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NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery Mission Status Briefing (incl. Statement from Cmdr. Collins and Crew)

Commander Eileen Collins and crew briefly thanked everyone who worked hard to get the Shuttle back in space, and dedicated the mission to the Columbia crew as she bids their first "good night" to the Mission Control Room in Houston. Video continues with the Mission Status Briefing by Phil Engelauf, STS-114 Mission Operations Representative, and John Shannon, Manager of the Space Shuttle Operations and Integration. Phil noted that launching and ascent had gone extremely well, the crews and the flight control team performed well and the vehicle performed exceptionally as well. The launch is the beginning of a 12 day mission period. John details the tasks of the Engineering team processing the radar data taken during ascent and checking frame by frame the imagery from both on vehicle imagery and ground imagery. John further detailed the two debris event from ascent video clips of tile loss and an unidentified material falling off from the external tank; the release of TYVEK covers, and bird impact on the external tank nose cone. Tile shearing, tile damage, tile repair, landing gear door seals, repair capabilities, debris assessment, safety, inspections criteria, data acquisitions and data analysis were topics covered with the News media.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2007

The NASA Dryden Flight Research Center Unmanned Aircraft System Service Capabilities

Over 60 years of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) expertise at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center are being leveraged to provide capability and expertise to the international UAS community. The DFRC brings together technical experts, UAS, and an operational environment to provide government and industry a broad capability to conduct research, perform operations, and mature systems, sensors, and regulation. The cornerstone of this effort is the acquisition of both a Global Hawk (Northrop Grumman Corporation, Los Angeles, California) and Predator B (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., San Diego, California) unmanned aircraft system (UAS). In addition, a test range for small UAS will allow developers to conduct research and development flights without the need to obtain approval from civil authorities. Finally, experts are available to government and industry to provide safety assessments in support of operations in civil airspace. These services will allow developers to utilize limited resources to their maximum capability in a highly competitive environment.

Bauer, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2007

The NASA Dryden Flight Research Center Unmanned Aircraft System Service Capabilities

Over 60 years of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) expertise at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center are being leveraged to provide capability and expertise to the international UAS community. The DFRC brings together technical experts, UAS, and an operational environment to provide government and industry a broad capability to conduct research, perform operations, and mature systems, sensors, and regulation. The cornerstone of this effort is the acquisition of both a Global Hawk (Northrop Grumman Corporation, Los Angeles, California) and Predator B (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., San Diego, California) unmanned aircraft system (UAS). In addition, a test range for small UAS will allow developers to conduct research and development flights without the need to obtain approval from civil authorities. Finally, experts are available to government and industry to provide safety assessments in support of operations in civil airspace. These services will allow developers to utilize limited resources to their maximum capability in a highly competitive environment.

Bauer, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2008

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) GN and C Technical Discipline Team (TDT): Its Purpose, Practices and Experiences

This paper will briefly define the vision, mission, and purpose of the NESC organization. The role of the GN&C TDT will then be described in detail along with an overview of how this team operates and engages in its objective engineering and safety assessments of critical NASA projects. This paper will then describe key issues and findings from several of the recent GN&C-related independent assessments and consultations performed and/or supported by the NESC GN&C TDT. Among the examples of the GN&C TDT s work that will be addressed in this paper are the following: the Space Shuttle Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) assessment, the ISS CMG failure root cause assessment, the Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technologies (DART) spacecraft mishap consultation, the Phoenix Mars lander thruster-based controllability consultation, the NASA in-house Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Smart Buyer assessment and the assessment of key engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) of robust and reliable GN&C systems for human-rated spacecraft.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Crew Activity Analyzer

