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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Thoughts on Earned Value Assessments

This slide presentation reviews the concepts of Earned Value reporting and Earned Value Metrics (EVM) and the implementation for the Constellation Program. EVM is used to manage both the contract and civil service workforce, and used as a measure of contractor costs and performance. The Program EVM is not as useful for Level of Effort tasking, for either contractor, or civil service employees. Some issues and concerns in reference to EVM and the process for the use of EVM for Mission assurance are reviewed,

Pido, Kelle↗
NASA NTRS2009

Constellation Program (CxP) Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Project Integrated Landing System

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Chief Engineer requested a risk comparison of the Integrated Landing System design developed by NASA and the design developed by Contractor- referred to as the LM 604 baseline. Based on the results of this risk comparison, the CEV Chief engineer requested that the NESC evaluate identified risks and develop strategies for their reduction or mitigation. The assessment progressed in two phases. A brief Phase I analysis was performed by the Water versus Land-Landing Team to compare the CEV Integrated Landing System proposed by the Contractor against the NASA TS-LRS001 baseline with respect to risk. A phase II effort examined the areas of critical importance to the overall landing risk, evaluating risk to the crew and to the CEV Crew Module (CM) during a nominal land-landing. The findings of the assessment are contained in this report.

Baker, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Red Plague Control Plan (RPCP)

SCOPE: Prescribes the minimum requirements for the control of cuprous / cupric oxide corrosion (a.k.a. Red Plague) of silver-coated copper wire, cable, and harness assemblies. PURPOSE: Targeted for applications where exposure to assembly processes, environmental conditions, and contamination may promote the development of cuprous / cupric oxide corrosion (a.k.a. Red Plague) in silver-coated copper wire, cable, and harness assemblies. Does not exclude any alternate or contractor-proprietary documents or processes that meet or exceed the baseline of requirements established by this document. Use of alternate or contractor-proprietary documents or processes shall require review and prior approval of the procuring NASA activity.

Cooke, Robert W.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Information Technology and the Human Research Facility

This slide presentation reviews how information technology supports the Human Research Facility (HRF) and specifically the uses that contractor has for the information. There is information about the contractor, the HRF, some of the experiments that were performed using the HRF on board the Shuttle, overviews of the data architecture, and software both commercial and specially developed software for the specific experiments.

Klee, Margaret↗
NASA NTRS2010

TRL Assessment of Solar Sail Technology Development Following the 20-Meter System Ground Demonstrator Hardware Testing

The NASA In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Projects Office sponsored two separate, independent solar sail system design and development demonstration activities during 2002-2005. ATK Space Systems of Goleta, CA was the prime contractor for one development team and L' Garde, Inc. of Tustin, CA was the prime contractor for the other development team. The goal of these activities was to advance the technology readiness level (TRL) of solar sail propulsion from 3 towards 6 by the year 2006. Component and subsystem fabrication and testing were completed successfully, including the ground deployment of 10-meter and 20-meter demonstration hardware systems under vacuum conditions. The deployment and structural testing of the 20-meter solar sail systems was conducted in the 30 meter diameter Space Power Facility thermal-vacuum chamber at NASA Glenn Plum Brook in April though August, 2005. This paper will present the results of the TRL assessment following the solar sail technology development activities associated with the design, development, analysis and testing of the 20-meter system ground demonstrators.

Young, Roy M.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Risk Management for the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) is an extremely complex system, both technically and programmatically. The Space Station must support a wide range of payloads and missions. It must be launched in numerous launch packages and be safely assembled and operated in the harsh environment of space. It is being designed and manufactured by many organizations, including the prime contractor, Boeing, the NASA institutions, and international partners and their contractors. Finally, the ISS has multiple customers, (e.g., the Administration, Congress, users, public, international partners, etc.) with contrasting needs and constraints. It is the ISS Risk Management Office strategy to proactively and systematically manages risks to help ensure ISS Program success. ISS program follows integrated risk management process (both quantitative and qualitative) and is integrated into ISS project management. The process and tools are simple and seamless and permeate to the lowest levels (at a level where effective management can be realized) and follows the continuous risk management methodology. The risk process assesses continually what could go wrong (risks), determine which risks need to be managed, implement strategies to deal with those risks, and measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. The process integrates all facets of risk including cost, schedule and technical aspects. Support analysis risk tools like PRA are used to support programatic decisions and assist in analyzing risks.

