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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗
DOE OSTI2019

Plutonium Pit Production

A plutonium pit is a key component of a nuclear weapon. During the Cold War, the United States produced approximately 1,000 pits per year at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. Rocky Flats was closed in 1992 and today the United States does not have the capability to manufacture new pits at the rate needed to maintain the nuclear deterrent. A delay in revitalizing this capability will eventually necessitate a larger, more expensive recapitalization effort in the future.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2019

Plutonium Pit Production - Savannah River Site (Plutonium Pit Production Mission)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has been providing strategic materials to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent for 70 years. Establishing plutonium pit production capabilities at SRS will leverage existing infrastructure at the site and optimize use of the talented workforce in the region to meet validated national security requirements. This new mission will require a large skilled workforce for decades to come. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions LLC, the management and operating (M&O) partner at SRS, has established teams for both the transition of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the development of the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF). In addition, NNSA remains committed to safely and securely removing surplus plutonium from South Carolina in a timely and cost-effective manner by using the dilute and dispose method.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Multilateral Testing Workshop on Relocatable Portal Monitors

The procurement and deployment of radiation detection equipment is a multi-faceted challenge across the globe. Knowledge sharing of the testing methods used to evaluate equipment for deployment scenarios helps improve the understanding of deployed systems by the global community. The United States Department of Energy’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Office (NSDD) performed a series of characterization measurements in 2019, focused on radiation detection systems that could function as relocatable portal monitors. The capstone activity for this project was a multilateral and cross-disciplinary workshop demonstrating, performing, and refining the techniques used in the characterization measurements with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and global partners. A group of technical experts including representatives from nine countries, the IAEA, and NSDD gathered at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM during September of 2019 for the Operational and Performance Testing and Evaluation of Relocatable Portals Workshop. Over the course of a week, the group discussed the necessity for and process of developing operational and performance requirements, challenges related to deploying radiation detection systems for the countries in attendance, use cases for deploying relocatable radiation detection equipment, and considerations related to testing equipment for appropriate deployment scenarios. All participants were given the opportunity to have hands-on experience with eleven relocatable systems in executing a limited scope characterization test comprised of six test scenarios. At the conclusion of testing, participants reviewed and presented their findings, and the group as a whole compared and contrasted their experiences. Suggested revisions to the test methods and ideas for further collaborations were discussed. This report discusses the logistical and planning considerations for bringing together experts across disciplines in a multilateral workshop on testing of radiation detectors, as well as presenting the testing methods performed, results, and paths forward. Success of workshops related to technical knowledge transfer and improvement of test methods is key to global technical and scientific support of radiation detection deployments.

Erchinger, Jennifer L.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of Survey Results from Advanced Reactor Industry Domain Experts on Nonlinear Soil-Structure Interaction Analysis Software Verification and Validation

The seismic load case has a significant impact on the design and cost of nuclear power plants. Given the need to substantially reduce cost, advanced reactor designers are looking to leverage numerical tools that enable seismic analysis of an integrated vessel/support/structure/soil system. Modern nonlinear analysis tools provide a solution, capturing dynamic coupling between components (including soil-structure interaction (SSI)) concurrent with nonlinear behavior in one or more parts of the system. Although these methods have a rich history of technical development and implementation, software quality assurance (SQA) following nuclear industry standards remains a significant burden for those wishing to adopt such methods for advanced reactor design and licensing. To reduce the SQA burden, this project will develop the guidance for SQA verification and validation (V&V) of coupled nonlinear SSI analysis tools, to include a test matrix of software features and test problems to support commercial grade dedication (CGD). The guidance is intended to be technology-neutral: supporting designers of all advanced reactors. To maximize the value of the project to reactor designers, the project team performed focused surveys of and interviews with advanced reactor designers. Additionally, the project surveyed members of the broader industry involved in reactor design and licensing. The aggregated industry feedback consists of written survey responses, live polling responses, focused interviews, and informal feedback provided after outreach presentations, collectively referred to as “survey results”. Herein, the survey results are reported, reviewed, and assessed to inform follow-on project activities. The survey results confirmed the familiarity of the industry with the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis. They also affirm the project need based upon the expressed intent to (1) incorporate nonlinear features and (2) pursue the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis to reduce seismic demands and construction costs. All reactor designers indicated their intent to incorporate two or more nonlinear features, and all reactor designer respondents opined that the coupled nonlinear SSI analysis would allow for the optimization of the reactor design and construction. However, the programmatic challenges, whether real or perceived, present a significant barrier to reactor designers. The barrier most commonly identified by the reactor designer population was regulatory risk, with 70% citing this as a reason not to pursue the approach. The perceived regulatory risk identified by the reactor designers underscores the importance of regulator engagement and dialogue in this project. Additionally, half of the reactor designers identified cost and lack of guidance as a deterrent. The survey results also provide insights to tailor specific aspects of the guidance document and test matrix. The project plans to prepare both a formal referenceable guidance document and a collaborative, web-based test matrix and problem set. The project will focus on more complete test problem definitions for the prioritized nonlinear features over shallower problem descriptions for a larger set of features. The nonlinearities prioritized as high based upon survey feedback include fluid-structure interaction and seismic isolation and energy dissipation devices. The nonlinearities prioritized as intermediate include nonlinear geomaterials, nonlinear concrete, nonlinear steel, and interface/contact nonlinearity. Deep embedment and the associated nonlinear phenomena are assigned the lowest priority based upon survey feedback.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Wargames as experiments: The Project on Nuclear Gaming’s SIGNAL framework

