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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

From Count Rates to Quantifying Isotopic Activities – Field Analysis of Radiation Monitoring Data

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS2015

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Development Risks

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTP for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse ((is) approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration to Mars and beyond. However, 'NUCLEAR' is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. The public often associates the 'nuclear' word with weapons of mass destruction. The development NTP is at risk due to unwarranted public fears and clear honest communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTP technology. Reducing cost to NTP development is critical to its acceptance and funding. In the past, highly inflated cost estimates of a full-scale development nuclear engine due to Category I nuclear security requirements and costly regulatory requirements have put the NTP technology as a low priority. Innovative approaches utilizing low enriched uranium (LEU). Even though NTP can be a small source of radiation to the crew, NTP can facilitate significant reduction of crew exposure to solar and cosmic radiation by reducing trip times by 3-4 months. Current Human Mars Mission (HMM) trajectories with conventional propulsion systems and fuel-efficient transfer orbits exceed astronaut radiation exposure limits. Utilizing extra propellant from one additional SLS launch and available energy in the NTP fuel, HMM radiation exposure can be reduced significantly.

Kim, Tony↗
NASA NTRS2017

Verification of a Finite Element Model for Pyrolyzing Ablative Materials

Ablating thermal protection system (TPS) materials have been used in many reentering spacecraft and in other applications such as rocket nozzle linings, fire protection materials, and as countermeasures for directed energy weapons. The introduction of the finite element model to the analysis of ablation has arguably resulted in improved computational capabilities due the flexibility and extended applicability of the method, especially to complex geometries. Commercial finite element codes often provide enhanced capability compared to custom, specially written programs based on versatility, usability, pre- and post-processing, grid generation, total life-cycle costs, and speed.

ablating materials↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2003

Propulsion Flight-Test Fixture

NASA Dryden Flight Research Center s new Propulsion Flight Test Fixture (PFTF), designed in house, is an airborne engine-testing facility that enables engineers to gather flight data on small experimental engines. Without the PFTF, it would be necessary to obtain such data from traditional wind tunnels, ground test stands, or laboratory test rigs. Traditionally, flight testing is reserved for the last phase of engine development. Generally, engines that embody new propulsion concepts are not put into flight environments until their designs are mature: in such cases, either vehicles are designed around the engines or else the engines are mounted in or on missiles. However, a captive carry capability of the PFTF makes it possible to test engines that feature air-breathing designs (for example, designs based on the rocket-based combined cycle) economically in subscale experiments. The discovery of unknowns made evident through flight tests provides valuable information to engine designers early in development, before key design decisions are made, thereby potentially affording large benefits in the long term. This is especially true in the transonic region of flight (from mach 0.9 to around 1.2), where it can be difficult to obtain data from wind tunnels and computational fluid dynamics. In January 2002, flight-envelope expansion to verify the design and capabilities of the PFTF was completed. The PFTF was flown on a specially equipped supersonic F-15B research testbed airplane, mounted on the airplane at a center-line attachment fixture, as shown in Figure 1. NASA s F-15B testbed has been used for several years as a flight-research platform. Equipped with extensive research air-data, video, and other instrumentation systems, the airplane carries externally mounted test articles. Traditionally, the majority of test articles flown have been mounted at the centerline tank-attachment fixture, which is a hard-point (essentially, a standardized weapon-mounting fixture). This hard-point has large weight margins, and, because it is located near the center of gravity of the airplane, the weight of equipment mounted there exerts a minimal effect on the stability and controllability of the airplane. The PFTF (see Figure 2) includes a one-piece aluminum structure that contains space for instrumentation, propellant tanks, and feed-system components. The PFTF also houses a force balance, on which is mounted the subscale engine or other experimental apparatus that is to be the subject of a flight test. The force balance measures a combination of inertial and aerodynamic forces and moments acting on the experimental apparatus.

