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At least 271 records · Page 15

Using Cyber-Informed Engineering for Cyber Defense Workbook

This workbook was prepared for a detailed workshop in Cyber-Informed Engineering. It is designed to provide an audience of electrical cooperative engineering staff with an opportunity to practice leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering for a hypothetical system upgrade. This workbook contains material describing the fictional project, information about Cyber-Informed Engineering, hands-on exercises, and a copy of the slides presented during the workshop. It can stand alone as a CIE resource.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Principles of the Battery Data Genome

Batteries are central to modern society. They are no longer just a convenience but a critical enabler of the transition to a resilient, low-carbon economy. Battery development capabilities are provided by communities spanning materials discovery, battery chemistry and electrochemistry, cell and pack design, scale-up, manufacturing, and deployments. Despite their relative maturity, data-science practices among these diverse groups are far behind the state of the art in other fields, which have demonstrated an ability to significantly improve innovation and economic impact. The negative consequences of the present paradigm include incremental improvements but few breakthroughs, significant manufacturing uncertainties, and cascading investment risks that collectively slow deployments. The primary roadblock to a battery-data-science renaissance is the requirement for large amounts of high-quality data, which are not available in the current fragmented ecosystem. Here, in this study, we identify gaps and propose principles that enable the solution by building a robust community of data hubs with standardized practices and flexible sharing options that will seed advanced tools spanning innovation to deployment. Precedents are offered that demonstrate that both public good and immense economic gains will arise from sharing valuable battery data. The proposed Battery Data Genome looks to broadly transform innovations and revolutionize their translation from research to societal impact.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Methods for the Enhancement of Security Probabilistic Risk Assessments

The US Department of Energy is exploring the methods associated with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and how they could be used to enhance physical security evaluations for nuclear facilities. A brief review of both international and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical security assessment methods is presented. From this review, and with an understanding of the technical elements associated with a traditional nuclear safety PRA, several observations are made pertaining to where physical security analysis methods could be enhanced. These observations principally support and enhance the answers within a physical security context to the risk triplet: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood? and (3) What are the consequences? Finally, benefits and technical challenges toward the development of a full security PRA are presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Target Diagnostic Menu Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory SYSM-5620: Design Thinking and Systems Engineering

Target Diagnostic’s Engineering Science (TDES) currently supports over 80 diagnostic systems, all of which draw from a fixed budget that covers staff time and procurement. As the division continues to add new diagnostics, demand on these limited resources increases, yet the budget remains unchanged. Shot Responsible Individuals (RIs) have unrestricted freedom to select any number or type of diagnostics for each experiment, often by copying previous shot configurations with only minor modifications. This practice makes it easy to generate new shots but does not encourage critical evaluation of diagnostic necessity. As a result, many diagnostics are routinely included in a shot without a clear justification, and in practice, much of the data collected is not analyzed. The ever-growing arsenal of diagnostics also increases the burden on TDES personnel, requiring more staff for support, maintenance, and service. This environment creates challenges in focusing resources on diagnostics that provide the greatest value to the NIF mission and raises concerns about the continued justification for maintaining all existing systems. The static TDES budget cannot sustain the ongoing growth in demand for new diagnostic systems. Shot RIs currently face no constraints on the number or type of diagnostics they assign to each experiment, often defaulting to previous configurations without critically assessing the necessity of each diagnostic. This results in the routine inclusion of diagnostics whose data may not be analyzed or may no longer directly support the NIF mission. Consequently, TDES is required to maintain and support an expanding set of diagnostics, straining limited resources and risking inefficient use of staff and funding. There is a need for TDES to efficiently allocate limited resources by establishing a process that requires shot RIs to critically evaluate and justify the inclusion of each diagnostic in their experiments. This process should discourage the routine, unexamined inclusion of diagnostics, support the identification of underutilized or obsolete systems, and ensure that only those diagnostics providing the greatest value to the NIF mission are maintained and supported. Ultimately, this approach must enable TDES to operate within budget constraints while maximizing scientific impact and operational efficiency.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications

