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At least 271 records · Page 15

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NASA NTRS2005

Trusted Autonomy for Space Flight Systems

NASA has long supported research on intelligent control technologies that could allow space systems to operate autonomously or with reduced human supervision. Proposed uses range from automated control of entire space vehicles to mobile robots that assist or substitute for astronauts to vehicle systems such as life support that interact with other systems in complex ways and require constant vigilance. The potential for pervasive use of such technology to extend the kinds of missions that are possible in practice is well understood, as is its potential to radically improve the robustness, safety and productivity of diverse mission systems. Despite its acknowledged potential, intelligent control capabilities are rarely used in space flight systems. Perhaps the most famous example of intelligent control on a spacecraft is the Remote Agent system flown on the Deep Space One mission (1998 - 2001). However, even in this case, the role of the intelligent control element, originally intended to have full control of the spacecraft for the duration of the mission, was reduced to having partial control for a two-week non-critical period. Even this level of mission acceptance was exceptional. In most cases, mission managers consider intelligent control systems an unacceptable source of risk and elect not to fly them. Overall, the technology is not trusted. From the standpoint of those who need to decide whether to incorporate this technology, lack of trust is easy to understand. Intelligent high-level control means allowing software io make decisions that are too complex for conventional software. The decision-making behavior of these systems is often hard to understand and inspect, and thus hard to evaluate. Moreover, such software is typically designed and implemented either as a research product or custom-built for a particular mission. In the former case, software quality is unlikely to be adequate for flight qualification and the functionality provided by the system is likely driven largely by the need to publish innovative work. In the latter case, the mission represents the first use of the system, a risky proposition even for relatively simple software.

Freed, Michael↗

NASA NTRS2004

Validating the autonomous EO-1 science agent

This paper describes the validation process for the Autonomous Science Agent, a software agent that is currently flying onboard NASA EO-1 spacecraft. The agent autonomously collects, analyzes, and reacts to onboard science data. The Autonomous Science Agent has been designed using a layered architectural approach with specific redundant safeguards to reduce the risk of an agent malfunction to the EO-1 spacecraft. This safe design has been thoroughly validated by informal validation methods supplemented by sub-system and system-level testing. This paper describes the analysis used to define agent safety, elements of the design that increase the safety of the agent, and the process used to validate agent safety.

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NASA NTRS2011

NASA Planning for Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Ground Operations

The NASA Orion Ground Processing Team was originally formed by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Constellation (Cx) Project Office's Orion Division to define, refine and mature pre-launch and post-landing ground operations for the Orion human spacecraft. The multidisciplined KSC Orion team consisted of KSC civil servant, SAIC, Productivity Apex, Inc. and Boeing-CAPPS engineers, project managers and safety engineers, as well as engineers from Constellation's Orion Project and Lockheed Martin Orion Prime contractor. The team evaluated the Orion design configurations as the spacecraft concept matured between Systems Design Review (SDR), Systems Requirement Review (SRR) and Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The team functionally decomposed prelaunch and post-landing steps at three levels' of detail, or tiers, beginning with functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs). The third tier FFBDs were used to build logic networks and nominal timelines. Orion ground support equipment (GSE) was identified and mapped to each step. This information was subsequently used in developing lower level operations steps in a Ground Operations Planning Document PDR product. Subject matter experts for each spacecraft and GSE subsystem were used to define 5th - 95th percentile processing times for each FFBD step, using the Delphi Method. Discrete event simulations used this information and the logic network to provide processing timeline confidence intervals for launch rate assessments. The team also used the capabilities of the KSC Visualization Lab, the FFBDs and knowledge of the spacecraft, GSE and facilities to build visualizations of Orion pre-launch and postlanding processing at KSC. Visualizations were a powerful tool for communicating planned operations within the KSC community (i.e., Ground Systems design team), and externally to the Orion Project, Lockheed Martin spacecraft designers and other Constellation Program stakeholders during the SRR to PDR timeframe. Other operations planning tools included Kaizen/Lean events, mockups and human factors analysis. The majority of products developed by this team are applicable as KSC prepares 21st Century Ground Systems for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System.

