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NASA NTRS2012

Human Thermal Model Evaluation Using the JSC Human Thermal Database

Human thermal modeling has considerable long term utility to human space flight. Such models provide a tool to predict crew survivability in support of vehicle design and to evaluate crew response in untested space environments. It is to the benefit of any such model not only to collect relevant experimental data to correlate it against, but also to maintain an experimental standard or benchmark for future development in a readily and rapidly searchable and software accessible format. The Human thermal database project is intended to do just so; to collect relevant data from literature and experimentation and to store the data in a database structure for immediate and future use as a benchmark to judge human thermal models against, in identifying model strengths and weakness, to support model development and improve correlation, and to statistically quantify a model s predictive quality. The human thermal database developed at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is intended to evaluate a set of widely used human thermal models. This set includes the Wissler human thermal model, a model that has been widely used to predict the human thermoregulatory response to a variety of cold and hot environments. These models are statistically compared to the current database, which contains experiments of human subjects primarily in air from a literature survey ranging between 1953 and 2004 and from a suited experiment recently performed by the authors, for a quantitative study of relative strength and predictive quality of the models.

Bue, Grant↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Behavior and Performance Support for ISS Operations and Astronaut Selections: NASA Operational Psychology for Six-Crew Operations

The Behavioral Health and Performance group at NASA Johnson Space Center provides psychological support services and behavioral health monitoring for ISS astronauts and their families. The ISS began as an austere outpost with minimal comforts of home and minimal communication capabilities with family, friends, and colleagues outside of the Mission Control Center. Since 1998, the work of international partners involved in the Space Flight Human Behavior and Performance Working Group has prepared high-level requirements for behavioral monitoring and support. The "buffet" of services from which crewmembers can choose has increased substantially. Through the process of development, implementation, reviewing effectiveness and modifying as needed, the NASA and Wyle team have proven successful in managing the psychological health and well being of the crews and families with which they work. Increasing the crew size from three to six brought additional challenges. For the first time, all partners had to collaborate at the planning and implementation level, and the U.S. served as mentor to extrapolate their experiences to the others. Parity in available resources, upmass, and stowage had to be worked out. Steady progress was made in improving off-hours living and making provisions for new technologies within a system that has difficulty moving quickly on certifications. In some respect, the BHP support team fell victim to its previous successes. With increasing numbers of crewmembers in training, requests to engage our services spiraled upward. With finite people and funds, a cap had to placed on many services to ensure that parity could be maintained. The evolution of NASA BHP services as the ISS progressed from three- to six-crew composition will be reviewed, and future challenges that may be encountered as the ISS matures in its assembly-complete state will be discussed.

VanderArk, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2013

Exploration Space Suit Architecture and Destination Environmental-Based Technology Development

This paper continues forward where EVA Space Suit Architecture: Low Earth Orbit Vs. Moon Vs. Mars1 left off in the development of a space suit architecture that is modular in design and could be reconfigured prior to launch or during any given mission depending on the tasks or destination. This paper addresses the space suit system architecture and technologies required based on human exploration (EVA) destinations, and describes how these systems should evolve to meet the future exploration EVA needs of the US human space flight program. A series of exercises and analyses provided a strong indication that the Constellation Program space suit architecture, with its maximum reuse of technology and functionality across a range of mission profiles and destinations, is postured to provide a viable solution for future space exploration missions. The destination environmental analysis demonstrates that the modular architecture approach could provide the lowest mass and mission cost for the protection of the crew, given any human mission outside of low-Earth orbit. Additionally, some of the high-level trades presented here provide a review of the environmental and non-environmental design drivers that will become increasingly important as humans venture farther from Earth. This paper demonstrates a logical clustering of destination design environments that allows a focused approach to technology prioritization, development, and design that will maximize the return on investment, largely independent of any particular design reference mission.

