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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2020

NRIC EBR-II Test Bed Pre-Conceptual Design Report

Authorized by the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA), the National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) provides private sector technology developers access to strategic infrastructures and assets for commercial nuclear energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment activities. The mission is to support a timely and cost-effective path to the licensing and commercialization of new nuclear energy systems. To meet these needs, NRIC is developing two test beds at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The ZPPR Test bed (ZTB) and the EBR-II Test bed (ETB). The EBR-II test bed will support the demonstration of systems that operate at less than 10 MWt. The baseline objective is for the EBR-II Dome to act as a safety significant containment structure capable of siting reactors that utilize Safeguards Category 4 material for operations. The major areas addressed in the pre-conceptual design include: • Installation of an access door • Electrical Power • Heat Removal • Ventilation in the Dome • Module handling system Along with the design for ETB a concept of operations (COP) has also been developed. The COP is intended to facilitate a common understanding of ideas, challenges, and issues. As systems continue to evolve in complexity System Engineers and Project Directors will utilize the COP to develop and sustain a common vision of the system for stakeholders.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

MICROREACTOR APPLICATIONS, RESEARCH, VALIDATION, AND EVALUATION (MARVEL) REACTOR ? STATUS, CONSTRUCTION, AND TESTING

The paper presents the current status of the Microreactor Applications, Research, Validation, and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor design, qualification testing, fabrication, and high-level construction schedule. An overview of initial criticality, low power physics testing, and start-up testing is included, as well as an overview of the envisioned processes in which end-users can engage the project for access to operational data or specific demonstrations. Designed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) under the auspices of the US Department of Energy’s Microreactor Program for construction and operation at the INL, MARVEL is a small, fully functional advanced reactor with UZrH fuel and thermal output of 85 kW. It offers a unique opportunity for scaled demonstrations that can dramatically accelerate the design, licensing, and deployment of commercial microreactors for power production or process heat applications. MARVEL’s objective is to build a small liquid-metal thermal reactor at the INL to demonstrate design and operating processes for microreactors, microgrid integration, and process heat applications. MARVEL finished 90%-final-design in September 2023 and completed an independent project assessment in early 2024. Fabrication of long-lead components and fuel, safety analysis review, and procurement for construction are underway. MARVEL assembly and construction will start in 2025 and fuel loading is expected in mid- 2027. Initial criticality will be performed in a dry condition in late 2027, followed by loading of NaK coolant and start-up testing. Approximately six months later, release for unrestricted operations will enable subsequent testing of microreactor characteristics, microgrid integration and select heat extraction applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Monolithic Heat Pipe Microreactor Reference Plant Model Updates

This work presents the latest improvements to, and investigations performed with, the generic monolithic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor reference plant model for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This model serves as the foundation for the future detailed design evaluation models based on license applications. This model has been developed with the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle (BlueCRAB) and its specifications are based on open literature publications for the eVinci™ design . BlueCRAB is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission non-light-water reactor analysis system based on MOOSE, the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment framework, which can couple the Griffin, BISON, and Sockeye applications to resolve the various physics that are essential for the safety analysis of this type of reactor system. The core specifications include tristructural isotropic fuel, graphite monolith, graphite reflectors, and drums composed of graphite and B 4 C.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

