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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
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NASA NTRS1947

Low-Speed Wind-Tunnel Tests of a Pilotless Aircraft Having Horizontal and Vertical Wings and Cruciform Tail

Low-speed tests of a pilotless aircraft were conducted in the Langley propeller-research tunnel to provide information for the estimation of the longitudinal stability and. control, to measure the aileron effectiveness, and to calibrate the radome and the Machmeter pitot-static orifices. It was found that the model possessed a stEb.le variation of elevator angle required for trim throughout the speed range at the design angle of attack. A comparison of the airplane with and without JATO units and with an alternate rocket booster showed that a large loss in longitudinal stability and control resulting from the addition of the rocket booster to the aircraft was sufficient to make the rocket-booster assembly unsatisfactory as an alternate for the JATO units. Reversal of the aileron effectiveness was evident at positive deflections of the vertical wing flap indicating that the roll-stabilization system would produce roiling moments in a tight right turn contrary to its design purpose. Vertical-wing-flap deflections caused large errors in the static-pressure reading obtained by the original static-tube installation. A practical installation point on the fuselage was located which should yield reliable measurement of the free-stream static pressure.

Mastrocola, N↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Space Launch System Begins Integration, Stacking in Preparation for Artemis I Launch

The Artemis era of human lunar exploration is nearing take-off as NASA’s new super heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Space Launch System (SLS), begins stack-ing and integration operations in mid-2020 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. With a planned upgrade path to progressively more powerful vehicles and availability in crew and cargo configurations, SLS provides a unique and flexible launch solution to send crew, large-scale infrastructure and robotic probes to deep space. The SLS Block 1 vehicle, the initial variant to fly, is optimized for lunar missions with a proven propulsion system consisting of four liquid hydrogen (LH2)/liquid oxygen (LOX)-fed RS-25 engines and twin five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs). The Block 1 vehicle can also be outfitted with an industry-standard 5 m-class payload fairing (the “cargo” configuration) and will launch at least 27 metric tons (t) of mass to trans-lunar injection (TLI). SLS is the backbone of NASA’s Artemis program, which will return the agency’s human spaceflight program to the Moon for the first time since 1972. For the Artemis I mission, SLS will send an uncrewed Orion spacecraft to TLI, where it will enter a distant retrograde lunar orbit and fly 38,000 nmi past the Moon – farther than any spacecraft built for humans has ever traveled. The SLS Block 1 vehicle for Artemis I completed manufacturing in 2019. Several elements, including the upper stage, have been delivered to the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) program at KSC and are being prepped for integration and stack-ing. The five-segment solid rocket boosters – the largest and most powerful ever built for flight – are also complete. The booster motor segments for the Artemis I flight are scheduled to ship from prime contractor Northrop Grumman’s Utah facilities and begin stacking and integration at KSC in June 2020. The SLS core stage is the largest rocket stage NASA has ever built in terms of volume and height, and includes the avionics and the tanks that feed cryogenic propellant to the four RS-25s (formerly Space Shuttle Main Engines [SSMEs]). They have been modified with an updated controller and nozzle insulation to protect them from the hotter launch environment. The SLS core stage is currently being test-ed at NASA’s Stennis Space Center (SSC) in a series of “green run” tests to verify it meets design and performance requirements. Following the green run test series, which is scheduled to culminate with a full-duration hot-fire of the four RS-25 engines, the core stage will ship to KSC and be stacked between the sol-id rocket boosters in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Integration of the vehicle will continue with the upper stage, known as the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) and the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA) on the core stage. Another adapter, the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA), connects SLS to Orion and provides housing for 13 6U CubeSat payloads manifested on Artemis I. The CubeSats will be released in deep space after Orion separates from the vehicle, and the flight marks the first ride share opportunity for independent small-sats to deep space. The second major SLS variant to come online, Block 1B, replaces the single-engine ICPS with a four-engine LH2/LOX Exploration Upper Stage (EUS). This more powerful upper stage, along with other vehicle up-grades, will enable the Block 1B vehicle to launch 38-42 t to TLI, depending on crew or cargo configuration. The final evolution of the vehicle, Block 2, will onramp evolved solid rocket boosters to increase mass to TLI to 43-46 t, de-pending on crew or cargo configuration. The Block 1B/Block 2 vehicles can be outfitted with an 8.4 m-diameter payload fairing in 19.1 m or 27.4 m lengths, to provide unprecedented volume for payloads. With the initial Block 1 vehicle completely manufactured and the core stage in final testing before shipping to KSC, the SLS Program and its industry partners have made significant progress manufacturing subsequent vehicles. For the second Block 1 vehicle, the solid rocket motor segments are complete, as are the RS-25 engines with controllers. All five major components of the Artemis II core stage – the forward skirt, LOX and LH2 tanks, intertank and engine section – are manufactured and technicians are installing subsystems at NASA’s rocket factory, Michoud Assembly Facility. The RL-10 engine for the Artemis II ICPS is complete and panels have been machined for its LH2 tank. In addition, panels are machined for the vehicle’s two adapters, with welding scheduled to begin in summer 2020. Flight hard-ware is also in production for the third SLS vehicle, with several booster motor segments cast. The pace of development on the EUS has increased, with the goal to complete Critical Design Review (CDR) in December 2020. Several EUS test rings have been machined at Michoud. The EUS is designed to exe-cute a variety of missions – human spaceflight, deployment of deep-space infra-structure, or high-C3 missions to the outer solar system – with crew and cargo configurations available beginning in the mid-2020s. The near-term goal for the nation’s powerful new space exploration asset, however, is to launch the Arte-mis program, and send the first woman and the next man to the lunar surface. At the Astrodynamics Specialist Conference, the SLS program will update the community on the progress of the initial Block 1 vehicle in final green run test-ing, integration and stacking. In addition, this paper will provide an update to the community on the manufacturing status of subsequent Block 1 and Block 1B vehicles.