Palumbo, Nate↗
NASA NTRS1994

Common modeling system for digital simulation

The Joint Modeling and Simulation System is a tri-service investigation into a common modeling framework for the development digital models. The basis for the success of this framework is an X-window-based, open systems architecture, object-based/oriented methodology, standard interface approach to digital model construction, configuration, execution, and post processing. For years Department of Defense (DOD) agencies have produced various weapon systems/technologies and typically digital representations of the systems/technologies. These digital representations (models) have also been developed for other reasons such as studies and analysis, Cost Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) tradeoffs, etc. Unfortunately, there have been no Modeling and Simulation (M&S) standards, guidelines, or efforts towards commonality in DOD M&S. The typical scenario is an organization hires a contractor to build hardware and in doing so an digital model may be constructed. Until recently, this model was not even obtained by the organization. Even if it was procured, it was on a unique platform, in a unique language, with unique interfaces, and, with the result being UNIQUE maintenance required. Additionally, the constructors of the model expended more effort in writing the 'infrastructure' of the model/simulation (e.g. user interface, database/database management system, data journalizing/archiving, graphical presentations, environment characteristics, other components in the simulation, etc.) than in producing the model of the desired system. Other side effects include: duplication of efforts; varying assumptions; lack of credibility/validation; and decentralization in policy and execution. J-MASS provides the infrastructure, standards, toolset, and architecture to permit M&S developers and analysts to concentrate on the their area of interest.

Painter, Rick↗
DOE OSTI2022

Optical noise in a free-space quantum communications link from natural and nuclear disturbed environments*

Satellite communications at radio frequencies can experience a ‘blackout’ period following the atmospheric detonation of a nuclear weapon. The wavelengths used for free-space quantum communications will not incur the same ‘blackout’ effects from a nuclear detonation, but the optical systems will suffer from a phenomenon called redout. Redout occurs in an optical detector when ambient light scatters into the optical receiver, causing elevated background photon counts in the detector such that background noise overwhelms the signal. In this work, the duration of the redout effect is quantified from a nuclear disturbed environment on a ground-to-space quantum optical link. In addition, we comment on various techniques for reducing ambient and nuclear disturbed background counts in a quantum free-space optical link. For low-altitude nuclear detonations (i.e., under 50 km), the maximum interference time will be less than 1 min. Implementing a telescope, timing gate, and wavelength filter to the detector can reduce the background counts in the detector significantly. Aerosol levels and ground albedo are major contributors to background noise in a ground-to-satellite quantum channel, and ground station location should factor in both variables.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
NASA NTRS1978

Satellite Power System (SPS) military implications

The military implications of the reference satellite power system (SPS) were examined is well as important military related study tasks. Primary areas of investigation were the potential of the SPS as a weapon, for supporting U.S. military preparedness, and for affecting international relations. In addition, the SPS's relative vulnerability to overt military action, terrorist attacks, and sabotage was considered.

Bain, C. N.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Space Technology developed during 1980s ~ present

Early 1980s, a science team of NASA Langley Research has developed various space power systems, especially directly solar-pumped iodine laser (DSPIL), wireless power transmission technology, concepts of solar thermal propulsion, pulse-power for direct-energy weapons (DEW) applications, soft X-ray lithography and to name a few. This presentation will briefly overview these NASA-Langley developed space technology for future applications.

plasma devices↗
DOE OSTI2024

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center: Capability Expansion and Experiments in the Last Three Years

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general purpose criticality experiments facility located inside the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Critical experiments containing any special nuclear material, any enrich ment/separation, most physical forms, and any configuration are possible within the constraints of the defined safety basis. NCERC draws upon physical assets and experimental knowledge to solve some of the most difficult problems with respect to criticality safety, reactor physics, and reactor kinetics. In terms of physical assets, NCERC houses hundreds of kilograms of special nuclear material with a majority consisting of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). NCERC is home to four critical assembly machines: Comet, Planet, Flattop, and Godiva IV. To support various derivative diagnostics on fissioning systems, NCERC houses a count room to measure irradiated samples and dosimeters. This paper will step through each of these capabilities explaining recently completed work and upgrades.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2006

The Hyper-X Antenna Radiation Pattern Tests and Radio Frequency System Redesign

Testing was performed to determine the antenna radiation pattern measurements of the Hyper-X, X-43 ship 2 aircraft. One test was conducted at the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) Benefield Anechoic Facility (BAF) on January 24-January 27, 2000. A second test was done at MicroCraft in Tullahoma Tennessee by the Naval Air Weapons Center (NAWC) China Lake, California on September 8, 2001. The overall test objective was to gather qualitative antenna radiation pattern data from installed antennas on the HXRV. This objective was accomplished by collecting antenna radiation patterns at selected elevations of the HXRV. The test data was used to identify areas of RF coverage and assist in positioning the P-3 aircraft for best RF reception. The antenna pattern data presented nulls and possible low RF reception areas around the aircraft. This led to a redesign of the RF system. The redesigned system provided redundancy in case a telemetry transmitter should fail. The redesign provided more complete RF coverage within the antenna's capabilities. A second look at the flight path and necessary data collection led to a change in the beacon transponder system.

