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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 271 records · Page 15
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NASA NTRS1981

Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) Technology to an Advanced Subsonic Transport: Project Plan

The state of the art of active controls technology (ACT) and a recommended ACT development program plan are reviewed. The performance benefits and cost of ownership of an integrated application of ACT to civil transport aircraft is to be assessed along with the risk and laboratory and/or flight experiments designed to reduce the technical risks to a commercially acceptable level.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1999

Composites for Cryotank Structures. Present and Future: MSFC Perspective

The development of reusable launch vehicle systems for a single stage to orbit vehicle requires vehicles at liftoff with 85% to 94% of its mass consisting exclusively of propellants. These dry mass requirements drive designs to utilize stronger, lighter weight materials for structures. This technology development focus has allowed the introduction of composite materials in lieu of conventional metallic materials due to their higher specific strengths. Composite materials were successfully used for the liquid hydrogen tanks for the DC-XA, and a multi-lobed liquid hydrogen tank will be employed for the X-33. Another potential non-traditional application for composite materials is for liquid oxygen tanks, which is still being investigated. Traditionally, organic materials have been avoided wherever possible, due the potential fire hazard and the fact that composites fail conventional oxygen compatibility requirements. However, the potential weight savings warrant the investigation of the use of polymeric composite materials in oxygen environments. Since composites fail the conventional, time-proven test methods because they are considered flammable by test, we have embarked on an innovative approach to oxygen compatibility testing and evaluation focused on the use environments and attempts to eliminate or "design away" all potential ignition sources. Oxygen compatibility is defined as the ability of a material to coexist with oxygen and potential ignition sources with an acceptable, manageable degree of risk.

Vaughn, Timothy P.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Fault Tree Analysis Application for Safety and Reliability

Many commercial software tools exist for fault tree analysis (FTA), an accepted method for mitigating risk in systems. The method embedded in the tools identifies a root as use in system components, but when software is identified as a root cause, it does not build trees into the software component. No commercial software tools have been built specifically for development and analysis of software fault trees. Research indicates that the methods of FTA could be applied to software, but the method is not practical without automated tool support. With appropriate automated tool support, software fault tree analysis (SFTA) may be a practical technique for identifying the underlying cause of software faults that may lead to critical system failures. We strive to demonstrate that existing commercial tools for FTA can be adapted for use with SFTA, and that applied to a safety-critical system, SFTA can be used to identify serious potential problems long before integrator and system testing.

Wallace, Dolores R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Fission Surface Power for the Exploration and Colonization of Mars

The colonization of Mars will require abundant energy. One potential energy source is nuclear fission. Terrestrial fission systems are highly developed and have the demonstrated ability to safely produce tremendous amounts of energy. In space, fission systems not only have the potential to safely generate tremendous amounts of energy, but could also potentially be used on missions where alternatives are not practical. Programmatic risks such as cost and schedule are potential concerns with fission surface power (FSP) systems. To be mission enabling, FSP systems must be affordable and programmatic risk must be kept acceptably low to avoid jeopardizing exploration efforts that may rely on FSP. Initial FSP systems on Mars could be "workhorse" units sized to enable the establishment of a Mars base and the early growth of a colony. These systems could be nearly identical to FSP systems used on the moon. The systems could be designed to be safe, reliable, and have low development and recurring costs. Systems could also be designed to fit on relatively small landers. One potential option for an early Mars FSP system would be a 100 kWt class, NaK cooled system analogous to space reactors developed and flown under the U.S. "SNAP" program or those developed and flown by the former Soviet Union ("BUK" reactor). The systems could use highly developed fuel and materials. Water and Martian soil could be used to provide shielding. A modern, high-efficiency power conversion subsystem could be used to reduce required reactor thermal power. This, in turn, would reduce fuel burnup and radiation damage .effects by reducing "nuclear" fuels and materials development costs. A realistic, non-nuclear heated and fully integrated technology demonstration unit (TDU) could be used to reduce cost and programmatic uncertainties prior to initiating a flight program.

