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NASA NTRS2017

RNAV STAR Procedural Adherence

In this exploratory archival study we mined the performance of 24 major US airports area navigation standard terminal arrival routes (RNAV STARs) over the preceding three years. Overlaying radar track data on top of RNAV STAR routes provided a comparison between aircraft flight paths and the waypoint positions and altitude restrictions. NASA Ames Supercomputing resources were utilized to perform the data mining and processing. We investigated STARs by lateral transition path (full-lateral), vertical restrictions (full-lateral/full-vertical), and skipped waypoints (skips). In addition, we graphed altitudes and their frequencies of occurrence for altitude restrictions. Full-lateral compliance was generally greater than Full-lateral/full-vertical, but the delta between the rates was not always consistent. Full-lateral/full-vertical usage medians of the 2016 procedures ranged from 0 in KDEN (Denver) to 21 in KMEM (Memphis). Waypoint skips ranged from 0 to nearly 100 for specific waypoints. Altitudes restrictions were sometimes missed by systemic amounts in 1000 ft. increments from the restriction, creating multi-modal distributions. Other times, altitude misses looked to be more normally distributed around the restriction. This work is a preliminary investigation into the objective performance of instrument procedures and provides a framework to track how procedural concepts and design intervention function. In addition, this tool may aid in providing acceptability metrics as well as risk assessment information.

Stewart, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

RNAV STAR Procedural Adherence

Flight crews and air traffic controllers have reported many safety concerns regarding area navigation standard terminal arrival routes (RNAV STARs). However, our information sources to quantify these issues are limited to subjective reporting and time consuming case-by-case investigations. This work is a preliminary study into the objective performance of instrument procedures and provides a framework to track procedural concepts and assess design functionality. We created a tool and analysis methods for gauging aircraft adherence as it relates to RNAV STARs. This information is vital for comprehensive understanding of how our air traffic behaves. In this exploratory archival study, we mined the performance of 24 major US airports over the preceding three years. Overlaying radar track data on top of RNAV STAR routes provided a comparison between aircraft flight paths and the waypoint positions and altitude restrictions. NASA Ames Supercomputing resources were utilized to perform the data mining and processing. We assessed STARs by lateral transition path (full-lateral), vertical restrictions (full-lateralfull-vertical), and skipped waypoints (skips). In addition, we graphed aircraft altitudes relative to the altitude restrictions and their occurrence rates. Full-lateral adherence was generally greater than Full-lateralfull-vertical, but the difference between the rates was not always consistent. Full-lateralfull-vertical adherence medians of the 2016 procedures ranged from 0 in KDEN (Denver) to 21 in KMEM (Memphis). Waypoint skips ranged from 0 to nearly 100 for specific waypoints. Altitudes restrictions were sometimes missed by systematic amounts in 1000 ft. increments from the restriction, creating multi-modal distributions. Other times, altitude misses looked to be more normally distributed around the restriction. This tool may aid in providing acceptability metrics as well as risk assessment information.

rnav↗
NASA NTRS2018

Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Success Criteria and Risk Management for the New Millennium Program

The NASA New Millennium Program (NMP) is a technology development and validation program that will flight-validate advanced, new technologies with space flight applications. NMP's purpose is twofold. First, it will develop technologies that will enable future spacecraft to be smaller, more capable and reliable, and to be launched more frequently. Second, it will validate the technologies in flight to reduce the risks to future science missions in flying these technologies for the first time. To measure the program's success, NMP has devised a set of criteria that stresses the relevance of technologies selected for flight validation to NASA's 21st-century science mission needs. Also, NMP has instituted a 'risk management' policy, where, through a combination of adequate resources and early risk assessment and risk mitigation plans for the technologies, the overall risk of the NMP flights can be rendered acceptable.

