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At least 289 records · Page 16

Detection of DoS Attacks Using ARFIMA Modeling of GOOSE Communication in IEC 61850 Substations

Integration of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in modern smart grids (SGs) offers many advantages including the use of renewables and an effective way to protect, control and monitor the energy transmission and distribution. To reach an optimal operation of future energy systems, availability, integrity and confidentiality of data should be guaranteed. Research on the cyber-physical security of electrical substations based on IEC 61850 is still at an early stage. In the present work, we first model the network traffic data in electrical substations, then, we present a statistical Anomaly Detection (AD) method to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) network communication. According to interpretations on the self-similarity and the Long-Range Dependency (LRD) of the data, an Auto-Regressive Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was shown to describe well the GOOSE communication in the substation process network. Based on this ARFIMA-model and in view of cyber-physical security, an effective model-based AD method is developed and analyzed. Two variants of the statistical AD considering statistical hypothesis testing based on the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) are presented to detect flooding attacks that might affect the availability of the data. Our work presents a novel AD method, with two different variants, tailored to the specific features of the GOOSE traffic in IEC 61850 substations. The statistical AD is capable of detecting anomalies at unknown change times under the realistic assumption of unknown model parameters. The performance of both variants of the AD method is validated and assessed using data collected from a simulation case study. We perform several Monte-Carlo simulations under different noise variances. The detection delay is provided for each detector and it represents the number of discrete time samples after which an anomaly is detected. In fact, our statistical AD method with both variants (CUSUM and GLRT) has around half the false positive rate and a smaller detection delay when compared with two of the closest works found in the literature. Our AD approach based on the GLRT detector has the smallest false positive rate among all considered approaches. Whereas, our AD approach based on the CUSUM test has the lowest false negative rate thus the best detection rate. Depending on the requirements as well as the costs of false alarms or missed anomalies, both variants of our statistical detection method can be used and are further analyzed using composite detection metrics.

IEC 61850 electrical substations↗

Use of Data Libraries for IAEA Nuclear Security Assessment Methodologies (NUSAM) [section 5.4]

Data libraries are essential for the characterization of the facility and provide the documented input which enables the facility assessment results and subsequent conclusions. Data Libraries are historical, verifiable, quantified, and applicable collections of testing data on different types of barriers, sensors, cameras, procedures, and/or personnel. Data libraries are developed and maintained as part of any assessment program or process. Data is collected during the initial stages of facility characterization to aid in the model and/or simulation development process. Data library values may also be developed through the use of state testing centers and/or site resources by testing different types of barriers, sensors, cameras, procedures, and/or personnel. If no data exists, subject matter expert opinion and manufacturer's specifications/ testing values can be the basis for initially assigning values, but are generally less reliable and lack appropriate confidence measures. The use of existing data libraries that have been developed by a state testing organization reduces the assessment costs by establishing standard delay, detection and assessment values for use by multiple sites or facilities where common barriers and alarms systems exist.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Enhancing grid reliability and resilience through novel DER control, total situational awareness and integrated distribution-transmission representation

High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) can lead to overvoltage and thermal violations, miscoordination of protection devices and potential adverse control interactions. The challenges are exacerbated by a lack of operator situational awareness of behind-the-meter DERs, and T&D interactions. Furthermore, the large attack surface of a DER environment creates significant cyber security challenges. The motivation is to address these barriers. The main goal is to enable extreme levels of DERs in distribution systems while simultaneously enhancing their reliability and resiliency. This is achieved by a data-driven approach for operation, planning and control of distribution systems with total situational awareness and real-time DER control enabled by a network of edge intelligent devices, a cloud-based analytical platform, and secure communications.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

On the Limits of EM Based Detection of Control Logic Injection Attacks In Noisy Environments

The difficulty in applying traditional security mechanisms in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments makes a large portion of these mission-critical assets vulnerable to cyber attacks. Therefore, there is a dire need for the development of novel security mechanisms specifically designed to protect such critical systems. Recently a lot of attention has been given to mechanisms that exploit the EM emanations of devices for defense purposes. Such practices may lead to the development of robust external and non-intrusive anomaly detection systems. Nevertheless, the majority of current work in the area neglects to consider the implications of real-life environments, particularly environmental noise. In this work, we explore the limits of EM-based anomaly detection towards identifying injection attacks in control logic software in noisy environments. Our study conducted upon both synthetically generated and real signals identified that indeed environmental noise might significantly degrade the accuracy of the anomaly detection process. Experiments done upon synthetic data indicated that assuming that signals are captured with high sampling rates, even minor code injections can be detected with above-90% accuracy in noisy environments where SNR is up to -2dB. This is true even if naive detection methods are considered. Moreover, experiments done using a real-life testbed attest that even single-instruction injections can be detected with near-perfect accuracy in relatively clean environments. Finally, noise-elimination techniques can drastically improve the reliability of the detection mechanism even in noisy environments.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Phasor Measurement Units Optimal Placement and Performance Limits for Fault Localization

Here, the performance limits of faults localization are investigated using synchrophasor data. The focus is on a non-trivial operating regime where the number of Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) sensors available is insufficient to have full observability of the grid state. Proposed analysis uses the Kullback Leibler (KL) divergence between the distributions corresponding to different fault location hypotheses associated with the observation model. This analysis shows that the most likely locations are concentrated in clusters of buses more tightly connected to the actual fault site akin to graph communities. Consequently, a PMU placement strategy is derived that achieves a near-optimal resolution for localizing faults for a given number of sensors. The problem is also analyzed from the perspective of sampling a graph signal, and how the placement of the PMUs i.e. the spatial sampling pattern and the topological characteristic of the grid affect the ability to successfully localize faults. To highlight the superior performance of presented fault localization and placement algorithms, the proposed strategy is applied to a modified IEEE 34, IEEE-123 bus test cases and to data from a real distribution grid. Additionally, the detection of cyber-physical attacks is also examined where PMU data and relevant Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network traffic information are compared to determine if a network breach has affected the integrity of the system information and/or operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Passive Noise Analysis for Advanced Tamper Indication. End of Year Report 2015