Steve Creech↗
NASA NTRS1991

SRB Environment Evaluation and Analysis. Volume 3: ASRB Plume Induced Environments

Contract NAS8-37891 was expanded in late 1989 to initiate analysis of Shuttle plume induced environments as a result of the substitution of the Advanced Solid Rocket Booster (ASRB) for the Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB). To support this analysis, REMTECH became involved in subscale and full-scale solid rocket motor test programs which further expanded the scope of work. Later contract modifications included additional tasks to produce initial design cycle environments and to specify development flight instrumentation. Volume 3 of the final report describes these analyses and contains a summary of reports resulting from various studies.

Bender, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Advanced transportation system studies. Alternate propulsion subsystem concepts: Propulsion database

The Advanced Transportation System Studies alternate propulsion subsystem concepts propulsion database interim report is presented. The objective of the database development task is to produce a propulsion database which is easy to use and modify while also being comprehensive in the level of detail available. The database is to be available on the Macintosh computer system. The task is to extend across all three years of the contract. Consequently, a significant fraction of the effort in this first year of the task was devoted to the development of the database structure to ensure a robust base for the following years' efforts. Nonetheless, significant point design propulsion system descriptions and parametric models were also produced. Each of the two propulsion databases, parametric propulsion database and propulsion system database, are described. The descriptions include a user's guide to each code, write-ups for models used, and sample output. The parametric database has models for LOX/H2 and LOX/RP liquid engines, solid rocket boosters using three different propellants, a hybrid rocket booster, and a NERVA derived nuclear thermal rocket engine.

Levack, Daniel↗
NASA NTRS1999

STS-86 Post Flight Presentation

The Crew of STS-86 Atlantis Shuttle, Commander James D. Wetherbee, Pilot Michael J. Bloomfield, Mission Specialists Vladimar G. Titov, Scott E. Parazynski, Jean-Loup J. M. Chretien, Wendy Lawrence, and David Wolf, narrate the footage of their mission to the Mir International Space Station. Scenes include crew suit up, walk out to the transfer vehicle, strap-in into the shuttle, start of the main engine, ignition of the rocket boosters, and separation of the solid rocket boosters. The crew of Atlantis participates in an exchange of gifts with the members of Mir, and a space walk to recover experiments outside the Mir Space Station. A beautiful panoramic view of Mir above South America is seen. Scenes also depict the closing of Mir's hatch, Atlantis' separation from Mir, and the reentry of the Atlantis Space Shuttle into the Earth's atmosphere.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1987

Flow visualization study of a two-dimensional representation of the Space Shuttle launch pad configuration

The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by the failure of the aft joint O-ring seals in its right solid rocket booster. It has been suggested by several sources that wind conditions through a reduction in temperature of the right solid rocket booster caused by the wind blowing across the cold external tank, played a role in the O-ring failure. To check the plausibility of the wind theory, an experiment was carried out in a water towing tank to visualize the flow past a two-dimensional model representing a cross section of the Space Shuttle launch configuration. The periodic formation of vortices was found to characterize the wake generated by the model. It is suggested that this organized motion in the flow is the dominant mechanism that accomplishes heat transfer from the external tank to the right solid rocket booster. Flow visualization results consisting of photographs that show instantaneous streamline patterns of the flow are presented.

