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At least 289 records · Page 16

Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nine Canyon Long-Duration Energy Storage: A Feasibility Study

The Nine Canyon Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES) Feasibility Study explores the technical and economic viability of deploying advanced energy storage technologies at Energy Northwest's (EN) Nine Canyon (9C) Wind Project site in Benton County, Washington. Supported by the Washington State Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity under its LDES Voucher Program, the study represents a collaborative effort between EN, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and ARES North America. At the core of this effort is the development of a generalized techno-economic modeling framework and evaluation tool designed to assess the value proposition of LDES projects across a variety of contexts. The modeling tool is technology-agnostic and accommodates user-defined parameters such as rated power, energy duration, round-trip efficiency, capital and operational costs, and dispatch constraints. It also integrates economic inputs, including market prices, energy revenue structures, and financing parameters to evaluate performance through key metrics. The tool provides utilities with a transparent, adaptable platform to support decision-making, investment prioritization, and portfolio planning for various storage technologies. To guide scenario design and interpretation, the study first surveyed the LDES technology landscape, including lithium-ion batteries, flow batteries, non-hydro gravity storage, and thermo-mechanical systems, comparing cost trajectories, technical performance, safety and hazards, materials sourcing and recyclability, and spatial/siting considerations. This literature-grounded review highlights technology trade-offs and reinforces the need to align technology choice with site characteristics, use cases, and project objectives. A companion chapter examines ownership structures (EN ownership, third-party ownership, shared models) and offtake options (energy marketing, capacity/energy PPAs, time-of-use PPAs, block-delivery PPAs, and tolling), where PPAs (power purchase agreements) represent contractual arrangements for buying and selling electricity. The chapter also highlights implications for risk allocation, capital access, operational control, and revenue certainty. The study also evaluates supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and transmission interconnection pathways, options include upgrading the existing SCADA or deploying a dedicated LDES controller, with attention to protection schemes, data telemetry, cybersecurity, and regulatory coordination with BPA. In addition, an ARES-specific geotechnical and hydrology assessment presented in the appendix screens multiple corridors for slope stability, bearing capacity, cut-and-fill magnitude, and stormwater behavior.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2021: Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals of supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high-performance computing (HPC) needs; contributing to the community to build the next generation HPC workforce, and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2021 saw continued excellence in research supported by the OLCF’s leadership-class computing resources, including Summit (the nation’s most powerful supercomputer), the global scratch file system Alpine, the Scalable Protected Infrastructure (SPI), the Exploratory Visualization Environment for Research in Science and Technology (EVEREST), and the archival mass-storage resource High-Performance Storage System (HPSS). While maintaining access and exceptional user support for Summit, the OLCF continued to make progress on the installation and deployment of Frontier, which will be the nation’s first exascale system when it comes online at the start of CY 2023. Users have already begun running and optimizing scientific codes on Crusher, the OLCF test and development system equipped with Frontier’s architecture. Throughout the year, the OLCF maintained a strong culture of operational excellence, including risk management, workplace safety, and cybersecurity. The OLCF’s rigorous risk management strategy anticipated and mitigated risks, and at this time there are no high-priority operational risks. Similarly, ORNL and the OLCF were committed to operating under the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) safety regulations that ensure a safe workplace. Technical staff tracked and monitored existing threats and vulnerabilities within the OLCF while continually developing tools and practices to enhance operations without increasing the facility’s risk. CY 2021 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments, including a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the eighth consecutive year; a tremendous number of node hours delivered to 1,671 researchers on Summit; and the successful delivery of the allocation split of roughly 60%, 20%, and 20% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director’s Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (Section 2). COVID-19 research remained a focus in 2021, and the ALCC and DD programs allocated over 1 million Summit hours to the COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium. These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (i.e., overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of leadership class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Virtual Power Plant Architecture and Resilient Design

Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) represent a fundamental shift in electric grid operations, aggregating distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar panels and battery storage to deliver utility-scale grid services traditionally provided by centralized power plants. This report examines the unique architectural, operational, and digital assurance considerations that distinguish VPPs from conventional utility infrastructure as they scale from pilot projects to mainstream deployment across the United States. While VPPs offer significant opportunities for grid modernization and enhanced flexibility, their distributed, multi-stakeholder architecture introduces distinct security challenges that differ fundamentally from traditional generation facilities. The analysis identifies risks in VPP operations, including device-level security gaps, platform vulnerabilities, and communication protocol weaknesses that create expanded attack surfaces compared to centralized power plants. Through examination of real-world incidents and emerging threat patterns, the report demonstrates how some VPPs' reliance on consumer-owned devices, public internet infrastructure, and complex vendor ecosystems require new approaches to digital assurance and operational security. The findings provide practical guidance for utilities, regulators, and aggregators to implement robust security frameworks and operational best practices essential for maintaining grid reliability as VPP deployment accelerates under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 2222 and related regulatory initiatives.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluation of Acoustic Channel Capacity for Complex Piping Topology

Transmission of information using elastic waves on existing metallic pipes provides an alternative communication option for a nuclear facility. The advantages of this approach consist of transmitting information through physical barriers, such as the containment building wall. In addition, this approach provides physical cybersecurity since the pipe becomes an analog communication channel which is difficult to eavesdrop on and difficult to sever. In prior work, a laboratory bench-scale system consisting of a six foot-long straight section of nuclear grade stainless steel pipe and high-temperature ultrasonic LiNbO 3 transducers was assembled. The lab systems was used for communication protocol development and preliminary data transmission demonstration. Next phase of project development involves deployment of the ultrasonic communication system in a representative environment. Mechanisms Engineering Test Loop (METL) facility at ANL was chosen as a viable candidate for communication system demonstration. Analysis of piping manifolds at METL has shown that in a typical scenario, ultrasonic signals have to be transmitted over straight and bent piping sections. This report describes preliminary studies on transmission of information with ultrasonic shear waves across bent piping sections. A test article consisting of a stainless steel pipe bent at 90° was developed for laboratory analysis of ultrasonic signal transmission. The bent piping test article developed by welding two straight pipes to an elbow. For consistency, the diameter and wall thickness of the bent pipe is the same as that of the straight pipe utilized in prior studies. COMSOL computer simulations were performed to study ultrasonic refracted shear wave coupling and transmission across bent piping. Preliminary evaluations of ultrasonic shear wave transmission were conducted with piezoelectric (PZT) and LiNbO 3 transducers, with the signals recorded with previously developed LabView interface. Preliminary results have shown significant dispersion of transmitted signals, most likely due to reflections and scattering by piping welds. Signal distortion compensation algorithm based on time reversal modulation (TRM) was initially investigated for transmission through solids, and demonstrated for signals transmitted over the bent pipe. Using TRM, it was shown that communication bitrates of 100Kbps were achievable, in principle.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering

A continuing challenge for engineers who utilize digital systems is to understand the impact of cyber-attacks across the entire product and program lifecycle. This is a challenge due to the evolving nature of cyber threats that may impact the design, development, deployment, and operational phases of all systems. Cyber Informed Engineering is the process by which engineers are made aware of both how to use their engineering knowledge to positively impact the cyber security in the processes by which they architect and design components and the services and security of the components themselves.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detection and Analysis of Threats to the Energy Sector: DATES

