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Global reverse supply chain design for solid waste recycling under uncertainties and carbon emission constraint

Highlights: • We propose a robust model for global reverse supply chain design. • The uncertain waste collection rate, currency exchange rate, and the maritime cost are incorporated. • The total emission and cost are affected by both the uncertainties and the global carbon cap. • The waste products flows between countries vary with the levels of uncertainties and the global carbon cap. • There is an opportunity to reduce the maritime emission. - Abstract: The emergence of concerns over environmental protection, resource conservation as well as the development of logistics operations and manufacturing technology has led several countries to implement formal collection and recycling systems of solid waste. Such recycling system has the benefits of reducing environmental pollution, boosting the economy by creating new jobs, and generating income from trading the recyclable materials. This leads to the formation of a global reverse supply chain (GRSC) of solid waste. In this paper, we investigate the design of such a GRSC with a special emphasis on three aspects; (1) uncertainty of waste collection levels, (2) associated carbon emissions, and (3) challenges posed by the supply chain’s global aspect, particularly the maritime transportation costs and currency exchange rates. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to integrate the three above-mentioned important aspects in the design of a GRSC. We have used mixed integer-linear programming method along with robust optimization to develop the model which is validated using a sample case study of e-waste management. Our results show that using a robust model by taking the complex interactions characterizing global reverse supply chain networks into account, we can create a better GRSC. The effect of uncertainties and carbon constraints on decisions to reduce costs and emissions are also shown.

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Remediation of D-Area Ash Units, Savannah River Site - 18151

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), under the tri-party Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) between the United States Department of Energy (US DOE), United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), agreement was reached to remediate two ash basins, one coal pile runoff basin and one ash landfill as Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Removal Actions within a schedule of five years (2014 - 2019). These removal actions complete the remediation of these basins and the ash landfill which originated from nearly 60 years of powerhouse operations and cover a total area of nearly 40.5 hectares (100 acres). Utilizing proven as well as state of the art technologies and methods, the completed actions culminate in two protective multi-layer cover systems and the conversion of the coal pile runoff basin to an ecological diverse storm water retention basin. Completion of these removal actions has been determined to provide protection of future industrial workers and ecological receptors as well as prevent migration of mobile contaminants found in coal residues (e.g., arsenic) from powerhouse operations, achieving all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements. (authors)

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Radioactive Waste Management in Central Asia - 12034

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly independent states in Central Asia (CA) whose regulatory bodies were set up recently are facing problems with the proper management of radioactive waste and so called 'nuclear legacy' inherited from the past activities. During the former Soviet Union (SU) period, various aspects of nuclear energy use took place in CA republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Activities range from peaceful use of energy to nuclear testing for example at the former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (SNTS) in Kazakhstan, and uranium mining and milling industries in all four countries. Large amounts of radioactive waste (RW) have been accumulated in Central Asia and are waiting for its safe disposal. In 2008 the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has developed bilateral projects that aim to assist the regulatory bodies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (from 2010) to identify and draft relevant regulatory requirements to ensure the protection of the personnel, population and environment during the planning and execution of remedial actions for past practices and radioactive waste management in the CA countries. The participating regulatory authorities included: Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Agency, Kyrgyzstan State Agency on Environmental Protection and Forestry, Nuclear Safety Agency of Tajikistan, and State Inspectorate on Safety in Industry and Mining of Uzbekistan. The scope of the projects is to ensure that activities related to radioactive waste management in both planned and existing exposure situations in CA will be carried out in accordance with the international guidance and recommendations, taking into account the relevant regulatory practice from other countries in this area. In order to understand the problems in the field of radioactive waste management we have analysed the existing regulations through the so called 'Threat assessment' in each CA country which revealed additional problems in the existing regulatory documents beyond those described at the start of our ongoing bilateral projects in Kazakhstan, Kirgizistan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. (authors)

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NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center Saves Water With High-Efficiency Toilet and Urinal Program: Best Management Practice Case Study #6 - Toilets and Urinals (Fact Sheet)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has a longstanding, successful sustainability program that focuses on energy and water efficiency as well as environmental protection. Because MSFC was built in the 1960s, most of the buildings house outdated, inefficient restroom fixtures. The facility engineering team at MSFC developed an innovativeefficiency model for replacing these older toilets and urinals.