Letchworth, Gary↗

NASA NTRS1985

Reactor power system deployment and startup

This paper addresses issues that should receive further examination in the near-term as concept selection for development of a U.S. space reactor power system is approached. The issues include: the economics, practicality and system reliability associated with transfer of nuclear spacecraft from low earth shuttle orbits to operational orbits, via chemical propulsion versus nuclear electric propulsion; possible astronaut supervised reactor and nuclear electric propulsion startup in low altitude Shuttle orbit; potential deployment methods for nuclear powered spacecraft from Shuttle; the general public safety of low altitude startup and nuclear safe and disposal orbits; the question of preferred reactor power level; and the question of frozen versus molten alkali metal coolant during launch and deployment. These issues must be considered now because they impact the SP-100 concept selection, power level selection, weight and size limits, use of deployable radiators, reliability requirements, and economics, as well as the degree of need for and the urgency of developing space reactor power systems.

Wetch, J. R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

NASA Tech Briefs, August 2005

Topics include: Hidden Identification on Parts: Magnetic Machine-Readable Matrix Symbols; System for Processing Coded OFDM Under Doppler and Fading; Multipurpose Hyperspectral Imaging System; Magnetic-Flux-Compensated Voltage Divider; High-Performance Satellite/Terrestrial-Network Gateway; Internet-Based System for Voice Communication With the ISS; Stripline/Microstrip Transition in Multilayer Circuit Board; Dual-Band Feed for a Microwave Reflector Antenna; Quadratic Programming for Allocating Control Effort; Range Process Simulation Tool; Simulator of Space Communication Networks; Computing Q-D Relationships for Storage of Rocket Fuels; Contour Error Map Algorithm; Portfolio Analysis Tool; Glass Frit Filters for Collecting Metal Oxide Nanoparticles; Anhydrous Proton-Conducting Membranes for Fuel Cells; Portable Electron-Beam Free-Form Fabrication System; Miniature Laboratory for Detecting Sparse Biomolecules; Multicompartment Liquid-Cooling/Warming Protective Garments; Laser Metrology for an Optical-Path-Length Modulator; PCM Passive Cooling System Containing Active Subsystems; Automated Electrostatics Environmental Chamber; Estimating Aeroheating of a 3D Body Using a 2D Flow Solver; Artificial Immune System for Recognizing Patterns; Computing the Thermodynamic State of a Cryogenic Fluid; Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric; Magnetic Control of Concentration Gradient in Microgravity; Avionics for a Small Robotic Inspection Spacecraft; and Simulation of Dynamics of a Flexible Miniature Airplane.

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NASA NTRS2014

The Max Launch Abort System - Concept, Flight Test, and Evolution

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is an independent engineering analysis and test organization providing support across the range of NASA programs. In 2007 NASA was developing the launch escape system for the Orion spacecraft that was evolved from the traditional tower-configuration escape systems used for the historic Mercury and Apollo spacecraft. The NESC was tasked, as a programmatic risk-reduction effort to develop and flight test an alternative to the Orion baseline escape system concept. This project became known as the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS), named in honor of Maxime Faget, the developer of the original Mercury escape system. Over the course of approximately two years the NESC performed conceptual and tradeoff analyses, designed and built full-scale flight test hardware, and conducted a flight test demonstration in July 2009. Since the flight test, the NESC has continued to further develop and refine the MLAS concept.

