Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Unit testing”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16

Assessing the Performance of LED-Based Flashlights Available in the Kenyan Off-Grid Lighting Market

Low cost rechargeable flashlights that use LED technology are increasingly available in African markets. While LED technology holds promise to provide affordable, high quality lighting services, the widespread dissemination of low quality products may make it difficult to realize this potential. This study includes performance results for three brands of commonly available LED flashlights that were purchased in Kenya in 2009. The performance of the flashlights was evaluated by testing five units for each of the three brands. The tests included measurements of battery capacity, time required to charge the battery, maximum illuminance at one meter, operation time and lux-hours from a fully charged battery, light distribution, and color rendering. All flashlights tested performed well below the manufacturers? rated specifications; the measured battery capacity was 30-50percent lower than the rated capacity and the time required to fully charge the battery was 6-25percent greater than the rated time requirement. Our analysis further shows that within each brand there is considerable variability in each performance indicator. The five samples within a single brand varied from each other by as much as 22percent for battery capacity measurements, 3.6percent for the number of hours required for a full charge, 23percent for maximum initial lux, 38percent for run time, 11percent for light distribution and by as much as 200percent for color rendering. Results obtained are useful for creating a framework for quality assurance of off-grid LED products and will be valuable for informing consumers, distributors and product manufacturers about product performance.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Bench-Scale Testing of a High Efficiency, Ultra-Compact Process for Pre-Combustion CO 2 Capture (Final Report)

The overarching objective of this bench-scale study is to field-validate the technical feasibility of a membrane- and adsorption-enhanced water gas shift (WGS) reaction process that employs a carbon molecular sieve (CMS) membrane reactor (MR) followed by an adsorption reactor (AR) for pre-combustion CO 2 capture while demonstrating progress towards achievement of the overall performance goals of CO 2 capture with 95% CO 2 purity at a cost of electricity (COE) of 30% less than the baseline capture approaches. The main goal of this bench-scale project is to advance the proposed MR-AR transformative CO 2 capture technology to a sufficient maturity level so that our present industrial partners (M&PT and Worley) can potentially adapt the technology for further small pilot-scale testing. The project began at TRL 4, as the system prototype had already been validated in the laboratory on simulated syngas (as part of project DE-FE0026423). The project ended at TRL 5, via scaling-up of the prototype system and testing it on actual syngas at a host site (CAER at the University of Kentucky (UKy)). The project was carried-out in two different phases: In Phase I (during BP1 of the project), the team designed, constructed, and assembled the bench-scale experimental MR-AR system, prepared the membranes, adsorbents, and catalysts, tested the bench-scale unit with simulated syngas to validate functionality, and prepared a preliminary TEA of the technology. In Phase II (during BP2 of the project), the team installed the unit at the test site at the UKy site and completed all utility connections and hookups, field-tested the novel MR-AR process in the bench-scale system using real syngas, collected and analyzed experimental data, and completed a detailed TEA of the technology. A key aim of the project was to identify and address the technical and process risks and to generate information to advance the technology to the next stage of development. All project milestones and success criteria were met. Specifically, the team: (i) designed, constructed and assembled a bench scale system that handled 1 – 5 scfm syngas and tested its functionality with simulated syngas; (ii) prepared high performance CMS membrane tubes (ID: 3.5 mm, OD: 5.7 mm, 30” long) that meet the target H 2 permeance ( > 1 m 3 /(m 2 .hr.bar) or (> 370.3 GPU)) and a target H 2 /CO selectivity >80 at the relevant temperature (up to 300oC) and pressure conditions (up to 25 bar) with a <10% decline in performance over each 250 hr. testing period (iii) procured commercial sour-shift catalyst in sufficient quantity and prepared up to 10 kg of pelletized adsorbent for use at relevant conditions (250oC 2.5wt.% and target sorbent attrition rate < 0.2; (iv) installed the bench-scale unit at the test site (UKy) and tested the MR-AR technology using real syngas for over 250 hr. for both static and flow experiments; (v) updated the TEA analysis based on bench-scale data and met CO 2 capture goals of 95% CO 2 purity at a cost of electricity 30% less than baseline capture approaches. The CMS membranes, HTC adsorbents and catalysts employed all exhibited very robust and stable performance during the long-term run (over a >250 hr live syngas run). Furthermore, the proposed MR-AR IGCC system achieved a LCOE with a N 2 sale price of $\$$ 30/ton, with N 2 compression (no N 2 compression) of 101.2 $\$$/MWh (95.3 $\$$/MWh), which represents a 29.8% (33.9%) LCOE reduction in the baseline IGCC with carbon capture of 144.2 $\$$/MWh. The proposed MR-AR IGCC delivers a CO 2 capture cost of 44.8 $\$$/tonne (39.9 $\$$/tonne) vs 98.1 $\$$/tonne of the baseline capture case and a net power production of 586 MWe (623 MWe) vs 556 MWe of the baseline capture case.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of short-term initial performance of a “Molekule Air” portable air cleaner

