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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Aerospace Medical Support in Russia

This slide presentation reviews the role of the flight surgeon in support of aerospace medical support operations at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center (GCTC), also known as Star City, in Russia. The flight surgeon in this role is the medical advocate for non-russian astronauts, and also provides medical care for illness and injury for astronauts, family members, and guests as well as civil servants and contractors. The flight surgeon also provides support for hazardous training. There are various photos of the area, and the office, and some of the equipment that is used.

Castleberry, Tara↗
NASA NTRS2011

ARES I Upper Stage Subsystems Design and Development

From 2005 through early 2011, NASA conducted concept definition, design, and development of the Ares I launch vehicle. The Ares I was conceived to serve as a crew launch vehicle for beyond-low-Earth-orbit human space exploration missions as part of the Constellation Program Architecture. The vehicle was configured with a single shuttle-derived solid rocket booster first stage and a new liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen upper stage, propelled by a single, newly developed J-2X engine. The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle was to be mated to the forward end of the Ares I upper stage through an interface with fairings and a payload adapter. The vehicle design passed a Preliminary Design Review in August 2008, and was nearing the Critical Design Review when efforts were concluded as a result of the Constellation Program s cancellation. At NASA Glenn Research Center, four subsystems were developed for the Ares I upper stage. These were thrust vector control (TVC) for the J-2X, electrical power system (EPS), purge and hazardous gas (P&HG), and development flight instrumentation (DFI). The teams working each of these subsystems achieved 80 percent or greater design completion and extensive development testing. These efforts were extremely successful representing state-of-the-art technology and hardware advances necessary to achieve Ares I reliability, safety, availability, and performance requirements. This paper documents the designs, development test activity, and results.

Frate, David T.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage Structures and Thermal Design

The Ares 1 Upper Stage was part of the vehicle intended to succeed the Space Shuttle as the United States manned spaceflight vehicle. Although the Upper Stage project was cancelled, there were many lessons learned that are applicable to future vehicle design. Lessons learned that are briefly detailed in this Technical Memorandum are for specific technical areas such as tank design, common bulkhead design, thrust oscillation, control of flight and slosh loads, purge and hazardous gas system. In addition, lessons learned from a systems engineering and vehicle integration perspective are also included, such as computer aided design and engineering, scheduling, and data management. The need for detailed systems engineering in the early stages of a project is emphasized throughout this report. The intent is that future projects will be able to apply these lessons learned to keep costs down, schedules brief, and deliver products that perform to the expectations of their customers.

Ahmed, Rafiq↗
NASA NTRS2013

Autonomous Cryogenic Leak Detector for Improving Launch Site Operations

NASA, military, and commercial satellite users need launch services that are highly reliable, less complex, easier to test, and cost effective. This project has developed a tapered optical fiber sensor for detecting hydrogen. The invention involves incorporating chemical indicators on the tapered end of an optical fiber using organically modified silicate nanomaterials. The Hazardous Gas Detection Lab (HGDL) at Kennedy Space Center is involved in the design and development of instrumentation that can detect and qualify various mission-critical chemicals. Historically, hydrogen, helium, nitrogen, oxygen, and argon are the first five gases of HGDL focus. The use of these cryogenic fluids in the area of propulsion offers challenges. Due to their extreme low temperatures, these fluids induce contraction of the materials they contact, a potential cause of leakage. Among them, hydrogen is of particular concern. Small sensors are needed in multiple locations without adding to the structural weight. The most vulnerable parts of the engine are the connection flanges on the transfer lines, which have to support cycles of large thermal amplitude. The thermal protection of the engine provides a closed area, increasing the likelihood of an explosive atmosphere. Thus, even a small leak represents an unacceptable hazardous condition during loading operations, in flight, or after an aborted launch. Tapered fibers were first fabricated from 1/1.3-mm core/cladding (silica/ plastic) optical fibers. Typically a 1-ft (approx. 30- cm) section of the 1-mm fiber is cut from the bundle and marked with a pen into five 2-.-in. (.5.7-cm) sections. A propane torch is applied at every alternate mark to burn the jacket and soften the glass core. While the core is softening, the two ends of the fiber are pulled apart slowly to create fine tapers of .- to .-in. (.6- to 12-mm) long on the 1-mm optical fiber. Following this, the non-tapered ends of the fibers are polished to a 0.3-micron finish. Then these fibers were coated with indicators sensitive to hydrogen. The tapered hydrogen detection system with its unique flexibility is the only system that can be placed in many locations inside the vehicles and detect the exact location of leaks, saving millions of dollars for launch vehicle industries.