AGR-5/6/7 Irradiation Test Final As-run Report

This document presents the as-run analysis of the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) 5/6/7 irradiation experiment. AGR-5/6/7 is the last of a series of experiments conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in support of the development and qualification of tri-structural isotropic (TRISO) low enriched fuel for use in high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR). The test train contained five separate capsules that were independently controlled and monitored. Each capsule contained multiple 24.91-mm-long and 12.25-mm-dimeter compacts filled with low-enriched uranium carbide/oxide tri-structural isotropic fuel particles. The objectives of the AGR 5/6/7 experiment were to: 1. Irradiate reference-design fuel particles to support fuel qualification. 2. Establish operating margins for the fuel, beyond normal operating conditions. 3. Provide irradiated-fuel performance data and irradiated-fuel samples for post irradiation examination and safety testing. The primary objective of the AGR-5/6 test (Capsules 1, 2, 4, and 5) was to verify the successful performance of the reference-design fuel under normal operating conditions. The AGR-7 test (Capsule 3) was designed to explore fuel performance at higher temperatures. Its primary objective is to demonstrate the capability of the fuel to withstand conditions beyond normal operating conditions, in support of plant design and licensing. AGR 5/6/7 will also provide irradiated-fuel performance data based on the fission gas release from particles during irradiation. To achieve the test objectives, the AGR-5/6/7 experiment was irradiated in the northeast (NE) flux trap of the ATR with a planned duration of 500 effective full-power days (EFPDs). The NE flux trap was selected because its larger diameter provided greater flexibility for test-train design compared to the Large B positions used for the AGR-1 and AGR-2 irradiations, significantly enhancing test capabilities for the combined irradiation campaigns. Due to delays in the ATR schedule, the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation was significantly shorter than the originally planned 13-cycle schedule. Irradiation began on February 16, 2018 and ended on July 22, 2020, spanning nine ATR cycles (162B?168A) over two and a half years. Thus, the AGR-5/6/7 fuel compacts were irradiated for a total of approximately 360.9 EFPDs. Final burnup values, on a per-compact basis, ranged from 5.66% to 15.26% fissions per initial heavy metal atom, while fast fluence values ranged from 1.62 to 5.55 × 1025 n/m2 (E >0.18 MeV). Time-averaged volume-averaged fuel temperatures on a capsule basis at the end of irradiation ranged from 756°C in Capsule 5 to 1313°C in Capsule 3 excluding days with significantly lower temperature during the two short powered axial locator mechanism cycles, 163A and 167A. By the end of irradiation, 48 out of 54 installed thermocouples (TC) had failed (the bottom three capsules lost all TCs). During the first five cycles (162B ? 165A), fission-gas isotope release-rate-to-birthrate (R/B) ratios were stable in the 10-8?10-6 range, and no in-pile particle failures were observed based on the gross gamma counts. During this time, the high exposed kernel fraction and high fuel particle temperatures in Capsule 1 led to the maximum R/B value of around 2 ? 10-6 for Kr-85m. The fission gas release in all capsules started to increase from the second half of Cycle 166A, when a large number of in-pile particle failures occurred in Capsule 1 and a gas line problem in this capsule caused fission gas leakage at various degrees into the other four capsules. This gas line problem also prevented fission gas release measurement for Capsule 1 during the last three cycles due to gas flow isolation. By the end of irradiation, it is estimated that approximately 15 particle failures in Capsule 3, which was considered possible at the start of the irradiation, since the experiment was designed to operate beyond the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) normal operating temperature range. A few hundred in-pile particle failures were estimated for Capsule 1 by the end of Cycle 166A, but the total number of failures is unknown due to lack of fission gas release data in the later cycles. Additionally, four potential in-pile failures were identified for Capsule 2 during the last cycle, 168A. In contrast, no in-pile failures were identified in the top two capsules (4 and 5) based on absence of the typical spikes in gross gamma counts and low failure estimates using the AGR-3/4 R/B per exposed kernel model.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Non-Nuclear Test Facility Development to Support Verification and Validation Needs

This study focuses on developing a non-nuclear test facility to help meet the verification and validation (V&V) requirements of a water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) system. The scaling analysis necessary for reactor system experimentation and assessment model V&V considers various reactor system accident scenarios such as main steam line break (MSLB), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and containment condensation and heat transfer. The goal is to identify key physics based phenomena of interest (POI), specific figures of merit (FOMs), and the state of knowledge (SOK) by employing phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies. Important physics phenomena such as heat transfer, fluid dynamics, structural integrity, and material selection must be addressed when scaling a thermal-hydraulics system. Alongside these considerations, modifications to the facility may be needed to align the scaled system with the available footprint (height and space) of the facility. These modifications may include infrastructure upgrades, changes to the piping layout, implementation of safety measures, and installation of new instrumentation and control systems. The test facility aims to provide a scaled-down version of prototypic facilities for comprehensive V&V activities by overcoming these challenges and making the necessary modifications. This approach minimizes scaling distortion, simulates prototypic plant conditions, and accurately models accident event progressions. Thus, the facility will be capable of adequately modeling a scaled SMR system to support the design, development and licensing needs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