The crew activity analyzer (CAA) is a system of electronic hardware and software for automatically identifying patterns of group activity among crew members working together in an office, cockpit, workshop, laboratory, or other enclosed space. The CAA synchronously records multiple streams of data from digital video cameras, wireless microphones, and position sensors, then plays back and processes the data to identify activity patterns specified by human analysts. The processing greatly reduces the amount of time that the analysts must spend in examining large amounts of data, enabling the analysts to concentrate on subsets of data that represent activities of interest. The CAA has potential for use in a variety of governmental and commercial applications, including planning for crews for future long space flights, designing facilities wherein humans must work in proximity for long times, improving crew training and measuring crew performance in military settings, human-factors and safety assessment, development of team procedures, and behavioral and ethnographic research. The data-acquisition hardware of the CAA (see figure) includes two video cameras: an overhead one aimed upward at a paraboloidal mirror on the ceiling and one mounted on a wall aimed in a downward slant toward the crew area. As many as four wireless microphones can be worn by crew members. The audio signals received from the microphones are digitized, then compressed in preparation for storage. Approximate locations of as many as four crew members are measured by use of a Cricket indoor location system. [The Cricket indoor location system includes ultrasonic/radio beacon and listener units. A Cricket beacon (in this case, worn by a crew member) simultaneously transmits a pulse of ultrasound and a radio signal that contains identifying information. Each Cricket listener unit measures the difference between the times of reception of the ultrasound and radio signals from an identified beacon. Assuming essentially instantaneous propagation of the radio signal, the distance between that beacon and the listener unit is estimated from this time difference and the speed of sound in air.] In this system, six Cricket listener units are mounted in various positions on the ceiling, and as many as four Cricket beacons are attached to crew members. The three-dimensional position of each Cricket beacon can be estimated from the time-difference readings of that beacon from at least three Cricket listener units

Murray, James↗
NASA NTRS2010

Safety Arguments for Next Generation, Location Aware Computing

Concerns over accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity have limited the integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) and Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) for safety-critical applications. More recent augmentation systems, such as the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and the North American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) have begun to address these concerns. Augmentation architectures build on the existing GPS/GLONASS infrastructures to support location based services in Safety of Life (SoL) applications. Much of the technical development has been directed by air traffic management requirements, in anticipation of the more extensive support to be offered by GPS III and Galileo. WAAS has already been approved to provide vertical guidance for aviation applications. During the next twelve months, the full certification of EGNOS for SoL applications is expected. This paper discusses similarities and differences between the safety assessment techniques used in Europe and North America.

Johnson, C. W.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Spaceport Performance Measures

Spaceports have traditionally been characterized by performance measures associated with their site characteristics. Measures such as "Latitude" (proximity to the equator), "Azimuth" (range of available launch azimuths) and "Weather" (days of favorable weather) are commonly used to characterize a particular spaceport. However, other spaceport performance measures may now be of greater value. These measures can provide insight into areas of operational differences between competing spaceports and identify areas for improving the performance of spaceports. This paper suggests Figures of Merit (FOMs) for spaceport "Capacity" (number of potential launch opportunities per year and / or potential mass' to low earth orbit (LEO) per year); "Throughput" (actual mass to orbit per year compared to capacity); "Productivity" (labor effort hours per unit mass to orbit); "Energy Efficiency" (joules expended at spaceport per unit mass to orbit); "Carbon Footprint" tons CO2 per unit mass to orbit). Additional FOMS are investigated with regards to those areas of special interest to commercial launch operators, such as "Assignment Schedule" (days required for a binding assignment of a launch site from the spaceport); "Approval Schedule" (days to complete a range safety assessment leading to an approval or disapproval of a launch vehicle); "Affordability" (cost for a spaceport to assess a new launch vehicle); "Launch Affordability" (fixed range costs per launch); "Reconfigure Time" (hours to reconfigure the range from one vehicle's launch ready configuration to another vehicle's configuration); "Turn,Around Time" (minimum range hours required between launches of an identical type launch vehicle). Available or notional data is analyzed for the KSC/CCAFS area and other spaceports. Observations regarding progress over the past few decades are made. Areas where improvement are needed or indicated are suggested.

Finger, G. Wayne↗
NASA NTRS2011

How Can You Support RIDM/CRM/RM Through the Use of PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is one of key Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) tools. It is a scenario-based methodology aimed at identifying and assessing Safety and Technical Performance risks in complex technological systems.