Mclachland, B. G.↗
NASA NTRS1990

A parametric shell analysis of the shuttle 51-L SRB AFT field joint

Following the Shuttle 51-L accident, an investigation was conducted to determine the cause of the failure. Investigators at the Langley Research Center focused attention on the structural behavior of the field joints with O-ring seals in the steel solid rocket booster (SRB) cases. The shell-of-revolution computer program BOSOR4 was used to model the aft field joint of the solid rocket booster case. The shell model consisted of the SRB wall and joint geometry present during the Shuttle 51-L flight. A parametric study of the joint was performed on the geometry, including joint clearances, contact between the joint components, and on the loads, induced and applied. In addition combinations of geometry and loads were evaluated. The analytical results from the parametric study showed that contact between the joint components was a primary contributor to allowing hot gases to blow by the O-rings. Based upon understanding the original joint behavior, various proposed joint modifications are shown and analyzed in order to provide additional insight and information. Finally, experimental results from a hydro-static pressurization of a test rocket booster case to study joint motion are presented and verified analytically.

Davis, Randall C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.

Calle, Luz M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Inviscid and Viscous CFD Analysis of Booster Separation for the Space Launch System Vehicle

This paper presents details of Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) simulations of the Space Launch System during solid-rocket booster separation using the Cart3D inviscid and Overflow viscous CFD codes. The discussion addresses the use of multiple data sources of computational aerodynamics, experimental aerodynamics, and trajectory simulations for this critical phase of flight. Comparisons are shown between Cart3D simulations and a wind tunnel test performed at NASA Langley Research Center's Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel, and further comparisons are shown between Cart3D and viscous Overflow solutions for the flight vehicle. The Space Launch System (SLS) is a new exploration-class launch vehicle currently in development that includes two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) modified from Space Shuttle hardware. These SRBs must separate from the SLS core during a phase of flight where aerodynamic loads are nontrivial. The main challenges for creating a separation aerodynamic database are the large number of independent variables (including orientation of the core, relative position and orientation of the boosters, and rocket thrust levels) and the complex flow caused by exhaust plumes of the booster separation motors (BSMs), which are small rockets designed to push the boosters away from the core by firing partially in the direction opposite to the motion of the vehicle.

Viscous↗
NASA NTRS1999

STS-96 Post Flight Presentation

The Crew of STS-96 Discovery Shuttle, Commander Kent V. Rominger, Pilot Rick D. Husband, Mission Specialists Ellen Ochoa, Tamara E. Jernigan, Daniel T. Barry, Julie Payette, and Valery Ivanovich Tokarev, are shown narrating the mission highlights. Scenes include walk out to the transfer vehicle, and launch of the shuttle. Also presented are scenes of the start of the main engine, ignition of the solid rocket boosters, and the separation of the solid rocket boosters. Footage of Payette preparing the on-board camera equipment, while Barry and Jernigan perform routine checks of the equipment is seen. Also presented are various pictures of the shuttle in its orbit, the docking of the shuttle with the Mir International Space Station, and crewmembers during their space walk. Beautiful panoramic views of the Great Lake, Houston, and a combined view of Italy and Turkey are seen. The crew of Discovery is shown performing a juice ball experiment, tumbling, undocking, performing transfer operations, and deploying the STARSHINE educational satellite. The film ends with the reentry of the Discovery Space Shuttle into the Earth's atmosphere.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2002

Shuttle Reference Data

This collection of shuttle reference data contains the following information: shuttle abort history, shuttle abort modes, abort decisions, space shuttle rendezvous maneuvers, space shuttle main engines, space shuttle solid rocket boosters, hold-down posts, SRB (solid rocket boosters) ignition, electrical power distribution, hydraulic power units, thrust vector control, SBR rate gyro assemblies, SBR separation and Space Shuttle Super Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1976

EDIN design study alternate space shuttle booster replacement concepts. Volume 1: Engineering analysis

The use of a recoverable liquid rocket booster (LRB) system to replace the existing solid rocket booster (SRB) system for the shuttle was studied. Historical weight estimating relationships were developed for the LRB using Saturn technology and modified as required. Mission performance was computed using February 1975 shuttle configuration groundrules to allow reasonable comparison of the existing shuttle with the study designs. The launch trajectory was constrained to pass through both the RTLS/AOA and main engine cut off points of the shuttle reference mission 1. Performance analysis is based on a point design trajectory model which optimizes initial tilt rate and exoatmospheric pitch profile. A gravity turn was employed during the boost phase in place of the shuttle angle of attack profile. Engine throttling add/or shutdown was used to constrain dynamic pressure and/or longitudinal acceleration where necessary. Four basic configurations were investigated: a parallel burn vehicle with an F-1 engine powered LRB; a parallel burn vehicle with a high pressure engine powered LRB; a series burn vehicle with a high pressure engine powered LRB. The relative sizes of the LRB and the ET are optimized to minimize GLOW in most cases.