Sebastian, J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Effect of Liquid Penetrant Sensitivity on Probability of Detection

The objective of the task is to investigate the effect of liquid penetrant sensitivity level on probability of detection (POD) of cracks in various metals. NASA-STD-5009 currently requires the use of only sensitivity level 4 liquid penetrants for NASA Standard Level inspections. This requirement is based on the fact that the data used to establish the reliably detectable flaw sizes penetrant inspection was from studies performed in the 1970s using penetrant deemed to be equivalent only to modern day sensitivity level 4 penetrants. However, many NDE contractors supporting NASA Centers routinely use sensitivity level 3 penetrants. Because of the new NASA-STD-5009 requirement, these contractors will have to either shift to sensitivity level 4 penetrants or perform formal POD demonstration tests to qualify their existing process. We propose a study to compare the POD generated for two penetrant manufactures, Sherwin and Magnaflux, and for the two most common penetrant inspection methods, water washable and post emulsifiable, hydrophilic. NDE vendors local to GSFC will be employed. A total of six inspectors will inspect a set of crack panels with a broad range of fatigue crack sizes. Each inspector will perform eight inspections of the panel set using the combination of methods and sensitivity levels described above. At least one inspector will also perform multiple inspections using a fixed technique to investigate repeatability. The hit/miss data sets will be evaluated using both the NASA generated DOEPOD software and the MIL-STD-1823 software.

Parker, Bradford H.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program Energy Storage Project Battery Technology Development

Technical Interchange Meeting was held at Saft America s Research and Development facility in Cockeysville, Maryland on Sept 28th-29th, 2010. The meeting was attended by Saft, contractors who are developing battery component materials under contracts awarded through a NASA Research Announcement (NRA), and NASA. This briefing presents an overview of the components being developed by the contractor attendees for the NASA s High Energy (HE) and Ultra High Energy (UHE) cells. The transition of the advanced lithium-ion cell development project at NASA from the Exploration Technology Development Program Energy Storage Project to the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration High Efficiency Space Power Systems Project, changes to deliverable hardware and schedule due to a reduced budget, and our roadmap to develop cells and provide periodic off-ramps for cell technology for demonstrations are discussed. This meeting gave the materials and cell developers the opportunity to discuss the intricacies of their materials and determine strategies to address any particulars of the technology.

Reid, Concha M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA-DoD Lead-Free Electronics Project. DRAFT Joint Test Report

The use of conventional tin-lead (SnPb) in circuit board manufacturing is under ever-increasing political scrutiny due to increasing regulations concerning lead. The "Restriction of Hazardous Substances" (RoHS) directive enacted by the European Union (EU) and a pact between the United States National Electronics Manufacturing Initiative (NEMI), Europe's Soldertec at Tin Technology Ltd. and the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA) are just two examples where worldwide legislative actions and partnerships/agreements are affecting the electronics industry. As a result, many global commercial-grade electronic component suppliers are initiating efforts to transition to lead-free (Pb-free) in order to retain their worldwide market. Pb-free components are likely to find their way into the inventory of aerospace or military assembly processes under current government acquisition reform initiatives. Inventories "contaminated" by Pb-free will result in increased risks associated with the manufacturing, product reliability, and subsequent repair of aerospace and military electronic systems. Although electronics for military and aerospace applications are not included in the RoHS legislation, engineers are beginning to find that the commercial industry's move towards RoHS compliance has affected their supply chain and changed their parts. Most parts suppliers plan to phase out their non-compliant, leaded production and many have already done so. As a result, the ability to find leaded components is getting harder and harder. Some buyers are now attempting to acquire the remaining SnPb inventory, if it's not already obsolete. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), depots, and support contractors have to be prepared to deal with an electronics supply chain that increasingly provides more and more parts with Pb-free finishes-some labeled no differently than their Pb counterparts-while at the same time providing the traditional Pb parts. The longer the transition period, the greater the likelihood of Pb-free parts inadvertently being mixed with Pb parts and ending up on what are supposed to be Pb systems. As a result, OEMs, depots, and support contractors need to take action now to either abate the influx of Pb-free parts, or accept it and deal with the likely interim consequences of reduced reliability due to a wide variety of matters, such as Pb contamination, high temperature incompatibility, and tin whiskering. Allowance of Pb-free components produces one of the greatest risks to the reliability of a weapon system. This is due to new and poorly understood failure mechanisms, as well as unknown long-term reliability. If the decision is made to consciously allow Pb-free solder and component finishes into SnPb electronics, additional effort (and cost) will be required to make the significant number of changes to drawings and task order procedures. This project is a follow-on effort to the Joint Council on Aging Aircraft/Joint Group on Pollution Prevention (JCAA/JG-PP) Pb-free Solder Project which was the first group to test the reliability of Pb-free solder joints against the requirements of the aerospace and military community.

