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NASA NTRS2015

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange is a two-year research effort to visualize the U. S. aviation industry at a point 50 years in the future, and to define potential communication solutions to meet those future data exchange needs. The research team, led by XCELAR, was tasked with identifying future National Airspace System (NAS) scenarios, determining requirements and functions (including gaps), investigating technical and business issues for air, ground, & air-to-ground interactions, and reporting on the results. The project was conducted under technical direction from NASA and in collaboration with XCELAR's partner, National Institute of Aerospace, and NASA technical representatives. Parallel efforts were initiated to define the information exchange functional needs of the future NAS, and specific communication link technologies to potentially serve those needs. Those efforts converged with the mapping of each identified future NAS function to potential enabling communication solutions; those solutions were then compared with, and ranked relative to, each other on a technical basis in a structured analysis process. The technical solutions emerging from that process were then assessed from a business case perspective to determine their viability from a real-world adoption and deployment standpoint. The results of that analysis produced a proposed set of future solutions and most promising candidate technologies. Gap analyses were conducted at two points in the process, the first examining technical factors, and the second as part of the business case analysis. In each case, no gaps or unmet needs were identified in applying the solutions evaluated to the requirements identified. The future communication solutions identified in the research comprise both specific link technologies and two enabling technologies that apply to most or all specific links. As a result, the research resulted in a new analysis approach, viewing the underlying architecture of ground-air and air-air communications as a whole, rather than as simple "link to function" paired solutions. For the business case analysis, a number of "reference architectures" were developed for both the future technologies and the current systems, based on three typical configurations of current aircraft. Current and future costs were assigned, and various comparisons made between the current and future architectures. In general, it was assumed that if a future architecture offers lower cost than the current typical architecture, while delivering equivalent or better performance, it is likely that the future solution will gain industry acceptance. Conversely, future architectures presenting higher costs than their current counterparts must present a compelling benefit case in other areas or risk a lack of industry acceptance. The business case analysis consistently indicated lower costs for the proposed future architectures, and in most cases, significantly so. The proposed future solutions were found to offer significantly greater functionality, flexibility, and growth potential over time, at lower cost, than current systems. This was true for overall, fleet-wide equipage for domestic and oceanic air carriers, as well as for single, General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The overall research results indicate that all identified requirements can be met by the proposed solutions with significant capacity for future growth. Results also illustrate that the majority of the future communication needs can be met using currently allocated aviation RF spectrum, if used in more effective ways than it is today. A combination of such optimized aviation-specific links and commercial communication systems meets all identified needs for the 50-year future and beyond, with the caveat that a new, overall function will be needed to manage all information exchange, individual links, security, cost, and other factors. This function was labeled "Delivery Manager" (DM) within this research. DM employs a distributed client/server architecture, for both airborne and ground communications architectures. Final research results included identifying the most promising candidate technologies for the future system, conclusions and recommendations, and identifying areas where further research should be considered.

Communications↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders

The NASA commitment to human space flight includes continuing to fly astronauts on the ISS until it is decommissioned as well as possibly returning astronauts to the moon or having astronauts venture to an asteroid or Mars. As missions leave low Earth orbit and explore deeper space, BHP supports and conducts research to enable a risk posture that considers the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders “acceptable given mitigations,” for pre-, in, and post-flight.The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) determines the risk of various mission scenarios using a likelihood (per person per year) by consequences matrix examining those risks across two categories—long term health and operational (within mission). Colors from a stoplight signal are used by HSRB and quickly provide a means of assessing overall perceived risk for a particular mission scenario. Risk associated with the current six month missions on the ISS are classified as “accepted with monitoring” while planetary missions, such as a mission to Mars, are recognized to be a “red” risk that requires mitigation to ensure mission success.Currently, the HSRB deems that the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric outcomes requires mitigation for planetary missions owing to long duration isolation and radiation exposure (see Table 1). While limited research evidence exists from spaceflight, it is well known anecdotally that the shift from the two week shuttle missions to the six month ISS missions renders the psychological stressors of space as more salient over longer duration missions. Shuttle astronauts were expected just to tolerate any stressors that arose during their mission and were successful at doing so (Whitmire et al, 2013). While it is possible to deal with stressors such as social isolation and to live with incompatible crewmembers for two weeks on shuttle, “ignoring it” is much less likely to be a successful coping mechanism on station. For the longer missions of the ISS, astronauts require a larger, more robust set of coping skills and more psychological support. Evidence of this are the number of BHP’s Operational Psychology (Op Psy) staff who have been awarded silver Snoopys by long duration astronauts†, in the statements of praise for the Op Psy and Family Support Office teams, and in the written and oral statements from flown astronauts regarding difficulty of longer missions and how much Op Psy helped.

