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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Aseptic Operations for Post DHMR Processing of MOMA Mass Spectrometer

Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer - Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is an instrument in the MOMA instrument suite for the European Space Agency (ESA) ExoMars 2020 Rover. The rover is Planetary Protection Mission Category IVb, the first IVb mission since the Viking missions in the 1970s. Within the sample path of the MOMA instrument suite, the hardware surfaces of the must be sanitized to a level of less than 0.03 spore/m sq. To meet this requirement, the MS sample path was subjected to Dry Heat Microbial Reduction (DHMR) to decrease the number of viable spores by 4 orders of magnitude from a measured 88 spores/m sq to 0.009 spores/m sq. Before DHMR, the hardware is handled using standard cleanroom practices. After DHMR, planetary protection filters protect the sample path for most of integration, but when sample path exposure is required, aseptic operations are instituted and exposure times are kept to an absolute minimum. The surface area of exposure is also taken into account to determine safe exposure times. Before work begins, the ISO class 5 aseptic workspace is cleaned and tested for surface and airborne bioburden, and all tools that will contact or be used near sample path surfaces are sterilized. During the exposure activity, sterile garments are worn, sterile gloves are changed as often as necessary, and the environment is monitored with active and passive fallout for bioburden and real time airborne particle counts. Sterile tools are handled by a two person team so that the operator touches only the tool and not the exterior surfaces of the sterilization pouch, and a sterile operating field is established as a safe place to organize tools or parts during the aseptic operations. In cases where aseptic operations are not feasible, localized DHMR is used after exposure. Any breach in the planetary protection cleanliness can necessitate repeating instrument level DHMR, which not only has significant cost and schedule implications, it also become a risk to hardware that is not rated for repeated long exposures to high temperatures.

Spacecraft Design↗
NASA NTRS2012

Extreme Ionizing-Radiation-Resistant Bacterium

There is a growing concern that desiccation and extreme radiation-resistant, non-spore-forming microorganisms associated with spacecraft surfaces can withstand space environmental conditions and subsequent proliferation on another solar body. Such forward contamination would jeopardize future life detection or sample return technologies. The prime focus of NASA s planetary protection efforts is the development of strategies for inactivating resistance-bearing microorganisms. Eradification techniques can be designed to target resistance-conferring microbial populations by first identifying and understanding their physiologic and biochemical capabilities that confers its elevated tolerance (as is being studied in Deinococcus phoenicis, as a result of this description). Furthermore, hospitals, food, and government agencies frequently use biological indicators to ensure the efficacy of a wide range of radiation- based sterilization processes. Due to their resistance to a variety of perturbations, the non-spore forming D. phoenicis may be a more appropriate biological indicator than those currently in use. The high flux of cosmic rays during space travel and onto the unshielded surface of Mars poses a significant hazard to the survival of microbial life. Thus, radiation-resistant microorganisms are of particular concern that can survive extreme radiation, desiccation, and low temperatures experienced during space travel. Spore-forming bacteria, a common inhabitant of spacecraft assembly facilities, are known to tolerate these extreme conditions. Since the Viking era, spores have been utilized to assess the degree and level of microbiological contamination on spacecraft and their associated spacecraft assembly facilities. Members of the non-spore-forming bacterial community such as Deinococcus radiodurans can survive acute exposures to ionizing radiation (5 kGy), ultraviolet light (1 kJ/sq m), and desiccation (years). These resistive phenotypes of Deinococcus enhance the potential for transfer, and subsequent proliferation, on another solar body such as Mars and Europa. These organisms are more likely to escape planetary protection assays, which only take into account presence of spores. Hence, presences of extreme radiation-resistant Deinococcus in the cleanroom facility where spacecraft are assembled pose a serious risk for integrity of life-detection missions. The microorganism described herein was isolated from the surfaces of the cleanroom facility in which the Phoenix Lander was assembled. The isolated bacterial strain was subjected to a comprehensive polyphasic analysis to characterize its taxonomic position. This bacterium exhibits very low 16SrRNA similarity with any other environmental isolate reported to date. Both phenotypic and phylogenetic analyses clearly indicate that this isolate belongs to the genus Deinococcus and represents a novel species. The name Deinococcus phoenicis was proposed after the Phoenix spacecraft, which was undergoing assembly, testing, and launch operations in the spacecraft assembly facility at the time of isolation. D. phoenicis cells exhibited higher resistance to ionizing radiation (cobalt-60; 14 kGy) than the cells of the D. radiodurans (5 kGy). Thus, it is in the best interest of NASA to thoroughly characterize this organism, which will further assess in determining the potential for forward contamination. Upon the completion of genetic and physiological characteristics of D. phoenicis, it will be added to a planetary protection database to be able to further model and predict the probability of forward contamination.

