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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Z Facility Sustainment Status (November FY 2024) [Slides]

FY24 sustainment project list has been revised resulting in sixteen projects. Total budget for the finalized project list is $9,570,968 (includes FY23 Carryover and FY24). Key factors for project selection included: risk mitigation to address operations highest failure risk subsystems, purchase of long lead parts to address life limited parts, and completion of multi phase sustainment projects initiated in prior year. Given the backlog of projects and limited FY24 funding, there are identified projects that are not included in the final project list that could reduce future Z facility failure risk. Should additional budget become available, these identified projects can be kicked off.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Autonomous Inversion of In Situ Deformation Measurement Data for Injection-Induced Stress Change

Geologic carbon storage (GCS) is likely to play a key part of the global effort to dramatically reduce CO2 emissions and perhaps even reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations through carbon negative operations. A critical part of effort to commercialize and widely deploy this technology is developing the capability to rapidly assimilate real-time monitoring data into a form that will enable site operators to make decisions to manage the safe and efficient operations. Two of the risks associate with GCS are the risk of inducing fractures in the sealing formations that can create leakage pathways and the risk of inducing earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to cause public concern, property damage, or safety risks. To properly manage these risks the site operator needs to know the initial state of stress, the change in stress induced by injection, and the relationship between operational parameters such as injection rate and pressure and the change in stress. Current methods of estimating the change in stress require choosing the type of constitutive model and the model parameters based on core, log, and geophysical data during the characterization phase, with little feedback from operational observations to validate or refine these choices. These characterization methods interrogate the geologic formations using length scales, loading rates or magnitudes that are quite different from those encountered by the actual storage system. It is shown that errors in the assumed constitutive response, even when informed by laboratory tests on core samples, are likely to be common, large, and underestimate the magnitude of stress change caused by injection. Recent advances in borehole-based strain instruments and borehole and surface-based tilt and displacement instruments have now enabled monitoring of the deformation of the storage system throughout its operational lifespan. This data can enable validation and refinement of the knowledge of the geomechanical properties and state of the system, but brings with it a challenge to transform the raw data into actionable knowledge. We demonstrate a method that uses automatic differentiation and a finite-element based geomechanical model perform a gradient-based deterministic inversion of geomechanical monitoring data. This approach allows autonomous integration of the instrument data without the need for time consuming manual interpretation and selection of updated model parameters. Furthermore, only isotropic linear elasticity is considered in this paper, the approach presented is very flexible as to what type of geomechanical constitutive response can be used. The approach is easily adaptable to nonlinear physics-based constitutive models to account for common rock behaviors such as creep and plasticity. The approach also enables training of machine learning-based constitutive models by allowing back propagation of errors through the finite element calculations. This enables strongly enforcing known physics, such as conservation of momentum and continuity, while allowing data-driven models to learn the truly unknown physics such as the constitutive or petrophysical responses.

Burghardt, Jeffrey A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Modelling the Risks Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pose to People on the Ground

Worldwide there is much e ort being directed towards the development of a framework of air- worthiness regulations for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). It is now broadly accepted that regulations should have a strong foundation in, and traceability to, the management of the safety risks. Existing risk models for RPAS operations do not provide a simple means for incorporating the wide range of technical and operational controls into the risk analysis and evaluation processes. This paper describes a new approach for modelling and evaluating the risks associated with RPAS operations near populous areas based on the barrier bow tie (BBT) model. A BBT model is used to structure the underlying risk management problem. The model focuses risk analysis, evaluation, and decision making activities on the devices, people, and processes that can be employed to reduce risk. The BBT model and a comprehensive set of example risk controls are presented. The general model can be applied to any RPAS operation. The foundations for quantitative and qualitative assessments using a BBT model are also presented. The modelling and evaluation framework is illustrated through its application to a case-study rotary wing RPAS for two operational scenarios. The model can be used as a basis for determining airworthiness certification requirements for RPAS.

Barrier bow tie model↗
DOE OSTI2017

Procedure design of F and B operation and its impact on the risk of a nuclear power plant - 168

A feed and bleed (F and B) operation is an operator's emergency task to remove core heat from a reactor coolant system by bleeding coolant from the pressurizer, and feeding makeup water through safety injection systems under the loss of all feedwater condition. Even though the F and B operation is an important task having a significant impact on the risk of a nuclear power plant, there is a high uncertainty regarding its modeling and analysis in a PSA. This paper introduces a study on the design of an operational strategy for an F and B operation and its impact on the risk of a nuclear power plant in Korea. An intensive support analysis was conducted to understand the plant behavior and revise the success criteria for the HRA of the F and B operation. A human performance analysis on the emergency tasks was also conducted using a training simulator to generate the operator's performance time for the F and B operation. We revised the PSA model and updated the risk of the reference plant, which shows that the risk of the revised model is much higher than that of the existing model. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDRs approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

radio equipment↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDR's approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

space communication↗
NASA NTRS2017

Medical Systems Engineering to Support Mars Mission Crew Autonomy

Human spaceflight missions to Mars face exceptionally challenging resource limitations that far exceed those faced before. Increasing transit times, decreasing opportunity for resupply, communications challenges, and extended time to evacuate a crew to definitive medical care dictate a level of crew autonomy in medical care that is beyond the current medical model. To approach this challenge, a medical systems engineering approach is proposed that relies on a clearly articulated Concept of Operations and risk analysis tools that are in development at NASA. This paper proposes an operational clinical model with key terminology and concepts translated to a controls theory paradigm to frame a common language between clinical and engineering teams. This common language will be used for design and validation of an exploration medical system that is fully integrated into a Mars transit vehicle. This approach merges medical simulation, human factors evaluation techniques, and human-in-the-loop testing in ground based analogs to tie medical hardware and software subsystem performance and overall medical system functionality to metrics of operational medical autonomy. Merging increases in operational clinical autonomy with a more restricted vehicle system resource scenario in interplanetary spaceflight will require an unprecedented level of medical and engineering integration. Full integration of medical capabilities into a Mars vehicle system may require a new approach to integrating medical system design and operations into the vehicle Program structure. Prior to the standing-up of a Mars Mission Program, proof of concept is proposed through the Human Research Program.