What can we learn from the Peloponnesian War that will help us deal with the intersection of cyber and nuclear conflict? What does World War I teach us about the role of nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons in warfare? The short answer to both questions is—probably not much. While extensive scholarship on nuclear warfare and strategy exists, empirical data on the impact of emerging technologies such as cyber weaponry, advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools, and precision-guided munitions are lacking. Here, given the importance of policy-relevant research to equip decision-makers with tools to understand nuclear deterrence and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, the scarcity of data available to analysts remains a critical gap.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Interdiction Through Relocatable Detectors

The NNSA Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has investigated a set of minimal-infrastructure radiation detection systems as alternatives to fixed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) for nuclear interdiction applications. These versatile and relocatable systems can improve nuclear security in missions or locations that do not warrant or support a standard fixed radiation detection system. Over 2019, a variety of relocatable detectors were characterized at the Interdiction Technologies Integration Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Evaluated detectors were diverse in their size and capabilities, ranging from backpack-sized systems to lane-spanning cargo scanning portals. Both spectroscopic and non-spectroscopic pedestrian and vehicle detection systems were characterized against uranium and plutonium sources. Signatures from the sources were modulated by both shielding and distance to quantify the performance of the relocatable systems as signal strength was decreased. Findings showed that relocatable spectroscopic detectors with isotope identification capabilities could reduce nuisance alarm rates compared to conventional fixed installation, gross-counting, radiation portal monitors. In vehicle scanning applications, detection ability generally trended with detection volume, regardless of spectral capability. In pedestrian scanning applications, several smaller backpack-sized detector systems were found to be more sensitive to detecting material than pedestrian portal monitors. The results of this characterization effort have helped inform the deployment of versatile equipment to improve nuclear security missions.

relocatable detectors, Nuclear Security↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Simplified Building Modeling Approach for Identifying Whole Building Retrofits

Building Energy Modeling (BEM) is an effective strategy for optimizing new and retrofit building design, evaluating its energy savings potential and rating its energy performance. However, because of the complexity and expense of modeling, only a small percentage of buildings are simulated. Over 80% of buildings are <25,000 ft2, and the cost associated with BEM can be a big deterrent for reaching this subsector, which usually ends up complying with energy codes and qualifying for incentives using prescriptive measures or generalized design guides. Similarly, efficiency considerations for small building retrofits are often identified through deemed measures or Technical Reference Manuals, which though a scalable and convenient approach, can limit innovation in design and optimization of measures. Simplification of the modeling process, where appropriate, can lead to increased energy savings and more informed decision making. This paper will discuss the development of a ruleset for a simplified approach based on the Performance Rating Method (PRM) contained in ASHRAE Standard 90.1. The approach aims to simplify and lower the cost of the energy modeling process in a controlled and documented manner. An anticipated outcome is an increased use of BEM and its effectiveness in the design, retrofit and operation of commercial buildings. In addition, simplification of the modeling process will result in fewer errors from misinterpretations of both program requirements and program intent in simulation software. The paper will discuss the need and advantages of a simplified modeling approach for whole building retrofits and the technical process for achieving the same.

