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Checklists have been compiled for planning, design, construction, startup and debugging, and operation of liquefied natural gas facilities. Lists include references to pertinent safety regulations. Methods described are applicable to handling of other hazardous materials.
Volume two of the facilities catalogue deals with Airbreathing Propulsion and Flight Simulation Facilities. Data pertinent to managers and engineers are presented. Each facility is described on a data sheet that shows the facility's technical parameters on a chart and more detailed information in narratives. Facilities judged comparable in testing capability are noted and grouped together. Several comprehensive cross-indexes and charts are included.
All industrial facilities deal with safety hazards such as equipment failures, chemical and toxic releases, and fires and explosions just to name a few. A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes that handle hazardous substances by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices is called process safety. The goal of such framewoks is to prevent the release of energy or material that could cause harm to people or damage to equipment and/or environment. Process safety covers all aspects of facility operation also including design, maintenance, and human and organizational factors that could possibly have effect on process safety. As it will be seen from the discussion below, process safety is just one of the pieces of the much bigger matter, a safety culture. Many industries have long recognized the importance of safety culture in their day-to-day operation. Although the definition of safety culture can slightly differ from organization to organization, in general, a safety culture is how things are done to demonstrate a commitment to safety by everyone involved. An organization acquires safety culture over time as the product of individual and group values, actions, and behaviors toward overall safety. It is important to note that safety culture should not be viewed as some static state that an organization wants to reach. It is more like a constantly evolving level of “how things are done when nobody is watching.” Safety culture is an inherent characteristic of an organization, it is always present, but the level can range on a continuum from undesirable to desirable or more commonly used, from negative to positive. An example for an undesirable, negative safety culture would be a company in which accidents resulting in harm (physical and/or emotional) of its employees, equipment or surrounding environment and community occur frequently. At the other end of the spectrum would be a company in which such accidents are rare or do not occur at all (desired or positive safety culture). Every company/industry exists somewhere within this spectrum.
Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), including perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), are widely used in industrial and consumer products due to their unique water and oil repelling properties. These slow-degrading and bio-accumulating compounds, often called "forever chemicals," are not typically removed by conventional industrial and municipal water/wastewater (W/WW) treatment. This tip of the month provides comprehensive strategies for managing PFAS-contaminated waste streams. Understanding the various types of PFAS waste streams is the first step in managing them. Primary PFAS waste includes contaminated process W/WW and solid materials directly from the production and processing of PFAS-containing materials. These might come from manufacturing facilities, firefighting training areas, or other industrial operations where PFAS compounds are used or were historically present. Secondary PFAS waste results from treatment and disposal mechanisms of primary PFAS waste streams, including spent activated carbon, used ion exchange resins, membrane reject streams, PFAS-laden backwash water, landfill leachate, incineration residuals, etc. TABLE 1 lists examples of the most common PFAS waste streams in different industrial facilities.
An account is given of configuration management activities for the Western Aeronautical Test Range (WATR) at NASA-Ames, whose primary function is the conduct of aeronautical research flight testing through real-time processing and display, tracking, and communications systems. The processing of WATR configuration change requests for specific research flight test projects must be conducted in such a way as to refrain from compromising the reliability of WATR support to all project users. Configuration management's scope ranges from mission planning to operations monitoring and performance trend analysis.