This workbook presents a vulnerability (CVE-2025-1727 ) found in train applications and guides a digital risk assessment and mitigation analysis and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles to mitigate the potential consequences and ultimately the hazard through the engineering discipline because of exploiting this vulnerability. Workshop participants are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The workbook guides the participant to: • Understand the HE communication vulnerability • Map digital threats to physical consequences • Use bowtie analysis to illustrate both “security” and “engineering” barriers • Apply CIE principles to ensure that even if communications are compromised, the physical engineered system still behaves safely. • Produce an actionable set of engineered and infosec controls for implementation

42 - ENGINEERING↗

MSD CoP Webinar: Accounting for distributive justice in model-based decision support

Context: This webinar was hosted by the MultiSector Dynamics Community of Practice (MSD CoP; https://multisectordynamics.org). Abstract: Model-based analyses play an ever-increasing role in informing policy and decision-making. However, many large-scale societal challenges unavoidably involve questions about the fair distribution of positive and negative consequences. How are the costs of the energy transition distributed over households and businesses? How are flood risks redistributed under different flood risk management plans? How are the impacts of climate change and climate mitigation distributed over different parts of the world?These kinds of questions play an important role when deliberating public policy, and the lack, in many cases, of clear answers becomes an obstacle to decision-making. At recent COPs, for example, wicked questions about loss and damages and the phase-out versus phase-down of coal became obstacles to global climate action, illustrating the misalignment of the direction of scientific research and decision-makers' information needs. In this talk, I'll explore advances that are being made that enable analysts to start providing grounded model-based answers to questions of distributive justice, as well as argue that analysts should embrace and explicate the normative nature of their work instead of hiding behind the purported neutrality of science. Presenters: Dr. Jan Kwakkel (Delft University of Technology) Moderator(s): Rebecca Saari (MSD CoP Working Group Co-Chair; Univ. of Waterloo), Matt Sparks (Univ. of Waterloo); Sarah Fletcher (MSD CoP Working Group Co-Chair; Stanford University), Juan Moreno-Cruz (Univ. of Waterloo), Patrick Reed (MSD CoP Facilitation Team Member, Moderator and Organizer) This webinar was held on: November 13, 2024 from 1 PM - 2:15 PM ET

Kwakkel, Jan H.↗

Hypothetical Solar Cyberattack Scenarios and Impacts

This report offers approachable, plausible scenarios of cyberattacks affecting photovoltaic assets and interconnected infrastructure. It may be used by State Energy Officials and Public Utility Commission Staff to educate themselves on the potential consequences of these scenarios and the practical, high-level actions that may be implemented now to mitigate future impacts. It highlights plausible consequences of inadequate cyber provisions for PV systems and offers potential state actions to alleviate the identified risks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Choosing the Best Modeling Platform for Radiological Risk Assessment Models - 20468