New↗
NASA NTRS2004

Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor

In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗
NASA NTRS1991

The Marshall Engineering Thermosphere model atmosphere Statistical Analysis Mode (MET-SAM)

The minimum, mean, and maximum exospheric temperature on the globe were calculated for every three hour period from 1947 through 1989 using the algorithms in the Marshall Engineering Thermosphere (MET) model and the appropriate solar activity input parameters. Cumulative percent frequency (CPF) distributions were then calculated for each of these temperatures at five levels of solar activity as defined by the 13-month smoothed values of the 10.7-cm solar radio noise flux. Next, the 50, 95, 97.7, and 100 percentile temperature values in each of these five levels of solar activity were curve fit as a function of the 13-month smoothed 10.7-cm flux. The resulting algorithms are used to compute the exospheric temperature in the MET model instead of the technique developed by Jacchia in his 1970 model. These temperatures are then used to enter tables to determine the total mass density and/or the atomic oxygen number density for application to engineering problems. Users can specify the risk level they are willing to accept in the results of analyses that require neutral atmosphere parameters inputs. The model eliminates the guess work in how to combine the solar activity input parameters to insure that the results provide answers at the proper risk levels.

Smith, Robert E.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Enabling Deep Space Science Missions with Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

Nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) enables entirely new classes of deep-space science missions to yield scientific returns that, in most cases, are simply not possible with traditional architectures. NTP systems can yield dramatically reduced interplanetary travel times, deliver roughly 2- 3 times (or more) the mass that can be delivered by conventional chemical propulsion systems, or provide a combination of these advantages to further enhance scientific return. Present NASA and DoD-sponsored plans for NTP systems will mature the technology using prototype and flight demonstration engines to prove the designs. These prototype engines will have performance in the correct thrust range so as to permit use as a low-risk propulsion stage in support of high-payoff deep space science missions. Additionally, the use of low-enriched Uranium (LEU) fuels over highly-enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels reduce the costs of engine development, qualification, acceptance and launch, and lowers the risks associated with proliferation management.

Kurt A Polzin↗
NASA NTRS2004

Modeling of Radiation Risks for Human Space Missions

Prior to any human space flight, calculations of radiation risks are used to determine the acceptable scope of astronaut activity. Using the supercomputing facilities at NASA Ames Research Center, Ames researchers have determined the damage probabilities of DNA functional groups by space radiation. The data supercede those used in the current Monte Carlo model for risk assessment. One example is the reaction of DNA with hydroxyl radical produced by the interaction of highly energetic particles from space radiation with water molecules in the human body. This reaction is considered an important cause of DNA mutations, although its mechanism is not well understood.

Fletcher, Graham↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Strategy to Safely Live and Work in the Space Radiation Environment

In space, astronauts are constantly bombarded with energetic particles. The goal of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the NASA Space Radiation Project is to ensure that astronauts can safely live and work in the space radiation environment. The space radiation environment poses both acute and chronic risks to crew health and safety, but unlike some other aspects of space travel, space radiation exposure has clinically relevant implications for the lifetime of the crew. Among the identified radiation risks are cancer, acute and late CNS damage, chronic and degenerative tissue decease, and acute radiation syndrome. The term "safely" means that risks are sufficiently understood such that acceptable limits on mission, post-mission and multi-mission consequences can be defined. The NASA Space Radiation Project strategy has several elements. The first element is to use a peer-reviewed research program to increase our mechanistic knowledge and genetic capabilities to develop tools for individual risk projection, thereby reducing our dependency on epidemiological data and population-based risk assessment. The second element is to use the NASA Space Radiation Laboratory to provide a ground-based facility to study the health effects/mechanisms of damage from space radiation exposure and the development and validation of biological models of risk, as well as methods for extrapolation to human risk. The third element is a risk modeling effort that integrates the results from research efforts into models of human risk to reduce uncertainties in predicting the identified radiation risks. To understand the biological basis for risk, we must also understand the physical aspects of the crew environment. Thus, the fourth element develops computer algorithms to predict radiation transport properties, evaluate integrated shielding technologies and provide design optimization recommendations for the design of human space systems. Understanding the risks and determining methods to mitigate the risks are keys to a successful radiation protection strategy.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Assessing the Likelihood of Rare Medical Events in Astronauts