Kessel, Kurt↗
NASA NTRS2011

Standards and Specifications for Ground Processing of Space Vehicles: From an Aviation-Based Shuttle Project to Global Application

Proprietary or unique designs and operations are expected early in any industry's development, and often provide a competitive early market advantage. However, there comes a time when a product or industry requires standardization for the whole industry to advance...or survive. For the space industry, that time has come. Here, we will focus on standardization of ground processing for space vehicles and their ground systems. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, and emergence of a new global space race, affordability and sustainability are more important now than ever. The growing commercialization of the space industry and current global economic environment are driving greater need for efficiencies to save time and money. More RLV's (Reusable Launch Vehicles) are being developed for the gains of reusability not achievable with traditional ELV's (Expendable Launch Vehicles). More crew/passenger vehicles are also being developed. All of this calls for more attention needed for ground processing-repeatedly before launch and after landing/recovery. RLV's should provide more efficiencies than ELV's, as long as MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) is well-planned-even for the unplanned problems. NASA's Space Shuttle is a primary example of an RLV which was supposed to thrive on reusability savings with efficient ground operations, but lessons learned show that costs were (and still are) much greater than expected. International standards and specifications can provide the commonality needed to simplify design and manufacturing as well as to improve safety, quality, maintenance, and operability. There are standards organizations engaged in the space industry, but ground processing is one of the areas least addressed. Challenges are encountered due to various factors often not considered during development. Multiple vehicle elements, sites, customers, and contractors pose various functional and integration difficulties. Resulting technical publication structures and methods are incongruent. Some processing products are still done on paper, some electronic, and many being converted in between. Business systems then are not fully compatible, and paper as well as electronic conversions are time-consuming and costly. NASA and its Shuttle contractors setup rules and systems to handle what has produced over 130 RLV launches, but they have had many challenges. Attempts have been made to apply aviation industry specifications to make the Shuttle more efficient with its ground processing. One efficiency project example was to make a Shuttle Maintenance Manual (SMM) based on the commercial ATA (Air Transport Association of America) Spec 100 for technical publications. This industry standard, along with others, has been a foundation for efficient global MRO of commercial airlines for years. A modified version was also made for some military aircraft. The SMM project found many similarities in Spec 100 which apply to the Shuttle, and room for expansion for space systems/structures not in aircraft. The SMM project team met with the ATA and representatives from NASA's X-33 and X-34 programs to discuss collaboration on a national space standard based on Spec 100. A pilot project was enabled for a subset of Shuttle systems. Full implementation was not yet achieved, X-33 and X-34 were cancelled, and the Shuttles were then designated for retirement. Nonetheless, we can learn from this project how to expand this concept to all space vehicle products. Since then, ATA has joined with ASD (AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe) and AIA (Aerospace Industries Association) to form a much-enhanced and expanded international specification: Sl000D, International Specification for Technical Publications. It includes air, land, and sea vehicles, missiles, support equipment, ordnance, and communications. It is used by a growing number of countries for commercial and government products. Its modular design is supported by a Common Source Dabase (CSDB), and COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) software is available for production of IETP's (Interactive Electronic Technical Publications). A few space industry products in Europe have begun to apply Sl000D already. Also, there are other related standards/specifications which have global implications. We have an opportunity to adapt Sl000D and possibly other standards for use with space vehicles and ground systems. Sl000D has plenty of flexibility to apply to any product needed. To successfully grow the viability of the space industry, all members, commercial and government, will need to engage cooperatively in developing and applying standards to move toward interoperability. If we leverage and combine the best existing space standards and specifications, develop new ones to address known gaps, and adapt the best applicable features from other industries, we can establish an infrastructure to not only accelerate current development, but also build longevity for a more cohesive international space community.