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the location of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1 and 2, Revision 0 with ROTCs 1,2, and 3

Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises five corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 374 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at CASs 18-23-01 and 20-45-03, and a corrective action of removing potential source material (PSM) was conducted at CAS 20-45-03. The other CASs require no further action; however, best management practices of removing PSM and drums at CAS 18-22-06, and removing drums at CAS 18-22-08 were performed. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from May 4 through October 6, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigating the primary release of radionuclides and investigating other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 374 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were found to be present in the surface soil that was sampled. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present in subsurface media within the craters and ejecta fields (default contamination boundaries) at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that PSM in the form of lead-acid batteries at Schooner exceeds the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing PSM, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 374. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 374. • Corrective Action Unit 374 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 371, Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe, located within Areas 11 and 18 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 comprises two corrective action sites (CASs): • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 371 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at both CASs. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 8, 2009, through February 16, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 371 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface soil. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within the Johnnie Boy crater and the fissure at Pin Stripe. Due to the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each site. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 371. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 371. • Corrective Action Unit 371 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 With ROTC-1

Corrective Action Unit 365 comprises one corrective action site (CAS), CAS 08-23-02, U-8d Contamination Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 365 based on the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with a use restriction (UR). Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 18, 2011, through August 2, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 365 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in supporting the DQO decisions. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were found to be present to the southwest of the Baneberry crater. It was also assumed that radionuclide levels present within the crater and fissure exceed the FAL. Corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of establishing a UR and posting warning signs for the crater, fissure, and the area located to the southwest of the crater where soil concentrations exceeded the FAL. These URs were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions beyond what are described in this document are necessary for CAU 365. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 365. (3) Corrective Action Unit 365 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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Variation of annual effective dose due to radon level in indoor air in Marwar region of Rajasthan, India

In the present work, indoor radon and thoron measurements have been carried out from different locations of Jodhpur and Nagaur districts of Northern Rajasthan, India using RAD7, a solid state alpha detector. The radon and thoron concentration in indoor air varies from 8.75 to 61.25 Bq m{sup −3} and 32.7 to 147.2 Bq m{sup −3} with the mean value of 32 and 73 Bq m{sup −3} respectively. The observed indoor radon concentration values are well below the action level recommended by International Commission on Radiological Protection (200-300 Bq m{sup −3}) and Environmental Protection Agency (148 Bq m{sup −3}). The survey reveals that the thoron concentration values in the indoor air are well within the International Commission on Radiological Protection (2005). The calculated total annual effective dose due to radon level in indoor air varies from 0.22 to 1.54 mSv y{sup −1} with the mean value of 0.81 mSv y{sup −1} which is less than even the lower limit of action level 3-10 mSv y{sup −1} recommended by International Commission on Radiological Protection (2005)

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2016 Annual Site Environmental Report Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at SNL, New Mexico. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs at SNL/NM during calendar year 2016. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial and ecological surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration, oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This ASER is prepared in accordance with and required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting.

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Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Environmental Report 2021

The purposes of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Environmental Report 2021 are to record Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) compliance with environmental standards and requirements, describe LLNL’s environmental protection and remediation programs, and present the results of environmental monitoring at the two LLNL sites—the Livermore Site and Site 300. The report is prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by LLNL’s Environmental Functional Area. Submittal of the report satisfies requirements under DOE Order 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,” and DOE Order 458.1, “Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment.” The report is distributed electronically and is available at https://saer.llnl.gov/, the website for the LLNL annual environmental report. Previous LLNL annual environmental reports beginning with 1994 are also on the website. Some references in the electronic report text are underlined, which indicates that they are clickable links. Clicking on one of these links will open the related document, data workbook, or website. Sampling location maps throughout this report were created using ArcGIS® software by Esri. The report begins with an executive summary, which provides the purpose of the report and an overview of LLNL’s compliance and monitoring results. The first three chapters provide background information: Chapter 1 is an overview of the location, meteorology, and hydrogeology of the two LLNL sites; Chapter 2 is a summary of LLNL’s compliance with environmental regulations; and Chapter 3 is a description of LLNL’s environmental programs with an emphasis on the Environmental Management System including pollution prevention. The majority of the report covers LLNL’s environmental monitoring programs and monitoring data for 2021: effluent and ambient air monitoring and dose assessment (Chapter 4); waters, including wastewater, storm water runoff, surface water, rain, and groundwater (Chapter 5); and terrestrial, including soil, sediment, vegetation, foodstuff, ambient radiation, and special status wildlife and plants (Chapter 6). The remaining two chapters discuss LLNL’s groundwater remediation program (Chapter 7), and quality assurance for the environmental monitoring programs (Chapter 8). Complete monitoring data, which are summarized in the body of the report, are provided in Appendix A. The report uses Système International units, consistent with the federal Metric Conversion Act of 1975 and Executive Order 12770, “Metric Usage in Federal Government Programs” (1991). For ease of comparison to environmental reports issued prior to 1991, dose values and many radiological measurements are given in both metric and U.S. customary units. A conversion table is provided in the glossary. The report is the responsibility of LLNL’s Environmental Functional Area. Monitoring data were obtained through the combined efforts of the Environmental Functional Area; Environmental Restoration Department; Physical and Life Sciences Environmental Monitoring Radiological Laboratory; and the Radiation Protection Functional Area.