This report summarizes Detection and Analysis of Threats to the Energy Sector (DATES), a project sponsored by the United States Department of Energy and performed by a team led by SRI International, with collaboration from Sandia National Laboratories, ArcSight, Inc., and Invensys Process Systems. DATES sought to advance the state of the practice in intrusion detection and situational awareness with respect to cyber attacks in energy systems. This was achieved through adaptation of detection algorithms for process systems as well as development of novel anomaly detection techniques suited for such systems into a detection suite. These detection components, together with third-party commercial security systems, were interfaced with the commercial Security Information Event Management (SIEM) solution from ArcSight. The efficacy of the integrated solution was demonstrated on two testbeds, one based on a Distributed Control System (DCS) from Invensys, and the other based on the Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) from Sandia. These achievements advance the DOE Cybersecurity Roadmap [DOE2006] goals in the area of security monitoring. The project ran from October 2007 until March 2010, with the final six months focused on experimentation. In the validation phase, team members from SRI and Sandia coupled the two test environments and carried out a number of distributed and cross-site attacks against various points in one or both testbeds. Alert messages from the distributed, heterogeneous detection components were correlated using the ArcSight SIEM platform, providing within-site and cross-site views of the attacks. In particular, the team demonstrated detection and visualization of network zone traversal and denial-of-service attacks. These capabilities were presented to the DistribuTech Conference and Exhibition in March 2010. The project was hampered by interruption of funding due to continuing resolution issues and agreement on cost share for four months in 2008. This resulted in delays in finalizing agreements with commercial partners, and in particular the Invensys testbed was not installed until December 2008 (as opposed to the March 2008 plan). The project resulted in a number of conference presentations and publications, and was well received when presented at industry forums. In spite of some interest on the part of the utility sector, we were unfortunately not able to engage a utility for a full-scale pilot deployment.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cognitive IoT and Edge Computing for Intrusion Detection with Federated TinyML

Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) are rapidly becoming an integral part of the modern society. By 2030, there is estimated to be over 40 billion active and connected IoT devices [1]. This rapid progress also comes with a significant implication on cybersecurity. Back-end infrastructure and systems have a much broader attack than they did previously due to vulnerable IoT/EC devices being connected to wireless networks. This expanding attack surface is a growing concern because IoT/EC are increasingly being used in critical systems such as power grids, health care, and smart homes. To effectively address a problem of this scale, cognitive cyber methods—which can autonomously detect and react to cyber attacks as they develop—are needed. To address this, we bring Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to IoT/EC devices, using tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data against cyber threats, and using Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. We propose a novel three-layer architecture: (1) an IoT layer for tinyML-based inference, (2) an edge layer for ML model training, and (3) a cloud layer for FL operations. Using the publicly available 11-class N-BaIoT dataset [2], we demonstrate that this architecture mitigates resource constraints at the IoT layer while improving detection accuracy over standard two-layer designs. An outlier-resistant scaler, feature reduction, and quantization enable the tinyML model to maintain detection accuracy with a reduced model size. Additionally, federated learning that only utilizes the intersection (across heterogenous devices) of the reduced feature set achieves superior detection accuracy compared to locally trained models.

Li, Mingyan [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000569532640)↗

Demonstration of a Novel Technology to Manage Electricity Demand in Grid-Independent Military Microgrids

This research was conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in collaboration with the S&C Electric Inc. through funding provided by the ESTCP. The project demonstrates use of cybersecure Automated Demand Response (ADR) technology to effectively manage microgrid loads during grid-independent, also known as "islanded," operation. When military microgrids become isolated from the main electrical grid, they are required to balance electricity supply and demand locally. Given that local generation may be constrained, the prevailing strategy involves shedding all but the most critical loads by tripping smart circuit breakers, which then necessitate manual resetting. This approach is generally implemented at the building level, which means that the buildings with mission-critical activities are exempt from load management and remain fully powered, whereas those deemed non-critical can experience a complete loss of service. In this research we developed a method that allows building automation systems to selectively control their assets in response to load shedding request from a microgrid controller, avoiding total loss of service in contrast to the conventional control approach. A commercial OpenADR client server by GridFabric is used for communication between the microgrid controller and the building management system (BMS). The microgrid controller monitors both generation capacity and various assets within the microgrid and issues a demand reduction request when necessary. This request is communicated to the OpenADR server via Modbus. Upon receiving the request, the OpenADR server forwards it to the BMS utilizing the OpenADR protocol. The BMS is pre-configured with various levels of load reduction strategies based on the controllable assets available, allowing for a nuanced approach to demand reduction. Both lab and field tests were performed that considered load shedding needed to achieve closed transition into island mode and to accommodate changing loads and power source availability while islanded. A commercial microgrid controller was used for these tests with normal programming within the expected constraints of the system capabilities. That is, the solution did not require any specialized modification to the code base of the controller. Given the latency of the round-trip communication path between the microgrid controller and the various devices involved with the load shed processes, there are certain scenarios for which the demonstrated solution are appropriate and some which are not. The methods described in this report can be used for load shedding/restoration during transitions between islanded and grid-tied modes of operation, as well as accommodating normal variations in load and the need to remove a power source from operation for maintenance. These methods should not be used for scenarios that require load shedding within a second or two such as sudden and unanticipated significant load increases or loss of power sources through equipment faults.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Real-Time Hardware-in-the-Loop Distributed Energy Resources System Testbed using IEEE 2030.5 Standard