Ingalls, John↗
NASA NTRS2011

Space Suit Joint Torque Testing

In 2009 and early 2010, a test was performed to quantify the torque required to manipulate joints in several existing operational and prototype space suits in an effort to develop joint torque requirements appropriate for a new Constellation Program space suit system. The same test method was levied on the Constellation space suit contractors to verify that their suit design meets the requirements. However, because the original test was set up and conducted by a single test operator there was some question as to whether this method was repeatable enough to be considered a standard verification method for Constellation or other future space suits. In order to validate the method itself, a representative subset of the previous test was repeated, using the same information that would be available to space suit contractors, but set up and conducted by someone not familiar with the previous test. The resultant data was compared using graphical and statistical analysis and a variance in torque values for some of the tested joints was apparent. Potential variables that could have affected the data were identified and re-testing was conducted in an attempt to eliminate these variables. The results of the retest will be used to determine if further testing and modification is necessary before the method can be validated.

Valish, Dana J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Space Suit Joint Torque Measurement Method Validation

In 2009 and early 2010, a test method was developed and performed to quantify the torque required to manipulate joints in several existing operational and prototype space suits. This was done in an effort to develop joint torque requirements appropriate for a new Constellation Program space suit system. The same test method was levied on the Constellation space suit contractors to verify that their suit design met the requirements. However, because the original test was set up and conducted by a single test operator there was some question as to whether this method was repeatable enough to be considered a standard verification method for Constellation or other future development programs. In order to validate the method itself, a representative subset of the previous test was repeated, using the same information that would be available to space suit contractors, but set up and conducted by someone not familiar with the previous test. The resultant data was compared using graphical and statistical analysis; the results indicated a significant variance in values reported for a subset of the re-tested joints. Potential variables that could have affected the data were identified and a third round of testing was conducted in an attempt to eliminate and/or quantify the effects of these variables. The results of the third test effort will be used to determine whether or not the proposed joint torque methodology can be applied to future space suit development contracts.

Valish, Dana↗
NASA NTRS2012

Orion GN and C Model Based Development: Experience and Lessons Learned

The Orion Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) team is charged with developing GN&C algorithms for the Exploration Flight Test One (EFT-1) vehicle. The GN&C team is a joint team consisting primarily of Prime Contractor (Lockheed Martin) and NASA personnel and contractors. Early in the GN&C development cycle the team selected MATLAB/Simulink as the tool for developing GN&C algorithms and Mathworks autocode tools as the means for converting GN&C algorithms to flight software (FSW). This paper provides an assessment of the successes and problems encountered by the GN&C team from the perspective of Orion GN&C developers, integrators, FSW engineers and management. The Orion GN&C approach to graphical development, including simulation tools, standards development and autocode approaches are scored for the main activities that the team has completed through the development phases of the program.

Jackson, Mark C.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Quantity Distance for the Kennedy Space Center Vehicle Assembly Building for Solid Propellant Fueled Launchers

The NASA KSC VAB was built to process Apollo launchers in the 1960's, and later adapted to process Space Shuttles. The VAB has served as a place to assemble solid rocket motors (5RM) and mate them to the vehicle's external fuel tank and Orbiter before rollout to the launch pad. As Space Shuttle is phased out, and new launchers are developed, the VAB may again be adapted to process these new launchers. Current launch vehicle designs call for continued and perhaps increased use of SRM segments; hence, the safe separation distances are in the process of being re-calculated. Cognizant NASA personnel and the solid rocket contractor have revisited the above VAB QD considerations and suggest that it may be revised to allow a greater number of motor segments within the VAB. This revision assumes that an inadvertent ignition of one SRM stack in its High Bay need not cause immediate and complete involvement of boosters that are part of a vehicle in adjacent High Bay. To support this assumption, NASA and contractor personnel proposed a strawman test approach for obtaining subscale data that may be used to develop phenomenological insight and to develop confidence in an analysis model for later use on full-scale situations. A team of subject matter experts in safety and siting of propellants and explosives were assembled to review the subscale test approach and provide options to NASA. Upon deliberations regarding the various options, the team arrived at some preliminary recommendations for NASA.