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Recertification Project Plan (Rev. 5)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Recertification Project was established to meet the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (Public Law 102-579, as amended by Public Law 104-201) (102nd U.S. Congress, 1992) requirement to demonstrate continued compliance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal regulations. This plan sets the overall direction for a complex and interdependent set of tasks that is repeated at five-year intervals and culminates in EPA certification that the WIPP facility demonstrates continued compliance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," pursuant to LWA sections 8(d)(1) and 8(f).

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Radionuclide Risk Coefficient Uncertainty Distributions for Use in Performance Assessments - 19156

Traditionally, radiation dose has been used as the regulatory criterion for decision making in performance assessments (PAs), despite the concept of cancer risk arguably being a more easily understood endpoint than dose for the public, and a preferable metric for decision analysis. However, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed risk parameters for use in risk assessments and PAs in the form of radionuclide-specific risk coefficients, or RCs, which are published in various Federal Guidance Reports (FGRs). RCs are employed as scalars to convert environmental radionuclide exposure (via ingestion, inhalation, and external exposure) estimates to incremental lifetime cancer risk (ILCR). ILCR is the additional cancer risk averaged over a lifetime, over-and-above all-cause cancer risk, associated with carcinogen exposure. Uncertainties associated with RCs are discussed in FGR 13 and in a joint report published by EPA and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, but statistical distributions for the RCs were not directly developed. The uncertainty assessments in the EPA/ONRL report were based on dosimetric modeling and elicitation of nine experts. From these sources, five uncertainty categories were defined based on ratios of the 5. and 95. quantiles of uncertainty. Thus, the representations of uncertainty defined by EPA/ORNL are not distributions in a traditional sense. Furthermore, the authors only addressed uncertainty in RCs for inhalation and ingestion pathways. We develop a methodology for assigning statistical distributions to EPA's published mortality RC values (i.e. to estimate the probability of dying from radiation-induced cancers) for the inhalation (slow, medium, and fast absorption types), ingestion (water, food, and soil), and external exposure pathways associated with all cancer types. We employed the same dosimetric concepts and assumptions as EPA/ORNL, including cancer risk (dose-response) distributional information from a previous expert elicitation, which was also employed by EPA/ORNL in their work. We assumed that uncertainty in RCs can be described by lognormal distributions based on the modeling conducted previously by EPA/ORNL, and that point estimates tabulated in FGR 13 represent median values of the distributions. We also extended EPA/ORNL's uncertainty ratios to statistical distributions for external exposure RCs. The results are a set of radionuclide-specific distributions that are applicable in PAs that focus on cancer mortality. These distributions are currently and will subsequently be employed in PAs at various sites, in addition to the required regulatory dose limits. Quantification of ILCRs and associated uncertainty in PAs will provide regulators and the public with additional information for good decision making. Future directions include further refinement of the distributions and development of statistical distributions for morbidity RCs, which are used to estimate the probability of developing, but not necessarily dying as a result of, radiation-induced cancer. (authors)

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Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons • CAS TA-21-001-TARC Roller Coaster N. Disposal Trench These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify these URs to administrative URs. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). These Administrative URs were based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

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Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons. This UR was established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and was based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This reevaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Site Environmental Report: 2010 (ASER)