IEEE 2030.5 standard is drawing special attention among communication protocols for smart inverters and distributed energy resources (DER). Moreover, California Rule 21 mandates new DER must be ready to communicate to a host utility using the IEEE 2030.5 standard. Therefore, development of an effective real-time simulation method for managing DER using IEEE 2030.5 network is crucial. This paper presents a real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) DER system testbed using the IEEE 2030.5 standard. The proposed real-time co-simulation testbed consists of a DER physical system simulation using OP AL-RT real-time simulator and a cyber system simulation including DER gateways and a DER management system (DERMS) cloud server. Custom-built client and server programs are developed to meet the compliant with IEEE 2030.5-2018 standard and implemented in the DER gateways and a DERMS server, respectively. Furthermore, the feasibility of the proposed testbed for DER systems is validated by experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The evolution of the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory in nuclear power research

The events at Three Mile Island in the United States brought about fundamental changes in the ways that simulation would be used in nuclear operations. The need for research simulators was identified to scientifically study human-centered risk and make recommendations for process control system designs. This paper documents the human factors research conducted at the Human Systems and Simulation Laboratory (HSSL) since its inception in 2010 at Idaho National Laboratory. The facility’s primary purposes are to provide support to utilities for system upgrades and to validate modernized control room concepts. In the last decade, however, as nuclear industry needs have evolved, so too have the purposes of the HSSL. Thus, beyond control room modernization, human factors researchers have evaluated the security of nuclear infrastructure from cyber adversaries and evaluated human-in-the-loop simulations for joint operations with an integrated hydrogen generation plant. Lastly, our review presents research using human reliability analysis techniques with data collected from HSSL-based studies and concludes with potential future directions for the HSSL, including severe accident management and advanced control room technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Enabling Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Resilience in Distribution Grids with High Penetration of Photovoltaics (CARE-PV) (Final Report)

Since legacy distribution systems have very limited visibility beyond the substation, high penetration of PV at the grid edge presents some unique operational challenges. One approach to address these challenges is to use information from advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and µPMUs. However, exploiting this information is impacted by a number of factors, including multi-timescale measurements, volume of data generated, communication network impairments (e.g., information loss and latency) and susceptibility to cyber-attacks. Therefore, one of the critical tasks involved in the management of a distribution grid is to develop complete situational awareness by integrating cyber-security mechanisms with state estimation strategies and leveraging this situational awareness to assure energy services at strategic locations while exploiting AMI/PV inverter/ µPMU data. This CARE-PV project addresses the fundamental challenges in situational awareness and resilience to cyber and physical vectors by exploiting the synergy between innovative modeling, estimation, data analytics, testing and validation using smart PV inverters designed at K-State and facilities at NREL. Specifically, the project involved the development, testing and validation of the following novel enabling technologies: (Thrust 1) Resilience to cyber vectors that impact data integrity was addressed via a two-level defense strategy that combines cyber intrusion detection using self-learning, cooperative smart PV inverters, and a novel moving target defense framework to combat data integrity attacks. (Thrust 2) Resilience to cyber-physical vectors that impact situational awareness by limiting data availability was addressed via novel centralized and decentralized, sparsity-based static and dynamic state estimation approaches that enhance observability even when the underlying system is unobservable. (Thrust 3) