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At least 271 records · Page 15

Seismic isolation: A pathway to standardized advanced nuclear reactors

Standardizing advanced nuclear reactors is a pathway to substantially reducing their overnight capital cost and achieving parity with other power sources, including renewables and fossil fuels. The seismic load case has thwarted standardization of nuclear power plants because site-specific seismic hazard and local near-surface geology has triggered soil-structure-interaction analysis, design, equipment qualification, regulatory review, and licensing, ensuring that each build is different. To achieve standardized or site-independent certified advanced reactor designs, the impact of the seismic load case on the engineering and construction cost and time must be substantially mitigated. Seismic isolation is a mature technology that has been used for more than 30 years in non-nuclear sectors to substantially reduce earthquake demands in buildings and other infrastructure. In this paper, seismic isolation is used to enable standardization of advanced reactor designs, aimed at the complete re-use of a site-independent, certified design and repeated procurement of safety-class equipment. A pathway to standardized designs using seismic isolation is demonstrated for two fundamentally different advanced reactors: a molten salt reactor and a high temperature gas reactor. Each reactor building is equipped with three specialized pieces of safety-class equipment, namely, a reactor vessel, a steam generator, and a control rod drive mechanism housing that is attached to the reactor head. Analysis is performed per ASCE and ASME standards to design the buildings and the equipment for two base conditions: conventional (fixed base) and base isolated. The impact of the seismic load case is characterized for the reinforced concrete walls in the buildings and for the equipment, measured using vessel wall thickness and horizontal accelerations. Here the analysis results show that the fixed-base buildings, designed for a site of low seismic hazard (peak ground acceleration, PGA = 0.15 g) could be constructed at a site of much greater seismic hazard (PGA = 0.7 g) if seismic base isolation is employed. Importantly, the scope of the site-specific analysis, design, and qualification would be limited to the seismic isolators and the isolated substructure, drastically reducing plant-specific engineering, review, and licensing, and time to construction start. Regulatory challenges and opportunities with standardized reactor designs are identified.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

HBU R and D Cask Transportation Options - 20436

The TN-32B HBU Demonstration Cask was successfully loaded in November 2017 with 32 high burnup (HBU) fuel assemblies at Dominion's North Anna Nuclear Plant and is collecting thermal data as intended. The first two phases of this very successful project sponsored by DOE and EPRI was designed to collect thermal data of HBU fuel to support extended storage. The next phase of the project requires the cask be licensed for transportation so the cask can be relocated to a site (to be determined by DOE) to facilitate long term monitoring and additional research on the fuel. This is a unique challenge given the constraints that exist for this particular bolted metal cask. The TN-32B cask is a 234,288 lb. (storage configuration) dry storage system that was selected for this project and it was modified to provide thermal data and the ability to collect gas samples after loading. Several major issues must be addressed to obtain the transport license including protecting the seven lid penetrations that were made to allow for the insertion of the thermocouples into the selected fuel assemblies after the cask was loaded. In order to protect the integrity of the research, the payload must remain as is. Therefore, the cask system must be placed into the transportation configuration without rewetting the fuel, replacing the lid and without removing the thermocouple instrumentation that is currently installed. A critical portion of the design and engineering that was performed in the first two phases of the project was to ensure that future transportation of the cask was integrated into the approach. Efforts were made to accommodate requirements such as containment boundary leakage testing, installation of impact limiter brackets and lid bolts suitable for transportation. Due to the science requirements of the project, the fuel selected was intended to yield the highest payload temperatures permitted to provide the greatest value for the researchers. This resulted in higher than usual external dose rates and surface temperatures that warranted performing as much preparatory work prior to cask loading to ensure ALARA and personnel safety to the greatest extent practical rather than working on a loaded cask. In addition to the work performed prior to cask load, there are remaining challenges such as protecting the modified lid, design and fabrication of impact limiters that accommodate the modified cask lid and preserving the thermocouple connections for continued monitoring. The project team is currently performing the necessary calculations, engineering, and design to support the licensing as required by the US NRC. Pre-application meetings have been held to inform the regulator of the planned technical approach to ensure compliance with the applicable regulations. The current plan is to obtain the transportation C of C by the end of 2021. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Design and License Application Development for TRISO-X (Final Scientific Technical Report)