Despite over half a century of manned space flight, the space flight community is only now coming to fully assess the short and long term medical dangers of exposure to reduced gravity environments. Further, as new manned spacecraft are designed and with the advent of commercial flight capabilities to the general public, a full understanding of medical risk becomes even more critical for maintaining and understanding mission safety and crew health. To address these critical issues, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Research Program (HRP) has begun to address the medical hazards with a formalized risk management approach by effectively identifying and attempting to mitigate acute and chronic medical risks to manned space flight. This paper describes NASA Glenn Research Center?s (GRC) efforts to develop a systematic methodology to assess the likelihood of in-flight medical conditions. Using a probabilistic approach, medical risks are assessed using well established and accepted biomedical and human performance models in combination with fundamentally observed data that defines the astronauts? physical conditions, environment and activity levels. Two different examples of space flight risk are used to show the versatility of our approach and how it successfully integrates disparate information to provide HRP decision makers with a valuable source of information which is otherwise lacking.

Myers, Jerry G., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Long-Term Health Risk Quantification

Astronauts face hazards during spaceflight, including space radiation exposure, isolation and confinement, traveling far distances from Earth, reduced gravity levels, and closed and hostile environments. These hazards drive the definition of human health and performance risks associated with spaceflight. NASA’s Human System Risk Board maintains the human spaceflight risk posture for in-mission risks, as well as post-flight, Long-Term Health (LTH)risks potentially occurring later in the astronaut’s life. LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. Possible LTH risk outcomes include the time and interventions needed for the astronaut to return to preflight physiological states after experiencing spaceflight hazards and recovery from any in-mission medical events that persist into the post-flight timeframe. It includes chronic complications that may arise due to experiencing in-flight medical conditions or injuries and medical conditions that occur later in life with a higher probability of occurrence or with more severity because of their spaceflight exposure. Finally, LTH risk outcomes can also include a reduction in life expectancy due to spaceflight exposures. There have been 144 medical conditions identified by NASA’s Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health team to be associated with LTH risk. Epidemiological studies have been performed for some of these conditions to determine if astronauts suffer from an increased prevalence or severity of the condition due to their spaceflight experience compared to a comparable cohort .Differences in astronaut mortality or morbidity due to spaceflight experience were not detected in several of these studies. There were two cases where a modest increase in the incidence rate of astronaut LTH outcomes was detected. The first suggested an increase in the incidence of melanoma cases in astronauts, where the number of cases in astronauts were similar to the elevated number of cases observed in airplane pilots. The second provided some evidence of elevated numbers of cardiovascular disease events in astronauts compared to an appropriate healthy comparator cohort, which may warrant additional investigation. The lack of detection of LTH risk outcomes should not ease concerns about astronaut LTH. The studies highlighted here constitute only a small portion of the potential LTH conditions that could occur. Once epidemiological studies are performed on all conditions, significant findings may be detected. The analysis of astronaut LTH also suffers from limited numbers of data points because of the limited numbers of astronauts overall and the even fewer who have reached an age where LTH outcomes may begin to manifest. As shuttle and ISS astronauts begin to age and increase the feasibility of analysis, LTH outcomes may be detected. An application of risk quantification is the use of risk metrics within trade studies for resource prioritization and decision making. Trade studies regarding countermeasures to LTH risk outcomes would benefit from a quantification of LTH risk. NASA has ground-based processes in place such as astronaut screening and access to continuous medical monitoring and care during and after their astronaut career which are the main methods for mitigating LTH risk. In-mission countermeasures, such as acceptable levels of medical care and available countermeasures to counter spaceflight related physiological decrements, can mitigate a poor health and performance status immediately post-flight. Identifying appropriate risk metrics, obtaining valid quantities for them, and tying them to LTH countermeasures are necessary steps for realizing their use in trade studies. This presentation will highlight the challenges associated with the identification, quantification, and utilization of LTH risk metrics