Goswami, Kisholoy↗
NASA NTRS2011

Comparison of In-Situ, Model and Ground Based In-Flight Icing Severity

Currently there are two systems that are being developed for the detection of in-flight icing: NASA Icing Remote Sensing System (NIRSS) and current Icing Product (CIP). In-flight icing (IFI) is a significant hazard for the aviation industry. IFI occurs when supercooled liquid water (SLW) comes in contact with, and freezes to, the leading surfaces of an aircraft. Significantly alters aircraft aerodynamic properties: increases the amount of drag on an aircraft and reduces the lift. The objective of this study is to examine how the testbed NIRSS icing severity product and the operational CIP severity product compare to PIREPs of icing severity, and how the NIRSS and CIP compare to each other.

Serke, David J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

TPSAS-NF1676L-12617-DND

Develop innovative lightning strike mitigation technologies to minimize flight safety risks from electromagnetic environmental hazards. (Lightning & HIRF).

George N Szatkowski↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The International Space Station (ISS) emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Barry Tobias↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The ISS emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of Russian gas masks to positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Emergency↗
NASA NTRS2010

Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project Status as of May 2010

This paper includes the current status of NASA s Autonomous precision Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project. The ALHAT team has completed several flight tests and two major design analysis cycles. These tests and analyses examine terrain relative navigation sensors, hazard detection and avoidance sensors and algorithms, and hazard relative navigation algorithms, and the guidance and navigation system using these ALHAT functions. The next flight test is scheduled for July 2010. The paper contains results from completed flight tests and analysis cycles. ALHAT system status, upcoming tests and analyses is also addressed. The current ALHAT plans as of May 2010 are discussed. Application of the ALHAT system to landing on bodies other than the Moon is included

Striepe, Scott A.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Design and Analysis of Morpheus Lander Flight Control System

The Morpheus Lander is a vertical takeoff and landing test bed vehicle developed to demonstrate the system performance of the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) system capability for the integrated autonomous landing and hazard avoidance system hardware and software. The Morpheus flight control system design must be robust to various mission profiles. This paper presents a design methodology for employing numerical optimization to develop the Morpheus flight control system. The design objectives include attitude tracking accuracy and robust stability with respect to rigid body dynamics and propellant slosh. Under the assumption that the Morpheus time-varying dynamics and control system can be frozen over a short period of time, the flight controllers are designed to stabilize all selected frozen-time control systems in the presence of parametric uncertainty. Both control gains in the inner attitude control loop and guidance gains in the outer position control loop are designed to maximize the vehicle performance while ensuring robustness. The flight control system designs provided herein have been demonstrated to provide stable control systems in both Draper Ares Stability Analysis Tool (ASAT) and the NASA/JSC Trick-based Morpheus time domain simulation.

Jang, Jiann-Woei↗
NASA NTRS1995

Systems and Techniques for Identifying and Avoiding Ice

In-flight icing is one of the most difficult aviation weather hazards facing general aviation. Because most aircraft in the general aviation category are not certified for flight into known icing conditions, techniques for identifying and avoiding in-flight ice are important to maintain safety while increasing the utility and dispatch capability which is part of the AGATE vision. This report summarizes a brief study effort which: (1) Reviewed current ice identification, forecasting, and avoidance techniques; (2) Assessed feasibility of improved forecasting and ice avoidance procedures; and (3) Identified key issues for the development of improved capability with regard to in-flight icing.

