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NASA NTRS2005

CoMET: Cost and Mass Evaluation Tool for Spacecraft and Mission Design

New technology in space exploration is often developed without a complete knowledge of its impact. While the immediate benefits of a new technology are obvious, it is harder to understand its indirect consequences, which ripple through the entire system. COMET is a technology evaluation tool designed to illuminate how specific technology choices affect a mission at each system level. COMET uses simplified models for mass, power, and cost to analyze performance parameters of technologies of interest. The sensitivity analysis that CoMET provides shows whether developing a certain technology will greatly benefit the project or not. CoMET is an ongoing project approaching a web-based implementation phase. This year, development focused on the models for planetary daughter craft, such as atmospheric probes, blimps and balloons, and landers. These models are developed through research into historical data, well established rules of thumb, and engineering judgment of experts at JPL. The model is validated by corroboration with JpL advanced mission studies. Other enhancements to COMET include adding launch vehicle analysis and integrating an updated cost model. When completed, COMET will allow technological development to be focused on areas that will most drastically improve spacecraft performance.

Bieber, Ben S.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance: A Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

The following literature review addresses the effects of various stressors on cognition. While attempting to be as inclusive as possible, the review focuses its examination on the relationships between cognitive appraisal, attention, memory, and stress as they relate to information processing and human performance. The review begins with an overview of constructs and theoretical perspectives followed by an examination of effects across attention, memory, perceptual-motor functions, judgment and decision making, putative stressors such as workload, thermals, noise, and fatigue and closes with a discussion of moderating variables and related topics. In summation of the review, a conceptual framework for cognitive process under stress has been assembled. As one might imagine, the research literature that addresses stress, theories governing its effects on human performance, and experimental evidence that supports these notions is large and diverse. In attempting to organize and synthesize this body of work, I was guided by several earlier efforts (Bourne & Yaroush, 2003; Driskell, Mullen, Johnson, Hughes, & Batchelor, 1992; Driskell & Salas, 1996; Haridcock & Desmond, 2001; Stokes & Kite, 1994). These authors should be credited with accomplishing the monumental task of providing focused reviews in this area and their collective efforts laid the foundation for this present review. Similarly, the format of this review has been designed in accordance with these previous exemplars. However, each of these previous efforts either simply reported general findings, without sufficient experimental illustration, or narrowed their scope of investigation to the extent that the breadth of such findings remained hidden from the reader. Moreover, none of these examinations yielded an architecture that adequately describes or explains the inter-relations between information processing elements under stress conditions.

Stress↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Effects of Safety Information on Aeronautical Decision Making

The importance of aeronautical decision making (ADM) has been considered one of the most critical issues of flight education for future professional pilots. Researchers have suggested that a safety information system based on information from incidents and near misses is an important tool to improve the intelligence and readiness of pilots. This paper describes a study that examines the effect of safety information on aeronautical decision making for students in a collegiate flight program. Data was collected from study participants who were exposed to periodic information about local aircraft malfunctions. Participants were then evaluated using a flight simulator profile and a pen and pencil test of situational judgment. Findings suggest that regular access to the described safety information program significantly improves decision making of student pilots.

Lee, Jang R.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Report of the Microspacecraft Panel

These findings and recommendations are based solely on the material presented during the Microtechnologies and Applications to Space Systems Workshop, 5/27 and 28/92, and the personal knowledge and judgment of the panel members. These findings and recommendations represent the consensus views of the committee. This mission utility of microspacecraft for NASA space science missions was not an issue that the panel addressed. For the purposes of this panel, a microspacecraft was defined to be a fully functional spacecraft, intended for use on NASA space science missions, whose mass is on the order of 10 kg. During the panel discussions the microspacecraft mass definition was used somewhat loosely to be not less than 10 kg but certainly not more than 100, dependent upon the mission requirements.

Jones, Ross M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Visualization support for risk-informed decision making when planning and managing software developments

Key decisions are made in the early stages of planning and management of software developments. The information basis for these decisions is often a mix of analogy with past developments, and the best judgments of domain experts. Visualization of this information can support to such decision making by clarifying the status of the information and yielding insights into the ramifications of that information vis-a-vis decision alternatives.

technology infusion↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Tool Measuring Remaining Thickness of Notched Acoustic Cavities in Primary Reaction Control Thruster NDI Standards

Stress corrosion cracking in the relief radius area of a space shuttle primary reaction control thruster is an issue of concern. The current approach for monitoring of potential crack growth is nondestructive inspection (NDI) of remaining thickness (RT) to the acoustic cavities using an eddy current or remote field eddy current probe. EDM manufacturers have difficulty in providing accurate RT calibration standards. Significant error in the RT values of NDI calibration standards could lead to a mistaken judgment of cracking condition of a thruster under inspection. A tool based on eddy current principle has been developed to measure the RT at each acoustic cavity of a calibration standard in order to validate that the standard meets the sample design criteria.

