Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Safety Controls”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1983

The space station - An overview of the design process

The design factors being considered in the NASA space-station development program are summarized. The currently envisioned mission requirements are listed, and the system architecture is defined as a core station, mission-dedicated elements, and supporting equipment such as an orbit maneuvering vehicle. System design factors discussed include orbit selection, contamination control, autonomy, system safety, technology implementation, long life, reliability and maintainability, and cost; subsystem design factors include structural considerations, electrical power, environmental control and life support, data management, communications and tracking, onboard propulsion, habitability, and crew support. Configurational design is seen as driven by a number of factors, primarily the need to fit all components into the Shuttle payload bay for assembly in LEO by the Shuttle crew.

Covington, C.↗
DOE OSTI2024

TRISO Fuel’s Safety Functions, Contributions to Reactor Safety, and Necessary Safety Limits

Safety functions are the actions, passive or active, that structures, systems, and components of nuclear facility that contribute to the safety of the workers, the public, or the environment. Well-defined safety functions are the foundation of a solid safety case for a reactor. For reactors that use TRISO-coated particles, the TRISO fuel plays an important part of the safety case because of its ability to contain radionuclides in the fuel itself. This ability enables the use of a functional containment strategy for the reactor where radionuclide retention is the primary safety function supported by the safety functions of controlling reactivity control and controlling heat rejection. This paper establishes at a deeper level the role that TRISO fuel plays in each of these safety functions and associated quality assurance and testing requirements for TRISO particle manufacturing to ensure these safety functions. Safety limits necessary to protect these safety functions include: operational limits, time at temperature limits, and fission gas release activity limits. In conclusion, this approach demonstrates the role that specific aspects of TRISO fuel play in protecting the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2018

Understanding Risk Tolerance and Building an Effective Safety Culture

Estimates range from 65-90 percent of catastrophic mishaps are due to human error. NASA's human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at approximately 75 percent. As much as we'd like to error-proof our work environment, even the most automated and complex technical endeavors require human interaction... and are vulnerable to human frailty. Industry and government are focusing not only on human factors integration into hazardous work environments, but also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong Safety Culture that diminishes risk. Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators to identify potential risk vulnerabilities. NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and complex facilities. NASA's facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) Process Safety, API (American Petroleum Institute) Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify risk control vulnerabilities.

Loyd, David↗
NASA NTRS1969

Instruction manuals for liquid penetrant nondestructive testing

Manuals provide quality control and test personnel with basic information on liquid penetrant testing. Topics covered include scope of application, equipment and materials used, test procedures, safety precautions, quality control, and comparison of liquid penetrant testing with other nondestructive testing processes.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1985

Practical aspects of photovoltaic technology, applications and cost (revised)

The purpose of this text is to provide the reader with the background, understanding, and computational tools needed to master the practical aspects of photovoltaic (PV) technology, application, and cost. The focus is on stand-alone, silicon solar cell, flat-plate systems in the range of 1 to 25 kWh/day output. Technology topics covered include operation and performance of each of the major system components (e.g., modules, array, battery, regulators, controls, and instrumentation), safety, installation, operation and maintenance, and electrical loads. Application experience and trends are presented. Indices of electrical service performance - reliability, availability, and voltage control - are discussed, and the known service performance of central station electric grid, diesel-generator, and PV stand-alone systems are compared. PV system sizing methods are reviewed and compared, and a procedure for rapid sizing is described and illustrated by the use of several sample cases. The rapid sizing procedure yields an array and battery size that corresponds to a minimum cost system for a given load requirement, insulation condition, and desired level of service performance. PV system capital cost and levelized energy cost are derived as functions of service performance and insulation. Estimates of future trends in PV system costs are made.