DoVemto. Tpmu↗
NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR)

Safety analyses of the Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) application are provided to establish its Failure Effects Classification which affects certification and operational approval requirements. TASAR was developed by NASA Langley Research Center to offer flight path improvement opportunities to the pilot during flight for operational benefits (e.g., reduced fuel, flight time). TASAR, using own-ship and network-enabled information concerning the flight and its environment, including weather and Air Traffic Control (ATC) system constraints, provides recommended improvements to the flight trajectory that the pilot can choose to request via Change Requests to ATC for revised clearance. This study reviews the Change Request process of requesting updates to the current clearance, examines the intended function of TASAR, and utilizes two safety assessment methods to establish the Failure Effects Classification of TASAR. Considerable attention has been given in this report to the identification of operational hazards potentially associated with TASAR.

Koczo, Stefan, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environmental Simulator (NTREES) Upgrade Activities

Over the past year the Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environmental Simulator (NTREES) has been undergoing a significant upgrade beyond its initial configuration. The NTREES facility is designed to perform realistic non-nuclear testing of nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) fuel elements and fuel materials. Although the NTREES facility cannot mimic the neutron and gamma environment of an operating NTR, it can simulate the thermal hydraulic environment within an NTR fuel element to provide critical information on material performance and compatibility. The first phase of the upgrade activities which was completed in 2012 in part consisted of an extensive modification to the hydrogen system to permit computer controlled operations outside the building through the use of pneumatically operated variable position valves. This setup also allows the hydrogen flow rate to be increased to over 200 g/sec and reduced the operation complexity of the system. The second stage of modifications to NTREES which has just been completed expands the capabilities of the facility significantly. In particular, the previous 50 kW induction power supply has been replaced with a 1.2 MW unit which should allow more prototypical fuel element temperatures to be reached. The water cooling system was also upgraded to so as to be capable of removing 100% of the heat generated during. This new setup required that the NTREES vessel be raised onto a platform along with most of its associated gas and vent lines. In this arrangement, the induction heater and water systems are now located underneath the platform. In this new configuration, the 1.2 MW NTREES induction heater will be capable of testing fuel elements and fuel materials in flowing hydrogen at pressures up to 1000 psi at temperatures up to and beyond 3000 K and at near-prototypic reactor channel power densities. NTREES is also capable of testing potential fuel elements with a variety of propellants, including hydrogen with additives to inhibit corrosion of certain potential NTR fuel forms. Additional diagnostic upgrades included in the present NTREES set up include the addition of a gamma ray spectrometer located near the vent filter to detect uranium fuel particles exiting the fuel element in the propellant exhaust stream to provide additional information any material loss occurring during testing. Other aspects of the upgrade included reworking NTREES to reduce the operational complexity of the system despite the increased complexity of the induction heating system. To this end, many of the controls were consolidated on fewer panels. As part of this upgrade activity, the Safety Assessment (SA) and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for NTREES were extensively rewritten. The new 1.2 MW induction heater consists of three physical units consisting of a transformer, rectifier, and inverter. This multiunit arrangement facilitated increasing the flexibility of the induction heater by more easily allowing variable frequency operation. Frequency ranges between 20 and 60 kHz can be accommodated in the new induction heater allowing more representative power distributions to be generated within the test elements.

Emrich, William J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM): Concept Description and Documentation

Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM) is an Interval Management (IM) concept that utilizes airborne and ground-based capabilities to enable the implementation of airborne pairwise spacing capabilities in oceanic regions. The goal of PTM is to use airborne surveillance and tools to manage an "at or greater than" inter-aircraft spacing. Due to the accuracy of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information and the use of airborne spacing guidance, the minimum PTM spacing distance will be less than distances a controller can support with current automation systems that support oceanic operations. Ground tools assist the controller in evaluating the traffic picture and determining appropriate PTM clearances to be issued. Avionics systems provide guidance information that allows the flight crew to conform to the PTM clearance issued by the controller. The combination of a reduced minimum distance and airborne spacing management will increase the capacity and efficiency of aircraft operations at a given altitude or volume of airspace. This document provides an overview of the proposed application, a description of several key scenarios, a high level discussion of expected air and ground equipment and procedure changes, a description of a NASA human-machine interface (HMI) prototype for the flight crew that would support PTM operations, and initial benefits analysis results. Additionally, included as appendices, are the following documents: the PTM Operational Services and Environment Definition (OSED) document and a companion "Future Considerations for the Pairwise Trajectory Management (PTM) Concept: Potential Future Updates for the PTM OSED" paper, a detailed description of the PTM algorithm and PTM Limit Mach rules, initial PTM safety requirements and safety assessment documents, a detailed description of the design, development, and initial evaluations of the proposed flight crew HMI, an overview of the methodology and results of PTM pilot training requirements focus group and human-in-the-loop testing activities, and the PTM Pilot Guide.