Hill, Terry R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Exploration Space Suit Architecture and Destination Environmental-Based Technology Development

This paper continues forward where EVA Space Suit Architecture: Low Earth Orbit Vs. Moon Vs. Mars left off in the development of a space suit architecture that is modular in design and could be reconfigured prior to launch or during any given mission depending on the tasks or destination. This space suit system architecture and technologies required based on human exploration (EVA) destinations will be discussed, and how these systems should evolve to meet the future exploration EVA needs of the US human space flight program. A series of exercises and analyses provided a strong indication that the Constellation Program space suit architecture, with its maximum reuse of technology and functionality across a range of mission profiles and destinations, is postured to provide a viable solution for future space exploration missions. The destination environmental analysis demonstrates that the modular architecture approach could provide the lowest mass and mission cost for the protection of the crew, given any human mission outside of low-Earth orbit. Additionally, some of the high-level trades presented here provide a review of the environmental and nonenvironmental design drivers that will become increasingly important as humans venture farther from Earth. The presentation of destination environmental data demonstrates a logical clustering of destination design environments that allows a focused approach to technology prioritization, development, and design that will maximize the return on investment, largely independent of any particular design reference mission.

Hill, Terry R.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders

The NASA commitment to human space flight includes continuing to fly astronauts on the ISS until it is decommissioned as well as possibly returning astronauts to the moon or having astronauts venture to an asteroid or Mars. As missions leave low Earth orbit and explore deeper space, BHP supports and conducts research to enable a risk posture that considers the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric disorders “acceptable given mitigations,” for pre-, in, and post-flight.The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) determines the risk of various mission scenarios using a likelihood (per person per year) by consequences matrix examining those risks across two categories—long term health and operational (within mission). Colors from a stoplight signal are used by HSRB and quickly provide a means of assessing overall perceived risk for a particular mission scenario. Risk associated with the current six month missions on the ISS are classified as “accepted with monitoring” while planetary missions, such as a mission to Mars, are recognized to be a “red” risk that requires mitigation to ensure mission success.Currently, the HSRB deems that the risk of adverse cognitive or behavioral conditions and psychiatric outcomes requires mitigation for planetary missions owing to long duration isolation and radiation exposure (see Table 1). While limited research evidence exists from spaceflight, it is well known anecdotally that the shift from the two week shuttle missions to the six month ISS missions renders the psychological stressors of space as more salient over longer duration missions. Shuttle astronauts were expected just to tolerate any stressors that arose during their mission and were successful at doing so (Whitmire et al, 2013). While it is possible to deal with stressors such as social isolation and to live with incompatible crewmembers for two weeks on shuttle, “ignoring it” is much less likely to be a successful coping mechanism on station. For the longer missions of the ISS, astronauts require a larger, more robust set of coping skills and more psychological support. Evidence of this are the number of BHP’s Operational Psychology (Op Psy) staff who have been awarded silver Snoopys by long duration astronauts†, in the statements of praise for the Op Psy and Family Support Office teams, and in the written and oral statements from flown astronauts regarding difficulty of longer missions and how much Op Psy helped.

Slack, Kelley J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Lockheed Martin Response to the OSP Challenge

The Lockheed Martin Orbital Space Plane System provides crew transfer and rescue for the International Space Station more safely and affordably than current human space transportation systems. Through planned upgrades and spiral development, it is also capable of satisfying the Nation's evolving space transportation requirements and enabling the national vision for human space flight. The OSP System, formulated through rigorous requirements definition and decomposition, consists of spacecraft and launch vehicle flight elements, ground processing facilities and existing transportation, launch complex, range, mission control, weather, navigation, communication and tracking infrastructure. The concept of operations, including procurement, mission planning, launch preparation, launch and mission operations and vehicle maintenance, repair and turnaround, is structured to maximize flexibility and mission availability and minimize program life cycle cost. The approach to human rating and crew safety utilizes simplicity, performance margin, redundancy, abort modes and escape modes to mitigate credible hazards that cannot be designed out of the system.