Rosenblum, L.↗
DOE OSTI2025

HFIR LEU High Density Silicide Dispersion Optimized Design Steady-State Heat Transfer Analyses

Steady-state heat transfer simulations of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) with the low-enriched uranium (LEU) high-density silicide dispersion Optimized fuel design were performed to support comprehensive performance and safety metric studies concerning this design. The LEU Optimized design operates at 95 MW to maintain HFIR’s current highly enriched uranium (HEU) core performance level at 85 MW. Full cycle Mode 1 full flow Case 1 (inlet temperature), Case 2 (flux-to-flow), and Case 3 (inlet pressure) safety limit analyses were performed to assess the margins to critical heat flux. Under the prescribed conditions, this LEU design meets the safety limit and limiting control setting requirements outlined in HFIR’s documented safety analysis; however, the safety margins are less than those for the 85 MW HEU core, and several assumptions were made where fuel fabrication and qualification data are currently lacking for the silicide fuel design. Effects of changes to pertinent fuel fabrication assumptions and uncertainty factors on thermal safety margins were also evaluated, showing that the margins are sensitive to many of these parameters. Power and pressure perturbations were also performed, indicating that significant steady-state thermal margins could be gained by increasing the coolant inlet pressure.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1978

Fault-tolerant software for aircraft control systems

Concepts for software to implement real time aircraft control systems on a centralized digital computer were discussed. A fault tolerant software structure employing functionally redundant routines with concurrent error detection was proposed for critical control functions involving safety of flight and landing. A degraded recovery block concept was devised to allow collocation of critical and noncritical software modules within the same control structure. The additional computer resources required to implement the proposed software structure for a representative set of aircraft control functions were discussed. It was estimated that approximately 30 percent more memory space is required to implement the total set of control functions. A reliability model for the fault tolerant software was described and parametric estimates of failure rate were made.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2014

Remote Software Application and Display Development

The era of the shuttle program has come to an end, but only to give rise to newer and more exciting projects. Now is the time of the Orion spacecraft, a work of art designed to exceed all previous endeavors of man. NASA is exiting the time of exploration and is entering a new period, a period of pioneering. With this new mission, many of NASAs organizations must undergo a great deal of change and development to support the Orion missions. The Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) is the new system that will provide NASA the ability to launch rockets into orbit and thus control Orion and other spacecraft as the goal of populating Mars becomes ever increasingly tangible. Since the previous control system, Launch Processing System (LPS), was primarily designed to launch the shuttles, SCCS was needed as Kennedy Space Center (KSC) reorganized to a multiuser spaceport for commercial flights, providing a more versatile control over rockets. Within SCCS, is the Launch Control System (LCS), which is the remote software behind the command and monitoring of flight and ground system hardware. This internship at KSC has involved two main components in LCS, including Remote Software Application and Display development. The display environment provides a graphical user interface for an operator to view and see if any cautions are raised, while the remote applications are the backbone that communicate with hardware, and then relay the data back to the displays. These elements go hand in hand as they provide monitoring and control over hardware and software alike from the safety of the Launch Control Center. The remote software applications are written in Application Control Language (ACL), which must undergo unit testing to ensure data integrity. This paper describes both the implementation and writing of unit tests in ACL code for remote software applications, as well as the building of remote displays to be used in the Launch Control Center (LCC).

ACL↗
NASA NTRS1994

Ground-based wake vortex monitoring, prediction, and ATC interface

This talk will discuss three elements of a proposed Wake Vortex Advisory Service: monitoring, prediction and ATC interface. The monitoring element is needed to ensure safety by warning controllers of hazardous wake vortex conditions. Such conditions exist when wake vortices persist in the approach/departure flight paths due to advection or to atmospheric conditions which prevent their decay. The prediction element is needed to provide ATC supervisors with advance warning that wake vortex separation conditions are about to change (i.e., require increased or decreased wake vortex separation). The ATC interface element is needed to provide controllers with adaptive wake vortex separations. The use of these adaptive wake vortex separations would lead to increased airport capacity under most conditions, while maintaining safety under conditions of wake vortex hazard.

Campbell, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project KDP-C Review

