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At least 289 records · Page 16

Apparatus and method supporting wireless access to multiple security layers in an industrial control and automation system or other system

A method includes receiving a message at a first wireless node. The first wireless node is associated with a first wired network, and the first wired network is associated with a first security layer. The method also includes transmitting the message over the first wired network when at least one destination of the message is located in the first security layer. The method further includes wirelessly transmitting the message for delivery to a second wireless node when at least one destination of the message is located in a second security layer. The second wireless node is associated with a second wired network, and the second wired network is associated with the second security layer. The first and second security layers may be associated with different security paradigms and/or different security domains. Also, the message could be associated with destinations in the first and second security layers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Secure key storage and distribution

This disclosure describes a distributed, fault-tolerant security system that enables the secure storage and distribution of private keys. In one implementation, the security system includes a plurality of computing resources that independently store private keys provided by publishers and encrypted using a single security system public key. To protect against malicious activity, the security system private key necessary to decrypt the publication private keys is not stored at any of the computing resources. Rather portions, or shares of the security system private key are stored at each of the computing resources within the security system and multiple security systems must communicate and share partial decryptions in order to decrypt the stored private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗

Synergies Between Nuclear Security and Critical Infrastructure: National Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities are part of a nation's critical infrastructure assets. Key cross-sector interdependencies, in relation to energy, transportation systems, communications, emergency services, water, information technologies and others, result in inevitable synergies between legal frameworks for the security of nuclear facilities and legal frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure. The protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and other malicious acts is paramount in ensuring energy security and thus ensuring uninterrupted energy supply. The protection of other sectors, such as uninterrupted communications, secure water supply, and others, supports a safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. Some countries rely on broader critical infrastructure frameworks to impose security requirements on nuclear facilities, or to achieve robust cybersecurity systems. This paper will analyze the interdependencies and synergies between the legal and regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection and nuclear facilities' security by comparing various national frameworks. The paper will also propose modalities to leverage the best practices and requirements from each framework towards energy security goals and stronger national nuclear security regimes.

Man, Madalina-Anca↗

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

Cyber / Physical Security Vulnerability Assessment Integration

Abstract Both physical protection and cyber security domains offer solutions for the discovery of vulnerabilities through the use of various assessment processes and software tools. Each vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology provides the ability to identify and categorize vulnerabilities, and quantifies the risks within their own areas of expertise. Neither approach fully represents the true potential security risk to a site and/or a facility, nor comprehensively assesses the overall security posture. The technical approach to solving this problem was to identify methodologies and processes that blend the physical and cyber security assessments, and develop tools to accurately quantify the unaccounted for risk. SMEs from both the physical and the cyber security domains developed the blending methodologies, and cross trained each other on the various aspects of the physical and cyber security assessment processes. A local critical infrastructure entity volunteered to host a proof of concept physical/cyber security assessment, and the lessons learned have been leveraged by this effort. The four potential modes of attack an adversary can use in approaching a target are; Physical Only Attack, Cyber Only Attack, Physical Enabled Cyber Attack, and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack. The Physical Only and the Cyber Only pathway analysis are two of the most widely analyzed attack modes. The pathway from an off-site location to the desired target location is dissected to ensure adversarial activity can be detected and neutralized by the protection strategy, prior to completion of a predefined task. This methodology typically explores a one way attack from the public space (or common area) inward towards the target. The Physical Enabled Cyber Attack and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack are much more intricate. Both scenarios involve beginning in one domain to affect change in the other, then backing outward to take advantage of the reduced system effectiveness, before penetrating further into the defenses. The proper identification and assessment of the overlapping areas (and interaction between these areas) in the VA process is necessary to accurately assess the true risk.

Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Analysis, Cyber Secur↗

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Nuclear security policy in the context of counter-terrorism in Cambodia

The risk of nuclear or dirty bomb attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening danger. The Cambodian national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear or other radioactive materials at ports, border crossings, and within the Cambodian institutions dealing with the nuclear security to manage the preventive programs. The aim of this study is to formulate guidance, to identify scenario of threat and risk, and to pinpoint necessary legal frameworks on nuclear security in the context of counterterrorism based on the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security series. The analysis of this study is guided by theoretical review, the review of international laws and politics, by identifying and interpreting applicable rules and norms establishing the nuclear security regime and how well enforcement of the regime is carried out and, what is the likelihood of the future reform might be. This study will examine the existing national legal frameworks of Cambodia in the context of counterterrorism to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack within the Cambodia territory. It will shed light on departmental lanes of national nuclear security responsibility, and provide a holistic perspective on the needs of additional resources and emphasis regarding nuclear security policy in the context of counterterrorism in Cambodia.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing Your ICS Software with the AttackSurface Host Analyzer (AHA)

Implementing a secure development lifecycle (SDL) presents increasing challenges to software developers as they must ensure software correctly integrates both underlying operating system security features while also managing dependencies on third-party libraries or executables. There are a growing number of security functions that require a close integration between the OS security features and software builds to ensure strong protection. Furthermore, as software platforms grow in complexity, they present many opportunities for misconfigurations and inadequate defenses. This challenge is especially prevalent for industrial control systems (ICS), which oten depend on both legacy sotware platforms, or out of date operating systems. This paper presents the AttackSurface Host Analyzer (AHA) tool, which is used to assess the security of a software platform through its integration with a host operating system. The tool collects data from the various platforms running on an OS, evaluates an array of security properties, and then introduces metrics and visualizations to provide feedback on the system's attack surface based on the external interconnections and the completeness of the available security protections. The paper then explores the attack surface of a variety of industry-standard ICS platforms to provide insight into the current degree of protection enabled by them.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Gross anatomy of network security

Information security involves many branches of effort, including information assurance, host level security, physical security, and network security. Computer network security methods and implementations are given a top-down description to permit a medically focused audience to anchor this information to their daily practice. The depth of detail of network functionality and security measures, like that of the study of human anatomy, can be highly involved. Presented at the level of major gross anatomical systems, this paper will focus on network backbone implementation and perimeter defenses, then diagnostic tools, and finally the user practices (the human element). Physical security measures, though significant, have been defined as beyond the scope of this presentation.