Sun, Yushi↗
NASA NTRS2007

Uncertainty Analysis of Historical Hurricane Data

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) study was conducted for historical hurricane data dating back to 1851 that was obtained from the U. S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The data set was chosen because it is a large, publicly available collection of information, exhibiting great variability which has made the forecasting of future states, from current and previous states, difficult. The availability of substantial, high-fidelity validation data, however, made for an excellent uncertainty assessment study. Several factors (independent variables) were identified from the data set, which could potentially influence the track and intensity of the storms. The values of these factors, along with the values of responses of interest (dependent variables) were extracted from the data base, and provided to a commercial software package for processing via the ANOVA technique. The primary goal of the study was to document the ANOVA modeling uncertainty and predictive errors in making predictions about hurricane location and intensity 24 to 120 hours beyond known conditions, as reported by the data set. A secondary goal was to expose the ANOVA technique to a broader community within NASA. The independent factors considered to have an influence on the hurricane track included the current and starting longitudes and latitudes (measured in degrees), and current and starting maximum sustained wind speeds (measured in knots), and the storm starting date, its current duration from its first appearance, and the current year fraction of each reading, all measured in years. The year fraction and starting date were included in order to attempt to account for long duration cyclic behaviors, such as seasonal weather patterns, and years in which the sea or atmosphere were unusually warm or cold. The effect of short duration weather patterns and ocean conditions could not be examined with the current data set. The responses analyzed were the storm latitude, longitude and intensity, as recorded in the data set, 24 or 120 hours beyond the current state. Several ANOVA modeling schemes were examined. Two forms of validation were used: 1) comparison with official hurricane prediction performance metrics and 2) cases studies conducted on hurricanes from the 2005 season, which were not included within the model construction and ANOVA assessment. In general, the ANOVA technique did not perform as well as the established official prediction performance metrics published by NOAA; still, the technique did remarkably well in this demonstration with a difficult data set and could probably be made to perform better with more knowledge of hurricane development and dynamics applied to the problem. The technique provides a repeatable prediction process that eliminates the need for judgment in the forecast.

Green, Lawrence L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Acoustics

The acoustics environment in space operations is important to maintain at manageable levels so that the crewperson can remain safe, functional, effective, and reasonably comfortable. High acoustic levels can produce temporary or permanent hearing loss, or cause other physiological symptoms such as auditory pain, headaches, discomfort, strain in the vocal cords, or fatigue. Noise is defined as undesirable sound. Excessive noise may result in psychological effects such as irritability, inability to concentrate, decrease in productivity, annoyance, errors in judgment, and distraction. A noisy environment can also result in the inability to sleep, or sleep well. Elevated noise levels can affect the ability to communicate, understand what is being said, hear what is going on in the environment, degrade crew performance and operations, and create habitability concerns. Superfluous noise emissions can also create the inability to hear alarms or other important auditory cues such as an equipment malfunctioning. Recent space flight experience, evaluations of the requirements in crew habitable areas, and lessons learned (Goodman 2003; Allen and Goodman 2003; Pilkinton 2003; Grosveld et al. 2003) show the importance of maintaining an acceptable acoustics environment. This is best accomplished by having a high-quality set of limits/requirements early in the program, the "designing in" of acoustics in the development of hardware and systems, and by monitoring, testing and verifying the levels to ensure that they are acceptable.

Goodman, Jerry R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Scheduling Software for Complex Scenarios

Preparing a vehicle and its payload for a single launch is a complex process that involves thousands of operations. Because the equipment and facilities required to carry out these operations are extremely expensive and limited in number, optimal assignment and efficient use are critically important. Overlapping missions that compete for the same resources, ground rules, safety requirements, and the unique needs of processing vehicles and payloads destined for space impose numerous constraints that, when combined, require advanced scheduling. Traditional scheduling systems use simple algorithms and criteria when selecting activities and assigning resources and times to each activity. Schedules generated by these simple decision rules are, however, frequently far from optimal. To resolve mission-critical scheduling issues and predict possible problem areas, NASA historically relied upon expert human schedulers who used their judgment and experience to determine where things should happen, whether they will happen on time, and whether the requested resources are truly necessary.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2008

