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Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

Hazards and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Advanced Nuclear Reactors Coupled with Industrial Facilities

This report provides a roadmap and tool kit for site specific risk assessments across a broad range of industrial customers co-located with advanced nuclear power plants (ANPP) that are not currently built and operating in the U.S. This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Integrated Energy Systems Pathway that has produced industrial requirements studies and techno-economic assessments on the topics of feasibility of ANPP supported industrial processes. This report also leverages the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program that has presented hazards assessment and generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors (LWRs) co-located with hydrogen production facilities. Many of the hazard assessments and risk assessments performed for the LWRS report are agnostic to whether the nuclear reactor is an ANPP or were adapted to the ANPP focus. The report performs hazards assessments to include industrial facilities: an oil refinery, a methanol plant, a synthetic fuel (synfuel) plant, the production of synthetic gas (syngas) as part of the methanol and synfuel plants, wood pulp and paper mills, and hydrogen production. Hydrogen production facilities are assessed in depth through prior reports in the LWRS program and the results are leveraged in this report. All these facilities are specified through industrial process and requirements research performed by national laboratories, universities, and interaction with industry. Many of the processes used in this report are pre-conceptual designs to use for decarbonization of the current technology facilities. A process of failure modes and effects analysis (what can go wrong) and accidentology (what has historically gone wrong) was used to determine the hazards presented to the nuclear power plant by the addition of the HES and the industrial customer. Chemical properties of feedstocks and products are summarized as part of the hazards assessment. Example analysis procedures are provided for each of the hazard types identified. These deterministic analyses can be used to assess adherence to licensing criteria. They can also be used to meet other safety goals like protection of the public, workers, or industrial facility equipment. A modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) PRA only existing on paper was modeled and verified in modern PRA software. This will provide a tool for representative ANPP probabilistic analyses for future research.

10 SYNTHETIC FUELS↗

Rationale and Methods for Archival Sampling and Analysis of Atmospheric Trace Chemical Contaminants On Board Mir and Recommendations for the International Space Station

Collection and analysis of spacecraft cabin air samples are necessary to assess the cabin air quality with respect to crew health. Both toxicology and engineering disciplines work together to achieve an acceptably clean cabin atmosphere. Toxicology is concerned with limiting the risk to crew health from chemical sources, setting exposure limits, and analyzing air samples to determine how well these limits are met. Engineering provides the means for minimizing the contribution of the various contaminant generating sources by providing active contamination control equipment on board spacecraft and adhering to a rigorous material selection and control program during the design and construction of the spacecraft. A review of the rationale and objectives for sampling spacecraft cabin atmospheres is provided. The presently-available sampling equipment and methods are reviewed along with the analytical chemistry methods employed to determine trace contaminant concentrations. These methods are compared and assessed with respect to actual cabin air quality monitoring needs. Recommendations are presented with respect to the basic sampling program necessary to ensure an acceptably clean spacecraft cabin atmosphere. Also, rationale and recommendations for expanding the scope of the basic monitoring program are discussed.

Perry, J. L.↗

High-Order Methods in NASA’s Next Generation of Computational Fluid Dynamics Tools