Gilbert, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2018

The Hayabusa2 Sample Return Mission and Its Small Carry-On Impactor Experiment

On December 3, 2014 the Hayabusa2 Spacecraft was launched by JAXA to investigate and return samples from carbonaceous Asteroid (162173) Ryugu. The spacecraft's payload contains several remote sensing instruments that are designed to characterize the asteroid's surface and to help identify scientifically interesting locations from which samples can be obtained safely. The data collected by these instruments will also help place any obtained samples in context with respect to the global characteristics of Ryugu. In addition to the suite of remote sensing instruments and the sampling device, Hayabusa2 also includes a small carry-on impactor (SCI) payload experiment, which is designed to impact the surface of the asteroid and excavate fresh material for subsequent collection. The SCI consists of a 30 cm diameter 2 kg copper disk that is accelerated by an explosive charge into the surface of Ryugu at approximately 2 km/s. The resultant crater formed during this experiment is estimated to be approximately between 2 - 10 meters in diameter with an ejecta blanket extending to 10 - 100 meters on the asteroid. Hayabusa2 will not be able to observe the impact experiment directly due to considerations of spacecraft safety since there is some risk of collisions with debris from the explosion and ejecta from the crater. However, prior to moving safely away, the spacecraft will deploy a small imaging system called Deployable Camera 3 (DCAM3). DCAM3 will detach from Hayabusa2 just before the detonation of the SCI and will image the moment of impact, crater formation, and ejecta propagation. These data will be transmitted to Hayabusa2 and will help constrain the near-surface properties of Ryugu and also impact scaling laws for small bodies in low gravity environments. These data could also be useful for gaining insights into determining asteroid physical properties from higher velocity impact events (e.g., DART and HERA data of Didymos).

Abell, Paul A.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Spreading the Word on Safety

Beginning with the Apollo Program in the early 1960s, the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) has supported every U.S. human exploration space flight program to date. Located in Las Cruces, New Mexico, WSTF is part of Johnson Space Center. The facility's primary mission is to provide the expertise and infrastructure to test and evaluate spacecraft materials, components, and rocket propulsion systems to enable the safe human exploration and utilization of space. WSTF stores, tests, and disposes of Space Shuttle and International Space Station propellants. Since aerospace fluids can have harmful reactions with the construction materials of the systems containing them, a major component of WSTF's work is the study of propellants and hazardous materials. WSTF has a wide variety of resources to draw upon in assessing the fire, explosion, compatibility, and safety hazards of these fluids, which include hydrogen, oxygen, hydrazine fuels, and nitrogen tetroxide. In addition to developing new test methods, WSTF has created technical manuals and training courses for the safe use of aerospace fluids.

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NASA NTRS2005

Expected EDL navigation performance with spacecraft to spacecraft data

Pinpoint landing (defined for the purpose of this discussion as landing within 1km of a preselected target) is a key Advanced Entry, Descent and Landing (EDL) technology for future Mars landers. Key scientific goals for Mars exploration, such as the search for water and characterization of aqueous process on Mars, the study of mineralogy and weathering of the Martian surface and the search for preserved biosignatures in Martian rocks, requires placing landers at pre-defined locations of greatest scientific interest. The capability to land within 1 km of a pre-defined landing site will improve safety and enable landing within roving range of sites of scientific interest while avoiding hazardous areas. A critical component of the closed-loop guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) system required for pinpoint landing is position and velocity estimation in real time. Spacecraft-to-spacecraft navigation will take advantage of the UHF link between two spacecraft (i.e. to an orbiter from an approaching lander for EDL telemetry relay) to build radiometric data, specifically the velocity between the two spacecraft along the radio beam, that are processed to determine position and velocity in real time. The improved onboard state knowledge provided by spacecraft-to-spacecraft navigation will reduce the landed position error and improve the performance of entry guidance. Results from the first of two years planned for this effort are documented here, including selection and documentation of prototype algorithms that will go forward into flight code along with analysis results used to define the algorithm set.

descent and landing↗

NASA NTRS2019

Orion Heat Shield Manufacturing Producibility Improvements for the EM-1 Flight Test Program