Hodge, Mark W.↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of measurements from an array of radioxenon samplers near to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station

As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor 25 (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of 26 radioxenon samplers to the region for a period of around 1 year, to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the 27 Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres away. The array of 3 sensors was operational for around 12 28 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and 29 interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. Whilst a key part of this work is to 30 measure any emissions of radioxenon from Hartlepool, this work presents one of the most comprehensive efforts to determine the 31 source of a great number of (mostly) 133Xe detections. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling 32 techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civil radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the 33 majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on 34 the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium (IRE).

Advanced gas-cooled reactor↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiological Handling and Containment Considerations in Support of an American Medical Isotope Producer

This work will discuss evaluation and design of new and modified facility level radiological containment, transfer, and handling systems in support of the United States’ American Medical Isotope Production Act. In the United States alone, Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) is used as a precursor to locally generate its decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), for use in approximately 40,000 medical procedures every day to detect cancer and heart disease. Currently, however, Mo-99 is primarily produced overseas and typically requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is classified as weapon -usable. This poses a serious security risk to the United States and, in 2012, Congress passed the American Medical Isotope ACT which aimed to cease all Mo-99 production that requires HEU and support American based companies who have found safer production methods. Through this effort, a system was designed and developed to access irradiated material in processing hot cells for ease of material introduction and removal in the confined area. The proposed solution uses a double-door design that allows for easy access to material while also providing shielding through a mechanically manipulated carousel. A system was also designed to transport irradiated materials from target reactors to a target receipt box using a rail guide system, pneumatic motor, and lead screw drive.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Autonomous Critical Data Extrapolator for the AGN-201m

Nuclear nonproliferation serves as a key goal, being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To recognize proliferation there are two pathways that states, who intend to use nuclear material for malicious purposes can take, diversion can misuse. Diversion is when fissile nuclear material is declared to the IAEA for non-weapon purposes, but then covertly removed. If the source of nuclear material, that is not declared and not fissionable, is placed inside the reactor core to create fissile material used to create weapons then the state is using the second pathway of proliferation, misuse. With the emerging development in areas of simulation and machine learning the creation of virtual models of reactor systems, digital twins, serve as a potential method to identify proliferation through detecting anomalous behavior in the reactor. A digital twin for a physical nuclear reactor has never been developed, as digital twins serve as an emerging technology. To investigate the process for development and use of a digital twin for a nuclear reactor Idaho State University’s AGN-201m serves as the nuclear reactor used for development of this digital twin. A data acquisition system has been installed to the reactor system allowing for the transfer of collected data from a reactor operation to Idaho National Laboratory’s Deeplynx data warehouse. When utilizing data to train reactor physics and machine learning models, a significant challenge encountered is the initial state of the data. Nuclear proliferation will have the capacity to be detected when the reactor immediately starts up, nor will it occur after the reactor shuts down. Generally, it will be detected when the reactor is operating at some desired power over a sufficient period for that specific reactor design. For the AGN-201m this will be when the reactor is critical (generally 1 mW or above) for a timespan that is within or less than the range of a regular business day. Datasets sent to Deeplynx have had to be manually cut to when the reactor is critical based on plots of power levels. This method is inefficient and laborious, especially when using multiple datasets at once to train a model. To provide a more streamlined approach an automated critical data extrapolator is developed, with capabilities of recognizing when the reactor operation first reaches criticality, and when the reactor undergoes a SCRAM and is shutdown.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1982

Use of the Charge/Discharge (C/D) ratio to aument voltage limit (V sub T) charge control in the ERBS spacecraft

A 50-ampere hour nickel cadmium cell test pack was operated in a power profile simulating the orbit of the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS). The objective was to determine the ability of the temperature compensated voltage limit (V sub T) charge control system to maintain energy balance in the half sine wave-type current profile expected of this mission. The four-cell pack (50 E) was tested at the Naval Weapons Support Center (NWSC) at Crane, Indiana. The ERBS evaluation test consisted of two distinct operating sequences, each having a specific purpose. The first phase was a parametric test involving the effect of V sub T level, temperature, and Beta angle on the charge/discharge (C/D) ratio, an indicator of the amount of overcharge. The second phase of testing made use of the C/D ratio limit to augment the V sub T charge limit control. When the C/D limit was reached, the current was switched from the taper mode to a C/67 (0.75 A) trickle charge. The use of an ampere hour integrator limiting the overcharge to a C/67 rate provided a fine tuning of the charge control technique which eliminated the sensitivity problems noted in the initial operating sequence.

Halpert, G.↗