Computer Security↗

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗

NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate System Security Engineering Approaches

System security engineering (SSE) is a set of formal engineering methods and is considered a subset of systems engineering. It is a relatively new development in systems engineering with the initial NIST (National Institute of Standards) standard published in November of 2016 with updates in 2018, and 2022. The guiding principles in our methodology are based in NIST Special Publication 800-160 Vol. 1 “Systems Security Engineering: Considerations For A Multidisciplinary Approach In The Engineering Of Trustworthy Secure Systems” and integrate methodologies from common IT (Information Technology) threat modeling approaches utilizing MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering). The presentation will discuss how our teams utilize SSE and MBSE (Model-Based Systems Engineering) to develop secure architectures for systems under development in our NASA aeronautics research environment. This includes the activities to develop Protection Needs (PN) that, in turn result in security requirements in the design context and policies for the future state operational context for system protection. The process of applying SSE to analyze project architectures and ConOps (Concept of Operations) is intended to ensure the transferred research is both secure and securable in a “real-world” setting.

Systems Security Engineering↗

VALUE OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS FOR SECURITY OF A SAFER WORLD

ABSTRACT Cooperation of countries for improving security of radioactive and nuclear assets is clearly the key to success in establishing a more safe and secure world. Over the past few years the United States Department of Energy s Global Threat Reduction Initiatives (GTRI) program has been actively engaged with many countries of the world to identify, account for, and support enhancements to security and accounting measures for these materials. The Republic of Albania has demonstrated its willingness and desire to work closely with the United States to achieve and implement the GTRI goals for security of their assets. The GTRI program has assisted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in development on a variety of subject areas related to security of sources and nuclear materials. . Albania, a Member State of the IAEA, received training and information support from the agency. The leadership of the Albanian nuclear program has changed but the commitment of Albania to work closely with GTRI continues. The GTRI/Albania global partnership made significant accomplishments in security and safe storage of Albania s nuclear assets. This paper will describe a brief history of the Albanian program and the achievements resulting from the cooperative program with GTRI, which have resulted in a more secure Albania.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The climate change and energy security nexus

The study of the impacts of climate change on national and interna-tional security has grown as a research field, particularly in the last five years. Within this broad field, academic scholarship has concentrated primarily on whether climate change is, or may become, a driver of violent conflict. This relationship remains highly contested. However, national security policy and many non-governmental organizations have identified climate change as a threat multiplier in conflict situations. The U.S. Department of Defense and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense have incorporated these findings into strategic planning documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. In contrast to the climate-conflict nexus, our analysis found that academic scholarship on the climate change and energy security nexus is small and more disciplinarily focused. In fact, a search of social science litera-ture found few sources, with a significant percentage of these works attribut-able to a single journal. Assuming that policymakers are more likely to rely on broader social science literature than technical or scientific journals, this leaves a limited foundation. This then begged the question: what are these sources? We identified a body of grey literature on the nexus of climate change and energy security of a greater size than the body of peer-reviewed social science literature. We reviewed fifty-eight recent reports, issue briefs, and transcripts to better understand the nexus of climate change and energy security, as well as to gain insight about the questions policymakers need answered by those undertaking the research. In this article, we describe the nature of the sources reviewed, highlight possible climate change and energy security linkages found within those sources, identify emerging risks, and offer conclusions that can guide further research.

clmate change↗

Training on Transport Security of Nuclear/Radioactive Materials for Key Audiences

Beginning in 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP), Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management has sponsored a series of three training courses on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials during Transport. These courses were developed and hosted by Argonne National Laboratory staff with guest lecturers from both the U.S. and international organizations and agencies including the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE national laboratories, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). Each of the three courses held to date were one-week in length. The courses delved in detail into the regulatory requirements for transport security, focusing on international and U.S.-domestic requirements and guidance documents. Lectures, in-class discussions and small group exercises, including tabletop (TTX) and field exercises were designed to enhance the learning objectives for the participants. For example, the field exercise used the ARG-US radio frequency identification (RFID) remote surveillance system developed by Argonne for DOE/PCP to track and monitor packages in a mock shipment, following in-class exercises of developing a transport security plan (TSP) for the mock shipment, performing a readiness review and identifying needed corrective actions. Participants were able to follow the mock shipment on the webpage in real time in the ARG-US Command Center at Argonne including “staged” incidents that were designed to illustrate the importance of control, command, communication and coordination in ensuring transport security. Great lessons were learned based on feedback from the participant’s course evaluations with the series of the courses. Since the development of the relevant teaching materials for the course have largely been completed, tailoring the course for targeted audiences becomes a relatively easy task, requiring less effort and providing more flexibility for both the lecturers and future participants. One-day or two-day courses with focus specifically on the U.S. transport security requirements can be delivered, at locations away from Argonne, by one or two principal lecturers to targeted audiences such as regulators, shippers, carriers, state and local law enforcement personnel, and emergency responders. This paper will highlight the lessons learned in hosting previous one-week courses and discuss the development of options for detailed and/or customized courses/workshops for targeted key audiences.

2016 Waste Management March 6-10 Training on Trans↗