Measurement Techniques for Hypervelocity Impact Test Fragments

The ability to classify the size and shape of individual orbital debris fragments provides a better understanding of the orbital debris environment as a whole. The characterization of breakup fragmentation debris has gradually evolved from a simplistic, spherical assumption towards that of describing debris in terms of size, material, and shape parameters. One of the goals of the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office is to develop high-accuracy techniques to measure these parameters and apply them to orbital debris observations. Measurement of the physical characteristics of debris resulting from groundbased, hypervelocity impact testing provides insight into the shapes and sizes of debris produced from potential impacts in orbit. Current techniques for measuring these ground-test fragments require determination of dimensions based upon visual judgment. This leads to reduced accuracy and provides little or no repeatability for the measurements. With the common goal of mitigating these error sources, allaying any misunderstandings, and moving forward in fragment shape determination, the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office recently began using a computerized measurement system. The goal of using these new techniques is to improve knowledge of the relation between commonly used dimensions and overall shape. The immediate objective is to scan a single fragment, measure its size and shape properties, and import the fragment into a program that renders a 3D model that adequately demonstrates how the object could appear in orbit. This information would then be used to aid optical methods in orbital debris shape determination. This paper provides a description of the measurement techniques used in this initiative and shows results of this work. The tradeoffs of the computerized methods are discussed, as well as the means of repeatability in the measurements of these fragments. This paper serves as a general description of methods for the measurement and shape analysis of orbital debris.

Hill, Nicole E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Learning from Space Entrepreneurs

The early days of rocketry and space exploration in the United States were marked by incredibly rapid progress: a seemingly endless parade of firsts. Not coincidentally, this period also saw more than its fair share of failure, especially in the infamous "kaputnik" days prior to the successful launch of Explorer. Without a standard canon of known quantities to turn to, the early pioneers of rocketry and space flight were forced to dream up new ideas that ranged from the elegant to the bizarre and to accept the fact that the price of radical progress is occasional failure. Nowadays, rapid prototyping and testing have slowed, as we rely more and more on the extensive knowledge pined by our predecessors and on the embarrassment of riches modern engineers get from computational modeling and computer assisted design. In many cases, this leads to much improved or phenomenally more efficient designs. It also, however, fosters a culture so terrified of failure that we over-engineer and overanalyze everything, often tweaking designs for decades before a new system takes flight. (This is not a problem unique to rockets; the same phenomenon seems to have occurred in high-performance jets.) This is one reason why it was possible for President Kennedy to dream of the completion of the Mercury and Gemini missions and a successful landing on the moon in under a decade, while returning to the moon may take nearly twice as long. Lacking access to the tremendous computational resources of the national space program-and, just as importantly, removed from the harsh judgment of public shareholders or congressional appropriations committees-the hungry entrepreneurs who compete for our prizes tend not to display such fear of failure. Instead, most of them follow a rapid "build, test, fly" program. They are willing to throw a handful of concepts against the wall and see what sticks. They often go from drawing on the back of a napkin to firing engines or even flying vehicles in a matter of weeks or months, learning valuable lessons along the way. Indeed, our teams have repeatedly learned many of the most valuable lessons after only a few moments of working with real hardware-lessons that could never have been learned from a CAD drawing, like finding the failure modes of different welding practices or tracking down the interference between an onboard camera and a GPS unit. As Paul Breed, the leader of a Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge team (playfully called Unreasonable Rocket), is fond of saying, "In computer simulations the plumbing never leaks. In real life, it always does."