AGR-5/6/7 Irradiation Test Final As-run Report

This document presents the as-run analysis of the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR)-5/6/7 irradiation experiment. AGR-5/6/7 is the last of a series of experiments conducted in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory in support of the development and qualification of tri-structural isotropic low-enriched fuel for use in high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. The test train contained five separate capsules that were independently controlled and monitored. Each capsule contained multiple 24.91-mm-long and 12.25-mm-dimeter compacts filled with low-enriched uranium carbide/oxide tri-structural isotropic fuel particles. The objectives of the AGR-5/6/7 experiment were to: • Irradiate reference-design fuel particles to support fuel qualification. • Establish operating margins for the fuel, beyond normal operating conditions. • Provide irradiated-fuel performance data and irradiated-fuel samples for post-irradiation examination and safety testing. The primary objective of the AGR-5/6 test (Capsules 1, 2, 4, and 5) was to verify the successful performance of the reference-design fuel under normal operating conditions. The AGR-7 test (Capsule 3) was designed to explore fuel performance at higher temperatures. Its primary objective was to demonstrate the capability of the fuel to withstand conditions beyond normal operating conditions, in support of plant design and licensing. AGR-5/6/7 will also provide irradiated-fuel performance data based on the fission gas release from particles during irradiation. To achieve the test objectives, the AGR-5/6/7 experiment was irradiated in the northeast flux trap of the ATR with a planned duration of 500 effective full-power days. The northeast flux trap was selected because its larger diameter provided greater flexibility for test-train design compared to the Large B positions used for the AGR-1 and AGR-2 irradiations, significantly enhancing test capabilities for the combined irradiation campaigns. Due to delays in the ATR schedule, the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation was significantly shorter than the originally planned 13-cycle schedule. Irradiation began on February 16, 2018 and ended on July 22, 2020, spanning nine ATR cycles (162B–168A) over two and a half years. Thus, the AGR-5/6/7 fuel compacts were irradiated for a total of approximately 360.9 effective full-power days. Final burnup values, on a per-compact basis, ranged from 5.66 to 15.26% fissions per initial heavy metal atom, while fast fluence values ranged from 1.62 to 5.55 × 1025 n/m2 (E >0.18 MeV). Time-averaged volume-averaged fuel temperatures on a capsule basis at the end of irradiation ranged from 756°C in Capsule 5 to 1313°C in Capsule 3 excluding days with significantly lower temperature during the two short powered axial locator mechanism cycles, 163A and 167A. By the end of irradiation, 48 out of 54 installed thermocouples had failed (the bottom three capsules lost all thermocouples). During the first five cycles (162B – 165A), the fission-gas isotope release-rate-to-birthrate (R/B) ratios were stable in the 10-8–10-6 range, and no in-pile particle failures were observed based on the gross gamma counts. During this time, the high exposed kernel fraction and high fuel particle temperatures in Capsule 1 led to a maximum R/B value of around 2 ? 10-6 for Kr-85m. The fission gas release in all capsules started to increase from the second half of Cycle 166A, when a large number of in-pile particle failures occurred in Capsule 1 and a gas line problem in this capsule caused fission gas leakage at various degrees into the other four capsules. This gas line problem also prevented a fission gas release measurement for Capsule 1 during the last three cycles due to gas flow isolation. By the end of irradiation, it is estimated that approximately 15 particles failed in Capsule 3, which was considered possible because the experiment was designed to operate beyond the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor normal operating temperature range. A few hundred in-pile particle failures were estimated for Capsule 1 by the end of Cycle 166A, but the total number of failures is unknown due to the lack of fission gas release data in the later cycles. Additionally, four potential in-pile failures were identified for Capsule 2 during the last cycle, Cycle 168A. In contrast, no in-pile failures were identified in the top two capsules (4 and 5) based on the absence of the typical spikes in gross gamma counts and low failure estimates using the AGR-3/4 R/B per exposed kernel model.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Progress in Fast Modular Reactor Conceptual Design