Slack, Kelley J.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Integrated Research Plan to Assess the Combined Effects of Space Radiation, Altered Gravity, and Isolation and Confinement on Crew Health and Performance: Implementation Strategy

This document supplements the white paper titled CBS Integrated Research Plan: Problem Statement. The Problem Statement describes why it is important to implement a fully integrated research plan to derive risk estimates for the combined, potentially synergistic, effects of the three major spaceflight hazards (space radiation; isolated, confined, and extreme environments; altered gravity). These risk estimates will help establish acceptable maximum decrement or change in a physiological or behavioral parameter during or after spaceflight, and the acceptable limit of exposure to the combined spaceflight hazards. This Implementation Strategy describes how the research plan will accomplish the CBS Integrated Research Plan goals. The Implementation Strategy includes approaches to evaluate relationships among biological responses underlying three risks that are managed by three of NASA’s Human Research Project (HRP) organizational “elements”. This CBS (Acute effects of radiation on CNS, BMed, Sensorimotor) Integrated Research Plan also identifies strategies to monitor and mitigate decrements to operationally relevant performance. Currently, the strategy that was initiated in 2018, includes an eight-year research plan and a four-year validation plan that extend to the year 2030. Once the monitoring tools and countermeasures are developed, they will be validated and refined during four years of early exploration missions. The planned tasks and their associated research products and deliverables have been mapped to the individual research emphases to clearly demonstrate how each research area helps ensure crew health and safety during exploration missions.

Susan Steinberg↗

NASA NTRS2006

A Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. The term safely means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences (for example, excess lifetime fatal cancer risk) can be defined. The Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the understanding of health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting risk of carcinogenesis, central nervous system damage, degenerative tissue disease, and acute radiation effects. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus the fourth element develops computer codes to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Developing acceptance limits for measured bearing wear of the Space Shuttle Main Engine high pressure oxidizer turbopump

The probabilistic design approach currently receiving attention for structural failure modes has been adapted for obtaining measured bearing wear limits in the Space Shuttle Main Engine high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. With the development of the shaft microtravel measurements to determine bearing health, an acceptance limit was neeed that protects against all known faiure modes yet is not overly conservative. This acceptance criteria limit has been successfully determined using probabilistic descriptions of preflight hardware geometry, empirical bearing wear data, mission requirements, and measurement tool precision as an input for a Monte Carlo simulation. The result of the simulation is a frequency distribution of failures as a function of preflight acceptance limits. When the distribution is converted into a reliability curve, a conscious risk management decision is made concerning the acceptance limit.

Genge, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Developing Crew Health Care and Habitability Systems for the Exploration Vision

This paper will discuss the specific mission architectures associated with the NASA Exploration Vision and review the challenges and drivers associated with developing crew health care and habitability systems to manage human system risks. Crew health care systems must be provided to manage crew health within acceptable limits, as well as respond to medical contingencies that may occur during exploration missions. Habitability systems must enable crew performance for the tasks necessary to support the missions. During the summer of 2005, NASA defined its exploration architecture including blueprints for missions to the moon and to Mars. These mission architectures require research and technology development to focus on the operational risks associated with each mission, as well as the risks to long term astronaut health. This paper will review the highest priority risks associated with the various missions and discuss NASA s strategies and plans for performing the research and technology development necessary to manage the risks to acceptable levels.

Laurini, Kathy↗

NASA NTRS1995

Issues in protection from galactic cosmic rays

Radiation risks to astronauts depend on the microscopic fluctuations of energy absorption events in specific tissues. These fluctuations depend not only on the space environment but also on the modifications of that environment by the shielding provided by structures surrounding the astronauts and the attenuation characteristics of the astronaut's body. The effects of attenuation within the shield and body depends on the tissue biological response to these microscopic fluctuations. In the absence of an accepted method for estimating astronaut risk, we examined the attenuation characteristics using conventional linear energy transfer (LET)-dependent quality factors (as one means of representing relative biological effectiveness, RBE) and a track-structure repair model to fit cell transformation (and inactivation) data in the C3H10 T1/2 mouse cell system obtained for various ion beams. Although the usual aluminum spacecraft shield is effective in reducing dose equivalent with increasing shield thickness, cell transformation rates are increased for thin aluminum shields. Clearly, the exact nature of the biological response to LET and track width is critical to evaluation of biological protection factors provided by a shield design. A significant fraction of biological injury results from the LET region above 100 keV/mu m. Uncertainty in nuclear cross-sections results in a factor of 2-3 in the transmitted LET spectrum beyond depths of 15 g/cm2, but even greater uncertainty is due to the combined effects of uncertainty in biological response and nuclear parameters. Clearly, these uncertainties must be reduced before the shield design can be finalised.