Goel, Supriya↗
DOE OSTI2023

INTEGRATION OF THE H3D-M400 DETECTOR AND SPOT ROBOT FOR AUTOMATED AREA SURVEY MISSIONS

Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is charged to identify and develop technologies to detect, disrupt, and investigate smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials •Border protection involves primary inspections using Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), complimented with secondary and area survey inspections, usually performed manually using portable radiation detectors (PRDs) -RPM rely on fast technologies which provide quick scans of passing cargo/vehicles -Secondary inspections rely on trained, field deployed staff responsible for additional interdiction of screened cargo/vehicle putting them in potentially hazardous environment -Area survey inspections rely on trained, field deployed staff responsible for scanning and identifying presence of radiation while patrolling through a facility or public space •This project explores the use of technology which could reduce risks to field inspectors and add efficiency •The work presented here is a proof of principle of detector-robot integration to perform area survey inspections

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2018

Mercury Cleanup at the Y-12 Nuclear Security Complex - 18304

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) is one of the nation's most important national security assets. The facility played a key role in producing the world's first atomic bomb during the Manhattan Project and since World War II has been a vital contributor to America's nuclear deterrent capability. Historically, mercury was used extensively in operations at Y-12 in connection with production of components for nuclear weapons. During peak usage - from 1950 to 1963 - approximately 11 million kilograms of mercury were used. Over the years, large quantities of mercury - as much as 330,000 kilograms -- were lost within buildings and to soil and surface water. Today, mercury is considered the greatest environmental risk on the Oak Ridge Reservation and mercury cleanup is a high priority for the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM). Remediation of Y-12 and East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) to mitigate the mercury risk is based on a phased, adaptive management approach. The approach to address surface water includes treatment actions in the short term and research and technology development to evaluate longer-term solutions in the downstream environment. A number of formidable challenges must be addressed in order to assure safe, effective cleanup of mercury contamination at Y-12 and in EFPC. In the long term, understanding how mercury moves in the EFPC system is essential to the development of new technologies and remedial options and strategies for mercury contamination in the creek. OREM has developed and is currently executing a Mercury Technology Development Plan to address these long term needs. As a major component of the short term actions, UCOR has completed the design of the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility. Outfall 200 is the point at which the west end Y-12 storm drain system discharges to Upper East Fork Poplar Creek (UEFPC). Outfall 200 is consistently the largest single source of mercury to UEFPC. Construction and operation of this facility is critical to reduce mercury in UEFPC, and operation of this facility will be required before demolition of mercury contaminated facilities can begin. Once operational, the Mercury Treatment Facility will have a treatment capacity of 3,000 gallons per minute (gpm), a storm water capture rate of 40,000 gpm, and two million gallons of storm water storage capacity. The headworks with transfer pipeline is designed to capture flow from Outfall 200 and move it to the treatment facility. A contract for construction of the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility is expected to be awarded in 2018. Early site preparation began in 2017. The early site preparation scope includes utilities relocation, small structure demolition and creek bank secant wall installation. Initial operation of the Mercury Treatment Facility is planned for 2022. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 34: US DOE Featured Site: Savannah River Operations Office: 70 Years of Service

The Savannah River Site celebrates its 70. anniversary on November 28, 2020. On this date in 1950, President Harry S. Truman requested the Dupont Company to design, build and operate what was then known as the Savannah River Plant in response to the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic weapon, which set the Cold War into motion. During the 1950's, six South Carolina towns were relocated for the construction of SRS and by 1953, the 310 square mile site was complete. Nearly 40,000 workers were employed t build five nuclear reactors and support facilities, two chemical separations plants, heavy water extraction plant, nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. SRS played a key role in winning the Cold War and for seven decades, SRS has been a leader within the DOE complex. Today, the site supports environmental stewardship and maintains the nation's nuclear deterrent while ensuring the safekeeping and disposal of domestic and international nuclear materials. The site continues to support the nation's nuclear defense as it explores new potential NNSA missions. SRS has a proud 70- year history and looks forward to a future of service as a national asset and strong community partner. The session was kicked off with a video message from Secretary of Energy, Dan Brouillette, who thanked employees past and current for their efforts. The video also provided an overview of the history and future of the Site. This panel provided an overview of the Savannah River Site's 70 years of service (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) presented by the SRS's Senior leadership and the local Aiken, South Carolina Mayor. Panelists with presentations: US DOE Secretary Dan Brouillette's Overview of DOE and SRS - A Legacy of 70 Years of Service (Amy Boyette); 70 Years of Service (Michael Budney); 70 Years of Service (Stuart MacVean); SRS Liquid Waste (Thomas Foster); National Nuclear Security Administration (Nicole Nelson-Jean)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Fusion Ignition and the Path to Inertial Fusion Energy

