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Reliability and Maintainability Engineering - A Major Driver for Safety and Affordability

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of an effort to design and build a safe and affordable heavy lift vehicle to go to the moon and beyond. To achieve that, NASA is seeking more innovative and efficient approaches to reduce cost while maintaining an acceptable level of safety and mission success. One area that has the potential to contribute significantly to achieving NASA safety and affordability goals is Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) engineering. Inadequate reliability or failure of critical safety items may directly jeopardize the safety of the user(s) and result in a loss of life. Inadequate reliability of equipment may directly jeopardize mission success. Systems designed to be more reliable (fewer failures) and maintainable (fewer resources needed) can lower the total life cycle cost. The Department of Defense (DOD) and industry experience has shown that optimized and adequate levels of R&M are critical for achieving a high level of safety and mission success, and low sustainment cost. Also, lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program clearly demonstrated the importance of R&M engineering in designing and operating safe and affordable launch systems. The Challenger and Columbia accidents are examples of the severe impact of design unreliability and process induced failures on system safety and mission success. These accidents demonstrated the criticality of reliability engineering in understanding component failure mechanisms and integrated system failures across the system elements interfaces. Experience from the shuttle program also shows that insufficient Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability (RMS) engineering analyses upfront in the design phase can significantly increase the sustainment cost and, thereby, the total life cycle cost. Emphasis on RMS during the design phase is critical for identifying the design features and characteristics needed for time efficient processing, improved operational availability, and optimized maintenance and logistic support infrastructure. This paper discusses the role of R&M in a program acquisition phase and the potential impact of R&M on safety, mission success, operational availability, and affordability. This includes discussion of the R&M elements that need to be addressed and the R&M analyses that need to be performed in order to support a safe and affordable system design. The paper also provides some lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program on the impact of R&M on safety and affordability.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗

Shuttle Entry Imaging Using Infrared Thermography

During the Columbia Accident Investigation, imaging teams supporting debris shedding analysis were hampered by poor entry image quality and the general lack of information on optical signatures associated with a nominal Shuttle entry. After the accident, recommendations were made to NASA management to develop and maintain a state-of-the-art imagery database for Shuttle engineering performance assessments and to improve entry imaging capability to support anomaly and contingency analysis during a mission. As a result, the Space Shuttle Program sponsored an observation campaign to qualitatively characterize a nominal Shuttle entry over the widest possible Mach number range. The initial objectives focused on an assessment of capability to identify/resolve debris liberated from the Shuttle during entry, characterization of potential anomalous events associated with RCS jet firings and unusual phenomenon associated with the plasma trail. The aeroheating technical community viewed the Space Shuttle Program sponsored activity as an opportunity to influence the observation objectives and incrementally demonstrate key elements of a quantitative spatially resolved temperature measurement capability over a series of flights. One long-term desire of the Shuttle engineering community is to calibrate boundary layer transition prediction methodologies that are presently part of the Shuttle damage assessment process using flight data provided by a controlled Shuttle flight experiment. Quantitative global imaging may offer a complementary method of data collection to more traditional methods such as surface thermocouples. This paper reviews the process used by the engineering community to influence data collection methods and analysis of global infrared images of the Shuttle obtained during hypersonic entry. Emphasis is placed upon airborne imaging assets sponsored by the Shuttle program during Return to Flight. Visual and IR entry imagery were obtained with available airborne imaging platforms used within DoD along with agency assets developed and optimized for use during Shuttle ascent to demonstrate capability (i.e., tracking, acquisition of multispectral data, spatial resolution) and identify system limitations (i.e., radiance modeling, saturation) using state-of-the-art imaging instrumentation and communication systems. Global infrared intensity data have been transformed to temperature by comparison to Shuttle flight thermocouple data. Reasonable agreement is found between the flight thermography images and numerical prediction. A discussion of lessons learned and potential application to a potential Shuttle boundary layer transition flight test is presented.