Vaishampayan, Parag A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Extreme Ionizing-Radiation-Resistant Bacterium

There is a growing concern that desiccation and extreme radiation-resistant, non-spore-forming microorganisms associated with spacecraft surfaces can withstand space environmental conditions and subsequent proliferation on another solar body. Such forward contamination would jeopardize future life detection or sample return technologies. The prime focus of NASA s planetary protection efforts is the development of strategies for inactivating resistance-bearing micro-organisms. Eradi cation techniques can be designed to target resistance-conferring microbial populations by first identifying and understanding their physiologic and biochemical capabilities that confers its elevated tolerance (as is being studied in Deinococcus phoenicis, as a result of this description). Furthermore, hospitals, food, and government agencies frequently use biological indicators to ensure the efficacy of a wide range of radiation-based sterilization processes. Due to their resistance to a variety of perturbations, the nonspore forming D. phoenicis may be a more appropriate biological indicator than those currently in use. The high flux of cosmic rays during space travel and onto the unshielded surface of Mars poses a significant hazard to the survival of microbial life. Thus, radiation-resistant microorganisms are of particular concern that can survive extreme radiation, desiccation, and low temperatures experienced during space travel. Spore-forming bacteria, a common inhabitant of spacecraft assembly facilities, are known to tolerate these extreme conditions. Since the Viking era, spores have been utilized to assess the degree and level of microbiological contamination on spacecraft and their associated spacecraft assembly facilities. Members of the non-sporeforming bacterial community such as Deinococcus radiodurans can survive acute exposures to ionizing radiation (5 kGy), ultraviolet light (1 kJ/m2), and desiccation (years). These resistive phenotypes of Deinococcus enhance the potential for transfer, and subsequent proliferation, on another solar body such as Mars and Europa. These organisms are more likely to escape planetary protection assays, which only take into account presence of spores. Hence, presences of extreme radiation-resistant Deinococcus in the cleanroom facility where spacecraft are assembled pose a serious risk for integrity of life-detection missions. The microorganism described herein was isolated from the surfaces of the cleanroom facility in which the Phoenix Lander was assembled. The isolated bacterial strain was subjected to a comprehensive polyphasic analysis to characterize its taxonomic position. This bacterium exhibits very low 16SrRNA similarity with any other environmental isolate reported to date. Both phenotypic and phylogenetic analyses clearly indicate that this isolate belongs to the genus Deinococcus and represents a novel species. The name Deinococcus phoenicis was proposed after the Phoenix spacecraft, which was undergoing assembly, testing, and launch operations in the spacecraft assembly facility at the time of isolation. D. phoenicis cells exhibited higher resistance to ionizing radiation (cobalt-60; 14 kGy) than the cells of the D. radiodurans (5 kGy). Thus, it is in the best interest of NASA to thoroughly characterize this organism, which will further assess in determining the potential for forward contamination. Upon the completion of genetic and physiological characteristics of D. phoenicis, it will be added to a planetary protection database to be able to further model and predict the probability of forward contamination.