Houts, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2007

Finding Uncertainties that Cause the Age Dependence of Dose Limits to Be Immature

Space radiation permissible exposure limits (PEL) are intended to set acceptable levels of cancer risks, and avoid any clinical significant non-cancer effects. The 1989 recommendation of the National Council of Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) recommended a strong age dependence of dose limits that departed drastically from the then mature 1970 dose limits recommendations from the National Academy of Science, which were independent of age. In 2000, the NCRP recommended revised limits that showed a similar trend of risk with age to the 1989 report. In this model, the cancer risk per Sv varies by more than 2-fold for ages between 30- and 50-yr. Therefore for galactic cosmic rays exposure, astronaut age has a larger influence on risk then radiation shielding mass or material composition, vehicle propulsion method, or position in the solar cycle. For considering the control of mission costs and resources, the possibility of using astronaut age as a trade variable in mission design could be considered. However, the uncertainties in describing the age dependence on risk have not been fully explored. We discuss biological factors that influence the age dependence of radiation risks, including susceptibility, expression and latency, and radiation quality. These factors depend not only on the individual s age, but also their genetic sensitivity and interaction with other environmental factors. Epidemiological data is limited in describing the age dependence on risk. The 2005, BEIR VII report recommends an age dependence for cancer risk attributable solely to the life-table disagreeing strongly with the NCRP model. However, BEIR VII also noted the limited power of human data for concomitantly describing both age and age after exposure dependences of cancer risks. Many experimental studies have shown that high LET radiation (e.g., high charge and energy (HZE) nuclei and neutrons) display reduced latency compared to low LET radiation, suggesting distinct biological factors are important. We discuss potential molecular mechanisms that would influence the age dependence of radiation risks. A probability distribution function for the uncertainties in age-dependence of risk models is described and predictions for Mars missions discussed. Our report suggests that theoretical considerations based on new experimental studies are needed to ensure the correct age dependence in space radiation risk models and the resulting Astronaut PEL.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Feasibility of Conducting J-2X Engine Testing at the Glenn Research Center Plum Brook Station B-2 Facility

A trade study of the feasibility of conducting J-2X testing in the Glenn Research Center (GRC) Plum Brook Station (PBS) B-2 facility was initiated in May 2006 with results available in October 2006. The Propulsion Test Integration Group (PTIG) led the study with support from Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Jacobs Sverdrup Engineering. The primary focus of the trade study was on facility design concepts and their capability to satisfy the J-2X altitude simulation test requirements. The propulsion systems tested in the B-2 facility were in the 30,000-pound (30K) thrust class. The J-2X thrust is approximately 10 times larger. Therefore, concepts significantly different from the current configuration are necessary for the diffuser, spray chamber subsystems, and cooling water. Steam exhaust condensation in the spray chamber is judged to be the key risk consideration relative to acceptable spray chamber pressure. Further assessment via computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and other simulation capabilities (e.g. methodology for anchoring predictions with actual test data and subscale testing to support investigation.

Schafer, Charles F.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Boiler and Pressure Balls Monopropellant Thermal Rocket Engine

The proposed technology is a rocket engine cycle utilizing as the propulsive fluid a low molecular weight, cryogenic fluid, typically liquid hydrogen, pressure driven, heated, and expelled through a nozzle to generate high velocity and high specific impulse discharge gas. The proposed technology feeds the propellant through the engine cycle without the use of a separate pressurization fluid and without the use of turbomachinery. Advantages of the proposed technology are found in those elements of state-of-the-art systems that it avoids. It does not require a separate pressurization fluid or a thick-walled primary propellant tank as is typically required for a classical pressure-fed system. Further, it does not require the acceptance of intrinsic reliability risks associated with the use of turbomachinery

Greene, William D.↗
NASA NTRS2009

From Research to Flight: Surviving the TRL Valley of Death for Robotic and Human Space Exploration

There must be a plan or opportunities for flight validation: a) To reduce the bottleneck of new technologies at the TRL Valley of Death; b) To allow frequent infusion of new technologies into flight missions. Risk must be tolerated for new technology flight experiments. Risk must also be accepted on early-adopting missions to enable new capabilities. Fundamental research is critical to taking the next giant leap in the scientific exploration of space. Technology push is often required to meet current mission requirements. Technology management requires more than issuing NRAs and overseeing contracts.

Johnson, Les↗
NASA NTRS2018

Why Space Technology Needs More Non-Traditional Chemical Engineers – From the Perspective of a NASA Chemical Engineering Student

Final document is attached. With planetary missions and deep space gateway on the horizon, humankind is entering a new era of space exploration. Manned mission durations will be longer than any previous flight, resupply capabilities are limited, and system robustness is more imperative than ever. Traditional space systems, especially in the realm of carbon dioxide removal and water remediation, are large in size, mass, energy consumption, and number of mechanical moving parts prone to failure. Non-traditional space exploration needs non-traditional technology solutions. Organizational psychologist Adam Grant is well-known for his studies on originality and how non-conformists can move the world. In the words of Adam Grant, "to become original, you have to try something new, which means accepting some measure of risk." As chemical engineers, we shouldn't let that measure of risk stop us from considering ingenious technology. As a part of the new generation of engineers at NASA, I believe we need a paradigm shift in space technology for this new era of exploration.