NASA Discipline Number 45-10↗

NASA NTRS2014

NASA's Approach to Critical Risks for Extended Human Space Flight

Planetary Robotic and Human Spaceflight Exploration Humans are exposed to a great variety of hazards in the space environment. These include the effects of weightlessness, radiation, isolation and confinement, altered day-night cycles, and others. These inherent hazards have both physiological and behavioral consequences. The adaptive capabilities of humans in these situations is remarkable, and often exceed our expectations. However, the demanding environment and challenging operational pace can push some of these adaptive processes to their limits. The NASA Human Research Program (HRP) is tasked with mitigating the most serious of these effects on human health, safety, and performance, in long-duration space flight. This can involve the development and deployment of physiological countermeasures, better understanding of the physiological alterations and avoidance of exacerbating situations, inputs to the design of future spacecraft to minimize risks, and in some cases the awareness that some level of risk might have to be accepted based on the resulting consequences and their likelihood. HRP has identified a few areas that are of special concern due to their severity, lack of understanding of underlying causes, or potential for negative impact on health or performance. Some of these areas are visual impairment possibly due to increased intracranial pressure, behavioral and performance problems due to sleep deficits and isolation, and acute and chronic effects of radiation. These problems can, if not addressed, be expected to increase on longer and more distant missions. The evidence from spaceflight, laboratory, and analog studies that supports the selection of the most critical risks will be discussed. Current and planned research programs that address these risks, and their anticipated outcomes, will also be described.

Shelhamer, Mark↗

NASA NTRS1990

The need for a hypersonic demonstrator

The requirement for research aircraft and demonstrator vehicles has been seriously challenged by tight budgets and erroneous impressions that aeronautical technology has matured to a point where the value added by flight research and/or demonstration is not sufficient to offset the costs. While this issue may be debatable with respect to subsonic/transonic speeds, such is not the case for high-speed (supersonic and hypersonic) operation. The aerodynamic performance, weight/payload fractions, and thermodynamic problems are such that small margins of error can be tantamount to the vehicle being unable to reach its design point or so inefficient as to render it useless. This paper addresses some of the critical design considerations and operational constraints which make it mandatory to carry out flight research and develop a demonstrator vehicle in order that the risks be reduced to an acceptable level to assure technology readiness for viable hypersonic flight.

Ayers, T. G.↗

NASA NTRS1997

The Space Shuttle Program Pre-Flight Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk/Damage Predictions and Post-Flight Damage Assessments

The pre-flight predictions and postflight assessments carried out in relation to a series of Space Shuttle missions are reviewed, and data are presented for the meteoroid and orbital debris damage observed on the Hubble Space Telescope during the 1994 Hubble repair mission. Pre-flight collision risk analyses are carried out prior to each mission, and in the case of an unacceptable risk, the mission profile is altered until the risk is considered to be acceptable. The NASA's BUMPER code is used to compute the probability of damage from debris and meteoroid particle impacts based on the Poisson statistical model for random events. The penetration probability calculation requires information concerning the geometry of the critical systems, the penetration resistance and mission profile parameters. Following each flight, the orbiter is inspected for meteoroid and space debris damage. The emphasis is on areas such as the radiator panels, the windows and the reinforced carbon-carbon structures on the leading wing edges and on the nose cap. The contents of damage craters are analyzed using a scanning electron microscope to determine the nature and origin of the impactor. Hypervelocity impact tests are often performed to simulate the observed damage and to estimate the nature of the damaging particles. The number and type of damage observed provides information concerning the orbital debris environment.