Hansman, R. John↗
NASA NTRS2017

Studies of Short Time Response Options for Potentially Hazardous Objects: Current and Forthcoming Results

NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory(LANL), and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) are collaborating on Planetary Defense Research. The research program is organized around three case studies: 1. Deflection of the Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA) 101955 Bennu (1999 RQ36)[OSIRIS-REx mission target], 2. Deflection of the secondary member of the PHA 65803 Didymos (1996 GT) [DART mission target], 3. Deflection of a scaled-down version of the comet 67PChuryumov-Gerasimenko [Rosetta mission target]. NASAGSFC is providing astrodynamics and spacecraft mission design expertise, while NNSA, DOE, LLNL, LANL and SNL are providing expertise in modeling the effects of kinetic impactor spacecraft and nuclear explosive devices on the target objects.

Mission Design↗
NASA NTRS1976

Wake vortex encounter hazards criteria for two aircraft classes

An investigation was conducted using a piloted, motion-base simulator to determine wake vortex hazard criteria for two classes of jet transport aircraft. A light business jet and a large multiengine jet transport were represented respectively. The hazard boundaries were determined in terms of the maximum bank angle due to the vortex encounter. Upsets as small as 7 deg in bank angle were considered to be hazardous at breakout altitude (200 ft (61.0 m)) for Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) and at 50 ft (15.2 m) for Visual Flight Rule (VFR) for both aircraft classes. Proximity to the ground was the primary reason for a hazardous rating. This was reflected in the reduction in the maximum bank angle at the hazard boundary and in more consistent ratings as altitude was decreased.

Sammonds, R. I.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Mitigation of EMU Glove Cut Hazard by MMOD Impact Craters on Exposed ISS Handrails

Recent cut damages to crewmember extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) gloves during extravehicular activity (EVA) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) has been found to result from contact with sharp edges or pinch points rather than general wear or abrasion. One possible source of cut-hazards are protruding sharp edged crater lips from impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles on external metallic handrails along EVA translation paths. During impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity an evacuation flow develops behind the shock wave, resulting in the formation of crater lips that can protrude above the target surface. In this study, two methods were evaluated to limit EMU glove cut-hazards due to MMOD impact craters. In the first phase, four flexible overwrap configurations are evaluated: a felt-reusable surface insulation (FRSI), polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, double-layer polyurethane polyether foam with beta-cloth cover, and multi-layer beta-cloth with intermediate Dacron netting spacers. These overwraps are suitable for retrofitting ground equipment that has yet to be flown, and are not intended to protect the handrail from impact of MMOD particles, rather to act as a spacer between hazardous impact profiles and crewmember gloves. At the impact conditions considered, all four overwrap configurations evaluated were effective in limiting contact between EMU gloves and impact crater profiles. The multi-layer beta-cloth configuration was the most effective in reducing the height of potentially hazardous profiles in handrail-representative targets. In the second phase of the study, four material alternatives to current aluminum and stainless steel alloys were evaluated: a metal matrix composite, carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP), fiberglass, and a fiber metal laminate. Alternative material handrails are intended to prevent the formation of hazardous damage profiles during MMOD impact and are suitable for flight hardware yet to be constructed. Of the four materials evaluated, only the fiberglass formed a less hazardous damage profile than the baseline metallic target. Although the CFRP laminate did not form any noticeable crater lip, brittle protruding fibers are considered a puncture risk. In parallel with EMU glove redesign efforts, modifications to metallic ISS handrails such as those evaluated in this study provide the means to significantly reduce cut-hazards from MMOD impact craters.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Probabilistic Survivability Versus Time Modeling

This presentation documents Kennedy Space Center's Independent Assessment work completed on three assessments for the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program to assist the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer during key programmatic reviews and provided the GSDO Program with analyses of how egress time affects the likelihood of astronaut and ground worker survival during an emergency. For each assessment, a team developed probability distributions for hazard scenarios to address statistical uncertainty, resulting in survivability plots over time. The first assessment developed a mathematical model of probabilistic survivability versus time to reach a safe location using an ideal Emergency Egress System at Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B); the second used the first model to evaluate and compare various egress systems under consideration at LC-39B. The third used a modified LC-39B model to determine if a specific hazard decreased survivability more rapidly than other events during flight hardware processing in Kennedy's Vehicle Assembly Building.