Under the Energy & Environmental Research Center’s (EERC’s) ~$\$$22 million Phase II Brine Extraction and Storage Test (BEST) Program, a multimillion-dollar brine treatment technology test bed facility was established in western North Dakota to provide a platform for evaluating developing technologies and approaches for brine treatment and volume reduction. The initial facility, and associated research effort, was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with in-kind contributions provided by several industry participants and the state of North Dakota. Since its opening, the Brine Technology Test Facility (BTTF) has supported performance evaluations of desalination technologies capable of treating high-salinity produced water (PW) and enabled data collection for multiple approaches of PW management and critical material recovery. As part of the decommissioning process for the original project, facility ownership and liability were transferred to Select Water, which is providing the EERC with a continuing site access option for state or federal research and/or commercial technology development. This report documents the findings from a design study conducted by the EERC and the engineering firm that was originally contracted to design and construct the facility (Advanced Engineering and Environmental Services, LLC [AE2S]) that evaluated the current status of BTTF and its systems and developed a retrofit design to increase the facility’s capabilities through automation and modularization of its PW treatment infrastructure. The proposed retrofit will provide DOE and industry with an expanded range of conditioned PW that can be produced at the facility for evaluating fit-for-purpose water treatment technologies, online instrumentation for brine chemistry determination, and systems that recover critical materials like lithium and magnesium. The current facility consists of an 9600-square-foot facility that includes a 40-foot by 65-foot Class 1, Division 2-rated demonstration area and associated control rooms and lab-ready space capable of sourcing oil and gas PW and wastewater from industrial sources or tailoring brine compositions up to 300,000 mg/L total dissolved solids (TDS) and supplying them at rates up to 25 gpm for extended-duration technology demonstrations. The colocation of the facility with Select Water’s water management facilities allows for access and unloading of more than 10,000 bbl/day of trucked water delivered to site and associated access to on-site Class I and Class II brine disposal wells and nearby hazardous waste landfills operated and/or contracted by Select Water to dispose of concentrate and/or effluents associated with the testing.
NASA's Western Aeronautical Test Range (WATR) is a network of facilities used to support aeronautical research, science missions, exploration system concepts, and space operations. The WATR resides at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center located at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The WATR is a part of NASA's Corporate Management of Aeronautical Facilities and funded by the Strategic Capability Asset Program (SCAP). It is managed by the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) to provide the right facility at the right time. NASA is a tenant on Edwards Air Force Base and has an agreement with the Air Force Flight Test Center to use the land and airspace controlled by the Department of Defense (DoD). The topics include: 1) The WATR supports a variety of vehicles; 2) Dryden shares airspace with the AFFTC; 3) Restricted airspace, corridors, and special use areas are available for experimental aircraft; 4) WATR Products and Services; 5) WATR Support Configuration; 6) Telemetry Tracking; 7) Time Space Positioning; 8) Video; 9) Voice Communication; 10) Mobile Operations Facilities; 11) Data Processing; 12) Mission Control Center; 13) Real-Time Data Analysis; and 14) Range Safety.
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)
Time, money, and, personnel are becoming increasingly scarce resources within government agencies due to a reduction in funding and the desire to demonstrate responsible economic efficiency. The ability of an organization to plan and schedule resources effectively can provide the necessary leverage to improve productivity, provide continuous support to all projects, and insure flexibility in a rapidly changing environment. Without adequate internal controls the organization is forced to rely on external support, waste precious resources, and risk an inefficient response to change. Management systems must be developed and applied that strive to maximize the utility of existing resources in order to achieve the goal of "faster, cheaper, better". An area of concern within NASA Langley Research Center was the scheduling, planning, and resource management of the Wind Tunnel Enterprise operations. Nine wind tunnels make up the Enterprise. Prior to this research, these wind tunnel groups did not employ a rigorous or standardized management planning system. In addition, each wind tunnel unit operated from a position of autonomy, with little coordination of clients, resources, or project control. For operating and planning purposes, each wind tunnel operating unit must balance inputs from a variety of sources. Although each unit is managed by individual Facility Operations groups, other stakeholders influence wind tunnel operations. These groups include, for example, the various researchers and clients who use the facility, the Facility System Engineering Division (FSED) tasked with wind tunnel repair and upgrade, the Langley Research Center (LaRC) Fabrication (FAB) group which fabricates repair parts and provides test model upkeep, the NASA and LARC Strategic Plans, and unscheduled use of the facilities by important clients. Expanding these influences horizontally through nine wind tunnel operations and vertically along the NASA management structure greatly increases the complexity of developing a model that can be used for successfully implementing a standardized management planning tool. The objective of this study was to implement an Integrated Wind Tunnel Planning System to improve the operations within the aeronautics testing and research group, in particular Wind Tunnel Enterprise. The study included following steps: Conducted literature search and expert discussions (NASA and Old Dominion University faculty), Performed environmental scan of NASA Langley wind tunnel operations as foundation for problem definition. Established operation requirements and evaluation methodologies. Examined windtunnel operations to map out the common characteristics, critical components, and system structure. Reviewed and evaluated various project scheduling and management systems for implementation, Evaluated and implemented "Theory of Constraints (TOC)" project scheduling methodology at NASA Langley wind tunnel operations together with NASA staff.