This is the final progress report submitted by X-energy, LLC (XE) to the Department of Energy in support of cooperative agreement DE-NE0008745. This report provides a high-level summary of the work performed during the entire period of performance, running from August 24, 2018 – August 22, 2022. This span of time covers the original 3-year award and a one year no-cost extension. There were five tasks within this project: (1) project management, (2) systems engineering and studies, (3) TRISO-X Facility design, (4) facility license application development, and (5) support to application review. Detailed reporting during execution of the project was provided by a total of 16 quarterly reports, voluntary monthly update presentations, and annual summary presentations. Technical work products include 103 X-energy technical reports, 38 subcontractor (Centrus technical reports), 75 Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations/Calculation reports, and 272 miscellaneous design documents (e.g., Engineering Service Orders, Engineering Component Specifications, Procedures, Guidelines/Policies, Design and Interface Requirements documents, and Drawings). All 29 of the X Energy milestones/deliverables were met early or on time and are archived in the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy’s Program Information Control System: Nuclear Energy under Fiscal Year 2018, Work Breakdown Structure F.OA – Industry FOA FY 2018 Awards, F.03 – X-Energy TRISO-X Project. All other work products are available to DOE upon request.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nested Pebble Bed Blanket (NesPeB)

Recent advances in magnetic confinement fusion technology have attracted billions of dollars of investments in startups from venture capitals and corporations, resulting in the development of devices aiming to demonstrate net energy gain in a self-heated burning plasma, such as SPARC (under construction) and others. However, future fusion power plants must operate in regimes that will require technologies far beyond current experience. According to a National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine report, to have nuclear fusion power plants contributing in a timely manner to the planned reduction of atmospheric carbon dioxide, a pilot plant should be built by 2035, and it should demonstrate fusion power production and the performance of the tritium fuel system (requiring a high enough tritium breeding) by 2040. A recognized key technology gap by [26] is the fusion first wall and blanket since no current blanket concept is considered satisfactory or has been built and proven. The first wall and blanket in magnetic fusion reactors form a vital and complex system, as it must satisfy different functions such as power extraction, tritium breeding, plasma containment, radiation shielding, and safety. The list of design requirements is even longer: high enough tritium production for fusion self-sufficiency, low material activation, decay heat and shutdown dose rates, high thermal efficiency, high-capacity factor, high magnets-divertor-vacuum vessel-first wall life, low corrosion, low cost, and intrinsically safe (requiring minimal licensing). Despite fifty-plus years of research, the first wall and blanket concepts proposed suffer from fundamental technical problems and immaturity (TRL=2-3) that jeopardize the timely delivery of a commercial fusion power plant. A fusion first-wall blanket has never been built nor tested, and a "winning", practical functioning design requires enough engineering margins (high enough tritium breeding considering the uncertainty, etc.), manufacturing simplicity, ease of continuous operation, maintenance, and low cost. A new, groundbreaking blanket concept called "Nested Pebble Bed Blanket" (NesPeB) was developed at ORNL under the successful ARPA-E GAMOW FERMI project (patent application allowed by the USPTO). The NesPeB blanket concept addresses current blanket concepts' shortcomings and technical immaturity, paving the way for accelerated delivery of fusion power plants. NesPeB is based on nested pebbles, which are binary-sized lithium-ceramic pebbles enclosed in "Beryllide" perforated and coated spherical shells, which are also binary-sized, stacked on top of each other, forming a "bed" and cooled by Nitrogen gas also "sweeping" the Helium and Tritium generated by the neutron irradiation of Lithium; the vacuum vessel plasma facing material is Molybdenum-96 and -97 with the first wall cooled by Helium while the divertor armor is made of Tungsten. The simulations of the NesPeB blanket using Fusion Reactors Models Integrator (FERMI) are encouraging as they estimate a tritium breeding ratio (TBR) greater than 1.2 using natural Lithium, acceptable pressure drop, and excellent heat transfer properties. Furthermore, the NesPeB blanket is not limited by magneto-hydro-dynamics (MHD) effects, is designed for online refueling, relies on existing tritium extraction technologies, has a simple construction, and limits the corrosion and chemical reactivity problems. NesPeB has the potential to be transformational and disruptive since it can solve all the main, challenging technical problems of fusion device blankets and accelerate a pilot plant delivery for 10 or more years.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Understanding TRISO Coated Particle Neutron Irradiation Behavior:Evolution of Advanced Micro Analysis and Electron Microscopy Approaches

