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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16

Comparative Analysis of Explosion Signals on Smartphones and Seismometers [Poster]

Seismoacoustic signatures from a chemical explosion was recorded on two seismometers and eight smartphone accelerometers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The captured waveform’s propagation and its time frequency representations are compared. The smartphone accelerometers were able to pick up a clear seismoacoustic explosion signal at within 1 km (150 m/kg 1/3 ) and a noisy signal up to 5.3 km (790 m/kg 1/3 ).

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

TRIPWIRE - Radiation and Electromagnetic Laboratory Work Report

This report summarizes the research outcomes for the work performed in fiscal year 2020. The report is divided into two main sections addressing the radiation and electromagnetic sensing components. Both sections present an introduction with theory to lay the foundation of how the systems work. The report is the key deliverable for Task 1: Radiation and Electromagnetic Detector Development - Laboratory Work. This task involves all work related to initial laboratory research associated with the radiation and electromagnetic detector development to reach TRL-3.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

TRIPWIRE – Deployment and Field-Testing Report

TRIPWIRE is a multi-modal system for containment verification in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The sensing modes are focused on radiation, electromagnetic and vibration. The radiation detection component has been developed over the last three years at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This development has focused on the fabrication, characterization, and testing of long-length (greater than 10-m) plastic scintillating fibers. This fiscal year, the focus of TRIPWIRE has been on field testing and demonstration of the radiation sensing component in a relevant environment. After reviewing the static storage facilities at INL, the Radioactive Scrap Waste Facility (RSWF) south storage area outside the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) was selected due to its periodic changes in configuration and inventory. This report summarizes the research outcomes for the work performed in fiscal year (FY) 2023.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Explosion Detection using Transfer Learning via YAMNet [Poster]

The acoustic data of explosions and noise collected on smartphones were fed to the YAMNet model to obtain the scores of each class. The data was split 60/20/20 for training, validation, and testing. A single-layered neural network was trained using the computed scores to predict if the data was an explosion or noise. The trained model was then combined with the YAMNet model. The combined model was tested with the ESC-50 dataset to investigate overall accuracy and class based false positive rates.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