Horvath, Thomas↗

Diagnosis of a Poorly Performing Liquid Hydrogen Bulk Storage Sphere

There are two 850,000 gallon Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) storage spheres used to support the Space Shuttle Program; one residing at Launch Pad A and the other at Launch Pad B. The LH2 Sphere at Pad B has had a high boiloff rate since being brought into service in the 1960's. The daily commodity loss was estimated to be approximately double that of the Pad A sphere, and well above the minimum required by the sphere's specification. Additionally, after being re-painted in the late 1990's a "cold spot" appeared on the outer sphere which resulted in a poor paint bond, and mold formation. Thermography was used to characterize the area, and the boiloff rate was continually evaluated. All evidence suggested that the high boiloff rate was caused by an excessive heat leak into the inner sphere due to an insulation void in the annulus. Pad B was recently taken out of Space Shuttle program service which provided a unique opportunity to diagnose the sphere's poor performance. The sphere was drained and inerted, and then opened from the annular relief device on the top where a series of boroscoping operations were accomplished. Boroscoping revealed a large Perlite insulation void in the region of the sphere where the cold spot was apparent. Perlite was then trucked in and off-loaded into the annular void region until the annulus was full. The sphere has not yet been brought back into service.

Krenn, Angela G.↗

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗

Space Shuttle wind tunnel testing program

A major phase of the Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) Development Program was the acquisition of data through the space shuttle wind tunnel testing program. It became obvious that the large number of configuration/environment combinations would necessitate an extremely large wind tunnel testing program. To make the most efficient use of available test facilities and to assist the prime contractor for orbiter design and space shuttle vehicle integration, a unique management plan was devised for the design and development phase. The space shuttle program is reviewed together with the evolutional development of the shuttle configuration. The wind tunnel testing rationale and the associated test program management plan and its overall results is reviewed. Information is given for the various facilities and models used within this program. A unique posttest documentation procedure and a summary of the types of test per disciplines, per facility, and per model are presented with detailed listing of the posttest documentation.

Whitnah, A. M.↗

Use It or Lose It: Skeletal Muscle Function and Performance Results from Space Shuttle

The Space Shuttle Program provided a wealth of valuable information regarding the adaptations of skeletal muscle to weightlessness. Studies conducted during the Extended Duration Orbiter Medical Project (EDOMP) represented ground breaking work on the effects of spaceflight on muscle form and function from applied human research to cellular adaptations. Results from detailed supplementary objective (DSO) 477 demonstrated that muscle strength losses could occur rapidly in response to short-duration spaceflight. The effects of spaceflight-induced unloading were primarily restricted to postural muscles such as those of the back as well as the knee extensors. DSO 606 provided evidence from MRI that the observed strength losses were partially accounted for by a reduction in the size of the individual muscles. Muscle biopsy studies conducted during DSO 475 were able to show muscle atrophy in individual muscle fibers from the quadriceps muscles. Reduced quadriceps muscle size and strength was also observed during the 17-d Life and Microgravity Spacelab mission aboard STS-78. Multiple maximal strength tests were conducted in flight on the calf muscles and it has been hypothesized that these high force contractions may have acted as a countermeasure. Muscle fiber mechanics were studied on calf muscle samples pre- and postflight. While some responses were crewmember specific, the general trend was that muscle fiber force production dropped and shortening velocity increased. The increased shortening velocity helped to maintain muscle fiber power. Numerous rodent studies performed during Shuttle missions suggest that many of the effects reported in Shuttle crewmembers could be due to lesions in the cellular signaling pathways that stimulate protein synthesis as well as an increase in the mechanisms that up-regulate protein breakdown. The results have important implications regarding the overall health and performance capabilities of future crewmembers that will venture beyond low-Earth orbit. Learning Objective: Overview of the Space Shuttle Program regarding adaptive changes in skeletal muscle function and performance, including what was learned from research and what was implemented for countermeasures.