Levin, George M.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Lessons Learned from the Clementine Mission

According to BMDO, the Clementine mission achieved many of its technology objectives during its flight to the Moon in early 1994 but, because of a software error, was unable to test the autonomous tracking of a cold target. The preliminary analyses of the returned lunar data suggest that valuable scientific measurements were made on several important topics but that COMPLEX's highest-priority objectives for lunar science were not achieved. This is not surprising given that the rationale for Clementine was technological rather than scientific. COMPLEX lists below a few of the lessons that may be learned from Clementine. Although the Clementine mission was not conceived as a NASA science mission exactly like those planned for the Discovery program, many operational aspects of the two are similar. It is therefore worthwhile to understand the strengths and faults of the Clementine approach. Some elements of the Clementine operation that led to the mission's success include the following: (1) The mission's achievements were the responsibility of a single organization and its manager, which made that organization and that individual accountable for the final outcome; (2) The sponsor adopted a hands-off approach and set a minimum number of reviews (three); (3) The sponsor accepted a reasonable amount of risk and allowed the project team to make the trade-offs necessary to minimize the mission's risks while still accomplishing all its primary objectives; and (4) The development schedule was brief and the agreed-on funding (and funding profile) was adhered to. Among the operational shortcomings of Clementine were the following: (1) An overly ambitious schedule and a slightly lean budget (meaning insufficient time for software development and testing, and leading ultimately to human exhaustion); and (2) No support for data calibration, reduction, and analysis. The principal lesson to be learned in this category is that any benefits from the constructive application of higher risk for lower cost and faster schedule will be lost if the schedule does not allow adequate time for the development of all essential systems or makes no allowance for human frailties. Another lesson to be drawn is that despite its limitations, if judged strictly as a science mission, Clementine attested that significant scientific information can be gathered during a technology-demonstration mission. In the current era of limited funds, when science missions will be infrequent, the opportunity to fly scientific instruments aboard missions whose objectives might be other than science must be seized and, indeed, encouraged. During such opportunities it would be inexcusable to do second-class science. Thus the scientific community must be actively involved in such projects from their initiation.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2001

Re-Entry Survivability Risk Assessment of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE)

A reentry analysis of the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) spacecraft was performed using the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) - Version 5.0. The analysis was done in response to a request by NASA Headquarters and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) after a preliminary assessment using the NASA Johnson Space Center Debris Assessment Software (DAS) - Version 1.0 had shown that the EUVE reentry may produce a debris area greater than the limit set within the NASA Safety Standard 1740.14 guidelines. DAS predicted that an uncontrolled reentry of the EUVE spacecraft would result in a total casualty area of 12.41 sq m, which exceeds the 8 sq m limit set in the NASA standards and implies a potential human casualty risk of approximately 1 in 5300. The ORSAT model enabled a higher fidelity thermal analysis of the EUVE spacecraft, utilizing sophisticated material and thermal properties such as emissivity, heat of oxidation, thermal conductivity, and material thickness inputs, which provided a foundation for a more in depth analysis of the reentering objects. Due to the conservative nature of the DAS study, it was reasonable to run ORSAT for only the ten objects shown to survive in the original DAS analysis. The result of the ORSAT study was a reduced casualty area of only 5.95 sq m, well within NASA safety limits. With the risk to human life now acceptably low, NASA can avoid having to take mitigation measures and allow EUVE to reenter the Earth's atmosphere uncontrolled.

O'Hara, Robin E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Software Certification - Coding, Code, and Coders

We describe a certification approach for software development that has been adopted at our organization. JPL develops robotic spacecraft for the exploration of the solar system. The flight software that controls these spacecraft is considered to be mission critical. We argue that the goal of a software certification process cannot be the development of "perfect" software, i.e., software that can be formally proven to be correct under all imaginable and unimaginable circumstances. More realistically, the goal is to guarantee a software development process that is conducted by knowledgeable engineers, who follow generally accepted procedures to control known risks, while meeting agreed upon standards of workmanship. We target three specific issues that must be addressed in such a certification procedure: the coding process, the code that is developed, and the skills of the coders. The coding process is driven by standards (e.g., a coding standard) and tools. The code is mechanically checked against the standard with the help of state-of-the-art static source code analyzers. The coders, finally, are certified in on-site training courses that include formal exams.

training↗

NASA NTRS2009

Findings from the Supersonic Qualification Program of the Mars Science Laboratory Parachute System

