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At least 271 records · Page 15

Towards Certification of a Space System Application of Fault Detection and Isolation

Advanced fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) software is being investigated at NASA as a means to the improve reliability and availability of its space systems. Certification is a critical step in the acceptance of such software. Its attainment hinges on performing the necessary verification and validation to show that the software will fulfill its requirements in the intended setting. Presented herein is our ongoing work to plan for the certification of a pilot application of advanced FDIR software in a NASA setting. We describe the application, and the key challenges and opportunities it offers for certification.

Software verification↗

Risk considerations for autonomy software

This paper summarizes key findings related to methods for the risk considerations of autonomy software. Existing methods for Verification and Validation (V&V) of autonomy software are summarized and a method for the assurance of autonomy software is suggested and demonstrated on a command execution use case. Risk and reliability are defined in the context of autonomy and an approach for risk assessment of autonomy is presented using an example use case. Key insights regarding areas of uncertainty for autonomy are provided, along with a suggested architecture for the systematic consideration of reliability within the context of a given autonomous planner.

Meshkat, Leila↗

Decision Engines for Software Analysis Using Satisfiability Modulo Theories Solvers

The area of software analysis, testing and verification is now undergoing a revolution thanks to the use of automated and scalable support for logical methods. A well-recognized premise is that at the core of software analysis engines is invariably a component using logical formulas for describing states and transformations between system states. The process of using this information for discovering and checking program properties (including such important properties as safety and security) amounts to automatic theorem proving. In particular, theorem provers that directly support common software constructs offer a compelling basis. Such provers are commonly called satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers. Z3 is a state-of-the-art SMT solver. It is developed at Microsoft Research. It can be used to check the satisfiability of logical formulas over one or more theories such as arithmetic, bit-vectors, lists, records and arrays. The talk describes some of the technology behind modern SMT solvers, including the solver Z3. Z3 is currently mainly targeted at solving problems that arise in software analysis and verification. It has been applied to various contexts, such as systems for dynamic symbolic simulation (Pex, SAGE, Vigilante), for program verification and extended static checking (Spec#/Boggie, VCC, HAVOC), for software model checking (Yogi, SLAM), model-based design (FORMULA), security protocol code (F7), program run-time analysis and invariant generation (VS3). We will describe how it integrates support for a variety of theories that arise naturally in the context of the applications. There are several new promising avenues and the talk will touch on some of these and the challenges related to SMT solvers. Proceedings

Bjorner, Nikolaj↗

Computers in Aerospace Conference, Los Angeles, Calif., October 31-November 2, 1977, Collection of Technical Papers and Addendum

Papers are presented on such topics as nuclear survivability concepts for airborne computers, military aerospace computer trends, a management approach to acquiring computer systems, software acquisition and verification, and future aerospace digital signal processing concepts. Also considered are CCD architecture for spacecraft SAR image processing, avionics software development for the B-1 aircraft, and software sneak analysis.

Source record↗

Progress Towards NQA-1 for Cardinal in FY25

Cardinal is a wrapping of the GPU-oriented spectral element Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) code NekRS and the Monte Carlo particle transport code OpenMC within the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE). Cardinal provides high-resolution thermal-hydraulics and/or radiation transport feedback to MOOSE multiphysics simulations. Multiphysics feedback is implemented in a geometry-agnostic manner which eliminates the need for rigid one-to-one mappings. A generic data transfer implementation also allows NekRS and OpenMC to couple to any MOOSE application, enabling a broad set of multiphysics capabilities. Cardinal simulations can also leverage combinations of MPI, OpenMP, and GPU resources. Cardinal continuous development and improvement efforts have led to the software being considered as a high-fidelity design and licensing tool for key areas of nuclear reactor relevant physics, including neutron transport, fluid flow, heat transfer, and mechanical processes. The fast development and expansion of the software from a pure R&D framework towards its application in the nuclear industry and regulation require a focus on developing, enhancing,and maintaining Cardinal’s software quality through strict adherence to a Software Quality Assurance (SQA) framework and SQA program. To facilitate compliance with SQA standards, the Cardinal SQA Program was initiated during Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23). During the development of the Cardinal SQA Program, multiple gaps have been identified. These gaps are primarily related to model verification and code pedigree as they relate to the use of Cardinal as an analysis tool. These gaps were captured in a report published in 2023. A second report highlighted the progress made during Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) and described Argonne’s effort to document and integrate software verification within Cardinal’s software development process. This report documents the progress made towards NQA-1 for Cardinal in the Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25). All cases in the expanded Continuous Integration (CI) suite of NekRS are included in this report which test the solvers and modules available in NekRS exhaustively. The NekRS tests are integrated with the Cardinal CI suite and made available in publicly accessible Github documentation. Following the CI practice permits integrating of source code changes frequently and ensuring that the integrated codebase clears the verification testing for the software. Also in this report is a brief overview of the development of the Cardinal Software Quality Assurance Plan (SQAP) that was done in FY25, though it should be noted that the rest of the documentation for the SQA program needs to be developed in a future step of this task.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of software technology to automatic test data analysis

The verification process for a major software subsystem was partially automated as part of a feasibility demonstration. The methods employed are generally useful and applicable to other types of subsystems. The effort resulted in substantial savings in test engineer analysis time and offers a method for inclusion of automatic verification as a part of regression testing.