Stover, Steven↗
NASA NTRS2013

Lessons Learned for Improving Spacecraft Ground Operations

NASA policy requires each Program or Project to develop a plan for how they will address Lessons Learned. Projects have the flexibility to determine how best to promote and implement lessons learned. A large project might budget for a lessons learned position to coordinate elicitation, documentation and archival of the project lessons. The lessons learned process crosses all NASA Centers and includes the contactor community. o The Office of The Chief Engineer at NASA Headquarters in Washington D.C., is the overall process owner, and field locations manage the local implementation. One tool used to transfer knowledge between program and projects is the Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). Most lessons come from NASA in partnership with support contractors. A search for lessons that might impact a new design is often performed by a contractor team member. Knowledge is not found with only one person, one project team, or one organization. Sometimes, another project team, or person, knows something that can help your project or your task. Knowledge sharing is an everyday activity at the Kennedy Space Center through storytelling, Kennedy Engineering Academy presentations and through searching the Lessons Learned Information system. o Project teams search the lessons repository to ensure the best possible results are delivered. o The ideas from the past are not always directly applicable but usually spark new ideas and innovations. Teams have a great responsibility to collect and disseminate these lessons so that they are shared with future generations of space systems designers. o Leaders should set a goal for themselves to host a set numbers of lesson learned events each year and do more to promote multiple methods of lessons learned activities. o High performing employees are expected to share their lessons, however formal knowledge sharing presentation are not the norm for many employees.

Bell, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2014

Reflections on Centaur Upper Stage Integration by the NASA Lewis (Glenn) Research Center

The NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led several expendable launch vehicle (ELV) projects from 1963 to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper stage. These major, comprehensive projects included system management, system development, integration (both payload and stage), and launch operations. The integration role that GRC pioneered was truly unique and highly successful. Its philosophy, scope, and content were not just invaluable to the missions and vehicles it supported, but also had significant Agencywide benefits. An overview of the NASA Lewis Research Center (now the NASA Glenn Research Center) philosophy on ELV integration is provided, focusing on Atlas/Centaur, Titan/Centaur, and Shuttle/Centaur vehicles and programs. The necessity of having a stable, highly technically competent in-house staff is discussed. Significant depth of technical penetration of contractor work is another critical component. Functioning as a cohesive team was more than a concept: GRC senior management, NASA Headquarters, contractors, payload users, and all staff worked together. The scope, content, and history of launch vehicle integration at GRC are broadly discussed. Payload integration is compared to stage development integration in terms of engineering and organization. Finally, the transition from buying launch vehicles to buying launch services is discussed, and thoughts on future possibilities of employing the successful GRC experience in integrating ELV systems like Centaur are explored.

Launch Vehicle↗
NASA NTRS2014

Ultrasonic Method for Deployment Mechanism Bolt Element Preload Verification

Deployment mechanisms play a pivotal role in mission success. These mechanisms often incorporate bolt elements for which a preload within a specified range is essential for proper operation. A common practice is to torque these bolt elements to a specified value during installation. The resulting preload, however, can vary significantly with applied torque for a number of reasons. The goal of this effort was to investigate ultrasonic methods as an alternative for bolt preload verification in such deployment mechanisms. A family of non-explosive release mechanisms widely used by satellite manufacturers was chosen for the work. A willing contractor permitted measurements on a sampling of bolt elements for these release mechanisms that were installed by a technician following a standard practice. A variation of approximately 50% (+/- 25%) in the resultant preloads was observed. An alternative ultrasonic method to set the preloads was then developed and calibration data was accumulated. The method was demonstrated on bolt elements installed in a fixture instrumented with a calibrated load cell and designed to mimic production practice. The ultrasonic method yielded results within +/- 3% of the load cell reading. The contractor has since adopted the alternative method for its future production. Introduction

Johnson, Eric C.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Reflections on Centaur Upper Stage Integration by the NASA Lewis (Glenn) Research Center

The NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led several expendable launch vehicle (ELV) projects from 1963 to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper stage. These major, comprehensive projects included system management, system development, integration (both payload and stage), and launch operations. The integration role that GRC pioneered was truly unique and highly successful. Its philosophy, scope, and content were not just invaluable to the missions and vehicles it supported, but also had significant Agency-wide benefits. An overview of the NASA Lewis Research Center (now the NASA Glenn Research Center) philosophy on ELV integration is provided, focusing on Atlas/Centaur, Titan/Centaur, and Shuttle/Centaur vehicles and programs. The necessity of having a stable, highly technically competent in-house staff is discussed. Significant depth of technical penetration of contractor work is another critical component. Functioning as a cohesive team was more than a concept: GRC senior management, NASA Headquarters, contractors, payload users, and all staff worked together. The scope, content, and history of launch vehicle integration at GRC are broadly discussed. Payload integration is compared to stage development integration in terms of engineering and organization. Finally, the transition from buying launch vehicles to buying launch services is discussed, and thoughts on future possibilities of employing the successful GRC experience in integrating ELV systems like Centaur are explored.

Centaur↗