Rogers, Tanya↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Enabling Advanced Air Mobility Operations through Appropriate Trust in Human-Autonomy Teaming: Foundational Research Approaches and Applications

Emerging Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)operations will be enabled by increasingly autonomous systems, requiring technologies to take on more responsibilities and fundamentally altering traditional human-automation interaction paradigms. The growing reliance on higher levels of automation will necessitate research to identify capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machines working and thinking better together, i.e., human-autonomy teaming (HAT). Trust is an inherent requirement in effective teams because when members work interdependently, those agents (human, automation) must be willing to accept a level of risk to rely upon each other to reach goals and contribute to team tasks. This work provides an initial approach to enabling AAM operations through appropriate trust within HAT. The main contributions of this approach resides in connecting the construct of trust to mental models. Using the outlined mental model approach, we propose novel HAT strategies, such as Adaptive Trust Calibration, and preview planned research activities derived from this approach. Additionally, we propose several practical applications that can currently be employed by AAM development communities.

Eric T Chancey↗
NASA NTRS2015

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange is a two-year research effort to visualize the U. S. aviation industry at a point 50 years in the future, and to define potential communication solutions to meet those future data exchange needs. The research team, led by XCELAR, was tasked with identifying future National Airspace System (NAS) scenarios, determining requirements and functions (including gaps), investigating technical and business issues for air, ground, & air-to-ground interactions, and reporting on the results. The project was conducted under technical direction from NASA and in collaboration with XCELAR's partner, National Institute of Aerospace, and NASA technical representatives. Parallel efforts were initiated to define the information exchange functional needs of the future NAS, and specific communication link technologies to potentially serve those needs. Those efforts converged with the mapping of each identified future NAS function to potential enabling communication solutions; those solutions were then compared with, and ranked relative to, each other on a technical basis in a structured analysis process. The technical solutions emerging from that process were then assessed from a business case perspective to determine their viability from a real-world adoption and deployment standpoint. The results of that analysis produced a proposed set of future solutions and most promising candidate technologies. Gap analyses were conducted at two points in the process, the first examining technical factors, and the second as part of the business case analysis. In each case, no gaps or unmet needs were identified in applying the solutions evaluated to the requirements identified. The future communication solutions identified in the research comprise both specific link technologies and two enabling technologies that apply to most or all specific links. As a result, the research resulted in a new analysis approach, viewing the underlying architecture of ground-air and air-air communications as a whole, rather than as simple "link to function" paired solutions. For the business case analysis, a number of "reference architectures" were developed for both the future technologies and the current systems, based on three typical configurations of current aircraft. Current and future costs were assigned, and various comparisons made between the current and future architectures. In general, it was assumed that if a future architecture offers lower cost than the current typical architecture, while delivering equivalent or better performance, it is likely that the future solution will gain industry acceptance. Conversely, future architectures presenting higher costs than their current counterparts must present a compelling benefit case in other areas or risk a lack of industry acceptance. The business case analysis consistently indicated lower costs for the proposed future architectures, and in most cases, significantly so. The proposed future solutions were found to offer significantly greater functionality, flexibility, and growth potential over time, at lower cost, than current systems. This was true for overall, fleet-wide equipage for domestic and oceanic air carriers, as well as for single, General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The overall research results indicate that all identified requirements can be met by the proposed solutions with significant capacity for future growth. Results also illustrate that the majority of the future communication needs can be met using currently allocated aviation RF spectrum, if used in more effective ways than it is today. A combination of such optimized aviation-specific links and commercial communication systems meets all identified needs for the 50-year future and beyond, with the caveat that a new, overall function will be needed to manage all information exchange, individual links, security, cost, and other factors. This function was labeled "Delivery Manager" (DM) within this research. DM employs a distributed client/server architecture, for both airborne and ground communications architectures. Final research results included identifying the most promising candidate technologies for the future system, conclusions and recommendations, and identifying areas where further research should be considered.