The achievement of fusion ignition at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) National Ignition Facility (NIF) in December 2022 was the culmination of more than 60 years of research and development in laser-driven inertial confinement fusion at LLNL. That historic scientific, engineering, and technological accomplishment, a prime example of the value of ingenuity and commitment in the face of a grand scientific challenge, marked a significant advance in LLNL's support of the National Nuclear Security Administration's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the reliability and security of the nation's nuclear deterrent without underground testing. It also furthered Livermore's research in high energy density science and established the fundamental scientific basis for inertial fusion energy (IFE), emboldening further public and private research into the development of IFE as a potential source of abundance clean, safe, and reliable energy. Finally, the U.S. government has funded a multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional program that LLNL is now leading to make inertial fusion energy a reality.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Challenges and Strategies for Testing Automation Practices at Sandia National Laboratories

Sandia National Laboratories is a premier United States national security laboratory which develops science-based technologies in areas such as nuclear deterrence, energy production, and climate change. Computing plays a key role in its diverse missions, and within that environment, Research Software Engineers (RSEs) and other scientific software developers utilize testing automation to ensure quality and maintainability of their work. We conducted a Participatory Action Research study to explore the challenges and strategies for testing automation through the lens of academic literature. Through the experiences collected and comparison with open literature, we identify these challenges in testing automation and then present strategies for mitigation grounded in evidence-based practice and experience reports that other, similar institutions can assess for their automation needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Harnessing the Power of AI: Status and Expansion of Current Domestic Transport Security Through Flexible Embedded Hardware

As applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continue to expand, there are increasing opportunities to leverage applied AI methodologies with mobile transportation focused embedded systems. Current applications of AI in transportation focus on a variety of areas, including fuel efficiency, safety, security, and other broad fields of optimization or detection. To leverage these AI workflows and methodologies in the field, teams must utilize complex embedded systems capable of implementing these AI-enabled algorithms in real-time. In this paper, we will investigate how these algorithms can be integrated into existing technologies leveraging vehicle data - such as the Controller Area Network Transport Security Tracking and Reporting Unit (C-STAR). The C-STAR technology is an embedded platform with onboard computation capable of running next generation algorithms in vehicle systems AI, such as preventative maintenance, driver authentication, and transport security. As deployed in the field, the C-STAR has a limited AI functionality –this paper will directly discuss how a device like C-STAR can be utilized and the advantages of integrating these new technologies. We will open with relevant background information and transportation projects that leverage AI, focusing specifically on those around transport security such as vehicle identification, anomaly detection, and deterrence. We will then extend this into potential opportunities and scaling for AI methodologies using platforms like the C-STAR. Finally, we will speak directly to the challenges of deploying AI-powered workflows, such as computing power needs, bandwidth, hallucinations, and other regulatory considerations.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2021

Inferring UAV Position Relative to Smartphone Sensor Based on Acoustic Characteristics

As commercial and non-commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) improve technologically and increase in accessibility, their potential for use in actions antithetical to nuclear non-proliferation efforts increases as well. The ability to identify and locate UAVs using ubiquitous, inexpensive hardware and software would be advantageous as both a deterrent and an initial warning system. Our team looks to utilize smartphones as acoustic sensors to record and characterize UAV movement based on the sound produced while in flight. Multi-rotor UAVs produce identifiable acoustic spectral characteristics with frequencies and harmonics corresponding to motor revolutions per minute and the propeller characteristics. As the source moves closer to the receiver these spectral patterns remain relatively stable (at slow speeds), while the energy observed from the waves increases. The goal of this work is to utilize a small network of smartphone sensors with known, fixed positions to infer the relative position of an in-flight UAV with respect to the position of the smartphones through the variation in acoustic energy.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