Jones, Kenneth M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Component-Level Model of Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B)

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is being employed in numerous peer-to-peer initiatives attempting to expand the capacity of the National Airspace System (NAS) or enable mixed operations of manned and unmanned vehicles. Safety assessments of these initiatives rely, in part, on modeling the accuracy of ADS-B in reporting the position and direction of an ownship and surrounding traffic. Frequently, these initiatives utilize a position uncertainty model that applies a reported ADS-B estimation position uncertainty (EPU) value to a Rayleigh distribution and uses a Gauss-Markov random walk to add error to the ADS-B output of a vehicle. This model of ADS-B state error is easy to implement and apply to numerous problems. However, it has a couple of draw-backs. First, the ADS-B state errors are equally probable in all directions. This is a good assumption in situations where aircraft maneuvering is not constrained. However, in situations where the aircraft maneuvering is constrained such as landing, the error distribution is likely to exhibit directionality and the non-directional model may skew results especially when assessing very low probabilities (e.g., 10(exp -9)) of catastrophic encounters. Second, the model does not account for processing latency in the receiving aircraft. NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) recently examined the feasibility of decreasing the spacing of aircraft on parallel approaches to runways separated by as little as 700 feet. For Monte-Carlo analysis using a high-fidelity simulation of a large transport, LaRC started with a Gauss-Markov model of ADS-B error but then developed a component level model of ADS-B error to increase the fidelity of results.

Madden, Michael M.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Potential Failure Modes and Failure Mitigation Strategies

Electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems hold great potential for the reduction of aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. Currently, NASA and other organizations are actively working to identify and mature technologies necessary to bring EAP designs to reality. A requirement for the development of any civil aircraft and its systems is to ensure that potential hazards in the design are identified and appropriately mitigated to ensure that the system is safe. During aircraft development, a system safety assessment that consists of a functional hazard assessment is conducted to identify all potential failure conditions of each function, and classify those failures according to the severity of their effects on the aircraft or its occupants. The more severe a function's failure condition classification, the greater the development assurance level required for the function to ensure that the probability of the hazard is acceptably low. Today, aircraft engines and their control systems receive type certificate approval as a stand-alone system to signify their airworthiness. However, the complex coupling and distributed nature of EAP designs are expected to place added challenges on the certification of these systems. This presentation will provide an initial high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards posed by a generic EAP system along with potential mitigation strategies for those failures. The EAP system is assumed to be a hybrid design consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems will be discussed along with the potential failure modes they may encounter. This will include a discussion of coupled failure effects, where a fault in one EAP subsystem effects the operation of other subsystems in the architecture. Next, potential failure mitigation strategies are discussed including both software-based and hardware-based mitigation strategies. The presentation will conclude with an example evaluation of the potential failure modes and mitigation strategies for a concept EAP system proposed by NASA.

Simon, Donald L.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Test Verification of the Cassini Spacecraft Dynamic Model

The Cassini spacecraft mission to Saturn will be launched in October 1997, on a Titan IV/Centaur launch vehicle. Cassini is the largest interplanetary spacecraft ever developed. Before launch approval can be obtained, a test verified finite element model of the Cassini spacecraft must be completed and approved by NASA. The correctness of this model is critical to the final verification coupled loads analysis and margin of safety assessments.

Cassini↗
NASA NTRS2020

Continued Discussion of Failure Mode Modeling and Overall Component Reliability: Are the Data Missing or Censored?

This paper is the continuation of a paper presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, in which a methodology of modeling failure modes of complex components was presented; see Paulos and Smith (2016). This methodology is not particularly helpful in the space industry where there is a lack of failure data, but is more helpful in industries that see a lot of component repairs and improvements, such as in the aircraft or automotive industries. The previous paper demonstrated how the typical approach of treating failure modes as being exponential in nature may yield optimistic predictions when estimating how improvements to components will perform in the future. It is more accurate to model the failure modes as a race in time; unfortunately, this does not give a closed-form solution. This paper uses simulation to solve for the model of the world, and the results compared to the standard methodology of treating the failure modes as being exponential random failures. The standard method is shown to have optimistic predictions, which will lead to prediction errors when failure modes are removed or “fixed.” The failure mode methodology presented in the first paper treated the data as being censored when the test stopped. In this paper, we will compare the results from treating the data as both censored and missing.