This paper describes how the Orion program is incorporating improvements in the heat shield design and manufacturing processes reducing programmatic risk and ensuring crew safety in support of NASA’s Exploration Missions. The Orion program successfully completed the EFT-1 flight test in 2014 and is currently developing the EM-1 spacecraft to meet the test objectives of an orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2019. Lessons learned from the EFT-1 manufacturing and flight test experience are being incorporated into a wide variety of vehicle systems and manufacturing processes to reduce risk to the Orion missions and flight crew. A critical contributor to crew safety is the heat shield that protects the crew capsule during re-entry through the earth’s atmosphere for return from deep space. The first flight test vehicle, EFT-1, was manufactured and tested in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout (O&C) facility at KSC to demonstrate early risk reduction including the functionality of the Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) for capsule safe return to earth. The approach for the EFT-1 heat shield utilized a low risk approach using Apollo heritage design and manufacturing processes using an Avcoat TPS ablator with a honeycomb substrate to provide a one piece heat shield to meet the mission re-entry heating environments. The manufacturing processes used honeycomb cell injection guns which were redeveloped from the Apollo Lunar Program processes to build the EFT-1 heat shield. The completed heat shield was transported across the country by aircraft to the O&C at KSC for installation onto the capsule. The EFT-1 heat shield successfully performed its mission and experienced ~80% of the re-entry velocity (50% heating rate) for a lunar return for an Exploration Mission. The second flight test vehicle is the EM-1 mission which will have additional flight systems installed to fly to the moon and return. Heat shield design and producibility improvements have been incorporated in the EM-1 vehicle to meet deep space mission and programmatic requirements. The design continues to use the Avcoat material, but in a “block” configuration to enable improvements in the application processes as well as additional improvements in the carrier structure design and manufacturing operations. Incorporating flight test results and producibility improvements from EFT-1 for the heat shield system design and processes have improved the thermal protection capability, improved the producibility, and cost for EM-1 flight test.

Producibility↗

NASA NTRS1972

Radioisotope thermionic power supply for spacecraft

Power supply design for unmanned electric propulsion missions to outer planets utilizes a store of curium-244 in compact array of capsules as energy source. Supply subassemblies are: heat source, converter equipment which supplies power, and safety equipment. System is designed for a 72,000 hour mission.

Homeyer, W. G.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Activities in Support of Artemis I and Plans for Artemis II

The Artemis I mission in 2022 accomplished humanity’s first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) with a human-rated spacecraft in over fifty years. Artemis comprises several key Program elements – Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion Crew Module, Service Module, Launch Abort System; the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Exploration Ground System (EGS). Much of our human spaceflight experience with crewed lunar missions is captured in historical program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous and reliable spacecraft. The assessment of compliance with applicable safety requirements and adequacy of hazard controls and verifications is the responsibility of the MPCV Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), along with a Joint [NASA/ESA] Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP) for the review of the European Service Module (ESM). The MSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering was added as a Panel co-chair, which enhanced the Engineering organization’s engagement and level of understanding of hazard analysis methodology and results. The MSERP has representation from each office, including Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) and Health and Medical Technical Authority, supporting the Orion Program in addition to the Engineering and Safety Technical Authority co-chairs. Second, the JSERP has a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety organizations, which recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership. This paper will focus on SMA processes, activities, and plans for the Orion element and explore unique challenges associated with Artemis II as we approach the flight of the first crewed Orion vehicle.

Paul J. Collier↗

NASA NTRS1993

On-orbit servicing for USAF space missions: A phased development approach

On-orbit servicing has been studied for years by the U.S. Air Force Space Systems Division--which recently cosponsored the Space Assembly, Maintenance, and Servicing Study with NASA and SDIO; but an Air force servicing program has yet to emerge. The Air Force has a limited set of servicing requirements, and the practices of 'pipelining' (incremental improvements to a space vehicle series) and orbital sparing provide many similar benefits. It is postulated that an Air Force Program will be initiated in response to a new critical mission requirement that calls for a spacecraft with the operational character of a Servicer, which will evolve into a servicing program. Such a requirement may be emerging. The Air Force organizations charged with on-orbit test safety for the Department of Defense are concerned with the hazard from uncontrolled reentry of low Earth orbit test spacecraft, which are increasing in number. Analysis and observations of actual reentries show that debris reaches the Earth's surface. A phased development of a system to remove these spacecraft from orbit can evolve into a servicing program.