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is part of a multi-lab project assessing front-end electronics for unattended measurement (FEUM) being developed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unattended systems. The FEUM development activity provides an opportunity to address tampering detection between FEUM and the detector, signal integrity from FEUM to the data acquisition systems, and data validity – long-standing challenges for the IAEA. This report summarizes the INL activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to characterize and test passive noise analysis as a potential tamper-indicating approach for implementation into FEUM or as a stand-alone method. The project’s primary objectives in FY-15 were to (1) determine detectable tamper scenarios using four pre-amplifier/detector systems, (2) perform tests of tampering scenarios with three common cable types used by the IAEA, (3) separate radio-frequency-induced events from inherent effect by means of an anechoic chamber, and (4) perform tests at an industrial facility. General conclusions were reached in several areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

Designing resilient IoT and Edge Computing with federated tinyML

The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) has brought significant conveniences to modern society but has also greatly expanded the cyber attack surfaces, particularly as these technologies are being increasingly integrated into critical systems such as power grids, healthcare, and smart homes. Here, to improve IoT/EC’s cybersecurity posture, we leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) by employing tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data for cyber threats while addressing devices’ resource constraints, and utilizing Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. Building on our three-layer architecture combining tinyML and FL to enhance autonomous cyber attack detection, this paper demonstrated that the architecture improves detection accuracy, reduces resource consumption, and enables lightweight, secure IoT device monitoring. These results were validated using the public N-BaIoT dataset as well as real IoT network traffic data collected under multiple attack scenarios from our testbeds. Additionally, we introduced an enhanced FL methodology with a novel preprocessing stage, including federated feature selection and global preprocessor construction, to address IoT/EC data heterogeneity. We developed a physical IoT testbed for attack simulations and data collection, implemented a tinyML-powered detector for realistic model validation, and also built a virtual testbed for scalable evaluations of FL models across diverse network environments.

Cognitive cyber↗

Modeling and Measurements for Mitigating Interface from Skyshine

Skyshine, the radiation scattered in the air above a high-activity gamma-ray source, can produce interference with radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems at distances up to even many hundred meters. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been engaged in a campaign of measurements, design work and modeling that explore methods of mitigating the effects of skyshine on outdoor measurements with sensitive instruments. An overview of our work with shielding of skyshine is being reported by us in another paper at this conference. This paper will concentrate on two topics: measurements and modeling with Monte Carlo transport calculations to characterize skyshine from an iridium-192 source, and testing of a prototype louver system, designed and fabricated at PNNL, as a shielding approach to limit the impact of skyshine interference on RPM systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Diagnosis of Corrosion Process in Nuclear Power Plant Secondary Piping Structures

Corrosion inside secondary pipe structures in Nuclear Power Plants is difficult to detect without intrusion. Statistical and machine learning techniques are used to predict corrosion using pipe vibration data. 3D accelerometers were used to record pipe vibration data in three directions using six sensors. Vibration data were processed using the Hilbert-Huang Transformation, which is known for its adaptable basis function to non-linear and non-stationary signals. Hilbert-Huang Transformation using empirical mode functions generates multiple intrinsic mode functions of different amplitude and frequency levels from raw vibration data. From intrinsic mode functions features are extracted which include phase, energy, entropy, mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. Logistic regression using only phase information correctly distinguished mass additions from baseline data in roughly 83% and 85% of the cases. Phase information varied substantially among different baseline runs and within trials of the same run. Random Forest resulted in >95% testing accuracy for both mass addition and mass removal data. Support Vector Machine had ~98% testing accuracy for mass removal and ~92% testing accuracy for mass additions when using Permutation Importance feature selection. When using Principle Component Analysis with Support Vector Machine, testing accuracy was ~68% testing accuracy for mass additions and ~85% testing accuracy for mass.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER)

This document is created as the deliverable on the project titled Timing Intrusion Management Ensuring Resiliency (TIMER). Its purpose is to define Specification Requirements that guide the development of various timing intrusion (TI) detection modules, as well as describe their implementation, validation, and future commercialization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗

Conflict Detection Using Variable Four-Dimensional Uncertainty Bounds to Control Missed Alerts

Decision-support tools for maintaining pairwise aircraft separation rely on conflict detection to alert the operator when the predicted trajectories of aircraft will result in a loss of separation. But aircraft frequently do not follow their predicted trajectories exactly. This can cause missed alerts and the failure of strategic separation procedures. We present a technique for modeling a bounded region of uncertainty around a four-dimensional predicted trajectory and an algorithm for detecting conflicts between trajectories modeled in this way that avoids missed alerts as long as the aircraft remain within the specified regions of uncertainty. In addition, we present an algorithm for detecting the intrusion of a trajectory modeled in this way into an area hazard modeled as a polygonal region. The size of the region of uncertainty can vary along the trajectory continually and independently in the along-path, cross-track, and vertical dimensions, providing an opportunity to reduce the likelihood of false alerts while protecting against typical prediction errors. The algorithm has been implemented in the Autonomous Operations Planner, a NASA Langley prototype decision support tool for airborne self-separation.

Karr, David A.↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