The topics discussed are the UAS-NAS project life-cycle and ARMD thrust flow down, as well as the UAS environments and how we operate in those environments. NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, CA, is leading a project designed to help integrate unmanned air vehicles into the world around us. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or UAS in the NAS, will contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The project falls under the Integrated Systems Research Program office managed at NASA Headquarters by the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. NASA's four aeronautics research centers - Armstrong, Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Glenn Research Center - are part of the technology development project. With the use and diversity of unmanned aircraft growing rapidly, new uses for these vehicles are constantly being considered. Unmanned aircraft promise new ways of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing safety and saving lives 460265main_ED10-0132-16_full.jpg Unmanned aircraft systems such as NASA's Global Hawks (above) and Predator B named Ikhana (below), along with numerous other unmanned aircraft systems large and small, are the prime focus of the UAS in the NAS effort to integrate them into the national airspace. Credits: NASA Photos 710580main_ED07-0243-37_full.jpg The UAS in the NAS project envisions performance-based routine access to all segments of the national airspace for all unmanned aircraft system classes, once all safety-related and technical barriers are overcome. The project will provide critical data to such key stakeholders and customers as the Federal Aviation Administration and RTCA Special Committee 203 (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) by conducting integrated, relevant system-level tests to adequately address safety and operational challenges of national airspace access by unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS. In the process, the project will work with other key stakeholders to define necessary deliverables and products to help enable such access. Within the project, NASA is focusing on five sub-projects. These five focus areas include assurance of safe separation of unmanned aircraft from manned aircraft when flying in the national airspace; safety-critical command and control systems and radio frequencies to enable safe operation of UAS; human factors issues for ground control stations; airworthiness certification standards for UAS avionics and integrated tests and evaluation designed to determine the viability of emerging UAS technology. Five Focus Areas of the UAS Integration in the NAS Project Separation Assurance Provide an assessment of how planned Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) separation assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed operations with manned aircraft Assess the applicability to UAS and the performance of NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and uncertain trajectories Assess functional allocations ranging from today's ground-based, controller-provided aircraft separation to fully autonomous airborne self-separation Communications Develop data and rationale to obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations to enable safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Develop and validate candidate secure safety-critical command and control system/subsystem test equipment for UAS that complies with UAS international/national frequency regulations, standards and recommended practices and minimum operational and aviation system performance standards for UAS Perform analysis to support recommendations for integration of safety-critical command and control systems and air traffic control communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Human Systems Integration Develop a research test bed and database to provide data and proof of concept for GCS - ground control station - operations in the NAS Coordinate with standards organizations to develop human-factors guidelines for GCS operation in the NAS Certification Define a UAS classification scheme and approach to determining Federal Aviation Regulation airworthiness requirements applicable to all UAS digital avionics Provide hazard and risk-related data to support development of type design criteria and best development practices Integrated Tests and Evaluation Integrate and test mature concepts from technical elements to demonstrate and test viability Evaluate the performance of technology development in a relevant environment (full-mission, human-in-the-loop simulations and flight tests)

outreach↗
NASA NTRS1982

Study of certain tether safety issues. Continuation of investigation of electrodynamic stabilization and control of long orbiting tethers, volume 1

The behavior of long tethers (10-100 km) in space are addressed under two failure situations with potential safety impact: instantaneous jamming of the reel controlling the tether during deployment and cutting of the tether due to a meteor strike or other similar phenomena. Dual and multiple mass point models were used in the SAO SKYHOOK program to determine this behavior. The results of the program runs were verified analytically or by comparison with previously verified results. The study included the effects of tether damping and air drag where appropriate. Most runs were done with the tether system undamped since we believe this best represents the true behavior of the tether. Means for controlling undesirable behavior of the tether, such as viscous dampers in the subsatellite, were also studied.

Colombo, G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safe Operations at Roadway Junctions - Design Principles from Automated Guideway Transit

Herein this paper describes a system-level view of a fully automated transit system comprising a fleet of automated vehicles (AVs) in driverless operation, each with an SAE level 4 Automated Driving System, along with its related safety infrastructure and other system equipment. This AV system-level control is compared to the automatic train control system used in automated guideway transit technology, particularly that of communications-based train control (CBTC). Drawing from the safety principles, analysis methods, and risk assessments of CBTC systems, comparable functional subsystem definitions are proposed for AV fleets in driverless operation. With the prospect of multiple AV fleets operating within a single automated mobility district, the criticality of protecting roadway junctions requires an approach like that of automated fixed-guideway transit systems, in which a guideway switch zone "interlocking" at each junction location deconflicts railway traffic, affirming safe passage. The analogous AV protection safety subsystem is defined as fail-safe equipment that monitors roadway intersections and junctions, communicates traffic signal status, perceives and communicates alerts and signals to AV connected vehicles concerning potential unsafe conditions, and performs related primary safety functions. Conclusions are drawn that the AV protection roadway intersection functions must be performed by local roadside equipment dedicated to protecting each roadway intersection and junction. Further, it is concluded that the communications technology connecting the infrastructure with the vehicle to perform this vital, fail-safe protection should meet specific functional and performance criteria.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
NASA NTRS2000