Beth Lewandowski↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Reliability and the Cost of Doing Business

Human error cannot be defined unambiguously in advance of it happening, it often becomes an error after the fact. The same action can result in a tragic accident for one situation or a heroic action given a more favorable outcome. People often forget that we employ humans in business and industry for the flexibility and capability to change when needed. In complex systems, operations are driven by their specifications of the system and the system structure. People provide the flexibility to make it work. Human error has been reported as being responsible for 60%‐80% of failures, accidents and incidents in high‐risk industries. We don't have to accept that all human errors are inevitable. Through the use of some basic techniques, many potential human error events can be addressed. There are actions that can be taken to reduce the risk of human error.

DeMott, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

The Impact of Apollo-Era Microbiology on Human Space Flight

The microbiota of crewmembers and the spacecraft environment contributes significant risk to crew health during space flight missions. NASA reduces microbial risk with various mitigation methods that originated during the Apollo Program and continued to evolve through subsequent programs: Skylab, Shuttle, and International Space Station (ISS). A quarantine of the crew and lunar surface samples, within the Lunar Receiving Laboratory following return from the Moon, was used to prevent contamination with unknown extraterrestrial organisms. The quarantine durations for the crew and lunar samples were 21 days and 50 days, respectively. A series of infections among Apollo crewmembers resulted in a quarantine before launch to limit exposure to infectious organisms. This Health Stabilization Program isolated the crew for 21 days before flight and was effective in reducing crew illness. After the program developed water recovery hardware for Apollo spacecraft, the 1967 National Academy of Science Space Science Board recommended the monitoring of potable water. NASA implemented acceptability limits of 10 colony forming units (CFU) per mL and the absence of viable E. coli, anaerobes, yeasts, and molds in three separate 150 mL aliquots. Microbiological investigations of the crew and spacecraft environment were conducted during the Apollo program, including the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and Skylab. Subsequent space programs implemented microbial screening of the crew for pathogens and acceptability limits on spacecraft surfaces and air. Microbiology risk mitigation methods have evolved since the Apollo program. NASA cancelled the quarantine of the crew after return from the lunar surface, reduced the duration of the Health Stabilization Program; and implemented acceptability limits for spacecraft surfaces and air. While microbial risks were not a main focus of the early Mercury and Gemini programs, the extended duration of Apollo flights resulted in the increased scrutiny of impact of the space flight environment on crew health. The lessons learned during that era of space flight continue to impact microbiology risk mitigation in space programs today.

Elliott, T. F↗
NASA NTRS1974

Space shuttle/food system study. Volume 2, Appendix A: Active heating system-screening analysis. Appendix B: Reconstituted food heating techniques analysis

Technical data are presented which were used to evaluate active heating methods to be incorporated into the space shuttle food system design, and also to evaluate the relative merits and penalties associated with various approaches to the heating of rehydrated food during space flight. Equipment heating candidates were subject to a preliminary screening performed by a selection rationale process which considered the following parameters; (1) gravitational effect; (2) safety; (3) operability; (4) system compatibility; (5) serviceability; (6) crew acceptability; (7) crew time; (8) development risk; and (9) operating cost. A hot air oven, electrically heated food tray, and microwave oven were selected for further consideration and analysis. Passive, semi-active, and active food preparation approaches were also studied in an effort to determine the optimum method for heating rehydrated food. Potential complexity, cost, vehicle impact penalties, and palatability were considered in the analysis. A summary of the study results is provided along with cost estimates for each of the potential sytems

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2000

Improved Quality in Aerospace Testing Through the Modern Design of Experiments

This paper illustrates how, in the presence of systematic error, the quality of an experimental result can be influenced by the order in which the independent variables are set. It is suggested that in typical experimental circumstances in which systematic errors are significant, the common practice of organizing the set point order of independent variables to maximize data acquisition rate results in a test matrix that fails to produce the highest quality research result. With some care to match the volume of data required to satisfy inference error risk tolerances, it is possible to accept a lower rate of data acquisition and still produce results of higher technical quality (lower experimental error) with less cost and in less time than conventional test procedures, simply by optimizing the sequence in which independent variable levels are set.