In 2012, the Mars Science Laboratory Mission (MSL) will deploy NASA's largest extra-terrestrial parachute, a technology integral to the safe landing of its advanced robotic explorer on the surface. The supersonic parachute system is a mortar deployed 21.5 m disk-gap-band (DGB) parachute, identical in geometric scaling to the Viking era DGB parachutes of the 1970's. The MSL parachute deployment conditions are Mach 2.3 at a dynamic pressure of 750 Pa. The Viking Balloon Launched Decelerator Test (BLDT) successfully demonstrated a maximum of 700 Pa at Mach 2.2 for a 16.1 m DGB parachute in its AV4 flight. All previous Mars deployments have derived their supersonic qualification from the Viking BLDT test series, preventing the need for full scale high altitude supersonic testing. The qualification programs for Mars Pathfinder, Mars Exploration Rover, and Phoenix Scout Missions were all limited to subsonic structural qualification, with supersonic performance and survivability bounded by the BLDT qualification. The MSL parachute, at the edge of the supersonic heritage deployment space and 33% larger than the Viking parachute, accepts a certain degree of risk without addressing the supersonic environment in which it will deploy. In addition, MSL will spend up to 10 seconds above Mach 1.5, an aerodynamic regime that is associated with a known parachute instability characterized by significant canopy projected area fluctuation and dynamic drag variation. This aerodynamic instability, referred to as "area oscillations" by the parachute community has drag performance, inflation stability, and structural implications, introducing risk to mission success if not quantified for the MSL parachute system. To minimize this risk and as an alternative to a prohibitively expensive high altitude test program, a multi-phase qualification program using computation simulation validated by subscale test was developed and implemented for MSL. The first phase consisted of 2% of fullscale supersonic wind tunnel testing of a rigid DGB parachute with entry-vehicle to validate two high fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tools. The computer codes utilized Large Eddy Simulation and Detached Eddy Simulation numerical approaches to accurately capture the turbulent wake of the entry vehicle and its coupling to the parachute bow-shock. The second phase was the development of fluid structure interaction (FSI) computational tools to predict parachute response to the supersonic flow field. The FSI development included the integration of the CFD from the first phase with a finite element structural model of the parachute membrane and cable elements. In this phase, a 4% of full-scale supersonic flexible parachute test program was conducted to provide validation data to the FSI code and an empirical dataset of the MSL parachute in a flight-like environment. The final phase is FSI simulations of the full-scale MSL parachute in a Mars type deployment. Findings from this program will be presented in terms of code development and validation, empirical findings from the supersonic testing, and drag performance during supersonic operation.

EDL↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Impact of Truth Surrogate Variance on Quality Assessment/Assurance in Wind Tunnel Testing

Minimum data volume requirements for wind tunnel testing are reviewed and shown to depend on error tolerance, response model complexity, random error variance in the measurement environment, and maximum acceptable levels of inference error risk. Distinctions are made between such related concepts as quality assurance and quality assessment in response surface modeling, as well as between precision and accuracy. Earlier research on the scaling of wind tunnel tests is extended to account for variance in the truth surrogates used at confirmation sites in the design space to validate proposed response models. A model adequacy metric is presented that represents the fraction of the design space within which model predictions can be expected to satisfy prescribed quality specifications. The impact of inference error on the assessment of response model residuals is reviewed. The number of sites where reasonably well-fitted response models actually predict inadequately is shown to be considerably less than the number of sites where residuals are out of tolerance. The significance of such inference error effects on common response model assessment strategies is examined.

DeLoach, Richard↗

NASA NTRS2017

Objective Assessment Method for RNAV STAR Adherence

Flight crews and air traffic controllers have reported many safety concerns regarding area navigation standard terminal arrival routes (RNAV STARs). Specifically, optimized profile descents (OPDs). However, our information sources to quantify these issues are limited to subjective reporting and time consuming case-by-case investigations. This work is a preliminary study into the objective performance of instrument procedures and provides a framework to track procedural concepts and assess design specifications. We created a tool and analysis methods for gauging aircraft adherence as it relates to RNAV STARs. This information is vital for comprehensive understanding of how our air traffic behaves. In this study, we mined the performance of 24 major US airports over the preceding three years. Overlaying 4D radar track data onto RNAV STAR routes provided a comparison between aircraft flight paths and the waypoint positions and altitude restrictions. NASA Ames Supercomputing resources were utilized to perform the data mining and processing. We assessed STARs by lateral transition path (full-lateral), vertical restrictions (full-lateral/full-vertical), and skipped waypoints (skips). In addition, we graphed frequencies of aircraft altitudes relative to the altitude restrictions. Full-lateral adherence was always greater than Full-lateral/ full- vertical, as it is a subset, but the difference between the rates was not consistent. Full-lateral/full-vertical adherence medians of the 2016 procedures ranged from 0% in KDEN (Denver) to 21% in KMEM (Memphis). Waypoint skips ranged from 0% to nearly 100% for specific waypoints. Altitudes restrictions were sometimes missed by systematic amounts in 1,000 ft. increments from the restriction, creating multi-modal distributions. Other times, altitude misses looked to be more normally distributed around the restriction. This tool may aid in providing acceptability metrics as well as risk assessment information.

Stewart, Michael↗