The missions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) routinely produce unique requirements and challenges for development and application of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) methods. NASA presently embodies four distinct Mission Directorates: Aeronautics Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations. These missions generate requirements for systems that operate in a wide variety of environments. They range from the high-speed flight of aerodynamically optimized vehicles operating in the earth’s atmosphere to spacecraft designed for missions that don’t favor aerodynamic optimization, some operating in the atmosphere of planets and planetary moons such as Mars and Venus or Saturn’s moon Titan. Systems supporting these vehicles, such as rocket and jet propulsion, reaction control systems, fluid and thermal transfer systems, etc. can also generate their own unique set of flow phenomena that challenge today’s CFD methodology. Through the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), NASA annually conducts state-of-the-discipline assessments in fifteen distinct engineering disciplines. These assessments are performed by the NASA Technical Fellows that lead Technical Discipline Teams (TDT) of recognized experts in these fifteen areas. In the Aerosciences discipline, three topics have been identified as the top challenges for the discipline: aero-plume interaction prediction, unsteady separated flows, and aerothermodynamic prediction. These challenge areas are defined by the Agency’s high-risk projects and problems on which the NESC is requested to perform independent testing, analysis, and assessments. When viewed as a whole, these tests, analyses, and assessments provide a clear view of the recurring technical challenges facing Agency engineers and researchers and can be used to guide future research and technology development. The present state-of-the-art in the application of CFD at NASA is the use of Reynolds-Averaged Navier- Stokes (RANS) solvers, primarily executed in a steady-state mode of operation. In isolated cases, Unsteady RANS (URANS) solvers have been employed when steady RANS solutions produce poorly converging or oscillating results or in cases, such as aeroelastic analysis, which require unsteady aerodynamic simulation. For most traditional external and internal aerodynamic flows, structured overset grids or unstructured grids are employed to minimize geometric modeling and grid generation times. Grid adaptation, primarily as a series of coarse-grain intermediate processing steps is also seeing use on particularly complex flow problems and configurations. In the case of aerothermodynamic flows, engineers have been forced to continue to employ structured grid techniques as the present unstructured grid methodology has proven inadequate in the prediction of surface heating. In the area of aero-plume interaction modeling, two-gas, frozen chemistry simulation is generally the state-of-the- art, with some production solvers capable of predicting flows with only a single gas component. Prediction of flows falling into the afore-mentioned top Aerosciences technical challenges have severely stressed the present state-of-the-art in CFD prediction and for some problems, such as unsteady separated flows and aero-plume interaction cases, engineers have begun employing Large Eddy Simulation (LES) and Hybrid RANS/LES techniques. In some isolated aero-propulsion interaction cases, chemically reacting flow simulations have been applied. These methods are highly evolutionary and engineers have little experience in their application, so they cannot be heavily relied upon in today’s application environment. Therefore, this leads one to muse over which numerical technologies will be included in the CFD tools that will be employed 30 years in the future. This presentation will describe specific technical problems that have stressed NASA’s traditional CFD methods to their breaking point and will link these issues to the Agency’s top Aerosciences technical challenges. The discussion will then shift to the characteristics of future CFD solvers that will be required to attack these challenges and how these characteristics differ from the present state-of-the- art. High-order methods certainly appear to have a place in the development of future CFD tools and some of the physical characteristics of our most challenging problems suggest that high-order methods are the only way to effectively solve them. But there are some relatively severe implementation issues that face these methods, particularly in the area of general applicability and robust operation as an engineering tool. Desired characteristics of next-generation CFD solvers will be discussed and the author’s view of which emerging numerical technologies might be employed to address these attributes will also be presented

David M Schuster↗

Multivariate Frequency Analysis of Annual Maxima Suspended Sediment Concentrations and Floods in the Jinsha River, China

Streamflow plays a critical role in sediment transport. Traditional frequency analysis of annual maximal (AM) suspended sediment concentrations (SSCs) is usually based on univariate distribution of SSCs and may provide a limited assessment of SSC state, leading to an underestimate or overestimate of the corresponding probability. To address this issue, we propose a multivariate frequency analysis framework is proposed for extreme sediment events using copula functions that account for the joint behavior of SSC and flood flow (i.e., peak discharge and volume). The uncertainties associated with copula modeling are also discussed. The Jinsha River in China is used as a case study. The results show that the copula-based multivariate method provides a more comprehensive assessment of extreme SSCs and their recurrence intervals than univariate frequency analysis. The uncertainty of copula modeling decreases with longer observation time and increases with larger return periods. The uncertainty ranges of the most likely design quantiles vary with different copulas, and the uncertainty range for the best-fit copula is not the smallest. This study is useful for the risk assessment of extreme SSC events under flood conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Using Bayesian Methodology to Estimate Liquefied Natural Gas Leak Frequencies

This analysis provides estimates on the leak frequencies of nine components found in liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities. Data was taken from a variety of sources, with 25 different data sets included in the analysis. A hierarchical Bayesian model was used that assumes that the log leak frequency follows a normal distribution and the logarithm of the mean of this normal distribution is a linear function of the logarithm of the fractional leak area. This type of model uses uninformed prior distributions that are updated with applicable data. Separate models are fit for each component listed. Five order-of-magnitude fractional leak areas are considered, based on the flow area of the component. Three types of supporting analyses were performed: sensitivity of the model to the data set used, sensitivity of the leak frequency estimates to differences in the model structure or prior distributions, and sufficiency of sample sized used for convergence. Recommended leak frequency distributions for all component types and leak sizes are given. These leak frequency predictions can be used for quantitative risk assessments in the future.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Structural Analysis Made 'NESSUSary'

Everywhere you look, chances are something that was designed and tested by a computer will be in plain view. Computers are now utilized to design and test just about everything imaginable, from automobiles and airplanes to bridges and boats, and elevators and escalators to streets and skyscrapers. Computer-design engineering first emerged in the 1970s, in the automobile and aerospace industries. Since computers were in their infancy, however, architects and engineers during the time were limited to producing only designs similar to hand-drafted drawings. (At the end of 1970s, a typical computer-aided design system was a 16-bit minicomputer with a price tag of $125,000.) Eventually, computers became more affordable and related software became more sophisticated, offering designers the "bells and whistles" to go beyond the limits of basic drafting and rendering, and venture into more skillful applications. One of the major advancements was the ability to test the objects being designed for the probability of failure. This advancement was especially important for the aerospace industry, where complicated and expensive structures are designed. The ability to perform reliability and risk assessment without using extensive hardware testing is critical to design and certification. In 1984, NASA initiated the Probabilistic Structural Analysis Methods (PSAM) project at Glenn Research Center to develop analysis methods and computer programs for the probabilistic structural analysis of select engine components for current Space Shuttle and future space propulsion systems. NASA envisioned that these methods and computational tools would play a critical role in establishing increased system performance and durability, and assist in structural system qualification and certification. Not only was the PSAM project beneficial to aerospace, it paved the way for a commercial risk- probability tool that is evaluating risks in diverse, down- to-Earth application

Source record↗

Case Study of Meteoroid Fluence on a Mars Sample Return Mission

The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.

Micrometeoroid↗

Case Study of Meteoroid Fluence on a Mars Sample Return Mission

The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.

micrometeoroid↗

Quantitative evaluation of common cause failures in high safety-significant safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems at nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems. They are proven to be more reliable, cheaper, and easier to maintain given obsolescence of analog components. However, they also pose new engineering and technical challenges, such as possibility of common cause failures (CCFs) unique to digital systems. Here this paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) that is developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). A methodology for evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs was developed as part of the framework. The framework integrates three stages of a typical risk assessment—qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analyses. The quantified risks compared with respective acceptance criteria provide valuable insights for system architecture alternatives allowing design optimization in terms of risk reduction and cost savings. A comprehensive case study performed to demonstrate the framework's capabilities is documented here in this paper. Results show that the PRADIC is a powerful tool capable to identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their probabilities, and evaluate their impacts on system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Making the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission safe

This paper will detail how the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) system safety program is conducted. Numerous safety analyses are conducted through the various phases of design, test, and fabrication, and results are presented to NASA management for discussion during dedicated safety reviews. This paper will then address the system safety assessment and risk analysis methodologies used (i.e. hazard analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis), and how they are coupled with enginering and test analyses for a 'synergistic picture' of the system. Some preliminary safety analysis results, showing the relationship between hazard identification, control or abatement, and finally control verification, will be presented as examples of this safety process.

Bahr, N. J.↗

Reliability Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.

FMEA/FMECA↗

Reliability Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.

Reliability prediction↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Cost- and Risk-Based Seismic Design Optimization of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems

Seismic analysis, design, and qualification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) is a significant contributor to the capital cost of a nuclear power plant. To reduce capital costs of advanced nuclear power plants and make commercial nuclear energy more competitive, innovations are needed in their structural design and construction, and not just in the reactor core and associated systems. Seismic isolation has been identified as an important cost-cutting technology that enables standardization of equipment across various sites. This paper develops and demonstrates a cost- and risk-based seismic design optimization of a representative safety system in a nuclear power plant with the dual goals of minimizing overnight capital cost and meeting safety goals. The design optimization can also include component seismic isolation, in which case, the optimized design includes a set of equipment that needs to be seismically isolated to minimize capital cost. The open-source codes MASTODON and Dakota are used for seismic probabilistic risk assessment and design optimization, respectively. A generic nuclear facility with a safety system comprising SSCs that are common to nuclear power plants is considered for the demonstration of the design optimization and is assumed to be located at the Idaho National Laboratory site. Generic costs and seismic design cost functions are assumed for the SSCs of the safety system. The sum of the costs of the SSCs is minimized in the optimization process, while the risk of failure of the safety system is provided as a constraint. Furthermore, results show that the optimization process reduces capital costs significantly while automatically prioritizing the safety of SSCs that contribute most to the risk of the safety system.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of a Light Water Reactor Coupled with a High Temperature Electrolysis Hydrogen Production Plant

Two generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) addition to a light water reactor (LWR) are performed, one for a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and one for a boiling water reactor (BWR). The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic, and some assumptions are made. Many conservative assumptions from a the preliminary PWR PRA report were eliminated using design data for both the HES and the high temperature electrolysis facility (HTEF). The results of the PRA indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all DBAs, none exceeding 5.6%. The PRA results for CDF and LERF support the use of RG 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full LAR. Further insights provided through hazard analysis and sensitivity studies confirm with high confidence that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and a HTEF sited at 1.0 km from the NPP is strong and that the placement of a HTEF at 0.5 km is a viable case. Site specific information can alter these conclusions.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