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At least 271 records · Page 15

Volt-Var Curve Reactive Power Control Requirements and Risks for Feeders with Distributed Roof-Top Photovoltaic Systems

The benefits and risks associated with Volt-Var Curve (VVC) control for management of voltages in electric feeders with distributed, roof-top photovoltaic (PV) can be defined using a stochastic hosting capacity analysis methodology. Although past work showed that a PV inverter’s reactive power can improve grid voltages for large PV installations, this study adds to the past research by evaluating the control method’s impact (both good and bad) when deployed throughout the feeder within small, distributed PV systems. The stochastic hosting capacity simulation effort iterated through hundreds of load and PV generation scenarios and various control types. The simulations also tested the impact of VVCs with tampered settings to understand the potential risks associated with a cyber-attack on all of the PV inverters scattered throughout a feeder. The simulation effort found that the VVC can have an insignificant role in managing the voltage when deployed in distributed roof-top PV inverters. This type of integration strategy will result in little to no harm when subjected to a successful cyber-attack that alters the VVC settings.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Risk Assessment at the Edge: Applying NERC CIP to Aggregated Grid-Edge Resources

Distributed energy resources (DERs) promise to deliver benefits for both utilities and consumers by dynamically interoperating utility systems with customer-owned grid-edge technologies. These small energy-consuming devices are increasingly being aggregated for participation in grid markets, planning and operations. A cyber attack penetrating the control system of aggregated DERs could negatively impact the operation of the grid. In the worst case, the power grid could be severely damaged and physical safety compromised. In this paper we analyze cybersecurity risks associated with the aggregation of DERs and develop an approach to mitigating that risk. The approaches to both cyber risk analysis and mitigation were developed during a recent research project that serves as an example of how the approaches could be applied. However, both the risk analysis and mitigation are applicable to the broader domain of all DERs. An important conclusion is that the successful cyber compromise of aggregated DERs could have a significant impact on the bulk power system. This is the case even if each individual DER falls below the threshold of compliance with bulk-grid cybersecurity standards. For this reason, we specifically investigate how National Electricity Reliability Corporation's Critical Infrastructure Protection requirements could flow down to interactions between DER aggregators and the DERs themselves in order to protect the grid from these bulk-scale cyber attack impacts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers

Technology related to risk-informed autonomous adaptive cyber controllers is disclosed. In one example of the disclosed technology, a method includes generating probabilities of a cyber-attack occurring along an attack surface of a network. The probabilities can be generated using sensor and operational data of a network as inputs to an attack graph. The risk scores can be determined using a plurality of fault trees and the generated probabilities from the attack graph. The respective risk scores can correspond to respective nodes of an event tree. The event tree and the determined risk scores can be used to determine risk estimates for a plurality of configurations of the network. The risk estimates for the plurality of configurations of the network can be used to reconfigure the network to reduce a risk from the cyber-attack.

Veeramany, Arun↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Principles: What’s in it for me?

CIE is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Rather, it expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve, and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. These principles are aimed at system or design engineers, operators, and technicians, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners, because the engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. This approach creates new opportunities for engineering teams—and not just cybersecurity teams—to secure the system using the physics and mechanics of engineering controls—not just digital monitoring and controls.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗

Sequential Perturbation-based FDIA Detection using DERs for Unbalanced Distribution System

The power distribution system with its reliance on automated monitoring and control infrastructure makes it a complicated cyber-physical system and vulnerable to various cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a moving target defense inspired false data injection attack (FDIA) detection mechanism for an unbalanced distribution system. In the proposed grid diagnosis service framework, the distribution system operator judiciously manipulates power outputs of a subset of inverter-based distribution energy resources (DERs) to create secret low magnitude voltage perturbations which are inconsequential to the normal operation of the grid. A mixed-integer-linear-programming algorithm is developed to select the optimal set of DERs that can create a voltage perturbation signal of the required magnitude at each sensor location at a minimum cost. Then, a sequential detector is applied that detects for the FDIA as measurements are received from individual sensors. The performance of the proposed perturbation-based FDIA detection framework is demonstrated via simulation of the IEEE 123 bus test system.

Attack Detection↗

Criticality Analysis of Wind Turbine Components - Intern Poster [Poster]

Wind turbines are an important part of critical energy infrastructure, with wind farms generating more than 10% of US energy in 2023. The goal of this project is to identify and analyze major, common components of wind turbines to reach a preliminary understanding of which should be considered most critical in terms of turbine operation and attack surface. At the time of this project, minimal data was available regarding component costs and lead times, so a qualitative risk assessment approach was used. Components were given a score of 1-5 in four categories– cost to repair, operational downtime, ease of physical attack, and ease of cyber attack. An overall component criticality score was assigned based on the sum of those scores, with a higher score indicating higher criticality. The turbine control system was identified as the most critical component, closely followed by the blades, structural components, and gearbox. This is ongoing project, and further research on the supply chain for wind turbine components will allow for a deeper and more concrete understanding of component criticality.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Moving-horizon false data injection attack design against cyber–physical systems

Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber–physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be capable of bypassing bad data detection (BDD) while causing targeted biases in resulting state estimates. However, their effectiveness against moving horizon estimators (MHE) is not well understood. In fact, this paper shows that conventional FDIAs are generally ineffective against MHE. One of the main reasons is that the moving window renders the static FDIA recursively infeasible. Here, this paper proposes a new attack methodology, moving-horizon FDIA (MH-FDIA), by considering both the performance of historical attacks and the current system’s status. Theoretical guarantees for successful attack generation and recursive feasibility are given. Numerical simulations on the IEEE-14 bus system further validate the theoretical claims and show that the proposed MH-FDIA outperforms state-of-the-art counterparts in both stealthiness and effectiveness. In addition, an experiment on a path-tracking control system of an autonomous vehicle shows the feasibility of the MH-FDIA in real-world nonlinear systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ARCADE Analysis Methods & Validation Pathway

The Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) provides an automated analysis system which supports risk-informed performance based (RIPB) evaluations of nuclear control systems. Every possible cyber threat which could lead to consequence is identified by simulating the unsafe control action sequences which transform digital harm into physical harm. Eliminating the simulation of complex digital cyber attack chains cuts out unnecessary computational overhead and focuses directly on the physics of cyber-physical attacks. This focus enables designers to make informed decisions which can entirely eliminate categories of cyber threats against advanced reactors through the physical nature of the plant design. This narrowing of cyber threat against nuclear power plants through the physics of the system is intended to make any remaining threat management and cost efficient. This is the goal of the Tiered Cyber Analysis (TCA) outlined in NRC Draft Regulation Guide (RG) 5.96, which provides a RIPB cybersecurity approach for new reactors. ARCADE has been custom developed to meet the demands of the rigorous analysis required in Tier 1 of the TCA, which forms the foundation of the TCA process. Currently, ARCADE is still under development, but has made significant leaps in capability. A pilot analysis on the opensource Asherah simulator was performed which demonstrated key functionality goals. The next stage of ARCADE development involves improvements to the applications which support the analysis system, and enabling the analysis system to utilize the full suite of unsafe control action simulations. Since the analysis method’s core functions are complete, validation of the analysis method will be started concurrent to the next development stages. The automated analysis ARCADE will provide can radically change the cybersecurity design process for advanced reactors, reducing the cost of security implementation while enhancing cyber resilience. The pathway for ARCADE’s development to this goal has become much clearer. The majority of technical hurdles have been cleared, and the remaining development needs have been solidified. ARCADE is now capable of assisting the advanced reactor design process and directly support advanced reactor industry RIPB practices.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Attacks in Vehicular Sensors

Today's modern vehicles contain anywhere from sixty to one-hundred sensors and exhibit the characteristics of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS). There is a high degree of coupling, cohesiveness, and interactions among vehicle's CPS components (e.g., sensors, devices, systems, systems-of-systems) across sensing, communication, and control layers. Cyber-attacks in the sensing or communication layers can compromise the security of the control layer. This paper provides a detailed review of potential cyber threats related to the sensing layer. Notably, the focus is mainly towards two categories of sensors: vehicle dynamics sensors (e.g., Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS), magnetic encoders, and inertial sensors) and environment sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), ultrasonic, camera, Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) systems, and Global Positioning System (GPS) units). Furthermore, the paper also offers perspectives through existing countermeasures from literature and stresses the need for data-driven cybersecurity solutions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear Power Plant Simulation and Cybersecurity

Critical infrastructure protection is vital to the day-to-day operation of any country, and those systems need to be protected to the fullest extent possible. As with what was seen in Ukraine in late 2016, with the cyber attack on the power grid, these systems are susceptible to attacks that can cause serious damage, both physically and economically. This incident shut down the power grid for 6 hours, with nearly 80,000 people affected. Cyber security can be referred to as the protection of data and systems in networks, both wired and wireless, from unauthorized access or attack. In nuclear power plants, assessments of cyber security are critical to ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the systems used. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the purpose of cyber security assessments is to detect and then eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities in the digital system that could be exploited either from outside or inside the digital system protected area. These cyber security assessments are essentially intended to reduce cyber security risk. The NRC refers to cyber security risk as the combination of the consequence to the nuclear power plant and the susceptibility of a digital system to internal and external cyber attack.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Enhancement in Digital Substations: Hidden Markov Model-Based Smart Cyber Switching and Threat Response

The rising incidence of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and power grids poses significant threats to the stability and reliability of electrical substations, with potentially devastating consequences such as extended blackouts. This paper introduces an advanced cybersecurity framework aimed at safeguarding IEC 61850-based substations through the integration of software-defined networking (SDN) and digital twin (DT) technologies. The proposed DT-based framework employs smart cyber switching (SCS) for proactive threat mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for swift system restoration, thereby maintaining continuous operational integrity and robust cybersecurity defenses. Central to this framework is the adaptive port controller (APC), which enables dynamic port management to adapt to evolving threats, and an intrusion detection system (IDS) designed to detect and neutralize malicious attacks on IEC 61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. Further, novel predictive intrusion detection and response (PIDR) algorithm is implemented on a digital substation (DS) to predict the best route to be taken by the attacker. The efficacy of these comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is validated through rigorous simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, showcasing the system’s ability to sustain substation operations amidst cyber-attacks.

Digital substation↗