The Fast Modular Reactor (FMR) is a 100-MW(thermal) gas-cooled fast reactor being developed by General Atomics Electromagnetic System with the goal of developing a FMR for flexible and dispatchable power to the U.S. electricity market in the mid-2030s. The conceptual design aims to develop and verify simplified design features. These include an inert helium gas coolant, pellet-loaded fuel rods, installations with air cooling as ultimate heat sink, and small and passive heat removal systems. The goal is to ensure the development of a safe, maintainable, cost-effective, and distributed nuclear energy-generating station. The baseline technologies selected to achieve this goal are a helium coolant that is an inert gas with no chemical reaction with structural components, not activated, single phase, enabling high-temperature operation and a high thermal efficiency Brayton cycle; conventional uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) fuel, which is the most widely used and well-known fuel material, capable of high burnup (100 MWd/kg) and a long fuel life; and silicon carbide composite (SiGA®) cladding and internal structures that are chemically inert in the helium environment, exceptionally radiation tolerant, and being derisked by accident tolerant fuel technology development. Further, the reactor was specifically designed with passive safety features, including high-temperature in-core materials and a reactor vessel cooling system consisting of cooling panels of naturally circulating water. The passive safety of the core was confirmed for the depressurized loss-of–forced cooling accident, which showed the peak cladding temperature at ~1600°C during the transient, which is below the current design limit of 1800°C. The conceptual design of the FMR has been conducted for the reactor system, vessel system, generator and turbomachine, instrumentation and control, residual heat removal system, plant service system, and containment, as well as pre-application licensing documents.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Demonstrating Advanced Nuclear Energy Solutions for Net Zero

Background/Objectives. The aggressive goals being set by nation states, communities, and private industry for decarbonization of grid electricity, industrial heat sources, and transportation around the world are imperative to mitigating the devastating effects that we are seeing from climate change. Although many of these goals focus on accomplishments by 2035 or 2050, the decisions that we make today won’t just impact the landscape of energy systems for the next 20 or 30 years—they will shape the world’s environment for centuries to come. That means that we can’t just focus on technologies that will get us to 2050, but technologies that will withstand our energy demands over that long-ranging future. Success will require us to utilize all of the clean energy resources that we have available to meet demands for electricity, heat, and steam, and we will need energy carriers such as hydrogen that do not emit additional greenhouse gases at the point of use. Nuclear energy, ranging from technologies in service today to advanced, higher temperature and modular systems that will be in service this decade, will provide a robust complement to renewable energy resources that operate variably. Researchers across the U.S. Department of Energy laboratory complex are working to advance multiple aspects of these clean energy solutions, with many focusing on integrated energy system solutions that leverage all available clean energy assets to meet wide-ranging energy demands. Approach/Activities. Nuclear energy is a proven, zero-emission option during operation that can provide consistent, dispatchable power to meet electricity demands while also providing high-quality heat that can meet energy demands beyond the electricity sector. Energy system design should seek to maximize these assets. As a dispatchable energy source with a small land utilization footprint, nuclear energy can be collocated with renewable resources, and the smaller systems that will be deployed this decade (ranging from a few megawatts to hundreds of megawatts) can be installed right where that energy is needed. Integrated nuclear and renewable systems will enhance power grid reliability and resilience, and they will help stabilize the grid through their increasingly flexible operation. Licensing, installation, and broad adoption of these advanced nuclear energy systems are expected to progress significantly in the 2020s, but this may be longer than desired by some stakeholders wishing to implement impactful clean energy decisions today. However, one must recall that nuclear energy systems will operate for 80 or more years, as is being demonstrated by current fleet nuclear systems. The nuclear community is extremely thorough in reviewing these systems with regard to safety and security; these efforts ensure that the deployed systems will continue to provide reliable, resilient energy over that operational lifetime. That investment of time up front will ensure that we can support energy demands over the centuries to come. While advanced nuclear technologies move through this process, communities and private industry may choose to install renewable generation systems that can later be coupled to the complementary nuclear systems as they become available—thus moving closer to the net zero goals in the near term. Choosing technologies and deployment configurations that allow small modular nuclear powerhouses to be added to these “energy parks” as they become available will ensure that advanced technologies can be readily adopted to support growing demands for clean energy. Results/Lessons Learned. The primary focus of integrated energy systems (IES) research is to assess the technical and economic potential of novel multi-input, multioutput solutions that are expected to enhance energy system flexibility, reliability, and resilience as we pursue a clean energy transition. Various energy applications and product streams beyond electricity are being evaluated, ranging from generation of potable water to production of hydrogen, fertilizers, synthetic fuels, and various chemicals. In early FY23 Idaho National Laboratory (INL) will commission thermal energy generation systems that emulate nuclear fission energy input using electric heating and will allow for integrated system testing with thermal energy storage, hydrogen production via high temperature electrolysis (HTE), and power systems hardware to demonstrate operation of a clean energy park within a microgrid or larger grid infrastructure, supporting up to 450 kW of heat input via electric heating and demonstrating operation of HTE systems at the multi-hundred kW scale. This presentation will highlight the wide array of RD&D being conducted at INL and partner laboratories to develop and deploy nuclear and renewable-based IES that will be key to achieving our net zero goals, including both computational and experimental demonstrations. By working with key collaborators in industry, analytical st