Vaishampayan, Parag A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Standardization of Spore Inactivation Method for PMA-PhyloChip Analysis

In compliance with the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) planetary protection policy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) monitors the total microbial burden of spacecraft as a means for minimizing the inadvertent transfer of viable contaminant microorganisms to extraterrestrial environments (forward contamination). NASA standard assay-based counts are used both as a proxy for relative surface cleanliness and to estimate overall microbial burden as well as to assess whether forward planetary protection risk criteria are met for a given mission, which vary by the planetary body to be explored and whether or not life detection missions are present. Despite efforts to reduce presence of microorganisms from spacecraft prior to launch, microbes have been isolated from spacecraft and associated surfaces within the extreme conditions of clean room facilities using state of the art molecular technologies. Development of a more sensitive method that will better enumerate all viable microorganisms from spacecraft and associated surfaces could support future life detection missions. Current culture-based (NASA standard spore assay) and nucleic-acid-based polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods have significant shortcomings in this type of analysis. The overall goal of this project is to evaluate and validate a new molecular method based on the use of a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) intercalating agent propidium monoazide (PMA). This is used in combination with DNA microarray (PhyloChip) which has been shown to identify very low levels of organisms on spacecraft associated surfaces. PMA can only penetrate the membrane of dead cells. Once penetrated, it intercalates the DNA and, upon photolysis using visible light it produces stable DNA monoadducts. This allows DNA to be unavailable for further PCR analysis. The specific aim of this study is to standardize the spore inactivation method for PMA-PhyloChip analysis. We have used the bacterial spores Bacillus subtilis 168 (standard laboratory isolate) as a test organism.

spore inactivation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Missions to Mars; Surface Concept of Operations for Dec 2020 COSPAR PP Workshop

The purpose of this presentation is to provide insight into NASA’s current thinking for human exploration on the surface of Mars as part of a December 2020 joint NASA/COSPAR workshop addressing planetary protection issues. This presentation has two major sections. The first section provides a general overview of human Mars missions. This includes major mission events typical of these missions and anticipated range of mission durations. The second section summarizes expected environmental conditions and operations on the surface of Mars and some of the planetary protection related question of current interest in planning for these human missions.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Reference Surface Activities for Crewed Mars Mission Systems and Utilization

This presentation was made at the “COSPAR Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Missions to Mars” virtual workshop. As the workshop title implies, the presentation is intended to explain basic features of current human Mars surface mission scenarios being analyzed by NASA. The specific scenario details described is documented in HEOMD-415 “Reference Surface Activities for Crewed Mars Mission Systems and Utilization.” Other workshop presentations will expand on details related to scientific investigations that could have planetary protection impacts.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microbes Share Rides Too: Updating Encapsulated Bioburden Estimate Values in Electronic Parts Common to Class D Missions

As NASA develops more planetary protection missions that are Category III and in the Class D/rideshare mission platform, there is an increasing reliance on estimation of prelaunch bioburden to understand needs for burn up and breakup analyses or other methods to meet pre-launch bioburden levels. Current levels estimated for the encapsulated bioburden of semiconductor parts cited by NASA have been based on estimates of semiconductor manufacturing approaches from the 1970s that do not incorporate the evolving cleanliness of semiconductor manufacturing since that time. This investigation will focus on direct sampling of semiconductor parts for encapsulated bioburden values, drawing upon Goddard’s strength in EEE parts, supply chain management, destructive parts analysis and existing local planetary protection lab facilities to prepare and measure encapsulated bioburden at a statistically significant level for standard electronics parts common to known Class D/rideshare platforms.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microbes Share Rides Too: Updating Encapsulated Bioburden Estimate Values in Electronic Parts Common to Class D Mission Platforms.