Shanney, Bill↗

NASA NTRS1973

Insulation commonality assessment (phase 1). Volume 2: Section 7.0 through 16.0

The heat transfer characteristics of various materials used for the thermal insulation of spacecraft are discussed. Techniques for conducting thermal performance analysis, structural performance analysis, and dynamic analysis are described. Processes for producing and finishing the materials are explained. The methods for determining reliability, system safety, materials tests, and design effectiveness are explained.

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NASA NTRS1990

Collision warning and avoidance considerations for the Space Shuttle and Space Station Freedom

The increasing hazard of manmade debris in low earth orbit (LEO) has focused attention on the requirement for collision detection, warning and avoidance systems to be developed in order to protect manned (and unmanned) spacecraft. With the number of debris objects expected to be increasing with time, the impact hazard will also be increasing. The safety of the Space Shuttle and the Space Station Freedom from destructive or catastrophic collision resulting from the hypervelocity impact of a LEO object is of increasing concern to NASA. A number of approaches to this problem are in effect or under development. The collision avoidance procedures now in effect for the Shuttle are described, and detection and avoidance procedures presently being developed at the Johnson Space Center for the Space Station Freedom are discussed.

Vilas, Faith↗

NASA NTRS1989

Shuttle data book: SRM fragment velocity model. Presented to the SRB Fragment Model Review Panel

This study was undertaken to determine the velocity of fragments generated by the range safety destruction (RSD) or random failure of a Space Transportation System (STS) Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). The specific requirement was to provide a fragment model for use in those Galileo and Ulysses RTG safety analyses concerned with possible fragment impact on the spacecraft radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGS). Good agreement was obtained between predictions and observations for fragment velocity, velocity distributions, azimuths, and rotation rates. Based on this agreement with the entire data base, the model was used to predict the probable fragment environments which would occur in the event of an STS-SRM RSD or randon failure at 10, 74, 84 and 110 seconds. The results of these predictions are the basis of the fragment environments presented in the Shuttle Data Book (NSTS-08116). The information presented here is in viewgraph form.

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NASA NTRS1996

System Guidelines for EMC Safety-Critical Circuits: Design, Selection, and Margin Demonstration

Demonstration of safety margins for critical points (circuits) has traditionally been required since it first became a part of systems-level Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements of MIL-E-6051C. The goal of this document is to present cost-effective guidelines for ensuring adequate Electromagnetic Effects (EME) safety margins on spacecraft critical circuits. It is for the use of NASA and other government agencies and their contractors to prevent loss of life, loss of spacecraft, or unacceptable degradation. This document provides practical definition and treatment guidance to contain costs within affordable limits.

Lawton, R. M.↗

NASA NTRS2012

NASA Occupant Protection Standards Development

Historically, spacecraft landing systems have been tested with human volunteers, because analytical methods for estimating injury risk were insufficient. These tests were conducted with flight-like suits and seats to verify the safety of the landing systems. Currently, NASA uses the Brinkley Dynamic Response Index to estimate injury risk, although applying it to the NASA environment has drawbacks: (1) Does not indicate severity or anatomical location of injury (2) Unclear if model applies to NASA applications. Because of these limitations, a new validated, analytical approach was desired. Leveraging off of the current state of the art in automotive safety and racing, a new approach was developed. The approach has several aspects: (1) Define the acceptable level of injury risk by injury severity (2) Determine the appropriate human surrogate for testing and modeling (3) Mine existing human injury data to determine appropriate Injury Assessment Reference Values (IARV). (4) Rigorously Validate the IARVs with sub-injurious human testing (5) Use validated IARVs to update standards and vehicle requirement

Somers, Jeffrey↗