Operational Hazards↗
NASA NTRS2010

Rationales for the Lightning Flight-Commit Criteria

Since natural and artificially-initiated (or "triggered") lightning are demonstrated hazards to the launch of space vehicles, the American space program has responded by establishing a set of Lightning Flight Commit Criteria (LFCC), also known as Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC), and associated Definitions to mitigate the risk. The LLCC apply to all Federal Government ranges and similar LFCC have been adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration for application at state-operated and private spaceports. The LLCC and Definitions have been developed, reviewed, and approved over the years of the American space program, progressing from relatively simple rules in the mid-twentieth century (that were inadequate) to a complex suite for launch operations in the early 21st century. During this evolutionary process, a "Lightning Advisory Panel (LAP)" of top American scientists in the field of atmospheric electricity was established to guide it. Details of this process are provided in a companion document entitled "A History of the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria and the Lightning Advisory Panel for America s Space program" which is available as NASA Special Publication 2010-216283. As new knowledge and additional operational experience have been gained, the LFCC/LLCC have been updated to preserve or increase their safety and to increase launch availability. All launches of both manned and unmanned vehicles at all Federal Government ranges now use the same rules. This simplifies their application and minimizes the cost of the weather infrastructure to support them. Vehicle operators and Range safety personnel have requested that the LAP provide a detailed written rationale for each of the LFCC so that they may better understand and appreciate the scientific and operational justifications for them. This document provides the requested rationales

Willett, John C.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Probabilistic Survivability Versus Time Modeling

This technical paper documents Kennedy Space Centers Independent Assessment team work completed on three assessments for the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program to assist the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) and GSDO management during key programmatic reviews. The assessments provided the GSDO Program with an analysis of how egress time affects the likelihood of astronaut and worker survival during an emergency. For each assessment, the team developed probability distributions for hazard scenarios to address statistical uncertainty, resulting in survivability plots over time. The first assessment developed a mathematical model of probabilistic survivability versus time to reach a safe location using an ideal Emergency Egress System at Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B); the second used the first model to evaluate and compare various egress systems under consideration at LC-39B. The third used a modified LC-39B model to determine if a specific hazard decreased survivability more rapidly than other events during flight hardware processing in Kennedys Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB).Based on the composite survivability versus time graphs from the first two assessments, there was a soft knee in the Figure of Merit graphs at eight minutes (ten minutes after egress ordered). Thus, the graphs illustrated to the decision makers that the final emergency egress design selected should have the capability of transporting the flight crew from the top of LC 39B to a safe location in eight minutes or less. Results for the third assessment were dominated by hazards that were classified as instantaneous in nature (e.g. stacking mishaps) and therefore had no effect on survivability vs time to egress the VAB. VAB emergency scenarios that degraded over time (e.g. fire) produced survivability vs time graphs that were line with aerospace industry norms.

Joyner, James J., Sr.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Weather Information Communication Technologies for Increased Safety and Mobility in the National Airspace System

The purpose of the NASA Glenn Research Center Weather Information Communications (WINCOMM) project was to develop advanced communications and information technologies to enable the high-quality and timely dissemination of strategic weather information between the flight deck and ground users as well as tactical turbulence hazard information between relevant aircraft and to the ground. This report will document and reference accomplishments on the dissemination of weather information during the en route phase of flight from ground-based weather information providers to the flight deck (ground-to-air), from airborne meteorological sensors to ground users (air-to-ground), and weather turbulence and icing hazard information between relevant aircraft (air-to-air). In addition, references in this report will demonstrate the architecture necessary to implement and perform successful transmission and reception of weather information to the cockpit, show that weather information flow does not impact "normal" traffic, demonstrate the feasibility of operational implementation, and lay foundation for future data link development.

Hilderman, Don R.↗