As NASA develops more planetary protection missions that are Category III and in the Class D/rideshare mission platform, there is an increasing reliance on estimation of prelaunch bioburden to understand needs for burn up and breakup analyses or other methods to meet pre-launch bioburden levels. Current levels estimated for the encapsulated bioburden of semiconductor parts cited by NASA have been based on estimates of semiconductor manufacturing approaches from the 1970s that do not incorporate over fifty years of evolving cleanliness of semiconductor manufacturing processes and facilities. This investigation will focus on direct sampling of semiconductor parts for encapsulated bioburden values, drawing upon Goddard’s strength in EEE parts, supply chain management, destructive parts analysis and existing local planetary protection lab facilities to prepare and measure encapsulated bioburden at a statistically significant level for standard electronics parts common to known Class D/rideshare platforms.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRS2016

Establishing and Monitoring an Aseptic Workspace for Building the MOMA Mass Spectrometer

Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer (MOMA) is an instrument suite on the ESA ExoMars 2018 Rover, and the Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is being built at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). As MOMA-MS is a life-detection instrument and it thus falls in the most stringent category of Planetary Protection (PP) biological cleanliness requirements. Less than 0.03 sporem2 is allowed in the instrument sample path. In order to meet these PP requirements, MOMA-MS must be built and maintained in a low bioburden environment. The MOMA-MS project at GSFC maintains three cleanrooms with varying levels of bioburden control. The Aseptic Assembly Cleanroom has the highest level of control, applying three different bioburden reducing methods: 70 IPA, 7.5 Hydrogen Peroxide, and Ultra-Violet C light. The three methods are used in rotation and each kills microbes by a different mechanism, reducing the likelihood of microorganisms developing resistance to all three. The Integration and Mars Chamber Cleanrooms use less biocidal cleaning, with the option to deploy extra techniques as necessary. To support the monitoring of cleanrooms and verification that MOMA-MS hardware meets PP requirements, a new Planetary Protection lab was established that currently has the capabilities of standard growth assays for spore or vegetative bacteria, rapid bioburden analysis that detects Adenosine Triphosphate (ATP), plus autoclave and DHMR verification. The cleanrooms are monitored both for vegetative microorganisms and by rapid ATP assay, and a clear difference in bioburden is observed between the aseptic the other cleanroom.

Contamination Control Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2017

Aseptic Handling of the MOMA Mass Spectrometer After Dry Heat Microbial Reduction

Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is an instrument in the larger MOMA instrument suite for the European Space Agency (ESA) ExoMars 2020 Rover. As a life-detection instrument on a Mars landing mission, MOMA-MS has very stringent Planetary Protection (PP) bioburden requirements. Within the MOMA instrument suite, the hardware surfaces of the sample path must be cleaned to a level of 0.03 spore/sq m. To meet this requirement, a process called Dry Heat Microbial Reduction (DHMR) is used to decrease the number of viable spores by 4 orders of magnitude. Before DHMR, the hardware is handled using standard cleanroom practices, while after DHMR, all sample path surfaces must be handled aseptically when exposed. Aseptic handling of the sample path involves a number of strategies and protocols including working only in an aseptic ISO class 5 work space, limiting the amount of time of exposure, using sterile garmenting with sterile gloves, and using sterile tools. Before work begins, the aseptic workspace will be tested for bioburden and particle fallout, and all tools that will contact sample path surfaces must be sterilized. During the exposure activity, sterile garments will be worn, sterile tools will be handled in a 2 person set up so that the operator touches only the sterile tool and not the exterior surfaces of the sterile pouch, and the environment will be monitored with active and passive fallout for bioburden and particle levels. Any breach in the planetary protection cleanliness can necessitate repeating DHMR, which not only has significant cost and schedule implications, it also become a risk to hardware that is not rated for repeated long exposures to high temperatures.