Radiological risk assessments, in the form of performance or safety assessments, are often required under regulations or guidance for remediation of contaminated land, decommissioning of contaminated buildings or structures, and radioactive waste disposal. These risk assessments are usually supported by fate and transport models that address decay and ingrowth of radionuclides, as well as their movement through engineered systems and the natural environment. These models are often projected thousands, or more, years into the future, largely because the radioactive species change through decay and ingrowth, and hence the magnitude of the radioactive effect changes with time. There are many computer codes that are available to address this type of modeling. They range from addressing specific pathways or processes such as infiltration of water, groundwater, surface water, air, biota, diffusion and advection of water and gases, to those that try to couple all processes together to evaluate the impact of fate and transport through the entire system to places in space and time to which access is assumed. These different types of codes are sometimes separated with the monikers process-level and systems-level codes, although it is often not clear that this separation does justice to the capabilities of the many codes that are available to evaluate fate and transport of radionuclides. The focus of this paper is the latter group of modeling codes. Several systems level modeling codes exist and are used. There are differences between these codes in terms of utility, flexibility, complexity and cost. The purpose of this paper is to compare a few of these codes in the context of work currently being performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Working Group 1 (WG1). The MODARIA II WG1's main focus is how stakeholder engaged decision analysis can, or should, be applied to radiological contamination problems so that better, longstanding, sustainable, solutions are reached. However, the WG1 also recognizes the potential impact of the modeling tools that are chosen to address radiological risk, which is often a primary objective of decision making for radiological problems. Other objectives might also be important, such as constraining costs, obtaining financing, minimizing impact on ecosystems, saving cultural resources, saving jobs, farmland, environmental justice, etc., in a full decision analysis for a given radiological contamination problem, but none of these other objectives have the same types of complex modeling needs as minimize radiological dose. Consequently, a further focus of WG1 is to evaluate the potential impacts on decision making of the choice of fate and transport, and risk assessment, modeling codes that are used to support decision making. The WG1 will produce a report at the end of 2020 that will focus on an approach to effective decision making and stakeholder engagement. The report will also consider the role that performance assessment modeling should play in the decision-making process, including the impact of the choice of modeling tools or computer codes on risk-informed decision making. Several sites around the World have been made available by Member States for these model comparisons, and several modeling tools have been considered. However, the focus of this paper is on two of the sites, one in Belgium and one in Ukraine, and on three of the tools: NORMALYSA (NORM And Legacy Site Assessment); GoldSim{sup C}, and AMBER{sup C}. The final report from this working group will also cover other modeling tools, including RESRAD, and PC-Cream{sup R}. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Stress characterization for friction-stir-welded electric vehicle battery trays with application of neutron diffraction

The battery tray is an essential component that protects and controls battery-cell temperatures in electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. The functional stress limit of the battery tray heavily depends on the residual stress acquired from the manufacturing process. Consequently, exceeding the stress limit of the battery tray during operation could compromise the battery-cell banks and may risk the vehicle's safety. Hence, understanding residual stress formation is vital for design and safety concerns. Here, in the current study, AA 6061-plates were friction stir welded to an A365 high-pressure die-cast battery tray to create sealed coolant channels in the battery tray. However, this multi-material lap friction stir weld introduces residual stress into the battery tray, resulting in distortion. This distortion was mitigated using burnishing or coining operations, though straightening the battery tray had initially unknown effects on the residual stress. Therefore, neutron diffraction was utilized to characterize residual stresses after straightening. The results indicate that the friction stir welding (FSW) operation generated residual stresses exceeding the yield strength of the material, consequently deforming the battery tray by ±3 mm from the pre-weld geometry. The burnishing operation reduced the residual stresses below the material's yield strength while restoring the tray to within ±0.75 mm of the pre-weld geometry. Similarly, the coining operation restored the battery tray to within ±0.75 mm of the pre-weld geometry, however, increasing the number of locations where the residual stress exceeds the yield strength of the material.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Slow Strain Rate Testing of A537 Tank Wall Material