Ryder, Jeffrey↗

Space shuttle system program definition. Volume 1: Executive summary

A study for the selection of a low cost shuttle system for design and development was conducted. The objective of the final study was to examine and penetrate the major technical and cost issues affecting the choice of the following: (1) liquid propulsion recoverable or solid propulsion recoverable booster, (2) parallel burn/parallel mount or series burn/tandem mount configurations, and (3) payload weight and payload bay size of the orbiter. The matrix of program options which were considered in the study is developed.

Source record↗

A study to define an in-flight dynamics measurement and data applications program for space shuttle payloads

Data measurement and interpretation techniques were defined for application to the first few space shuttle flights, so that the dynamic environment could be sufficiently well established to be used to reduce the cost of future payloads through more efficient design and environmental test techniques. It was concluded that: (1) initial payloads must be given comprehensive instrumentation coverage to obtain detailed definition of acoustics, vibration, and interface loads, (2) analytical models of selected initial payloads must be developed and verified by modal surveys and flight measurements, (3) acoustic tests should be performed on initial payloads to establish realistic test criteria for components and experiments in order to minimize unrealistic failures and retest requirements, (4) permanent data banks should be set up to establish statistical confidence in the data to be used, (5) a more unified design/test specification philosophy is needed, (6) additional work is needed to establish a practical testing technique for simulation of vehicle transients.

Rader, W. P.↗

Aerothermodynamic data base. Data file contents report, phase C

Space shuttle aerothermodynamic data, collected from a continuing series of wind tunnel tests, are permanently stored with the Data Management Services (DMS) system. Information pertaining to current baseline configuration definition is also stored. Documentation of DMS processed data arranged sequentially and by space shuttle configuration is listed to provide an up-to-date record of all applicable aerothermodynamic data collected, processed, or summarized during the space shuttle program. Tables provide survey information to the various space shuttle managerial and technical levels.

Lutz, G. R.↗

Alternative Approach to Vehicle Element Processing

The National Space Transportation Policy (NSTP), describes the challenge facing today's aerospace industry. 'Assuring reliable and affordable access to space through U.S. space transportation capabilities is a fundamental goal of the U.S. space program'. Experience from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) tells us that launch and mission operations are responsible for approximately 45 % of the cost of each shuttle mission. Reducing these costs is critical to NSTP goals in the next generation launch vehicle. Based on this, an innovative alternative approach to vehicle element processing was developed with an emphasis on reduced launch costs. State-of-the-art upgrades to the launch processing system (LPS) will enhance vehicle ground operations. To carry this one step further, these upgrade could be implemented at various vehicle element manufacturing sites to ensure system compatibility between the manufacturing facility and the launch site. Design center vehicle stand alone testing will ensure system integrity resulting in minimized checkout and testing at the launch site. This paper will addresses vehicle test requirements, timelines and ground checkout procedures which enable concept implementation.

Huether, Jacob E.↗

Integrated Orbiter/International Space Station Air Quality Analysis for Post-Mission 2A.1 Risk Mitigation

Even under the assumption that all Orbiter and ISS elements would be operating as designed, condensation control and crewmember comfort were paramount issues preceding each of the ISS Missions 2A and 2A.1. However, crewmember discomfort during Mission 2A.1, in addition to evidence provided by flight data and observations, suggested that countermeasures would be necessary for future flights where the Orbiter provides primary control. A review of Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and International Space Station Program (ISSP) assumptions and analytical methods that describe ECLS transport phenomena was accomplished in order to ensure the veracity of future analyses. Subsequently, various analyses and interpretations of Mission 2A.1 flight data provided the necessary information to help understand the probable causes of the flight environment. With cooperation between the SSP and ISSP, countermeasures were devised for Mission 2A.2 that would likely improve the delivery of conditioned air by the Orbiter to the ISS as well as within the ISS elements.