Objectives and motivation• Provide data for fuel qualification in support of reactor licensing• Establish a domestic commercial TRISO fuel fabrication capability Approach • Focus is on developing and testing UCO TRISO fuel –Develop fuel fabrication and QC measurement methods, first at lab scale and then at industrial scale –Perform irradiation testingover a range of conditions (burnup, temperature, fast neutron fluence) –Perform post-irradiation examination and safety testingto demonstrate and understand performance during irradiation and during accident conditions –Develop fuel performance modelsto better predict fuel behavior –Perform fission product transport experiments to improve understanding and refine models of fission product transport

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verified, Archived, Library of Inputs and Data (VALID) Supporting Files

This dataset contains input, output, and sensitivity data files for computational simulations with the SCALE code system as part of the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID). The simulations cover critical benchmark experiments from the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project. The files are to be housed in a public directory for distribution. The information contained in the files have been approved for release by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Users wanting to reproduce results from this dataset are required to obtain a license to the SCALE code system for which details on the distribution can be found here: https://www.ornl.gov/scale/releases.

keff↗

Phase 1 NuScale SMR FOAK Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The overarching objective of the Phase 1 NuScale SMR First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project was to enhance competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry by enabling timely deployment of the NuScale small modular reactor (SMR). The scope of this Phase 1 project continued to advance the licensing and design maturity, particularly in those areas related to supporting customer readiness, supply chain integration, cost competitiveness, and cost confidence. This investment provided by the Government has accelerated development of these designs and technologies so that the existing domestic fleet of nuclear power plants remains viable and the most mature in the nuclear industry. The intent is to have the new, advanced U.S. designs be deployed as early 2026, and be globally competitive. As a part of the First-of-a-Kind Nuclear Demonstration Readiness Project, NuScale has been developing an advanced reactor design, leading the path for other development projects or complex technology advancements for existing plants that have significant technical and licensing risk. The NuScale Power team (NuScale) is advancing licensing, engineering, supply chain development, testing, and other required activities to enhance the innovation and competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry by enabling timely deployment of the NuScale SMR. Specifically, NuScale is performing the following activities in Phase 1. Fully supporting the NRC review of the NuScale DCA to ensure approval of a final safety evaluation report by the end of 2020. Improving plant cost confidence and cost competitiveness through design and supply chain advancement, incorporation of constructability best practices, and margin recovery to increase plant power output. Accelerating design maturity, technology development, and operational program readiness to support a customer commitment for plant deployment. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), a unit of the Office of Science, fulfills agency-wide responsibilities to collect, preserve, and disseminate both unclassified and classified scientific and technical information (STI) emanating from DOE-funded research and development (R&D) activities at DOE national laboratories and facilities and at universities and other institutions nationwide. This scientific and technical report provides summaries of the analyses and research that was performed by NuScale under this project that achieves the objective of disseminating information to the nuclear industry to ensure the innovations realized are shared for the benefit of the industry at large.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Evaluation of AI-Enabled Digital Documented Safety Analysis: A Case Study

Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Advanced Fuels Campaign Time-at-Temperature Irradiation Campaign and Post-Irradiation Examination Plan

With increasing per capita energy consumption and rapidly growing energy consumption predicted for data centers, the US faces challenges in meeting projected energy demands. The current administration is attempting to accelerate the deployment of new nuclear construction by providing significant investments in advanced nuclear and by modernizing regulatory approaches for the licensing new reactors. However, enabling extended power uprates (EPUs) for the current nuclear reactor fleet would provide a shorter-term solution to better calibrate near-term energy generation capacity to the ever-growing energy demands of the modern era. One pathway to achieve power uprates is to increase the operational window by reassessing fuel safety limits around anticipated transients. Existing light-water reactors (LWRs) utilize a targeted operational window with well-defined operational efficiencies, yet this window is also often bound by conservative safety limits that result in suboptimal operational performance. For example, the operation of the existing fleet is highly constrained by safeguards to operation related to anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), which are moderate-frequency transients expected with a frequency greater than 0.01 per reactor-year. These AOOs include temperature excursions where the critical heat flux for the system is exceeded, resulting in a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the cladding surface. This DNB event is a thermohydraulic condition that, with current conservative fuel safety limits, results in the fuel rods being classified as “failed,” meaning that the cladding may not be returned to service.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Fuels Campaign Time-at-Temperature Irradiation Campaign and Post-Irradiation Examination Plan