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade carbon steel tanks. This waste in part consists of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. Preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to localized corrosion. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion and/or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. The salt dissolution process also liberates interstitial liquid trapped between the salt crystals. This liquid is initially high in nitrite and hydroxide concentration. High pH and greater ratios of nitrite to nitrate act as inhibitors to minimize corrosion of carbon steel in high nitrate environments. However, as dissolution proceeds, the concentration of nitrate will increase, while the hydroxide and nitrite concentration of the interstitial liquid will deplete and become insufficient to prevent the onset of corrosion attack. Tank blending and the addition of inhibitors are used to ensure adequate concentrations of hydroxide and nitrite. However, this is not desirable during salt dissolution as it can reduce process efficiency and increase the amount of waste that needs processing. This testing program was designed to examine the risk of SCC associated with utilizing the pitting factor (PF) and nitrite/nitrate (NO 2 - /NO 3 - ) ratio limits for handling dissolved salt solutions at an elevated temperature in the carbon steel waste tanks. The previously identified limits are a PF of 1.2 and an NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio of 0.15. The results indicate that as long as the NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio exceeds 0.1 and the PF is above approximately 0.8, there is a discernible safety margin between the open circuit potential (OCP) and the critical cracking potential (CCP) observed during applied potential testing. However, this margin, defined by the difference between the OCP and CCP, is relatively narrow, ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 volts. This small margin raises concerns about potential shifts in OCP during waste retrieval operations, which could inadvertently increase the risk of SCC if the OCP approaches or exceeds the CCP. These results confirm that dissolved salt solutions provide a potent chemistry that, under certain conditions, makes carbon steel susceptible to SCC. The next question to consider is the influence these results have on decisions for storage and retrieval of waste from the tanks. For Type III/IIIA waste tanks, the risk of SCC remains very low. First, and most importantly, the post-weld stress relief of the tanks has reduced the residual stress near the welds. Thus, without the stress component, SCC risk is minimized. The material of construction (A537 Carbon steel) for the Type III/IIIA tanks is superior to the steel in its resistance to SCC than the steel that was utilized for the Type I, II, and IV tanks (A285 carbon steel). From a chemistry control standpoint for a Type III/IIIA tank directly involved with handling dissolved salt solutions, the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio limits may be utilized wherein chemistry control provides an extra layer of defense against SCC. Chemistry control for a Type III/IIIA tank minimizes the risk for a tank that may receive the dissolved salt solution, particularly if that tank is a Type I, II, or IV waste tank. On the other hand, if the dissolved salt solution is handled by a Type I, II, or IV waste tank the risk of SCC is real. The potent chemistry, absence of stress relief, and inferior material result in a condition that is conducive to cracking. Efforts should be made to either avoid transferring waste that may not meet the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria to one of these tanks or if it is unavoidable, take measures to minimize the consequences of a leak. As shown by these tests, even if the PF and NO 2 - /NO 3 - ratio criteria are met, there is a risk that the tank potential may be disturbed in the positive direction and the risk of SCC increase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dataset Repository for Investigating Suicide Risk Using Social and Environmental Determinants of Health

Suicide is frequently modeled as a function of genetics and environment, where the latter refers to factors other than direct biological consequences, such as air quality, financial level, social connectivity, transportation and food access, and homelessness status. According to the World Health Organization, clean air, a stable climate, adequate water, sanitation and hygiene, safe chemical use, radiation protection, healthy and safe workplaces, sound agricultural practices, health-supportive cities and built environments, and a preserved natural environment are all prerequisites for good health. Understanding the relationships between these determinants and mental health outcomes requires standardized data that can be included in healthcare programs and health outcome models. There is a wealth of publicly available data on social and environmental factors provided by various US organizations that can benefit the design of health care systems and public health interventions, as well as improve our comprehension of factors that impact health. Such information would not only help improve the understanding of individual and community risk but also identify new risk factors that have not previously been therapeutically targeted, especially in terms of their impact on mental health. However, curating and standardizing such datasets is challenging because they are often recorded at numerous geographical and temporal resolutions and with varying spatial and temporal granularities. To address this challenge, we launched an endeavor in conjunction with the Veterans Health Administration to collect publicly available socioeconomic and environmental determinants of health statistics in the US. In this manuscript, we describe a social and environmental determinants of health (SEDH) datasets repository, data curation documentation, and a pipeline framework for data generation; This effort started in 2020, when we began constructing a scalable pipeline to automate the download, extraction, preparation, analysis, and production of datasets. These datasets have been made available to the VHA and may be shared upon agreement with collaborating organizations.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Supporting Risk-informed Decision-making During Reactor Accidents