Stagner, J. R.↗

NASA's Moon to Mars Autonomous Habitat Status

NASA is developing a strategy for sending humans to the Mars vicinity, known broadly as the Moon to Mars (M2M) Campaign. A critical part of this campaign is the development of in-space and surface habitation systems capable of substantially extending human presence beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Mars missions feature an in-space transit habitat capable of supporting crews of four on ~850-1200-day missions, including transit to and from Mars and time in Mars orbit. Surface and transit habitats are complex elements which must keep crewmembers healthy and productive in deep-space environments with limited resources, long rescue times in contingency situations, and communication delays; all within constrained mass, volume, and power budgets. These habitats provide crew both living and workspace as well as most of the resources needed to support crew life. For deep space habitats, automation needs to be employed due to latency and for significant amounts of time when the habitats are uncrewed. Automation of systems is possible in space applications, but there are limitations. Outside of the Earth’s (or any) magnetosphere, radiation environments are harsh to both the physical hardware and the software components. Radiation (charged particles and ionizing electromagnetic waves) degrades and damages the hardware and causes single event upsets (SEUs) in software. If the hardware is damaged, data can be lost, or control actions not made. For software, SEUs cause algorithms to result in different solutions, or incorrect commands to be sent out. This means that algorithms and hardware used for deep space systems are different than what is used on Earth. Radiation-tolerant hardware is generations behind the current state-of-the-art hardware. Recent NASA missions, such as James Webb Space Telescope, continue to rely on older technologies such as the RAD750 processor, and the most advanced processors are still single core and less than 1.5 GHz. There have been attempts to use higher performance processors, but these often take multiple mitigation steps to handle the radiation environments, which limits the processing power and/or throughput. Current techniques for radiation mitigation have been redundancies, voting, physical separation of hardware, encasing materials, under-clocking hardware, and more. Some radiation mitigation techniques do provide benefits such as having a redundant system to improve the probability that a system will be available when needed. Autonomous software systems will have fewer interactions with humans on deep space missions and therefore need to be able to handle more off-nominal conditions. Microgravity also complicates the autonomous aspects of the mission because autonomous systems are usually built from known deterministic states, but microgravity causes physical objects to shift and move changing the location an autonomous system placed the object. Not only does the software need to be reliable and deterministic, losing resources due to a software error is not only costly but detrimental to reputation. The combination of having lower performance hardware and having to be able to verify and deterministically run software and an ever-changing environment makes deep space autonomous systems more complicated. Multiple gaps have been identified including verification of autonomous software algorithms (including artificial intelligence and machine learning), higher performance processors (graphics and general purpose), high speed networks (onboard and transmissions), memory, power distribution, data security, and variations from these. These gaps need to be closed for more advanced systems to be deployed and reduce the size, weight, and power impacts on the habitats.

Scott B. Tashakkor↗

Garbage collection can be made real-time and verifiable

An efficient means of memory reclamation (also known as Garbage Collection) is essential for Machine Intelligence applications where dynamic storage allocation is desired or required. Solutions for real-time systems must introduce very small processing overhead and must also provide for the verification of the software in order to meet the application time budgets and to verify the correctness of the software. Garbage Collection (GC) techniques are proposed for symbolic processing systems which may simultaneously meet both real-time requirements and verification requirements. The proposed memory reclamation technique takes advantage of the strong points of both the earlier Mark and Sweep technique and the more recent Copy Collection approaches. At least one practical implementation of these new GC techniques has already been developed and tested on a very-high performance symbolic computing system. Complete GC processing of all generated garbage has been demonstrated to require as little as a few milliseconds to perform. This speed enables the effective operation of the GC function as either a background task or as an actual part of the application task itself.

Hino, James H.↗

Developing interpretable models with optimized set reduction for identifying high risk software components

Applying equal testing and verification effort to all parts of a software system is not very efficient, especially when resources are limited and scheduling is tight. Therefore, one needs to be able to differentiate low/high fault frequency components so that testing/verification effort can be concentrated where needed. Such a strategy is expected to detect more faults and thus improve the resulting reliability of the overall system. This paper presents the Optimized Set Reduction approach for constructing such models, intended to fulfill specific software engineering needs. Our approach to classification is to measure the software system and build multivariate stochastic models for predicting high risk system components. We present experimental results obtained by classifying Ada components into two classes: is or is not likely to generate faults during system and acceptance test. Also, we evaluate the accuracy of the model and the insights it provides into the error making process.