RISK MANAGEMENT↗

STS-114: Discovery Post MMT Press Conference

This press conference focuses on the outcome of the Mission Management Team (MMT) meeting. The launch and status of the Space Shuttle Discovery is discussed. George Diller from NASA Public Affairs introduces the panel which consists of: Wayne Hale, Space Shuttle Program Deputy Manager and Mike Wetmore, Director of Space Shuttle Processing at Nasa Kennedy Space Center. The news media asks questions about the history of the low level sensors in the hydrogen tank, the cryogenic atmosphere around the sensors, troubleshooting, astronaut activities, possible rollback procedures.

Source record↗

Status of NASA's Assessment of Satellite Servicing

Following recommendations by the National Research Council, NASA's Authorization Act of 2008 (P.I. 110-422) and the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act directed NASA to assess the feasibility of using the planned human spaceflight architecture to service existing and future observatory-class scientific spacecraft. This interest in space servicing, either with astronauts and/or with robots, reflects the decades-long success that NASA has achieved with the Space Shuttle program and the Hubble Space Telescope on behalf of the international astronomical community. This study is led by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and will last about a year, leading to an assessment report to NASA and the science communities. We will report on the status of this study, progress toward goals, workshops, and priorities for the next few months.

Thronson, H. A.↗

Twenty Years of Radiation Measurements in Low-Earth Orbit - What Have We Learned Space Radiation Environment?

The advent of the Space Shuttle program has made possible space radiation environment measurements spanning a wide range of altitudes and orbital inclinations over multiple solar cycles. These measurements range from routine integral dose measurements with thermoluminescent dosimeters to particle energy spectra measurements made with a charged particle telescope. This paper will review the new understanding about the space radiation environment gained from this diverse data set. Major findings from these measurements include: estimations of the westward drift rate of the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) of 0.28-0.49/y; evidence for a northward component to the SAA drift of 0.08-0.12/y; observation of the formation and decay of the pseudo-stable additional radiation belt following the Mar 1991 SPE and geomagnetic storm with an estimated decay e-folding time of 9-10 months; observation of a local geomagnetic east-west trapped proton exposure anisotropy with an estimated magnitude of 1.6-3.3; demonstration that the trapped proton exposure in low-Earth orbit (LEO) can be reasonably modeled as a power law function of atmospheric density in the SAA region, with best correlations obtained when the exospheric temperature saturates at 938-975 K; the actual solar cycle modulation of trapped proton exposure in LEO is less than predicted by the AP8 model; and the testing and validation of GCR flux models, radiation transport codes, and dynamic geomagnetic cutoff models. Long-term, time-resolved proportional counter measurements made aboard the Mir during the same period provides further demonstration of the solar cycle modulation of the trapped protons at low altitudes - the observed modulation is also well described as power law function of atmospheric density. These data and findings have helped to improve the overall accuracy of pre-mission crew exposure projections using various semi-empirical space environment models, radiation transport codes, and spacecraft radiation shielding models. During the rise phase of solar cycle 22 (1987-1991), the RMS error between preflight exposure projections and measured crew exposure was 73%. For the rise phase of cycle 23 (1997-2001), the preflight exposure projection RMS error has decreased to 23%. The launch and assembly of the Space Station has begun a new era of long-term LEO space environment monitoring. The radiation environment at the Space Station will be monitored with three external charged particle telescopes oriented in the velocity vector, anti-velocity vector, and zenith directions. Data from the telescopes will provide charge, mass, energy, and arrival direction for incident particles with energy to mass ratios of 13- 450 MeV/amu and Z of 1-24. The external environment data will be complimented by measurements from a portable charged particle telescope and proportional counter located inside the vehicle.

Golightly, Michael J.↗

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Debris Assessment

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. Prior to the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or mission success. When the accident investigation determined that a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - ice and foam, were not fully understood. There was no clear understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might impact or the damage the impact might cause. In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development and fiscal accountability.

Kendall, Kristin↗

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision E

The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems.

Roberts, Barry C.↗

Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Zapata, Edgar↗