With increasing per capita energy consumption and rapidly growing energy consumption predicted for data centers, the US faces challenges in meeting projected energy demands. The current administration is attempting to accelerate the deployment of new nuclear construction by providing significant investments in advanced nuclear and by modernizing regulatory approaches for the licensing new reactors. However, enabling extended power uprates (EPUs) for the current nuclear reactor fleet would provide a shorter-term solution to better calibrate near-term energy generation capacity to the ever-growing energy demands of the modern era. One pathway to achieve power uprates is to increase the operational window by reassessing fuel safety limits around anticipated transients. Existing light-water reactors (LWRs) utilize a targeted operational window with well-defined operational efficiencies, yet this window is also often bound by conservative safety limits that result in suboptimal operational performance. For example, the operation of the existing fleet is highly constrained by safeguards to operation related to anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), which are moderate-frequency transients expected with a frequency greater than 0.01 per reactor-year. These AOOs include temperature excursions where the critical heat flux for the system is exceeded, resulting in a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the cladding surface. This DNB event is a thermohydraulic condition that, with current conservative fuel safety limits, results in the fuel rods being classified as “failed,” meaning that the cladding may not be returned to service.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

INSERVICE INSPECTION OF EXTENDED DRY STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, PART II: NDE/SENSOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION

This paper describes development and demonstration of nondestructive examination (NDE) technologies to support periodic examinations of interim dry cask storage system (DCSS) canisters for spent nuclear fuel in the USA to verify continued safe operation and that the canister confinement is intact and performing its intended safety function. Specifically, this work relates to NDE technology development for “canister” based DCSS systems which form the majority population of DCSSs, in the USA, for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. Consideration of potential degradation of the welded stainless-steel canister in these systems is required for continued usage in the period of extended operation (PEO) beyond the initial license or certified term. Physical access to the canister surface is constrained due to narrow annulus spaces between the canister and the overpack, tortuous entry pathways, and high temperatures and radiation doses that can be damaging to materials and electronics related to inspections. Several activities to demonstrate NDE technologies for the inspections of different DCSS systems are summarized.

nondestructive examination (NDE), Dry Cask Storage↗

Technology Development of a High-Capacity High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium Transportation Concept

This paper discusses the technology development (TD) efforts that led to the development of a High-Capacity High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium Transportation (HALEU) transportation concept. In 2018, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Technology and Research Development tasked Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to investigate strategies to transport large quantities of HALEU. To complete this task, INL collaborated with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The project was completed in 2020, and one of the project outcomes was a transportation concept that consisting of five individual Type B packages transported on a single legal-weight truck (LWT). The total payload capacity of this concept is 1,881 kg (4,149 lb) of HALEU in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2) powder. The concept utilizes an existing Type B packaging design carrying a novel fuel basket design with an incorporated flux trap. The basket can be loaded with 18 individual fuel canisters. The research collaboration investigated the U.S. certification potential of this concept. This part of the project included evaluations of criticality safety, radiological safety, thermal safety, structural integrity, and confinement under hypothetical accident scenarios of transport. The results of these evaluations demonstrated a promising potential for U.S. certification of this concept. Eventually, the described efforts led to the pursuance and issuance of a U.S. patent, thus, protecting the associated intellectual property (IP). Current short-term goals include making this IP available to private industry partners for licensing, directly supporting DOE’s objectives of accelerating commercialization of national laboratory-generated IP. If additional funding becomes available, long-term research goals could include exploring the feasibility of transporting other uranium chemical forms (e.g., UF4) with this concept, or refining operational procedures to load or unload the packagings.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integration of the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste consists of three main phases – storage, transportation, and disposal – commonly referred to as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Current practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States (US) includes temporary storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage systems at operating or shutdown nuclear power plants. Storage pools are filling to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler spent fuel from pools into dry storage. Unless a repository becomes available that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 136,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage systems by mid-century, when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for dry storage systems rely on large multi-assembly canisters, the most common of which are so-called “dual-purpose canisters” (DPCs). DPCs are certified for both storage and transportation, but are not designed or licensed for permanent disposal. The large capacity (greater number of spent fuel assemblies) of these canisters can lead to higher canister temperatures, which can delay transportation and/or complicate disposal. This current management practice, in which the utilities continue loading an ever-increasing inventory of larger DPCs, does not emphasize integration among storage, transportation, and disposal. This lack of integration does not cause safety issues, but it does lead to a suboptimal system that increases costs, complicates storage and transportation operations, and limits options for permanent disposal. This paper describes strategies for improving integration of management practices in the US across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The complex interactions between storage, transportation, and disposal make a single optimal solution unlikely. However, efforts to integrate various phases of nuclear waste management can have the greatest impact if they begin promptly and continue to evolve throughout the remaining life of the current fuel cycle. A key factor that influences the path forward for integration of nuclear waste management practices is the identification of the timing and location for a repository. The most cost-effective path forward would be to open a repository by mid-century with the capability to directly dispose of DPCs without repackaging the spent fuel into disposalready canisters. Options that involve repackaging of spent fuel from DPCs into disposalready canisters or that delay the repository opening significantly beyond mid-century could add 10s of billions of dollars to the total system life cycle cost.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Plant Reload Optimization (prlo)