Communications↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders

The NASA commitment to human space flight includes continuing to fly astronauts on the ISS until it is decommissioned as well as possibly returning astronauts to the moon or having astronauts venture to an asteroid or Mars. As missions leave low Earth orbit and explore deeper space, BHP supports and conducts research to enable a risk posture that considers the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders “acceptable given mitigations,” for pre-, in, and post-flight.The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) determines the risk of various mission scenarios using a likelihood (per person per year) by consequences matrix examining those risks across two categories—long term health and operational (within mission). Colors from a stoplight signal are used by HSRB and quickly provide a means of assessing overall perceived risk for a particular mission scenario. Risk associated with the current six month missions on the ISS are classified as “accepted with monitoring” while planetary missions, such as a mission to Mars, are recognized to be a “red” risk that requires mitigation to ensure mission success.Currently, the HSRB deems that the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric outcomes requires mitigation for planetary missions owing to long duration isolation and radiation exposure (see Table 1). While limited research evidence exists from spaceflight, it is well known anecdotally that the shift from the two week shuttle missions to the six month ISS missions renders the psychological stressors of space as more salient over longer duration missions. Shuttle astronauts were expected just to tolerate any stressors that arose during their mission and were successful at doing so (Whitmire et al, 2013). While it is possible to deal with stressors such as social isolation and to live with incompatible crewmembers for two weeks on shuttle, “ignoring it” is much less likely to be a successful coping mechanism on station. For the longer missions of the ISS, astronauts require a larger, more robust set of coping skills and more psychological support. Evidence of this are the number of BHP’s Operational Psychology (Op Psy) staff who have been awarded silver Snoopys by long duration astronauts†, in the statements of praise for the Op Psy and Family Support Office teams, and in the written and oral statements from flown astronauts regarding difficulty of longer missions and how much Op Psy helped.

Slack, Kelley J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Integrated Research Plan to Assess the Combined Effects of Space Radiation, Altered Gravity, and Isolation and Confinement on Crew Health and Performance: Implementation Strategy

This document supplements the white paper titled CBS Integrated Research Plan: Problem Statement. The Problem Statement describes why it is important to implement a fully integrated research plan to derive risk estimates for the combined, potentially synergistic, effects of the three major spaceflight hazards (space radiation; isolated, confined, and extreme environments; altered gravity). These risk estimates will help establish acceptable maximum decrement or change in a physiological or behavioral parameter during or after spaceflight, and the acceptable limit of exposure to the combined spaceflight hazards. This Implementation Strategy describes how the research plan will accomplish the CBS Integrated Research Plan goals. The Implementation Strategy includes approaches to evaluate relationships among biological responses underlying three risks that are managed by three of NASA’s Human Research Project (HRP) organizational “elements”. This CBS (Acute effects of radiation on CNS, BMed, Sensorimotor) Integrated Research Plan also identifies strategies to monitor and mitigate decrements to operationally relevant performance. Currently, the strategy that was initiated in 2018, includes an eight-year research plan and a four-year validation plan that extend to the year 2030. Once the monitoring tools and countermeasures are developed, they will be validated and refined during four years of early exploration missions. The planned tasks and their associated research products and deliverables have been mapped to the individual research emphases to clearly demonstrate how each research area helps ensure crew health and safety during exploration missions.

Susan Steinberg↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. The term safely means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences (for example, excess lifetime fatal cancer risk) can be defined. The Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the understanding of health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting risk of carcinogenesis, central nervous system damage, degenerative tissue disease, and acute radiation effects. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus the fourth element develops computer codes to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Developing acceptance limits for measured bearing wear of the Space Shuttle Main Engine high pressure oxidizer turbopump

The probabilistic design approach currently receiving attention for structural failure modes has been adapted for obtaining measured bearing wear limits in the Space Shuttle Main Engine high-pressure oxidizer turbopump. With the development of the shaft microtravel measurements to determine bearing health, an acceptance limit was neeed that protects against all known faiure modes yet is not overly conservative. This acceptance criteria limit has been successfully determined using probabilistic descriptions of preflight hardware geometry, empirical bearing wear data, mission requirements, and measurement tool precision as an input for a Monte Carlo simulation. The result of the simulation is a frequency distribution of failures as a function of preflight acceptance limits. When the distribution is converted into a reliability curve, a conscious risk management decision is made concerning the acceptance limit.

Genge, Gary G.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Developing Crew Health Care and Habitability Systems for the Exploration Vision

This paper will discuss the specific mission architectures associated with the NASA Exploration Vision and review the challenges and drivers associated with developing crew health care and habitability systems to manage human system risks. Crew health care systems must be provided to manage crew health within acceptable limits, as well as respond to medical contingencies that may occur during exploration missions. Habitability systems must enable crew performance for the tasks necessary to support the missions. During the summer of 2005, NASA defined its exploration architecture including blueprints for missions to the moon and to Mars. These mission architectures require research and technology development to focus on the operational risks associated with each mission, as well as the risks to long term astronaut health. This paper will review the highest priority risks associated with the various missions and discuss NASA s strategies and plans for performing the research and technology development necessary to manage the risks to acceptable levels.

Laurini, Kathy↗