Life Detection↗
NASA NTRS2016

Establishing and Monitoring an Aseptic Workspace for Building the MOMA Mass Spectrometer

Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer (MOMA) is an instrument suite on the European Space Agency (ESA) ExoMars 2020 Rover, and the Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is being built at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). MOMA-MS is a life-detection instrument and thus falls in the most stringent category of Planetary Protection (PP) biological cleanliness requirements. Less than 0.03 spore/m2 are allowed in the instrument sample path. In order to meet these PP requirements, MOMA-MS must be built and maintained in a low bioburden environment. The MOMA-MS project at GSFC maintains three clean rooms with varying levels of bioburden control. The Aseptic Assembly Clean room has the highest level of control, applying three different bioburden reducing methods: 70% Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA), 7.5% Hydrogen Peroxide, and Ultra-Violet C (UVC) light. The three methods are used in rotation and each kills microorganisms by a different mechanism, reducing the likelihood of microorganisms developing resistance to all three. The Integration and Mars Chamber Clean rooms use less biocidal cleaning, with the option to deploy extra techniques as necessary. To support the monitoring of clean rooms and verification that MOMA-MS hardware meets PP requirements, a new Planetary Protection lab was established that currently has the capabilities of standard growth assays for spore or vegetative bacteria, rapid bioburden analysis that detects Adenosine Triphosphate (ATP), plus autoclave and Dry Heat microbial Reduction (DHMR) verification. The clean rooms are monitored for vegetative microorganisms and by rapid ATP assay, and a clear difference in bioburden is observed between the aseptic and other clean room.

Contamination Control Engineering↗
NASA NTRS2010

Sample Return: What Happens to the Samples on Earth?

As space agencies throughout the world turn their attention toward human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and the solar system beyond, there has been an increase in the number of robotic sample return missions proposed as precursors to these human endeavors. In reality, however, we, as a global community, have very little experience with robotic sample return missions: 3 of the Russian Luna Missions successfully returned lunar material in the 1970s; 28 years later, in 2004, NASA s Genesis Mission returned material from the solar wind; and in 2006, NASA s Stardust Mission returned material from the Comet Wild2. [Note: The Japanese Hyabusa mission continues in space with the hope of returning material from the asteroid 25143 Itokawa.] We launch many spacecraft to LEO and return them to Earth. We also launch spacecraft beyond LEO to explore the planets, our solar system, and beyond. Some even land on these bodies. But these do not return. So as we begin to contemplate the sample return missions of the future, some common questions arise: "What really happens when the capsule returns?" "Where does it land?" "Who retrieves it and just how do they do that?" "Where does it go after that?" "How do the scientists get the samples?" "Do they keep them?" "Who is in charge?" The questions are nearly endless. The goal of this paper/presentation is to uncover many of the mysteries of the post-return phase of a mission - from the time the return body enters the atmosphere until the mission ends and the samples become part of a long term collection. The discussion will be based largely on the author s own experience with both the Genesis and Stardust missions. Of course, these two missions have a great deal in common, being funded by the same NASA Program (Discovery) and having similar team composition. The intent, however, is to use these missions as examples in order to highlight the general requirements and the challenges in defining and meeting those requirements for the final phase of sample return missions. The choices made by the Genesis and Stardust teams regarding recovery and sample handling will be discussed. These will be compared with the handling of returned lunar samples and the proposed handling of the Hyabusa samples as well. Finally, though none of these recent missions have been restricted within NASA s Planetary Protection Protocol, this is likely to change as missions venture farther from Earth. The implementation of Planetary Protection requirements will vary significantly based on mission scenario, however some of the potential implications of restricted Earth return will be considered.