The aim of this project was to evaluate and characterize the performance of a MOLEKULE AIR air cleaner unit. The testing protocol comprised the evaluation of an unused Molekule Air unit operating at maximum (“boost” setting) fan speed setting. The device was tested over initial short-term periods of 70-80 h of continuous operation. The tested air cleaner was challenged in separate experiments with a well-characterized mixture of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and with ozone. All tests were performed at realistic pollutant levels in a 20-m 3 environmental stainless-steel chamber. Variables controlled and measured in this study included the chamber temperature, relative humidity, the composition and concentration of the challenge VOCs, and the concentrations of ozone. Potential formation of byproducts was also investigated to assess the overall performance.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

CY2018 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2018–December 2018, Revision 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2018. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. Tritium concentrations in both of these wells, RNM-2S and UE-5n, remain above the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level of 20,000 picocuries per liter but declined in 2018 as compared to measurements in 2017. All other contaminants of concern are below the minimum detection level plus analytical error. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2018 is generally consistent with recent measurements for all wells. Many wells continue to exhibit a long-term downward trend in water level, despite small increases in measured water levels in 2018. The sharp 2016 decline in water level in Well ER-5-3-2 remains unexplained, with the lower level persisting through 2018. Rising water-level trends continue to be observed in two relatively deep wells (ER-5-3 deep piezometer and ER-5-4-2), and also in former supply Well WW-5A. The current supply wells exhibit relatively erratic water levels associated with pumping activities. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Low-Cost, Accessible Vaccine Cooler Options

In response to cold chain management requirements for COVID-19 vaccines, Los Alamos National Laboratory has investigated, built, and demonstrated viability for different cryogenic storage options. With ease-of-access and affordability in mind, these cooler units have been built using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. The team was also able to design a testing method for evaluating the performance of the different vaccine cooler options as part of the Technology Evaluation and Demonstration program. The tested cooler units demonstrated compatibility with either dry ice or liquid nitrogen as the cryogen, along with several commercial solvents. This compatibility demonstration would potentially offer sufficient flexibility for temperature control continuity. Next steps are to investigate industry interest in supporting field testing of the cooler units.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

NUCON Vapor Abatement Unit Performance on Hanford Tank Farm Chemicals of Potential Concern

This report provided the results and methods used in the NUCON Vapor Abatement Unit performance testing. The purpose of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) testing was to assess the performance of the NUCON International, Inc., Vapor Abatement Unit (VAU) prototype for the reduction of Hanford Tank Farm vapors associated chemicals of potential concern (COPC). The testing was conducted in compliance with the PNNL Assessment of NUCON Vapor Abatement Unit for Single-Shell Tank (SST) Farm Off-Gas Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPCs) test plan. Performance testing started on May 4, 2018 and continued through June 13, 2018. Eleven (11) COPCs were chosen for testing out of the 61 identified COPCs. The COPCs were chosen either due to the importance of that COPC measured in Hanford high-level waste single-shell tank (SST) vapor emissions, as a surrogate to represent a class of COPC compounds, or both. Results of the performance tests are included.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563, Septic Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. CAU 563 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 563 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Site characterization activities were performed in 2007, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the CAU 563 Corrective Action Decision Document. The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives is summarized below. CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank, contains no contaminants of concern (COCs) above action levels. No further action is required for this site; however, as a best management practice (BMP), all aboveground features (e.g., riser pipes and bumper posts) will be removed, the septic tank will be removed, and all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout. CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool, contains no COCs above action levels. No further action is required for this site; however, as a BMP, all aboveground features (e.g., riser pipes and bumper posts) will be removed, the cesspool will be abandoned by filling it with sand or native soil, and all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout. CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks, will be clean closed by excavating approximately 4 cubic yards (yd3) of arsenic- and chromium-impacted soil. In addition, as a BMP, the liquid in the South Tank will be removed, the North Tank will be removed or filled with grout and left in place, the South Tank will be filled with grout and left in place, all open pipe ends will be sealed with grout or similar material, approximately 10 yd3 of chlordane-impacted soil will be excavated, and debris within the CAS boundary will be removed. CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls, contains no COCs above action levels. No further action is required for this site; however, as a BMP, three drain pipe openings will be sealed with grout.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a Pre-Combustion CO 2 Capture Process Using High-Temperature PBI Hollow-Fiber Membranes