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year of 2010 at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that overlap the calendar year - i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2010/2011 (October 2010 through May 2011) are also included. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, EO 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, SLAC effectively implements and integrates the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2010, SLAC continued to improve its management systems. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13423, EO 13514, and DOE Orders 450.1A and 430.2B. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. During 2010, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued. The following are among SLAC's environmental accomplishments for 2010. To facilitate management and identification of future potential greenhouse gases (GHG) reduction opportunities, SLAC voluntarily completed GHG inventories for calendar year (CY) 2008 and CY 2009 and submitted the results to The Climate Registry. A Lead Management Plan was completed to reduce the potential of lead impacting the environment, and two large legacy tube-trailer modules, each containing 38 tubes of compressed ethane, were reused or recycled by an outside contractor, resulting in hazardous waste avoidance and cost savings of approximately $100,000 in transportation and disposal costs. SLAC continues to make progress on achieving the sustainability goals of EOs 13423 and 13514, which include, but are not limited to reductions in the use of water, energy, and fuel, building to green standards and reductions in GHG emissions. Phase I of the SLAC Advanced Metering project for electrical and natural gas systems was completed. Phase I included the design of the metering system and purchase of the enterprise software. The planning, design, and installation of an advanced water metering system for select buildings, landscape, and process systems were completed. In addition, the last major onsite chiller containing a Class I ozone-depleting substance was taken out of service, and SLAC continued to replace conventional vehicles with electric vehicles. In 2010, there were no radiological impacts to the public or the environment from SLAC operations. The potential doses to the public were negligible and far below the regulatory and SLAC administrative limits. No radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels to the public or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC shipped 2,891 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste, half of which was legacy waste, to appropriate treatment and disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste. SLAC also continued its efforts to reduce the inventory of materials no longer needed for its mission by permanently removing 125 sealed radioactive sources from the inventory. Ninety-seven of the sealed sources were returned to the manufacturer, and 28 were sent to Energy Solutions for processing before being sent to the Nevada Test Site for burial. In addition, 87 concrete blocks which had been stored in an area known as the Bone Yard were surveyed for potential surface contamination and volumetric activation prior to off-site release. Based on the comprehensive measurements, all 87 blocks were qualified for release and were disposed of as ordinary materials at a landfill. In 2010, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program personnel continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

This document constitutes an addendum to the August 2004, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271, Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS 27-05-02, Leachfield. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on an “Occasional Use Area” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 400 total work hours). Any proposed activity within this use restricted area that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining postings at this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Facile and template-free preparation of {alpha}-MnO{sub 2} nanostructures and their enhanced adsorbability

Graphical abstract: . The as-obtained ({alpha}-MnO{sub 2}) nanomaterials could act as an adsorbent to remove Conge red. More significantly, the nanomaterials are nontoxic and environmentally friendly though a biological MTT assay experiment. Plots of the capacity to remove Conge red with time by the commercial and new-prepared {alpha}-MnO{sub 2}. Inset shows absorption of Congo Red with time by new-prepared rod-clusters {alpha}-MnO{sub 2} (0, 10, 20, 40 and 60 min, respectively). Highlights: {yields} Nanostructured {alpha}-MnO{sub 2} was prepared through a template-free hydrothermal method. {yields} The obtained {alpha}-MnO{sub 2} could act as effective adsorbents to remove organic dyes. {yields} The obtained adsorbents are environmentally friendly. -- Abstract: In this paper, nanostructured MnO{sub 2} materials were successfully prepared through a simple and template-free hydrothermal method. X-ray diffraction pattern indicates that the as-prepared nanomaterials are {alpha}-MnO{sub 2}. Transmission Electron Microscopy and Scanning Electron Microscopy images demonstrate that nanostructured rod-clusters {alpha}-MnO{sub 2} could be evolved from the nanorods. Brunauer-Emmett-Teller (BET) surface area measurement was employed to characterize the surface property. Moreover, the as-obtained ({alpha}-MnO{sub 2}) nanomaterials could act as an efficient adsorbent to remove Congo Red and Methlylene Blue. More significantly, the nanomaterials are nontoxic and environmentally friendly via biological methylthiazolyldiphenyltetrazoliumbromide assay experiments. Its nontoxic and enhanced adsorbability properties guarantee their safe applications in environmental protection and industrial aspects.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