McNamara, Karen↗
NASA NTRS2013

Mars Sample Return Using Commercial Capabilities: ERV Trajectory and Capture Requirements

Mars Sample Return was presented as the highest priority planetary science mission of the next decade [1]. Lemke et al. [2] present a Mars Sample Return mission concept in which the sample is returned directly from the surface of Mars to an Earth orbit. The sample is recovered in Earth Orbit instead of being transferred between spacecraft in Mars Orbit. This paper provides the details of this sample recovery in Earth orbit and presents as such a sub-element of the overall Mars sample return concept given in [2]. We start from the assumption that a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), initially landed on Mars using a modified SpaceX Dragon capsule, has successfully delivered the sample, already contained within an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV), to a parking orbit around Mars. From the parking orbit, the ERV imparts sufficient Delta-V to inject itself into an earthbound trajectory and to be captured into an Earth orbit eventually. We take into account launch window and Delta-V considerations as well as the additional constraint of increased safety margins imposed by planetary protection regulations. We focus on how to overcome two distinct challenges of the sample return that are driven by the issues of planetary protection: (1) the design of an ERV trajectory meeting all the requirements including the need to avoid contamination of Earth's atmosphere; (2) the concept of operations for retrieving the Martian samples in Earth orbit in a safe way. We present an approach to retrieve the samples through a rendezvous between the ERV and a second SpaceX Dragon capsule. The ERV executes a trajectory that brings it from low Mars orbit (LMO) to a Moon-trailing Earth orbit at high inclination with respect to the Earth-Moon plane. After a first burn at Trans-Earth Injection (TEI), the trajectory uses a second burn at perigee during an Earth flyby maneuver to capture the ERV in Earth orbit. The ERV then uses a non-propulsive Moon flyby to come to a near-circular Moon-trailing orbit. To perform the Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR), a second Dragon capsule is then launched from Earth and a similar lunar flyby is performed to rendezvous with the ERV. The requirements for rendezvous, close proximity operations and capture of the sample canister are described. A concept of operations for sample retrieval is presented along with design specifications of the ERV, the required modifications to the Dragon capsule, as well as the hardware, software, sensors, actuators, and capture mechanisms used. In our concept, a container is mounted to the front hatch of Dragon, capable of accommodating the sample canister and sealing it from the rest of the capsule. The sample canister is captured using a robotic arm with a magnetic grappling mechanism. Dragon then performs a propulsive maneuver to return to Earth for a controlled re-entry while the ERV (sans sample container) is left in the Moon trailing orbit. Contingency cases and related mitigation strategies are also discussed, including the advantages and disadvantages of performing the ERV rendezvous with a crew.

Faber, Nicolas F.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Identifying and Inactivating Bacterial Spores

Problems associated with, and new strategies for, inactivating resistant organisms like Bacillus canaveralius (found at Kennedy Space Center during a survey of three NASA cleanrooms) have been defined. Identifying the particular component of the spore that allows its heightened resistance can guide the development of sterilization procedures that are targeted to the specific molecules responsible for resistance, while avoiding using unduly harsh methods that jeopardize equipment. The key element of spore resistance is a multilayered protein shell that encases the spore called the spore coat. The coat of the best-studied spore-forming microbe, B. subtilis, consists of at least 45 proteins, most of which are poorly characterized. Several protective roles for the coat are well characterized including resistance to desiccation, large toxic molecules, ortho-phthalaldehyde, and ultraviolet (UV) radiation. One important long-term specific goal is an improved sterilization procedure that will enable NASA to meet planetary protection requirements without a terminal heat sterilization step. This would support the implementation of planetary protection policies for life-detection missions. Typically, hospitals and government agencies use biological indicators to ensure the quality control of sterilization processes. The spores of B. canaveralius that are more resistant to osmotic stress would serve as a better biological indicator for potential survival than those in use currently.

Newcombe, David↗
NASA NTRS2024

Space Environmental Effects on Cleanroom Microbes: A Pathfinder Study

Microbes have an extraordinary ability to adapt to their environment, but little is known about the effects of space irradiation on microbial survival and adaptation. Microbial responses are relevant to both Planetary Protection (PP), where microbes could contaminate planetary bodies and inhibit scientific investigation, and in crew wellbeing where microbes may develop unknown, dangerous resistance mechanisms that impact human health. This project aimed to determine survivability of a collection of isolates collected from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) cleanrooms. In this study, we developed a standard process for exposing dried microbes to various levels of proton irradiation, followed by evaluation of survival. Through multiple exposures at various intensities, we were able to narrow down a shortlist of cleanroom microbes deemed of highest threat to both PP and crew health. These findings could help to more clearly and accurately define risks associated with radiation impacts on microbes.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRS2000