Briand, Lionel C.↗

NASA Operational Simulator for Small Satellites (NOS3)

The Simulation-to-Flight 1 (STF-1) CubeSat mission aims to demonstrate how legacy simulation technologies may be adapted for flexible and effective use on missions using the CubeSat platform. These technologies, named NASA Operational Simulator (NOS), have demonstrated significant value on several missions such as James Webb Space Telescope, Global Precipitation Measurement, Juno, and Deep Space Climate Observatory in the areas of software development, mission operationstraining, verification and validation (VV), test procedure development and software systems check-out. STF-1 will demonstrate a highly portable simulation and test platform that allows seamless transition of mission development artifacts to flight products. This environment will decrease development time of future CubeSat missions by lessening the dependency on hardware resources. In addition, through a partnership between NASA GSFC, the West Virginia Space Grant Consortium and West Virginia University, the STF-1 CubeSat will hosts payloads for three secondary objectives that aim to advance engineering and physical-science research in the areas of navigation systems of small satellites, provide useful data for understanding magnetosphere-ionosphere coupling and space weather, and verify the performance and durability of III-V Nitride-based materials.

modeling simulation↗

Verification and validation of rulebased systems for Hubble Space Telescope ground support

As rulebase systems become more widely used in operational environments, the focus is on the problems and concerns of maintaining expert systems. In the conventional software model, the verification and validation of a system have two separate and distinct meanings. To validate a system means to demonstrate that the system does what is advertised. The verification process refers to investigating the actual code to identify inconsistencies and redundancies within the logic path. In current literature regarding maintaining rulebased systems, little distinction is made between these two terms. In fact, often the two terms are used interchangeably. Verification and validation of rulebased systems are discussed as separate but equally important aspects of the maintenance phase. Also described are some of the tools and methods that were developed at the Space Telescope Science Institute to aid in the maintenance of the rulebased system.

Vick, Shon↗

Apollo experience report: Guidance and control systems. Engineering simulation program

The Apollo Program experience from early 1962 to July 1969 with respect to the engineering-simulation support and the problems encountered is summarized in this report. Engineering simulation in support of the Apollo guidance and control system is discussed in terms of design analysis and verification, certification of hardware in closed-loop operation, verification of hardware/software compatibility, and verification of both software and procedures for each mission. The magnitude, time, and cost of the engineering simulations are described with respect to hardware availability, NASA and contractor facilities (for verification of the command module, the lunar module, and the primary guidance, navigation, and control system), and scheduling and planning considerations. Recommendations are made regarding implementation of similar, large-scale simulations for future programs.

Gilbert, D. W.↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

PHM for Ground Support Systems Case Study: From Requirements to Integration

This session will detail the experience of members of the NASA Ames Prognostic Center of Excellence (PCoE) producing PHM tools for NASA Advanced Ground Support Systems, including the challenges in applying their research in a production environment. Specifically, we will 1) go over the systems engineering and review process used; 2) Discuss the challenges and pitfalls in this process; 3) discuss software architecting, documentation, verification and validation activities and 4) discuss challenges in communicating the benefits and limitations of PHM Technologies.

Prognostics↗

Reducing software security risk through an integrated approach research initiative model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol

This document discusses the verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration of the Model Based Verification (MBV) portion of the verification instrument set being developed under the Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach research initiative. Code Q of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funds this project. The NASA Goddard Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) facility manages this research program at the NASA agency level and the Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) manages the research locally at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California institute of Technology) where the research is being carried out.

software security↗

Proceedings of the First NASA Formal Methods Symposium

Topics covered include: Model Checking - My 27-Year Quest to Overcome the State Explosion Problem; Applying Formal Methods to NASA Projects: Transition from Research to Practice; TLA+: Whence, Wherefore, and Whither; Formal Methods Applications in Air Transportation; Theorem Proving in Intel Hardware Design; Building a Formal Model of a Human-Interactive System: Insights into the Integration of Formal Methods and Human Factors Engineering; Model Checking for Autonomic Systems Specified with ASSL; A Game-Theoretic Approach to Branching Time Abstract-Check-Refine Process; Software Model Checking Without Source Code; Generalized Abstract Symbolic Summaries; A Comparative Study of Randomized Constraint Solvers for Random-Symbolic Testing; Component-Oriented Behavior Extraction for Autonomic System Design; Automated Verification of Design Patterns with LePUS3; A Module Language for Typing by Contracts; From Goal-Oriented Requirements to Event-B Specifications; Introduction of Virtualization Technology to Multi-Process Model Checking; Comparing Techniques for Certified Static Analysis; Towards a Framework for Generating Tests to Satisfy Complex Code Coverage in Java Pathfinder; jFuzz: A Concolic Whitebox Fuzzer for Java; Machine-Checkable Timed CSP; Stochastic Formal Correctness of Numerical Algorithms; Deductive Verification of Cryptographic Software; Coloured Petri Net Refinement Specification and Correctness Proof with Coq; Modeling Guidelines for Code Generation in the Railway Signaling Context; Tactical Synthesis Of Efficient Global Search Algorithms; Towards Co-Engineering Communicating Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems; and Formal Methods for Automated Diagnosis of Autosub 6000.

Denney, Ewen↗

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Evan J Anzalone↗