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Towards Risk-Informed Performance-Based Emergency Planning: Review of Regulation, Guidance, and Methods

At a fundamental level, nuclear facility safety is built upon the concept of defense-in-depth (DID), which entails multiple, independent layers of protection for public health and safety. Within the DID structure, emergency preparedness (EP) is the last layer of defense and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Over several decades, the EP regulatory framework has evolved in response to lessons learned from actual events, experience with maintaining and testing EP capabilities, and advances in a wide range of technologies. Furthering this evolution, recent developments in risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) design and licensing approaches provide an opportunity to leverage insights regarding the attributes of the specific facility and site to inform EP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Monolithic Heat Pipe Microreactor Reference Plant Model

This work introduces a reference plant model for a generic monolithic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor. The model will serve as a springboard to develop future evaluation models in the licensing process of similar microreactor designs at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This model has been developed with the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle and its specifications are based on open literature publications for the eVinci TM design. BlueCRAB is the U.S. Nu- clear Regulatory Commission non-light-water reactor analysis system based on the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment framework, which can couple the Griffin, BISON, and Sockeye applications to resolve the various physics that are essential for the safety analysis of this type of reactor system. The core specifications includes tristructural isotropic fuel, graphite monolith, graphite reflectors, and drums composed of graphite and B 4 C. No moderator or burnable poison pins are used in the design. The fuel enrichment is reduced to control excess reactivity in the core. This core design is not optimized and only serves for testing purposes, since the primary objective of this work is to exercise the multiphysics coupling for this type of reactor system. A three dimensional (3D) core heterogeneous Griffin discrete ordinates (SN) transport model allows the precise calculation of the flux distribution and pin powers. Griffin transfers the power density distribution and obtains a temperature distribution to and from BISON. The BISON model com- putes the 3D core temperature distribution and is coupled to 876 Sockeye subapplications running a heat pipe model. This 3D conduction model is coupled to the various heat pipes via heat flux boundary conditions. The model includes a small gap between the heat pipe and the monolith. Convective heat transfer boundaries with either ambient temperature or condenser temperature as heat sinks are imposed at the model boundaries. The 2D Sockeye heat pipe model uses a vapor- only methodology, which provides the needed resolution for transient calculations and allows the determination of various heat pipe limits. This approach is superior to the superconductor model traditionally used in steady-state calculations. BlueCRAB computes steady-state power and temperature distributions that serve as the initial condition for a loss-of-heat-sink transient simulation. The steady-state results show significant peaking due to the position of the control drum, but this is a characteristic of the particular design used, which is not optimized at this stage. The transient results show the reactor power slowly stabilizing towards a 3% power level after the partial loss of secondary heat removal. Several recriticalities are observed due to cooling through the secondary system but the reactor is self-stabilizing and behaves as expected.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary 2025