Modeling and Design of an Electro-Rheological Fluid Based Haptic System for Tele-Operation of Space Robots

For many years, the robotic community sought to develop robots that can eventually operate autonomously and eliminate the need for human operators. However, there is an increasing realization that there are some tasks that human can perform significantly better but, due to associated hazards, distance, physical limitations and other causes, only robot can be employed to perform these tasks. Remotely performing these types of tasks requires operating robots as human surrogates. While current "hand master" haptic systems are able to reproduce the feeling of rigid objects, they present great difficulties in emulating the feeling of remote/virtual stiffness. In addition, they tend to be heavy, cumbersome and usually they only allow limited operator workspace. In this paper a novel haptic interface is presented to enable human-operators to "feel" and intuitively mirror the stiffness/forces at remote/virtual sites enabling control of robots as human-surrogates. This haptic interface is intended to provide human operators intuitive feeling of the stiffness and forces at remote or virtual sites in support of space robots performing dexterous manipulation tasks (such as operating a wrench or a drill). Remote applications are referred to the control of actual robots whereas virtual applications are referred to simulated operations. The developed haptic interface will be applicable to IVA operated robotic EVA tasks to enhance human performance, extend crew capability and assure crew safety. The electrically controlled stiffness is obtained using constrained ElectroRheological Fluids (ERF), which changes its viscosity under electrical stimulation. Forces applied at the robot end-effector due to a compliant environment will be reflected to the user using this ERF device where a change in the system viscosity will occur proportionally to the force to be transmitted. In this paper, we will present the results of our modeling, simulation, and initial testing of such an electrorheological fluid (ERF) based haptic device.

Mavroidis, Constantinos↗
NASA NTRS1981

Hierarchical specification of the SIFT fault tolerant flight control system

The specification and mechanical verification of the Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) flight control system is described. The methodology employed in the verification effort is discussed, and a description of the hierarchical models of the SIFT system is given. To meet the objective of NASA for the reliability of safety critical flight control systems, the SIFT computer must achieve a reliability well beyond the levels at which reliability can be actually measured. The methodology employed to demonstrate rigorously that the SIFT computer meets as reliability requirements is described. The hierarchy of design specifications from very abstract descriptions of system function down to the actual implementation is explained. The most abstract design specifications can be used to verify that the system functions correctly and with the desired reliability since almost all details of the realization were abstracted out. A succession of lower level models refine these specifications to the level of the actual implementation, and can be used to demonstrate that the implementation has the properties claimed of the abstract design specifications.

Melliar-Smith, P. M.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Measurement and Controls Data Acquisition System

Measurement and Controls Data Acquisition System (MCDAS) is an application program that integrates the functions of two stand-alone programs: one for acquisition of data, the other for controls. MCDAS facilitates and improves testing of complex engineering systems by helping to perform calibration and setup of test systems and acquisition, dissemination, and processing of data. Features of MCDAS include an intuitive, user-friendly graphical user interface, a capability for acquiring data at rates greater than previously possible, cooperation between the data-acquisition software subsystem and alarm-checking and analytical components of the control software subsystem, and a capability for dissemination of data through fiber optics and virtual and wide-area networks, including networks that contain hand-held display units. The integration of the data acquisition and control software offers a safety advantage by making alarm information available to the control software in a more timely manner. By enabling the use of hand-held devices, MCDAS reduces the time spent by technicians asking for screen updates to determine effects of setup actions. Previously recorded data can be processed without interruption to current acquisition of data. Analysts can continue to view test parameters while test-data files are being generated.

Hall, Rick↗
DOE OSTI2021

PD21A680: Additive Manufacturing Process Optimization and Qualification FY21 Year-end Report

This project builds upon knowledge gained from previous projects on Additive Manufacturing (AM) operation, process control and monitoring, repeatability, and process improvement. This project will exclusively focus on metal powder bed additive manufacturing (PBAM). Objective 1: Advance metal powder bed AM R&D capabilities. Perform enhanced R&D on increased build volumes and throughput, safety and handling controls, process monitoring, and diagnostics with a focus on production end-states. Objective 2: Build upon knowledge gained from previous PDRD projects to develop deeper understanding of process controls, essential for transitioning metal AM processes for future applications. Objective 3: Maintain business development and research advantages through collaborations with external industry and university partners.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