Pomerantz, William↗
NASA NTRS2008

Dawn: Cooperation, not Control

On September 27, 2007, a Delta II rocket carrying the Dawn spacecraft lifted off from Kennedy Space Center. Part of NASAs Discovery program, the $370 million Dawn mission began its three-billion-mile voyage to the asteroid belt to study the asteroid Vesta and Ceres, a dwarf planet. The spacecraft is scheduled to reach Vesta in 2011. After spending nine months measuring the composition, shape, and topography of that body, it will travel a billion miles to carry out a similar analysis of Ceres in 2015. The Important Lessons: The demands of Dawn and other challenging missions have taught some important lessons for successful program and project management. These are the main ones: a) Program management, particularly of uncoupled and loosely coupled projects, should be more about enabling than controlling. You're working with motivated, high-performing teams and institutions with a track record of quality and success. Emphasize commander's intent over rudder control; let them know where you want to go and when you want to be there, then let them figure out how to get there. b) Open and honest discussion of issues is essential. People fill the void of the unknown with their worst fears. Get folks around the table and have open, honest, and frank dialogue. I've seldom seen this fail to get to the root of issues. c) You have to earn your seat at the table, proving that you are competent, trustworthy, and dedicated to the success of the mission. d) Know when to fold 'em. Your pride can get rolled up in making a milestone or launch date, but you have to make a judgment based on the realities of the situation and not wear down the team trying to meet an increasingly impossible deadline. e) The NASA governance model that gives a voice to the concerns of engineers and safety experts works-trust it and use it.

May, Todd↗
NASA NTRS2004

Developing Analogy Cost Estimates for Space Missions

The analogy approach in cost estimation combines actual cost data from similar existing systems, activities, or items with adjustments for a new project's technical, physical or programmatic differences to derive a cost estimate for the new system. This method is normally used early in a project cycle when there is insufficient design/cost data to use as a basis for (or insufficient time to perform) a detailed engineering cost estimate. The major limitation of this method is that it relies on the judgment and experience of the analyst/estimator. The analyst must ensure that the best analogy or analogies have been selected, and that appropriate adjustments have been made. While analogy costing is common, there is a dearth of advice in the literature on the 'adjustment methodology', especially for hardware projects. This paper discusses some potential approaches that can improve rigor and repeatability in the analogy costing process.

space mission cost↗
NASA NTRS2009

The Coming Paradigm-Shift in Maintenance: From Metals to Composites

The purpose of this study is to examine the current maintenance practices of airline operators in the detection and repair of damage to composite structures, with the aim of learning lessons that will be applicable to the maintenance of future advanced composite airplanes. A process map was created to capture the events and activities that occur from the moment a damage event occurs, through damage detection, assessment and repair. The study is identifying areas where operational risks may negatively impact the process, where personnel are required to make judgments in the absence of procedural guidance, and areas where future tools or techniques may be of assistance.

Hobbs, Alan↗
NASA NTRS2008

Automated Generation and Assessment of Autonomous Systems Test Cases

This slide presentation reviews some of the issues concerning verification and validation testing of autonomous spacecraft routinely culminates in the exploration of anomalous or faulted mission-like scenarios using the work involved during the Dawn mission's tests as examples. Prioritizing which scenarios to develop usually comes down to focusing on the most vulnerable areas and ensuring the best return on investment of test time. Rules-of-thumb strategies often come into play, such as injecting applicable anomalies prior to, during, and after system state changes; or, creating cases that ensure good safety-net algorithm coverage. Although experience and judgment in test selection can lead to high levels of confidence about the majority of a system's autonomy, it's likely that important test cases are overlooked. One method to fill in potential test coverage gaps is to automatically generate and execute test cases using algorithms that ensure desirable properties about the coverage. For example, generate cases for all possible fault monitors, and across all state change boundaries. Of course, the scope of coverage is determined by the test environment capabilities, where a faster-than-real-time, high-fidelity, software-only simulation would allow the broadest coverage. Even real-time systems that can be replicated and run in parallel, and that have reliable set-up and operations features provide an excellent resource for automated testing. Making detailed predictions for the outcome of such tests can be difficult, and when algorithmic means are employed to produce hundreds or even thousands of cases, generating predicts individually is impractical, and generating predicts with tools requires executable models of the design and environment that themselves require a complete test program. Therefore, evaluating the results of large number of mission scenario tests poses special challenges. A good approach to address this problem is to automatically score the results based on a range of metrics. Although the specific means of scoring depends highly on the application, the use of formal scoring - metrics has high value in identifying and prioritizing anomalies, and in presenting an overall picture of the state of the test program. In this paper we present a case study based on automatic generation and assessment of faulted test runs for the Dawn mission, and discuss its role in optimizing the allocation of resources for completing the test program.

