Virtual Presence and Extended Defense Systems Enhance Security.
Abstract not provided.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains at SNL for software and hardware testing. This paper will describe the capabilities of the new surveillance system, application and requirements, and the design approach.
Because wind power penetration levels in electric power systems are continuously increasing, voltage stability is a critical issue for maintaining power system security and operation. The traditional methods to analyze voltage stability can be classified into two categories: dynamic and steady-state. Dynamic analysis relies on time-domain simulations of faults at different locations; however, this method needs to exhaust faults at all locations to find the security region for voltage at a single bus. With the widely located phasor measurement units (PMUs), the Thevenin equivalent matrix can be calculated by the voltage and current information collected by the PMUs. This paper proposes a method based on a Thevenin equivalent matrix to identify system locations that will have the greatest impact on the voltage at the wind power plant's point of interconnection. The number of dynamic voltage stability analysis runs is greatly reduced by using the proposed method. The numerical results demonstrate the feasibility, effectiveness, and robustness of the proposed approach for voltage security assessment for a wind power plant.
This Sandia National Laboratories Mission Campaign (MC) seeks to create the technical basis that allows national leaders to efficiently assess and manage the digital assurance of high consequence systems. We will call for transformative research that enables efficient (1) development of provably secure systems and secure integration of untrusted products, (2) intelligent threat mitigation, and (3) digital risk-informed engineering trade-offs. Ultimately, this MC will impact multiple national security missions; it will develop an informed Digital Assurance for High Consequence Systems (DAHCS) community and expand Sandia partnerships to build this national capability.
The Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) DC Testbed Control System for Space Station Freedom was developed using a top down approach based on classical control system and conventional terrestrial power utilities design techniques. The design methodology includes the development of a testbed operating concept. This operating concept describes the operation of the testbed under all possible scenarios. A unique set of operating states was identified and a description of each state, along with state transitions, was generated. Each state is represented by a unique set of attributes and constraints, and its description reflects the degree of system security within which the power system is operating. Using the testbed operating states description, a functional design for the control system was developed. This functional design consists of a functional outline, a text description, and a logical flowchart for all the major control system functions. Described here are the control system design techniques, various control system functions, and the status of the design and implementation.
The Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) DC Testbed Control System for Space Station Freedom was developed using a top down approach based on classical control system and conventional terrestrial power utilities design techniques. The design methodology includes the development of a testbed operating concept. This operating concept describes the operation of the testbed under all possible scenarios. A unique set of operating states was identified and a description of each state, along with state transitions, was generated. Each state is represented by a unique set of attributes and constraints, and its description reflects the degree of system security within which the power system is operating. Using the testbed operating states description, a functional design for the control system was developed. This functional design consists of a functional outline, a text description, and a logical flowchart for all the major control system functions. Described here are the control system design techniques, various control system functions, and the status of the design and implementation.
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), with support from the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Technology Research and Development program, has been developing advanced instrumentation and approaches for enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear material control and accounting for future reprocessing facilities with particular emphasis on pyroprocessing. Advanced modeling capabilities augment new instrumentation development, predict material flows, integrate process monitoring data, and assess overall system effectiveness of the safeguards and security system. In this paper we provide a brief overview of the Safeguards and Security by Design approach being pursued under the program and details of advanced process monitoring instrumentation under development at the INL, which includes a triple bubbler system for on-line monitoring of level and density of molten salt, sensors for monitoring actinide concentrations in molten salt, and thermal-couple instrumentation for near real time determination of Pu content in U/TRU ingots. Laboratory and field testing data will be presented, as well as integration of these sensors into a concept for utilization of process monitoring information in concert with traditional nuclear material accountancy data.
In 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formed a working group in collaboration with the Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR) group to review cyber security programs at US nuclear nonpower reactor (NPR) facilities. Following their review of cyber security at four different university NPR (i.e. university research reactor (URR)) facilities, the NRC staff made recommendations for improvements at URR including 1) augmenting the URR licensees’ understanding of the protective features provided with their physical security systems, 2) educating URR facility staff on cyber security issues, and 3) developing guidance to help the URR facilities maintain adequate cyber security going forward. This three-year project to develop and implement a cyber-security risk assessment methodology and defense-in-depth mitigation strategy for application at URR facilities provides solutions effectively addressing each of the recommendations given in the NRC review referenced above. In support of this project, cyber security documentation and guidance from the NRC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were reviewed. Most of this documentation did not take the unique resources, configuration, and infrastructure associated with URR facilities into account. The NRC-TRTR effective practices document provides useful guidance for implementing cyber security protections at URR, but lacks a structured framework for systematically auditing facility digital control assets (DCA) and evaluating associated cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. The outcomes from this project, therefore, seek to build on the general resources above by providing a straightforward DCA auditing and risk assessment methodology, as well as mitigation strategies, that may be implemented to address the risk of cyber-attack at URR facilities.