Smith, Curtis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lander Lighting Solution to Reduce Pilot & Autonomous Approach Errors

The south pole lighting environment will have harsh low inclination sunlight, making overhead judgement of surface features difficult. Autonomous solutions are great, however, the need for visual monitoring and independent go/no-go decisions remain. Our project proposes that lunar landing systems will be better served by including a powerful landing light system that improves visibility of surfaces from overhead by illuminating the ground at critical distances for the crew to make last minute decisions regarding an approach. The project utilized computer-based optical modeling software to predict requirements for a potential landing light system. The analysis based the lamp prediction from commercially available LED chip sets and lamp optics. The goal was to illustrate a method to raise the surface contrast of a landing site within an acceptable contrast threshold for most camera systems and human observers to recognize hazards that would not be noticed with low inclination sunlight alone. The Apollo lunar landings benefitted from overhead sun or dark conditions. The surface lighting at the Lunar South Pole is a harsh environment where surfaces are lit from a low inclination angle by the sun (from the side). This change in lighting condition precipitates a need for updated lunar landing systems that facilitate improved recognition of landing sites, and thereby increase pilot awareness of landing hazards. The reliance on LIDAR and other autonomous mechanisms alone is risky given the known usage of visual monitoring for operator concurrence on current spacecraft programs and present-day autonomous land-based vehicles. Visual monitoring via cameras or windows requires the surface contrast to be within 3 orders of magnitude for reasonable recognition of objects. Artificial overhead illumination, when sufficiently sized, provides a means to even out contrast problems created by low inclination sunlight, potentially reducing piloting errors. Current vehicle requirements do not specify this type of guidance for the purpose of increasing mission success. An optical ray-trace simulation model was developed in Zemax Optics Studio to predict the best combination of LED power, LED optics, lamp quantity, and lamp location to raise the surface contrast to within 2 orders of magnitude from 3 orders required to further increased visibility and reduce risk. The project considered the following design constraints: potential base diameter of lander, approach distance(s) for a go-no-go decision point (200 meter), solar inclination angle (2-7), lunar surface reflectance (10%), LED chip sets, LED focusing optics, LED power, lamp quantity, lamp locations, and illumination diameter of lunar surface landing zone. The results can be used to establish minimum design constraints for vehicle landing light systems. With a solar inclination angle ranging from 2-7 degrees, the horizontal illumination of the lunar surface is attenuated by about 10% when compared to overhead illumination from the Sun. This modifies the sun's maximum of 130,000 lux to 13,000 lux horizontal illuminance. The artificial lighting system was designed to provide an 18-meter-wide illumination zone, to create viewing clearances around a 6-meter-wide lander. The system provides an average illuminance of 300 lux, meeting the 2 orders of magnitude criteria. The solution utilized modern Chip On Board LEDs, that each utilized 17 watts, with focusing Total Internal Reflection (TIR) lenses. A lighting system of 300 LEDs was arrayed along the "bottom" of a “lander”. With 17 watts per LED, the system is estimated to require 5100 watts. This is a large amount of power, but it would only be needed during critical phases during the landing. LED lighting systems can be dimmed, and it is assumed that as the lander arrives closer to the landing site, the lighting system power can be adjusted as needed to produce the necessary surface illuminance. The designed reduction of contrast improves reliability of safety assessments using real time visible light camera systems and out the window viewing by the crew.

T A Clark↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Within the next few decades, humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant two-way communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) performing an EVA and an Earth-based mission control. Next-generation operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the on-planet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. For this purpose, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automating the tracking and projection of consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments of an EVA timeline given consumables constraints, and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the intravehicular crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g. training bias.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) and Earth-based mission control. Nextgeneration operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the onplanet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular (IV) crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. Thus, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automatically tracking and projecting consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the IV crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g., training bias.

Mars↗