The PRLO framework is built on a modular and extensible architecture that tightly couples advanced evolutionary optimization algorithms with nuclear fuel depletion solvers (i.e., nuclear physics neutronics code). It supports exploring complex, high-dimensional design spaces constrained by user-specified operational, safety, and economic constraints. Objectives such as minimizing fresh fuel enrichment, flattening radial and axial power distributions, and maximizing discharge burnup are evaluated. PRLO’s equilibrium cycle optimization capability enables the identification of core configurations that maintain fuel cycle sustainability over extended planning horizons. Its integration with the RAVEN platform facilitates optimization of loading patterns or fuel shuffling schemes across multiple cycles. The interface with SIMULATE, a licensed industry-standard nodal code developed by Studsvik, ensures accurate neutronic and thermal-hydraulic feedback for reactor core design. PRLO’s automated workflow engine supports iterative design refinement, enabling utilities to streamline core design processes and meet evolving performance and regulatory targets.

Kim, Junyung [Idaho National Laboratory] (00090005↗

Drones for Decommissioning

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has responsibility for regulating the safe decommissioning of facilities and sites to meet the License Termination Rule in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Subpart E “Radiological Criteria for License Termination.” Decommissioning is performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, as part of license termination (§50.82) and release of the facility or site for unrestricted use (§50.83). The guidance currently demonstrates the minimum requirements and necessary conditions for conducting radiological surveys by a person carrying a radiation detector(s). The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated the use of an unoccupied aerial vehicle (UAV) to conduct radiological surveys that could be used in decommissioning to potentially reduce time, cost, and worker safety compared to current survey methods. The objective of this project was to evaluate the performance and limitations of a UAV to support a decommissioning radiological survey and compare it to a radiological survey conducted by a human. The primary research questions of interest evaluated were: 1. Did observed UAV paths differ from human paths and, if so, how much? 2. Did survey path deviation affect survey results and, if so, how? 3. Were radiological measurements from human and UAV surveys significantly different? To answer these research questions, an experimental field was set up at PNNL’s 3440 test track, and it included radiological sources commonly surveyed during decommissioning: cobalt-60 (Co-60), cesium-137 (Cs-137), and americium-241 (Am-241). Nine check sources (three each of Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60) with activities ranging from 3.54 µCi to 39.34 µCi were set over a path that also included an area for measuring background radiation. An Aurelia X6 UAV coupled with a GPS and lidar unit was used to conduct the radiological surveys. UAV and human surveys were conducted using two different NaI(Tl) scintillation radiation detectors (2 in. × 2 in. Ludlum, Inc. and 2 in. × 0.04 in. Alpha Spectra, Inc.) at a travel velocity of approximately 0.2 m/s at a low (15–40 cm median altitude) or high (87–105 cm median altitude) survey altitude. Since the survey velocity and altitude parameters were atypical for normal UAV operations, testing was done prior to conducting the radiological surveys to establish airworthiness, evaluate the navigation system, and establish flight control. Human and UAV surveys were paired according to the detector type and altitude regime to compare the survey data. The results of this proof-of-concept research determined that the UAV and human surveys followed similar survey paths and detected the radiological sources with no significant statistical difference (in 33 out of 36 surveys). However, further research is needed prior to deploying UAVs for decommissioning surveys.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION TEST SUITE

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a safety analysis software package already under copyright by Argonne National Laboratory. There is interest from third-party users of the software to gain access to our internal verification and validation test suite. Therefore we are seeking to establish copyright over the test suite, which includes input files and reference results for hundreds of test cases that demonstrate functionality of the software. Making the test suite available to licensed users allows them to utilize the broad range of tests for commercial grade dedication activities needed to qualify the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 software under their own Software Quality Assurance program for use in a regulatory environment (e.g. with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

FANNING, THOMAS↗