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the ARC-100, a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) being developed by ARC Clean Technology, Inc (ARC). The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, used fuel assembly wash station, cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks, used fuel dry storage facility, damaged fuel storage facility, and radioactive waste building. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2022

MECHANISTIC MULTIPHYSICS MODELING OF CLADDING RUPTURE IN NUCLEAR FUEL RODS DURING LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

The Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is a design basis accident that is included as part of the safety analysis of nuclear power plants. As the nuclear industry desires to increase the cycle length and discharge burnup of existing nuclear power plants they must demonstrate safe operation during a LOCA on high burnup fuel. During a LOCA transient on high burnup fuel rods, the rods may undergo a process known as fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersal (FFRD). To permit dispersal, the cladding encapsulating the fuel must rupture with an opening size large enough to allow the fragmented fuel particles to release. Current licensing tools used by industry and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission are limited in geometric fidelity and materials that can be analyzed. These simulation tools generally employ a quasi-two-dimensional (1.5D or Layered1D) or 2D-RZ axisymmetric geometric representations exclusively. While a valid approach under some instances, there are times when important physics have an asymmetric behavior in the fuel rod. Examples include fuel fragmentation, thermal-hydraulic boundary conditions, and cladding rupture, all of which are important for LOCA analysis. As industry pursues burnup extensions it must be demonstrated that fuel dispersal can be mitigated or eliminated. To do this, an understanding of the rupture opening after cladding failure is required. This work presents the development of a model for predicting the size and location of the rupture opening in failed fuel rods during LOCA conditions using advanced modeling and simulation tools. In order to supply the rupture model with appropriate boundary conditions, improvements to fuel fragmentation, axial relocation and oxidation modeling were required. First, the eXtended Finite Element Method (XFEM) is used to mechanistically predict the number of fuel fragments that form due to material strength randomization, criteria for strength randomization, mesh density, power ramping rates and irradiation effects. These predictions with associated uncertainty were compared to empirical correlations developed for UO2 verifying that they can be used with increased confidence in subsequent axial relocation analyses. Secondly, a new first-of-its-kind Layered2D computational framework was developed that provides the ability to apply azimuthally varying boundary conditions while providing discrete layers to track fuel movement during the LOCA. An existing fuel axial relocation model developed for Layered1D was extended to work within the Layered2D framework. A large sensitivity study was performed on the initial version of the model to identify modeling parameters of particular importance, with the emissivity used for radiation after blowdown being the primary source of uncertainty. Then, a simplistic approach to incorporate mechanical degradation of the cladding due to oxidation was also developed to investigate the impact of reduced cladding thickness on predictions of the time to failure of cladding tubes. It was found that the cladding will typically rupture prior to a reduction in thickness that is sufficient to impact the rupture behavior. A model was then developed for predicting cladding rupture that transfers the cladding surface temperatures, rod internal and external pressures, fast neutron fluence, and fast neutron flux from a more detailed Layered1D, Layered2D, or 2D-RZ analysis to a 3D cladding only analysis. Comparisons of the rupture model to a few experiments indicate reasonable predictions. The rupture model was then applied to two accident tolerant fuel concepts (FeCrAl and Cr-coated Zircaloy) where it predicted that both ATF concepts would have smaller rupture openings and delayed rupture times than the standard Zircaloy-4 cladding material under identical loading conditions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Summary of LWRS Research in Addressing RPV Research Gaps in NRC EMDA Report

Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPVs) are critical components in nuclear reactors, housing the reactor core and coolant under extreme conditions of temperature, pressure, and radiation. These harsh environments contribute to the degradation of RPV materials over time, presenting challenges for extending reactor operations beyond their original design lifespans. The NRC Expanded Materials Degradation Assessment (EMDA) report volume 3 have been instrumental in guiding research to support extending the operational life of light water reactors (LWRs) up to 80 years. It provides a comprehensive framework to address technical challenges related to aging and degradation mechanisms in RPVs. The LWRS program has played a key role in advancing this research, supporting projects such as the UCSB ATR-2 Experiment, material testing from Zion and Palisades reactors, and the development of advanced mini-compact tension testing techniques. These efforts have been crucial in identifying and addressing gaps in our understanding of RPV aging, contributing to the successful subsequent license renewals of eight LWR units in the U.S. The EMDA report volume 3, built on the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) analysis from earlier versions of the EPRI Materials Degradation Matrix (MDM) and Issue Management Tables (IMTs), provides a detailed assessment of RPV degradation mechanisms. However, as EPRI has updated the MDM and IMT, it is important to revisit research priorities and methodologies to reflect these changes. The revised MDM and IMT may introduce new factors affecting long-term RPV performance and safety, highlighting the need for continued research and updated guidance to ensure the reliable and safe operation of reactors beyond 80 years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Benchmark Uncertainties for Deimos, a HALEU-Fueled and Graphite-Moderated Advanced Reactor Testbed