Sullivan, Robert T.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Report by the International Space Station (ISS) Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force

The International Space Station (ISS) Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force (IMCE) was chartered to conduct an independent external review and assessment of the ISS cost, budget, and management. In addition, the Task Force was asked to provide recommendations that could provide maximum benefit to the U.S. taxpayers and the International Partners within the President's budget request. The Task Force has made the following principal findings: (1) The ISS Program's technical achievements to date, as represented by on-orbit capability, are extraordinary; (2) The Existing ISS Program Plan for executing the FY 02-06 budget is not credible; (3) The existing deficiencies in management structure, institutional culture, cost estimating, and program control must be acknowledged and corrected for the Program to move forward in a credible fashion; (4) Additional budget flexibility, from within the Office of Space Flight (OSF) must be provided for a credible core complete program; (5) The research support program is proceeding assuming the budget that was in place before the FY02 budget runout reduction of $1B; (6) There are opportunities to maximize research on the core station program with modest cost impact; (7) The U.S. Core Complete configuration (three person crew) as an end-state will not achieve the unique research potential of the ISS; (8) The cost estimates for the U.S.-funded enhancement options (e.g., permanent seven person crew) are not sufficiently developed to assess credibility. After these findings, the Task Force has formulated several primary recommendations which are published here and include: (1) Major changes must be made in how the ISS program is managed; (2) Additional cost reductions are required within the baseline program; (3) Additional funds must be identified and applied from the Human Space Flight budget; (4) A clearly defined program with a credible end-state, agreed to by all stakeholders, must be developed and implemented.

Young, A. Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2004

Modeling of Radiation Risks for Human Space Missions

Prior to any human space flight, calculations of radiation risks are used to determine the acceptable scope of astronaut activity. Using the supercomputing facilities at NASA Ames Research Center, Ames researchers have determined the damage probabilities of DNA functional groups by space radiation. The data supercede those used in the current Monte Carlo model for risk assessment. One example is the reaction of DNA with hydroxyl radical produced by the interaction of highly energetic particles from space radiation with water molecules in the human body. This reaction is considered an important cause of DNA mutations, although its mechanism is not well understood.

Fletcher, Graham↗
NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Achievable Human Exploration of Mars: Highlights from The Fourth Community Workshop (AM IV)

About a half decade ago, several professionals working mainly in industry on scenarios for initial human exploration of Mars together recognized that, under generally similar assumptions, there was a fair degree of similarity among these scenarios. Moreover, opportunities should be sought for greater community input into NASA's own scenario-building for the future of human space flight. A series of focused community workshops were considered to be effective to assess these scenarios and involve more directly the science community, including planetary protection, with industry. Four workshops to date each involve about sixty professional scientists, engineers, technologists, and strategists from NASA, academia, aerospace corporations, the National Academies, consulting organizations, and potential international partners.

human mission of Mars↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heavy Lift for Exploration: Options and Utilization

Every study of exploration capabilities since the Apollo Program has recommended the renewal of a heavy lift launch capability for the United States. NASA is aggressively pursuing that capability. This paper will discuss several aspects of that effort and the potential uses for that heavy lift capability. The need for heavy lift was cited most recent in the findings of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. Combined with considerations of launch availability and on-orbit operations, the Committee finds that exploration will benefit from the availability of a heavy-lift vehicle, the report said. In addition, heavy lift would enable the launching of large scientific observatories and more capable deep-space missions. It may also provide benefit in national security applications. The most recent focus of NASA s heavy lift effort is the Ares V cargo launch vehicle, which is part of the Constellation Program architecture for human exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). The most recent point-of-departure configuration of the Ares V was approved during the Lunar Capabilities concept Review (LCCR) in 2008. The Ares V first stage propulsion system consists of a core stage powered by six commercial liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen (LH2/LOX) RS-68 engines, flanked by two 5.5-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs) based on the 5-segment Ares I first stage. The boosters use the same Polybutadiene Acrylonitrile (PBAN) propellant as the Space Shuttle. Atop the core stage is the Earth departure stage (EDS), powered by a single J-2X upper stage engine based on the Ares I upper stage engine. The 33-foot-diameter payload shroud can enclose a lunar lander, scientific instruments, or other payloads. Since LCCR, NASA has continued to refine the design through several successive internal design cycles. In addition, NASA has worked to quantify the broad national consensus for heavy lift in ways that, to the extent possible, meet the needs of the user community.