Not Available
Human performance is a pivotal factor in the design, testing, maintenance, and operation of security systems. The effectiveness of these systems relies not only on the capabilities, limitations, motives, and attitudes of the individuals involved, but also on the quality of training, instructional content, and evaluation methods provided. To uphold security standards, seamless integration between technologies and operators necessitates reliable human input. In security operations, human errors, often attributed to blame, sanctions, low motivation, individual accountability, or complacency, are primary causes of system failures. Complacency, characterized by a false sense of security, reflects a lack of awareness of potential threats and is a significant contributing factor to lapses in security. Security incidents arise from various factors, many extend beyond individual control, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to human performance that integrates organizational processes and team collaboration. Historically, errors have been attributed to individual moral or cognitive failures. However, insights from Operational Experiences (OEs) suggest that organizational processes weakness and deficiencies in nuclear cultural values contribute more significantly to security failures than individual mistakes. This paper consolidates lessons learned from diverse international nuclear security cultures and aims to highlight the importance of security culture in shaping global perspectives on nuclear security. It underscores the role of cultural values in shaping nuclear security practices and enhancing the resilience of security systems in the nuclear sector.
Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.
Climate and its impacts on the natural environment, and on the ability of the natural environment to support population and the built environment, stands as a threat multiplier that impacts national and global security. The Water Intersections with Climate Systems Security (WICSS) Strategic Initiative is designed to improve understanding of water’s role in, among other topics, the connection of critical infrastructure to climate in light of competing national and global security interests (including transboundary issues and stability), and identifying research gaps aligned with Sandia, and Federal agency priorities. With this impetus in mind, the WICSS Strategic Initiative team conceptualized a causal loop diagram (CLD) of the relationship between and among climate, the natural environment, population, and the built environment, with an understanding that any such regionally focused system must have externalities that influence the system from beyond its’ control, and metrics for better understanding the consequences of the set of interactions. These are discussed in light of a series of worldviews that focus on portions of the overall systems relationship. The relationships are described and documented in detail. A set of reinforcing and balancing loops are then highlighted within the context of the model. Finally, forward-looking actions are highlighted to describe how this conceptual model can be turned into modeling to address multiple problems described under the purview of the Strategic Initiative.
With the development and wide deployment of measurement equipment, data can be automatically measured and visualized for situation awareness in power systems. However, the cyber security of power systems is also threated by data spoofing attacks. This letter proposed a measurement data source authentication (MDSA) algorithm based on feature extraction techniques including ensemble empirical mode decomposition (EEMD) and fast Fourier transform (FFT), and machine learning for real-time measurement data classification. Compared with previous work, the proposed algorithm can achieve higher accuracy of MDSA using a shorter window of data from closely located synchrophasor measurement sensors.
Time domain transient stability simulation of large interconnected power systems is becoming increasingly computationally intensive. With the addition of high levels of variable generation that can aggregately ramp over many hours, both the complexity and time horizon for which power system simulations will need to be conducted are increasing. Additionally, extended-term time domain simulation is required to analyze power system security when cascading events across the system span minutes or even hours. Analysis of these occurrences requires modeling power system dynamics over tens of minutes to many hours rather than tens of seconds. Because of the required high computational intensity, there are presently no stability modeling/simulation platforms that combine the needed computational capabilities with the required power system models relevant for representing and analyzing the potential reliability implications of phenomena that occurs over both short- and extended-term dynamic timeframes.
INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.
The Virtual SCADA system is a software-based Human-Machine Interface that can visualize the process of a plant. This paper described the results of the virtual SCADA system design that aims to recognize the principle of the Nuclear Power Plant type Pressurized Water Reactor. This simulation uses technical data of the Nuclear Power Plant Unit Olkiluoto 3 in Finland. This device was developed using Wonderware Intouch, which is equipped with manual books for each component, animation links, alarm systems, real time and historical trending, and security system. The results showed that in general this device can demonstrate clearly the principles of energy flow and energy conversion processes in Pressurized Water Reactors. This virtual SCADA simulation system can be used as instructional media to recognize the principle of Pressurized Water Reactor.