Many advanced reactor concepts will make use of various uranium fuels with levels of enrichment higher than previously seen in current light water reactors. In particular, High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU), that is uranium enriched to 235 U ≈ 20 w/o%, is planned to be used in over ten new reactor concepts. HALEU is attractive for advanced reactors as it enables longer intervals between refueling. Unfortunately, little to no experience with HALEU is available in experimental literature raising concerns for not only licensing advanced re actors but also fabrication and transportation of HALEU fuels. This is where Deimos, a Los Alamos National Laboratory internal project, comes in. Deimos is a new critical experiment scheduled for FY24 at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Deimos is a graphite moderated, graphite and beryllium reflected critical experiment making use of HALEU TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel from the Compact Nuclear Power System (CNPS). This transaction entails a brief description of efforts to benchmark Deimos for inclusion into the International Criticality Safety

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

SSR APPLIED – Automated Power Plants: Intelligent, Efficient and Digitised (V.2)

This report describes work undertaken during the SSR APPLIED project. The focus of the project has been on the development of digital twins to de-risk licensing of improved operating and maintenance practices. The operation of a bespoke flowing separate effects molten salt loop at ANL, with realistic temperature gradients, will provide invaluable data for computer codes validation. Three digital twins of aspects of the SSR-W have been successfully developed using ANL expertise and software. These digital twins have demonstrated optimization of the fuel cycle, the ability to model transients using an integrated coupled neutronic – thermal-hydraulic model with a model of the fuel expansion feedback so important to the inherent safety of the SSR-W. Advanced machine learning techniques have been developed and demonstrated for optimization of heat exchanger operation and maintenance.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

SCALE Lattice Physics Code Assessments of Accident Tolerant Fuel

This report highlights accident-tolerant fuel (ATF) code assessment activities performed under Project NRCHQ- 60-17-T-0017, Lattice Physics Enhancements and Assessment. ATF covers a broad range of advanced fuel and clad designs for light water reactors (LWRs) to enhance performance under several accident conditions. Several ATF concepts are anticipated to be deployed as lead test rods (LTRs) or lead test assemblies (LTAs) within the next five years. The purpose of this work is to assess the predictive capabilities of NRC neutronics codes that underpin various licensing calculations. ATF designs use different fuel and clad materials compared to standard UO 2 fuel and zirconium-alloy claddings (hereafter UO 2 -Zry). These new materials and geometrical designs need to be assessed to quantify the impact of nuclear data uncertainties on quantities of interest (QOIs) in licensing calculations and the impact of modeling approximations which may be valid for UO 2 -Zry but not for ATF. This report outlines a systematic approach for ATF neutronics code assessment which includes sensitivity and uncertainty (S/U) analysis of nuclear data, identification of experimental benchmark and gaps for code validation, investigation of modeling approximations, and code-to-code comparisons of calculated QOIs against high-fidelity reference continuous energy (CE) Monte Carlo (MC) calculations. This report focuses on the assessment of the SCALE/Polaris lattice physics code for reactor safety analysis. Polaris lattice physics calculations generate few group (FG) cross sections for PARCS full-core calculations. (Full-core analysis, spent fuel analysis, and severe accident analysis will be performed in future work.) The selected ATF concepts for this report include Cr 2 O 3 and Al 2 O 3 -Cr 2 O 3 -doped UO 2 fuel, U 3 Si 2 fuel, FeCrAl cladding, SiC cladding, and Cr-coated cladding.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