Creech, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2017

What Machines Need to Learn to Support Human Problem-Solving

In the development of intelligent systems that interact with humans, there is often confusion between how the system functions with respect to the humans it interacts with and how it interfaces with those humans. The former is a much deeper challenge than the latter it requires a system-level understanding of evolving human roles as well as an understanding of what humans need to know (and when) in order to perform their tasks. This talk will focus on some of the challenges in getting this right as well as on the type of research and development that results in successful human-autonomy teaming. Brief Bio: Dr. Alonso Vera is Chief of the Human Systems Integration Division at NASA Ames Research Center. His expertise is in human-computer interaction, information systems, artificial intelligence, and computational human performance modeling. He has led the design, development and deployment of mission software systems across NASA robotic and human space flight missions, including Mars Exploration Rovers, Phoenix Mars Lander, ISS, Constellation, and Exploration Systems. Dr. Vera received a Bachelor of Science with First Class Honors from McGill University in 1985 and a Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1991. He went on to a Post-Doctoral Fellowship in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University from 1990-93.

intelligent systems↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Propulsion Overview - The Design Challenges

The major elements of the Space Shuttle Main Propulsion System include two reusable solid rocket motors integrated into recoverable solid rocket boosters, an expendable external fuel and oxidizer tank, and three reusable Space Shuttle Main Engines. Both the solid rocket motors and space shuttle main engines ignite prior to liftoff, with the solid rocket boosters separating about two minutes into flight. The external tank separates, about eight and a half minutes into the flight, after main engine shutdown and is safely expended in the ocean. The SSME's, integrated into the Space Shuttle Orbiter aft structure, are reused after post landing inspections. The configuration is called a stage and a half as all the propulsion elements are active during the boost phase, with only the SSME s continuing operation to achieve orbital velocity. Design and performance challenges were numerous, beginning with development work in the 1970's. The solid rocket motors were large, and this technology had never been used for human space flight. The SSME s were both reusable and very high performance staged combustion cycle engines, also unique to the Space Shuttle. The multi body side mount configuration was unique and posed numerous integration and interface challenges across the elements. Operation of the system was complex and time consuming. This paper describes the design challenges and key areas where the design evolved during the program.

Owen, James W.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Integrated Space Transportation Plan: Defining Technology Requirements and Next Generation Launch Systems to Meet Commercial and Government Needs

NASA continues to focus on improving safety and reliability while reducing the annual cost of meeting human space flight and unique ISS and exploration needs. NASA's Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) Phase 2 in early 1998 focused on space transportation options. Subsequently, NASA directed parallel industry and government teams to conduct the Integrated Space Transportation Plan effort (STAS Phase 3). The objective of ISTP was to develop technology requirements, roadmaps, and risk reduction portfolio that considered expanded definition of "clean-sheet" and Shuttle-derived second generation ETO transportation systems in support of a 2005 RLV competition for NASA missions beginning 2010. NASA provided top-level requirements for improvements in safety, reliability, and cost and a set of design reference missions representing NASA ISS, human exploration, commercial, and other civil and government needs. This paper addresses the challenges of meeting NASA's objectives while servicing the varied market segments represented in the ISTP design reference missions and provides a summary of technology development needs and candidate system concepts. A comparison of driving requirements, architectures and technology needs is discussed and descriptions of viable Shuttle-derived and next generation systems to meet the market needs are presented.

