilities, with the results submitted annually to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) performed an annual review in fiscal year (FY) 2008 by evaluating operational factors and research results that impact the continuing validity of the PAs and CAs. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2008 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

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Regulatory standards for permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

This paper provides a summary of observations drawn from twenty years of personal experience in working with regulatory criteria for the permanent disposal of radioactive waste for both the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant repository for transuranic defense waste and the proposed Yucca Mountain repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level wastes. Rather than providing specific recommendations for regulatory criteria, my goal here is to provide a perspective on topics that are fundamental to how high-level radioactive waste disposal regulations have been implemented in the past. What are the main questions raised relevant to long-term disposal regulations? What has proven effective in the past? Where have regulatory requirements perhaps had unintended consequences? New regulations for radioactive waste disposal may prove necessary, but the drafting of these regulations may be premature until a broad range of policy issues are better addressed. In the interim, the perspective offered here may be helpful for framing policy discussions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Realization of the National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste in Bulgaria - 16611

Radioactive waste is generated in the Republic of Bulgaria from the operation and decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications, and the industry. The need for building a National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government and described and justified in its Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) to discharge its statutory responsibilities in waste management is. The European Union (EU) finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund (KIDSF). After an international tendering procedure, SERAW placed a contract for the development of the design of the NDF to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.R and DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, with ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency providing technical review and support. Two Bulgarian companies participate also in the project as subcontractors - EQE Bulgaria and to a lesser extent KK-Project. The repository project official name is 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria', usually abbreviated as 'R-Project 5'. After obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository conceptual design variant, the R Project 5 focused on developing the Technical Design on the one hand, and on preparing the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR) to demonstrate the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design on the other. These documents were handed over to the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA) as well as to the different authorities involved in the comprehensive licensing process required for nuclear facilities in the country. The corresponding permits have mostly been received or are expected for early 2016. In the last quarter of 2015 the procurement procedure for repository construction as turn-key project was started with the pre-qualification of possible constructors for the Phase I repository realization on a lump sum contract basis. Repository construction is now expected to start in 2016, with the start of waste disposal now scheduled for around 2020. With the realization of the Bulgarian National Disposal Facility an important milestone for waste disposal in the European Union is about to be achieved. This paper is a sequel of previously presented papers on the NDF construction, now including details of the complex licensing process that this disposal facility underwent, now in its final stages. (authors)

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A Decade of Innovative Approaches to Treating and Dispositioning Radioactive Waste at the Savannah River Site - 20620

This year marks the 70. anniversary of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS), located near Aiken, South Carolina. SRS is a key industrial complex responsible for environmental stewardship, environmental cleanup, waste management, and disposition of nuclear materials. SRS also continues to have a role in critical defense-related activities and the reprocessing of used reactor fuel. The SRS encompasses 803 square kilometers (310 square miles) in parts of Aiken, Barnwell, and Allendale counties. The Liquid Waste Mission starts with the safe receipt and storage of radioactive liquid waste in the waste tanks, which principally includes Cold War legacy waste, but also waste from support of National Aeronautics Space Administration missions, medical isotope production, and research activities. This 133,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) (35 million gallons [Mgal]) of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is currently held in 43 large underground waste tanks. The capacity of each of these tanks range from 2,800 m{sup 3} to 5,000 m{sup 3} (0.75 to 1.33 Mgal) and were placed in operation between 1954 and 1986. In July 2009, the DOE awarded a stand-alone contract to execute the Liquid Waste Mission at SRS. The Liquid Waste Contractor selected was Savannah River Remediation LLC1 (SRR), which is responsible for receipt, storage, retrieval and treatment of all HLW, disposal of the decontaminated low-activity waste fraction, as well as operationally closing cleaned HLW tanks. Since July 2009, SRR has successfully grouted and operationally closed six large underground tanks, poured 1,476 canisters of vitrified HLW (a stable glass waste form), treated approximately 34,200 m{sup 3} (9.0 Mgal) of HLW, and dispositioned over 41,200 m{sup 3} (10.9 Mgal) of decontaminated salt solution as low-level waste (LLW) into the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) being constructed by SRR on site. The innovative work performed by SRR in the LLW portion of its mission has earned it the Richard S. Hodes Award. The work conducted by SRR is the same work championed by the late Richard S. Hodes, a respected physician, statesmen, and Chairman of the Southeast Compact Commission for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management. (authors)

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