Antonsen, Erik↗
NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Hydrogen-Powered Locomotive Refueling

Hydrogen powered locomotives are being explored to reduce emissions in rail applications. The risks of operations like refueling should be understood to ensure safe environments for workers and members of the public. Sensitivity analyses were conducted using HyRAM+ to identify major drivers of risk and compare effects of system parameters on individual risk. The consequences of jet fires from full-bore leaks dominated the risk, compared to explosions or smaller leaks. Pipe size, leak detection capability, and leak frequencies of system components greatly affected risk while overpressure modeling parameters and ambient conditions had little effect. The effects of personal protective equipment (PPE) materials on individual risk were quantified by reducing the individual’s exposure time or absorbed thermal dose. PPE only showed a risk reduction in low-risk cases. This study highlighted target areas for risk mitigation, including leak detection equipment and component maintenance, and indicated that the minimal effects of other parameters on risk may not justify prescriptive requirements for refueling operators.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2018

A novel risk classification system for 30-day mortality in children undergoing surgery

A simple, objective and accurate way of grouping children undergoing surgery into clinically relevant risk groups is needed. The purpose of this study, is to develop and validate a preoperative risk classification system for postsurgical 30-day mortality for children undergoing a wide variety of operations. The National Surgical Quality Improvement Project-Pediatric participant use file data for calendar years 2012–2014 was analyzed to determine preoperative variables most associated with death within 30 days of operation (D30). Risk groups were created using classification tree analysis based on these preoperative variables. The resulting risk groups were validated using 2015 data, and applied to neonates and higher risk CPT codes to determine validity in high-risk subpopulations. A five-level risk classification was found to be most accurate. The preoperative need for ventilation, oxygen support, inotropic support, sepsis, the need for emergent surgery and a do not resuscitate order defined non-overlapping groups with observed rates of D30 that vary from 0.075% (Very Low Risk) to 38.6% (Very High Risk). When CPT codes where death was never observed are eliminated or when the system is applied to neonates, the groupings remained predictive of death in an ordinal manner.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan - Final.

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Component and Basic Science Detailed Test Plan-Revision 2

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Terry Turbopump Analytical Modeling Efforts in Fiscal Year 2016 - Progress Report

This document details the Fiscal Year 2016 modeling efforts to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 3 (full-scale component experiments) and Milestone 4 (Terry turbopump basic science experiments) experiments. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Terry Turbopump Expanded Operating Band Full-Scale Integral Long-Term Low-Pressure Experiments — Preliminary Test Plan

This document details the milestone approach to define the true operating limitations (margins) of the Terry turbopump systems used in the nuclear industry for Milestone 5 (full-scale integral long-term low-pressure operations) efforts. The overall multinational-sponsored program creates the technical basis to: (1) reduce and defer additional utility costs, (2) simplify plant operations, and (3) provide a better understanding of the true margin which could reduce overall risk of operations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

SOSAT: Geohazard Risk Assessment in Carbon Sequestration Operations

Like all operations in which fluids are injected into the subsurface, geologic carbon storage (GCS) presents inherit risks that must be assessed and mitigated to successfully deploy such technology in the field. For example, alterations to pore pressure and the stress state due to fluid injection may trigger certain geohazards, such as potential fault activation and induced seismicity or unintentional hydraulic fracturing. Here we present capabilities for assessing these potential risks using the State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT): a Python library and web-based application capable of probabilistically estimating the subsurface state of stress informed by various field observations. Using posterior distributions of principal stress components, SOSAT can assess the risk of fault activation within the injection formation for either a critically oriented fault or a fault with a user-prescribed orientation. Additionally, SOSAT can estimate the probability of unintentional hydraulic fracturing of the intact reservoir rock. Here, we demonstrate these SOSAT capabilities using a hypothetical GCS site. This type of risk assessment can assist with the effective deployment of GCS technology in the field by informing safe design and management practices.

Haagenson, Ryan J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Innovative Assembly and Integration Operations of the Launch Abort Systemat KSC

This paper describes the Artemis program assembly and integration approach that enables affordable and low risk processing operations for the Launch Abort System at KSC. NASA is currently developing the Artemis 1 spacecraft to meet the test objectives of an uncrewed orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2021. The Artemis Orion spacecraft consists of a Crew Module (CM), a Service Module (SM), and a Launch Abort System (LAS) to safely transport a crew of 4 to the moon and return to earth. The LAS enables the CM to have an abort capability for the crew during the launch phase of the mission from the launch pad throughout the ascent phase. The LAS includes motor elements for abort, attitude control, and stage separation is assembled at the Launch Abort System Facility (LASF) adjacent to the CM/SM (CSM) assembly operations in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout Building (O&C) at KSC. The LAS integration to the CSM is completed in the LASF and the completed Artemis spacecraft is integrated to the Space Launch System (SLS) in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at KSC. A significant LAS development flight test milestone was recently completed in 2019 for the Ascent Abort (AA-2) flight test at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station where a high-altitude abort test was successfully achieved using a Peacekeeper booster stage exercising all of the LAS systems including propulsion, avionics, and pyrotechnics demonstrating he LAS readiness for crewed flight. The first operational flight of the LAS will be for the Artemis 2 mission which is the first crewed mission for the Orion program planned in 2023.

William J Koenig↗