Davidoff, Larry D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Ultrasound Imaging of Spine: State of the Art and Utility for Space Flight

Introduction: Ultrasound imaging (sonography) has been increasingly used for both primary diagnosis and monitoring of musculoskeletal injury, including fractures. In certain injuries, sonography has been shown to equal or surpass Magnetic Resonance Imaging in accuracy. Long-term exposure to reduced gravity may be expected to cause physiological and anatomical changes of the musculoskeletal system, which are not fully described or understood. In a limited-resource environment like space flight, sonography will likely remain the only imaging modality; therefore, further attention to its potential is warranted, including its ability to image anatomical deviations as well as irregularities of vertebrae and the spinal column. Methods: A thorough review of literature was conducted on the subject. A multipurpose ultrasound system was used to identify specific vertebrae, intervertebral disks, and other structures of the cervical spine in healthy volunteers, selected to represent various age, gender, and Body Mass Index (BMI) groups. Sonographic views were sought that would parallel radiographic views and signs used in the diagnosis of cervical spine injuries. Results: While using widely accepted radiographic signs of cervical spine injury, this sonographic protocol development effort resulted in successful identification of scanning planes and imaging protocols that could serve as alternatives for radiography. Some of these views are also applicable to diagnosing degenerative disk and bone disease, and other non-traumatic spine pathology. Strong, preliminary correlation has been demonstrated in a number of clinical cases between sonography and other imaging modalities. Conclusion: In the absence of radiography, sonography can be used to diagnose or rule out certain common types of cervical spine conditions including injury. Clinical validation of the findings appears to be realistic and would facilitate establishment of new sonographic protocols for special environments with lacking radiographic capability, such as human space flight.

Sargsyan, Ashot E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Robots Explore the Farthest Reaches of Earth and Space

"We were the first that ever burst/Into that silent sea," the title character recounts in Samuel Taylor Coleridge s opus Rime of the Ancient Mariner. This famous couplet is equally applicable to undersea exploration today as surface voyages then, and has recently been applied to space travel in the title of a chronicle of the early years of human space flight ("Into That Silent Sea: Trailblazers of the Space Era, 1961-1965"), companion to the +n the Shadow of the Moon book and movie. The parallel is certainly fitting, considering both fields explore unknown, harsh, and tantalizingly inhospitable environments. For starters, exploring the Briny Deep and the Final Frontier requires special vehicles, and the most economical and safest means for each employ remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). ROVs have proven the tool of choice for exploring remote locations, allowing scientists to explore the deepest part of the sea and the furthest reaches of the solar system with the least weight penalty, the most flexibility and specialization of design, and without the need to provide for sustaining human life, or the risk of jeopardizing that life. Most NASA probes, including the historic Voyager I and II spacecraft and especially the Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, feature remote operation, but new missions and new planetary environments will demand new capabilities from the robotic explorers of the future. NASA has an acute interest in the development of specialized ROVs, as new lessons learned on Earth can be applied to new environments and increasingly complex missions in the future of space exploration.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2017

Achieving And Sustaining Human Exploration of Mars The Fourth Community Workshop (AM IV)

About a half decade ago, several professionals working mainly in industry on scenarios for initial human exploration of Mars exploration together recognized that, under generally similar assumptions, there was a fair degree of similarity among these scenarios. Moreover, opportunities should be sought for greater community input into NASAs own scenario-building for the future of human space flight. A series of focused community workshops were considered to be effective to critically assess the increasingly sophisticated scenarios. Explore Mars, Inc. the American Astronautical Society agreed to support them. Four workshops to date each involve about sixty professional scientists, engineers, technologists, and strategists from NASA, academia, aerospace corporations, the National Academies, consulting organizations, and potential international partners. Each workshop produced a series of presentations and reports briefed to NASA leadership and other stakeholders.

Achieving Sustaining Human Exploration of Mars The↗