The overall objective of this project was to evaluate the advantages of transformational polybenzimidazole (PBI) polymer hollow-fiber membrane (HFM)-based, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture and purification technology at bench-scale using an actual coal-derived syngas stream from a coal gasification facility. The project was carried out over two budget periods. The technical objectives in Budget Period 1 (BP1) included preparing HFs and modules and upgrading the available skid for field testing. The technical objectives for BP2 were to field-test the skid unit with actual coal-derived syngas from an oxygen-blown gasifier to obtain performance data, update the Techno-Economic Analysis (TEA) that would assist with future process scale-up, and provide information on the design of a small pilot-scale test unit. The goal was to advance the PBI-HFM CO 2 capture and gas separation system for pre-combustion applications beyond second-generation economic performance predictions and make progress toward meeting overall fossil energy performance goals of CO 2 capture with 95% CO 2 purity at a cost of electricity (COE) 30% less than baseline capture approaches. The research program was designed with progressive technical tasks leading to both dynamic and steady-state testing of the PBI-HFM skid with actual coal-derived syngas. The work plan was to: (1) fabricate sufficient Generation-2 (GEN-2) fibers for module fabrication; (2) upgrade the fiber skid to accommodate large fiber modules for bench-scale field testing; (3) conduct dynamic and steady-state testing with coal-derived syngas from an oxygen-blown gasifier and obtain system performance data; (4) perform a TEA and environmental, health, and safety (EH&S) assessment; (5) update the State-Point Data Table, Technology Gap Analysis (TGA), and Technology Maturation Plan (TMP); (6) uninstall and return the test skid to the Recipient’s facilities; and (7) submit a Final Report that describes the results and analysis of the project research effort.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 166 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials' and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 02-42-01, Condo Release Storage Yd - North; CAS 02-42-02, Condo Release Storage Yd - South; CAS 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area; CAS 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard; CAS 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum; CAS 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank; and CAS 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain. Closure activities were conducted from March to July 2009 according to the FF ACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 166 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007b). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure. Closure activities are summarized. CAU 166, Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, consists of seven CASs in Areas 2, 3, 5, and 18 of the NTS. The closure alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure. This CR provides a summary of completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and confirmation that remediation goals were met. The following site closure activities were performed at CAU 166 as documented in this CR: (1) At CAS 02-99-10, D-38 Storage Area, approximately 40 gal of lead shot were removed and are currently pending treatment and disposal as MW, and approximately 50 small pieces of DU were removed and disposed as LLW. (2) At CAS 03-42-01, Conditional Release Storage Yard, approximately 7.5 yd{sup 3} of soil impacted with lead and Am-241 were removed and disposed as LLW. As a BMP, approximately 22 ft{sup 3} of asbestos tile were removed from a portable building and disposed as ALLW, approximately 55 gal of oil were drained from accumulators and are currently pending disposal as HW, the portable building was removed and disposed as LLW, and accumulators, gas cylinders, and associated debris were removed and are currently pending treatment and disposal as MW. (3) At CAS 05-19-02, Contaminated Soil and Drum, as a BMP, an empty drum was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (4) At CAS 18-01-01, Aboveground Storage Tank, approximately 165 gal of lead-impacted liquid were removed and are currently pending disposal as HW, and approximately 10 gal of lead shot and 6 yd{sup 3} of wax embedded with lead shot were removed and are currently pending treatment and disposal as MW. As a BMP, approximately 0.5 yd{sup 3} of wax were removed and disposed as hydrocarbon waste, approximately 55 gal of liquid were removed and disposed as sanitary waste, and two metal containers were grouted in place. (5) At CAS 18-99-03, Wax Piles/Oil Stain, no further action was required; however, as a BMP, approximately l.5 yd{sup 3} of wax were removed and disposed as hydrocarbon waste, and one metal container was grouted in place.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: (CY2017 January 2017–December 2017, Rev. 0)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2017. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The 86,000-picocuries-per-liter (pCi/L) tritium concentration in one of the wells is about 12 percent higher than measured in 2016 but is over an order of magnitude less than the peak value measured in the well in 1980. The concentration in the other source/plume well is lower than measured in 2016. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2017 is generally consistent with recent measurements for most wells. Water-level declines differing from long-term trends were observed in four wells. Three of these (WW-4, WW-4A, and WW-5B) are water-supply wells that experienced increases in pumping during the year. No definitive cause for the sharp decline in the fourth well (ER-5-3-2) in 2016 is known as yet. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Special Form Testing of Sealed Source Encapsulation for High-Alpha-Activity Actinide Materials