Demakes, P. T.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Performance evaluation of Space Shuttle SRB parachutes from air drop and scaled model wind tunnel tests

The aerodynamic performance characteristics have been determined for the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster drogue, main, and pilot parachutes. The performance evaluation on the 20-degree conical ribbon parachutes is based primarily on air drop tests of full scale prototype parachutes. In addition, parametric wind tunnel tests were performed and used in parachute configuration development and preliminary performance assessments. The wind tunnel test data are compared to the drop test results and both sets of data are used to determine the predicted performance of the Solid Rocket Booster flight parachutes. Data from other drop tests of large ribbon parachutes are also compared with the Solid Rocket Booster parachute performance characteristics. Parameters assessed include full open terminal drag coefficients, reefed drag area, opening characteristics, clustering effects, and forebody interference.

Moog, R. D.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Space Shuttle booster recovery planning.

At the initiation of the Space Shuttle Program, recoverable solid rocket boosters were base-lined, with an estimated savings of 30 per cent over expendable solid rockets. Present studies indicate that the solid rocket boosters in the 142-inch diameter range can be recovered using state-of-the-art recovery systems. Marshall Space Flight Center is conducting extensive studies to establish the most cost effective recovery system for the present Shuttle boosters. Model drop testing, in various facilities, and structural load testing are being conducted with model sizes ranging from 6 inches to 120 inches in diameter.

Godfrey, R. E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRS2009

Ares I First Stage Booster Deceleration System: An Overview

In 2005, the Congressional NASA Authorization Act enacted a new space exploration program, the "Vision for Space Exploratien". The Constellation Program was formed to oversee the implementation of this new mission. With an intent not simply to support the International Space Station, but to build a permanent outpost on the Moon and then travel on to explore ever more distant terrains, the Constellation Program is supervising the development of a brand new fleet of launch vehicles, the Ares. The Ares lineup will include two new launch vehicles: the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle. A crew exploration vehicle, Orion, will be launched on the Ares I. It will be capable of docking with the Space Station, the lunar lander, Altair, and the Earth Departure Stage of Ares V. The Ares V will be capable of lifting both large-scale hardware and the Altair into space. The Ares First Stage Team is tasked with developing the propulsion system necessary to liftoff from the Earth and loft the entire Ares vehicle stack toward low Earth orbit. The Ares I First Stage booster is a 12-foot diameter, five-segment, reusable solid rocket booster derived from the Space Shuttle's four segment reusable solid rocket booster (SRB). It is separated from the Upper Stage through the use of a Deceleration Subsystem (DSS). Booster Tumble Motors are used to induce the pitch tumble following separation from the Upper Stage. The spent Ares I booster must be recoverable using a parachute deceleration system similar to that of the Shuttle SRB heritage system. Since Ares I is much heavier and reenters the Earth's atmosphere from a higher altitude at a much higher velocity than the SRB, all of the parachutes must be redesigned to reliably meet the operational requisites of the new launch vehicles. This paper presents an overview of this new booster deceleration system. It includes comprehensive detail of the parachute deceleration system, its design and deployment sequences, including how and why it is being developed, the requirements it must meet, and the testing involved in its implementation.

King, Ron↗
NASA NTRS1974

Supersonic tests of an 0.015 scale space shuttle mated vehicle model (67-OTS) in the LaRC UPWT to obtain aerodynamic force data (IA42A/B)

Wind tunnel tests were conducted of the NASA/Rockwell 0.015 scale configuration 4 mated space shuttle vehicle. Data were obtained for a range of Mach numbers from 1.60 to 4.63 and angles of attack from minus 10 degrees to plus 10 degrees. A complete model build-up was performed. Longitudinal and lateral directional stability and control data were obtained for the tank alone, tank plus solid rocket boosters, and mated configuration of tank plus orbiter plus solid rocket boosters. Single component rudder hinge moment data were obtained at rudder deflections of zero degrees and minus 20 degrees for each Mach number tested.

Hardin, R.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Aerodynamic flight evaluation analysis and data base update

Research was conducted to determine the feasibility of replacing the Solid Rocket Boosters on the existing Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SSLV) with Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRB). As a part of the LRB selection process, a series of wind tunnel tests were conducted along with aero studies to determine the effects of different LRB configurations on the SSLV. Final results were tabulated into increments and added to the existing SSLV data base. The research conducted in this study was taken from a series of wind tunnel tests conducted at Marshall's 14-inch Trisonic Wind Tunnel. The effects on the axial force (CAF), normal force (CNF), pitching moment (CMF), side force (CY), wing shear force (CSR), wing torque moment (CTR), and wing bending moment (CBR) coefficients were investigated for a number of candidate LRB configurations. The aero effects due to LRB protuberances, ET/LRB separation distance, and aft skirts were also gathered from the tests. Analysis was also conducted to investigate the base pressure and plume effects due to the new booster geometries. The test results found in Phases 1 and 2 of wind tunnel testing are discussed and compared. Preliminary LRB lateral/directional data results and trends are given. The protuberance and gap/skirt effects are discussed. The base pressure/plume effects study is discussed and results are given.

Boyle, W. W.↗