DeLoach, R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Radiation Transmission Properties of In-Situ Materials

The development of a permanent human presence in space is a key element of NASA's strategic plan for the Human Exploration and Development of Space (HEDS). The habitation of the International Space Station (ISS) is one near-term HEDS objective; the exploration and settlement of the moon and Mars are long-term goals of that plan. Achieving these goals requires maintaining the health and safety of personnel involved in such space operations at a high level, while at the same time reducing the cost of those operations to a reasonable level. Among the limiting factors to prolonged human space operations are the health risks from exposure to the space ionizing radiation environment. In order to keep the risk of radiation induced cancer at acceptable levels, it is necessary to provide adequate shielding from the ionizing radiation environment. The research presented here is theoretical and ground-based experimental study of the neutron production from interactions of GCR-like particles in various shielding components. An emphasis is placed here on research that will aid in the development of in-situ resource utilization. The primary goal of the program is to develop an accurate neutron-production model that is relevant to the NASA HEDS program of designing technologies that will be used in the development of effective shielding countermeasures. A secondary goal of the program is the development of an experimental data base of neutron production cross sections and thick-target yields which will aid model development.

Heilbronn, L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Interplanetary Transit Simulations Using the International Space Station

We evaluated the space life sciences utility of the International Space Station (ISS) to simulate the outbound transit portion of missions to Mars and Near Earth Asteroids (NEA) to investigate biomedical and psychological aspects of such transits, to develop and test space operation procedures compatible with communication delays and outages, and to demonstrate and validate technologies and countermeasures. Two major categories of space life sciences activities can capitalize on ISS capabilities. The first includes studies that require ISS (or a comparable facility), typically for access to prolonged weightlessness. The second includes studies that do not strictly require ISS but can exploit it to maximize their scientific return more efficiently and productively than in ground-based simulations. For these studies, ISS offers a high fidelity analog for fundamental factors on future missions, such as crew composition, mission control personnel, operational tasks and workload, real-world risk, and isolation, and can mimic the effects of distance and limited accessibility. In addition to conducting Mars- and NEA-transit simulations on 6-month ISS increments, extending the current ISS increment duration from 6 months to 9 or even 12 months will provide opportunities for enhanced and focused research relevant to long duration Mars and NEA missions. Increasing the crew duration may pose little additional risk to crewmembers beyond that currently accepted on 6-month increments, but additional medical monitoring capabilities will be required beyond those currently used for ISS operations. Finally, while presenting major logistical challenges, such a simulation followed by a post-landing simulation of Mars exploration could provide quantitative evidence of capabilities in an actual mission. Thus, the use of ISS to simulate aspects of Mars and NEA missions seems practical. If it were to be implemented without major disruption of on-going ISS activities, then planning should begin soon, in close consultation with all international partners.

Charles, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) Development Effort as a Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) for Urban Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operations

NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project aims to enable the integration of new aviation paradigms such as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) while providing the necessary infrastructure for future concepts such as On-Demand Mobility (ODM) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). In order to do so, the UTM project has developed an architecture to allow communication among UAS operators, UAS Service Suppliers (USS), Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP), and the public. As part of this framework, the Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) are envisioned as model and/or data based services that disseminate essential or enhanced information to ensure safe operations within low-altitude airspace. These services include terrain and obstacle data, specialized weather data, surveillance, constraint information, risk monitoring, etc. This paper highlights the development efforts of a non-participant casualty risk assessment SDSP called Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) which assists operators with preflight planning. GRASP is based on the previously introduced UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF) and allows UAS operators to simulate and visualize potential non-participant casualty risks associated with their proposed flight. The risk assessment capability also allows operators to revise their flight plans if the casualty risks are determined to be above acceptable thresholds. GRASP is configured to account for future improvements including servicing airborne aircraft as part of NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project.

Ancel, Ersin↗