In the United States all transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Beginning in 2008 a new type of sealed-source encapsulation package was developed and tested by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These packages contain high-alpha-activity actinides and are regulated and transported in accordance with the requirements for DOT Class 7 hazardous material. The DOT provides specific regulations pertaining to special form encapsulation designs. The special form designation indicates that the encapsulated radioactive contents have a very low probability of dispersion even when subjected to significant structural events. The special form designs have been shown to simplify the delivery, transport, acceptance, and receipt processes. It is intended for these sealed-source encapsulations to be shipped to various facilities making it very advantageous for them to be certified as special form. To this end, DOT Certificates of Competent Authority (CoCAs) have been sought for the design suitable for containing high-alpha-activity actinide materials. This design consists of the high-alpha-activity material encapsulated within a triangular zirconia canister, referred to as a ZipCan, tile that is then enclosed by a spherical shell. The spherical shell design, with ZipCan tile inside, was tested for compliance with the special form regulations found in 49 CFR 173.469. The spherical enclosure was subjected to 9-m impact, 1 m percussion, and 10-minute thermal tests at the Packaging Evaluation Facility located at the National Transportation Research Center in Knoxville, TN USA and operated by ORNL. Before and after each test, the test units were subjected to a helium leak check and a bubble test. The ZipCan tiles and core were also subjected to the tests required for ISO 2919:2012(E), including a Class IV impact test and heat test and subsequently subjected to helium leakage rate tests [49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i)]. The impact-tile test unit contained a nonradioactive surrogate; however, the thermal test unit contained a radioactive source. This paper describes the regulatory special form tests and presents detailed impact and leak test results that demonstrate that the sealed source encapsulation designs satisfy the regulatory tests.

Martinez, Oscar A↗

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

REGULATORY TESTING AND 3D SCANNING METHODOLOGY OF THE DPP-1 TYPE SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR NCT AND HAC TESTS

The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. In the United States of America all transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) along with input by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All packages that contain radioactive material requires that it be transported and regulated by the requirements set by the DOT Class 7 hazardous material transportation. Federal regulations place strict administrative controls on the transport of radioactive materials. The two main goals for transporting radioactive materials are 1. Safety should be the primarily focused on the package because it is the first line of defense. 2. Package integrity should be directly related to the degree of the hazard of the radioactive material contents. The two-part goal ensures that the right package is used. Type B packages are designed to transport radioactive materials with the highest level of radioactivity. Examples of material transported in Type B packagings include spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and high concentrations of other radioactive materials. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop and thermal testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-1). Required physical tests for the DPP-1 package include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) were measured. The Free Drop, Crush and Puncture tests were performed at the NTRC in Knoxville, TN, and the Thermal tests were performed Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, TX. The test units were subjected to a pre-operational leak testing before the NCT and HAC tests and a post-operational leak test and a helium leak test once regulatory testing was complete. Finally, all test units were scanned with a handheld blue light scanner to capture a 3D CAD geometry of the test units in the deformed shape. The handheld scanner provided the most effective and reliable way to acquire accurate 3D measurements of the test unit. The scanned geometry was sectioned in areas with deformation and the cross-section profile was measured to determine accurate and repeatable results of the deformed shape of the test units.

Martinez, Oscar↗

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are evaluated to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Additionally, monitoring data are used to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries (CBs) calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. In summary, the monitoring results from 2016 indicate the regulatory controls on the closure of CAU 98 remain effective in protection of human health and the environment. Recommendations resulting from this first year of monitoring activities include formally incorporating wells UE-5 PW-1, UE-5 PW-2, and UE-5 PW-3 into the groundwater-level monitoring network given their strategic location in the basin; and early development of a basis for trigger levels for the groundwater-level monitoring given the observed trends. Additionally, it is recommended to improve the Real Estate/Operations Permit process for capturing information important for evaluating the impact of activities on groundwater resources, and to shift the reporting requirement for this annual report from the second quarter of the federal fiscal year (end of March) to the second quarter of the calendar year (end of June).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2016. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The tritium concentration in both wells is slowly decreasing. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2016 in all wells is consistent with recent measurements. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