A Reliable Earth Return System for Safe Recovery of Mars Samples

The objective of a Mars sample return mission is to bring selected Mars surface materials to Earth. Numerous approaches for the Earth-return segment have been analyzed including propulsive or aerocapture return to low-Earth orbit followed by Space Shuttle rendezvous and direct entry. Of these approaches, ballistic entry of a small capsule terminating in a ground landing has been shown to be the lowest risk strategy. Over the past two years, significant work has been performed towards development of a robust direct entry vehicle for Mars sample return. In June 1999, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer provided initial guidance to the former Mars Sample Return Project. The sample return phase of the mission was assigned a restricted Earth return planetary protection classification. The draft mission requirement states that the total mean probability of release of unsterilized Mars material into the Earth;s biosphere must be less than 1.0E-06 (1 in a million). This strict requirement drives the approach and design of the Earth return system. To meet this requirement, selection of the Earth return strategy and development of the Earth return system must be guided by risk, not performance, based decisions. An initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to address the direct entry Earth return system containment assurance reliability and to identify high-risk elements of this system. The results of this PRA identified risk elements that include thermal protection system performance during entry, spin-eject orientation and aerodynamic stability during entry, structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and tracking/recovery of this system. This initial probabilistic risk quantification demonstrates that, with the proper development program, a prototypical direct entry design can satisfy the containment assurance reliability requirement. Through the current Mars Sample Return Advanced Technology Development effort, an extensive design, analysis, and test program is presently proceeding with the aim of reducing the containment assurance risk of this system. This technology development effort, guided by a continuing PRA, focuses on key risk areas of a direct entry Earth return system including: the thermal protection system, impact dynamics, structural performance, aerodynamic stability, and ground recovery. This development program will culminate in a system validation flight test, 1-2 years prior to launch of the flight system. This flight test would include the launch, entry, and recovery of a full-scale Earth return system, as a scientific validation of the key risk elements to verify nominal design performance. The results of the initial PRA suggested several dominant failure sequences that can be validated in a flight test. These include: demonstrating the thermal protection system reliability and performance during entry, demonstrating the spin-eject orientation and aero-dynamic stability during entry, demonstrating the structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and demonstrating tracking and recovery of the Earth return system. This single test will directly address over 50% of the total containment assurance risk elements. This presentation will begin by presenting the relative risk of various Earth return strategies. The results of the initial probabilistic risk assessment will be presented followed by a discussion of the development accomplishments and plans for demonstration of a highly reliable direct entry Earth return system.

Braun, R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Contamination Mitigation Strategies for Long Duration Human Spaceflight Missions

Contamination control issues are particularly challenging for long-term human spaceflight and are associated with the search for life, dynamic environmental conditions, human-robotic-environment interaction, sample collection and return, biological processes, waste management, long-term environmental disturbance, etc. These issues impact mission success, human health, planetary protection, and research and discovery. Mitigation and control techniques and strategies may include and integrate long-term environmental monitoring and reporting, contamination control and planetary protection protocols, habitation site design, habitat design, and surface exploration and traverse pathways and area access planning.

enviroment↗
NASA NTRS2014

Asteroid, Lunar and Planetary Regolith Management A Layered Engineering Defense

During missions on asteroid and lunar and planetary surfaces, space systems and crew health may be degraded by exposure to dust and dirt. Furthermore, for missions outside the Earth‐Moon system, planetary protection must be considered in efforts to minimize forward and backward contamination. This paper presents an end‐to‐end approach to ensure system reliability, crew health, and planetary protection in regolith environments. It also recommends technology investments that would be required to implement this layered engineering defense.

Wagner, Sandra↗