Testing challenges↗
NASA NTRS2010

Constellation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Design Consideration for the Crew Exploration Vehicle

Managed by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, a pilot probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of the NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) was performed in early 2006. The PRA methods used follow the general guidance provided in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners'. Phased-mission based event trees and fault trees are used to model a lunar sortie mission of the CEV - involving the following phases: launch of a cargo vessel and a crew vessel; rendezvous of these two vessels in low Earth orbit; transit to th$: moon; lunar surface activities; ascension &om the lunar surface; and return to Earth. The analysis is based upon assumptions, preliminary system diagrams, and failure data that may involve large uncertainties or may lack formal validation. Furthermore, some of the data used were based upon expert judgment or extrapolated from similar components~systemsT. his paper includes a discussion of the system-level models and provides an overview of the analysis results used to identify insights into CEV risk drivers, and trade and sensitivity studies. Lastly, the PRA model was used to determine changes in risk as the system configurations or key parameters are modified.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Standing Review Panel (SRP) evaluated 22 gaps and 39 tasks in the three risk areas assigned to the SHFE Project. The area where tasks were best designed to close the gaps and the fewest gaps were left out was the Risk of Reduced Safety and Efficiency dire to Inadequate Design of Vehicle, Environment, Tools or Equipment. The areas where there were more issues with gaps and tasks, including poor or inadequate fit of tasks to gaps and missing gaps, were Risk of Errors due to Poor Task Design and Risk of Error due to Inadequate Information. One risk, the Risk of Errors due to Inappropriate Levels of Trust in Automation, should be added. If astronauts trust automation too much in areas where it should not be trusted, but rather tempered with human judgment and decision making, they will incur errors. Conversely, if they do not trust automation when it should be trusted, as in cases where it can sense aspects of the environment such as radiation levels or distances in space, they will also incur errors. This will be a larger risk when astronauts are less able to rely on human mission control experts and are out of touch, far away, and on their own. The SRP also identified 11 new gaps and five new tasks. Although the SRP had an extremely large quantity of reading material prior to and during the meeting, we still did not feel we had an overview of the activities and tasks the astronauts would be performing in exploration missions. Without a detailed task analysis and taxonomy of activities the humans would be engaged in, we felt it was impossible to know whether the gaps and tasks were really sufficient to insure human safety, performance, and comfort in the exploration missions. The SRP had difficulty evaluating many of the gaps and tasks that were not as quantitative as those related to concrete physical danger such as excessive noise and vibration. Often the research tasks for cognitive risks that accompany poor task or information design addressed only part, but not all, of the gaps they were programmed to fill. In fact the tasks outlined will not close the gap but only scratch the surface in many cases. In other cases, the gap was written too broadly, and really should be restated in a more constrained way that can be addressed by a well-organized and complementary set of tasks. In many cases, the research results should be turned into guidelines for design. However, it was not clear whether the researchers or another group would construct and deliver these guidelines.

Wichansky, Anna↗
NASA NTRS2010

Probabilistic Multi-Factor Interaction Model for Complex Material Behavior

Complex material behavior is represented by a single equation of product form to account for interaction among the various factors. The factors are selected by the physics of the problem and the environment that the model is to represent. For example, different factors will be required for each to represent temperature, moisture, erosion, corrosion, etc. It is important that the equation represent the physics of the behavior in its entirety accurately. The Multi-Factor Interaction Model (MFIM) is used to evaluate the divot weight (foam weight ejected) from the external launch tanks. The multi-factor has sufficient degrees of freedom to evaluate a large number of factors that may contribute to the divot ejection. It also accommodates all interactions by its product form. Each factor has an exponent that satisfies only two points - the initial and final points. The exponent describes a monotonic path from the initial condition to the final. The exponent values are selected so that the described path makes sense in the absence of experimental data. In the present investigation, the data used were obtained by testing simulated specimens in launching conditions. Results show that the MFIM is an effective method of describing the divot weight ejected under the conditions investigated. The problem lies in how to represent the divot weight with a single equation. A unique solution to this problem is a multi-factor equation of product form. Each factor is of the following form (1 xi/xf)ei, where xi is the initial value, usually at ambient conditions, xf the final value, and ei the exponent that makes the curve represented unimodal that meets the initial and final values. The exponents are either evaluated by test data or by technical judgment. A minor disadvantage may be the selection of exponents in the absence of any empirical data. This form has been used successfully in describing the foam ejected in simulated space environmental conditions. Seven factors were required to represent the ejected foam. The exponents were evaluated by least squares method from experimental data. The equation is used and it can represent multiple factors in other problems as well; for example, evaluation of fatigue life, creep life, fracture toughness, and structural fracture, as well as optimization functions. The software is rather simplistic. Required inputs are initial value, final value, and an exponent for each factor. The number of factors is open-ended. The value is updated as each factor is evaluated. If a factor goes to zero, the previous value is used in the evaluation.

Abumeri, Galib H.↗