Uncertainty in severe accident evolution and outcome is driven by event bifurcations that represent distinctive challenges to defensive layers and tend to promote the emergence of discrete classes of core damage and accident risk. This discrete set of "attractor" states arise from the complex networks of competing physical phenomena and conditional event cascades occurring as the overall system degrades – a process that yields increasing degrees of freedom and accident progression pathways. Characterization of these event spaces has proven elusive to more traditional data interrogation methods, but proves tractable by application of more advanced data collection and machine learning approaches. Through application of these approaches we demonstrate a conceptual framework that enables real-time/robust, risk-informed decision-making support to improve accident mitigation and encourage “graceful exits” during low probability, extreme events limiting accident consequences. In this analysis, we simulated over 8,000 short-term station blackout (STSBO) accidents with the state-of-the-art integral severe accident code, MELCOR, and demonstrate the potential for ML approaches to predict simulation outcomes. We chose to pair ML tools with interpretable and mechanistic event trees for the considered STSBO accident space to predict the likelihood of future event paths along the tree. In addition to the current state of the system, we use information from recent trajectories of temperature, pressure, and other physical features, combining both the current state and past trajectories to forecast future event paths. Finally, we simulate the random injection of variable amounts of water to quantify the efficacy of available actions at reducing risks along the many branches in the event tree. We identify scenarios and windows of opportunity to mitigate risk as well as scenarios in which such actions are unlikely to alter the accident end-state.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Mechanical Design and Vacuum Pressure Impregnation of Combined Function Electromagnets

There are 96 combined function magnets, 48 focusing and 48 defocusing, that have been in operation in the Fermi NAL Booster without a critical failure requiring replacement for over 50 years. The Proton Improvement Plan-II (PIP-II) poses risk to these magnets and Fermilab does not currently have the tooling or knowledge of process to fabricate spares. Two new variants of these magnets are needed to reduce beam loss by having a larger aperture (Booster Gradient Defocusing Wide, or BGDS) and create space for a new injection system (Booster Gradient Defocusing Short, or BGDS). Risk of failure and need for spares will increase substantially with the implementation of PIP-II in consequence of a frequency increase from 15 Hz to 20 Hz and a 30 percent increase in peak to ground voltage. The BGDS and BGDW magnets will be fabricated in the same way as the current booster magnets so that future combined function magnet spares can be produced using learned processes.

Szabo, B. [Fermilab]↗

ARCADE Analysis Methods & Validation Pathway

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) provides an automated analysis system which supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of nuclear control systems. Every possible cyber threat which could lead to consequence is identified by simulating the unsafe control action sequences which transform digital harm into physical harm. Eliminating the simulation of complex digital cyber attack chains cuts out unnecessary computational overhead and focuses directly on the physics of cyber-physical attacks. This focus enables designers to make informed decisions which can entirely eliminate categories of cyber threats against advanced reactors through the physical nature of the plant design. This narrowing of cyber threat against nuclear power plants through the physics of the system is intended to make any remaining threat management and cost efficient. This is the goal of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands of the rigorous analysis required in Tier 1 of the TCA, which forms the foundation of the TCA process. Currently, ARCADE is still under development, but has made significant leaps in capability. A pilot analysis on the opensource Asherah simulator was performed which demonstrated key functionality goals. The next stage of ARCADE development involves improvements to the applications which support the analysis system, and enabling the analysis system to utilize the full suite of unsafe control action simulations. Since the analysis method’s core functions are complete, validation of the analysis method will be started concurrent to the next development stages. The automated analysis ARCADE will provide can radically change the cybersecurity design process for advanced reactors, reducing the cost of security implementation while enhancing cyber resilience. The pathway for ARCADE’s development to this goal has become much clearer. The majority of technical hurdles have been cleared, and the remaining development needs have been solidified. ARCADE is now capable of assisting the advanced reactor design process and directly support advanced reactor industry RIPB practices.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