The paper presents a mechanism permitting a type manager to fabricate a migrated object representation which can be entrusted to other subsystems or transmitted outside of the control of a local computer system. The migrated object representation is signed by the type manager in such a way that the type manager's signature cannot be forged and the manager is able to authenticate its own signature. Subsequently, the type manager can retrieve the migrated representation and validate its contents before reconstructing the object in its original representation. This facility allows type managers to authenticate the contents of off-line or network storage and solves problems stemming from the hierarchical structure of the system itself.
The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.
The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.
The power management and distribution (PMAD) systems test bed facility, including the power sources and loads available, is discussed, and the PMAD data system (PDS) is described. The PDS controls the test-bed facility hardware, and monitors and records the electric power system control data bus and external data. The PDS architecture is discussed, and each of the subsystems is described.
This report provides an assessment of the status of the Centrifuge Facility being developed by ARC for flight on the International Space Station Alpha. The assessment includes technical status, schedules, budgets, project management, performance of facility relative to science requirements, and identifies risks and issues that need to be considered in future development activities.
There are over 70,000 flights managed per day in the National Airspace System, with approximately 7,000 aircraft in the air over the United States at any given time. Operators of each of these flights would prefer to fly a user-defined “4D” trajectory (4DT), which includes arrival and departure times; preferred gates and runways at the airport; efficient, wind-optimal routes for departure, cruise and arrival phase of flight; and fuel efficient altitude profiles. To demonstrate the magnitude of this achievement a single flight from Los Angeles to Baltimore, accesses over 35 shared or “constrained” resources that are managed by roughly 30 air traffic controllers (at towers, approach control and en route sectors); along with traffic managers at 12 facilities, using over 22 different, independent automation system (including TBFM, ERAM, STARS, ASDE-X, FSM, TSD, GPWS, TCAS, etc.). In addition, dispatchers, ramp controllers and others utilize even more systems to manage each flight’s access to operator-managed resources. Flying an ideal 4DT requires successful coordination of all flight constraints among all flights, facilities, operators, pilots and controllers. Additionally, when conditions in the NAS change, the trajectories of one or more aircraft may need to be revised to avoid loss of flight efficiency, predictability, separation or system throughput. The Aviation Safety Network has released the 2016 airliner accident statistics showing a very low total of 19 fatal airliner accidents, resulting in 325 fatalities1. Despite several high profile accidents, the year 2016 turned out to be a very safe year for commercial aviation, Aviation Safety Network data show. Over the year 2016 the Aviation Safety Network recorded a total of 19 fatal airliner accidents [1], resulting in 325 fatalities. This makes 2016 the second safest year ever, both by number of fatal accidents as well as in terms of fatalities. In 2015 ASN recorded 16 accidents while in 2013 a total of 265 lives were lost. How can we keep it that way and not upset the apple cart by premature insertion of innovative technologies, functions, and procedures? In aviation, safety nets function as the last system defense against incidents and accidents. Current ground-based and airborne safety nets are well established and development to make them more efficient and reliable continues. Additionally, future air traffic control safety nets may emerge from new operational concepts.
In 2004, NASA awarded the Research, Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering (ROME) contract at NASA Langley Research Center to a team led by Jacobs Technology, Inc. A key component of the contract was the transitioning of the five large wind tunnel facilities from NASA managed and NASA or NASA/contractor workforces to fully contractor operated. The contractor would manage daily operations while NASA would continue to develop long-term strategies, make decisions regarding commitment of funds and commitment of facilities, and provide oversight of the contractor's performance. A major challenge would be the transition of knowledge of facility operations and maintenance from the incumbent civil servant workforce to the contractor workforce. While the contract has since been modified multiple times, resulting in a blended NASA/ROME workforce across the facilities, the processes developed and implemented to capture and document facility knowledge from the incumbent subject matter experts, build training and certification programs, and grow individual skills across subject areas and across facilities, are worthy of documentation. This is the purpose of this paper.
During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)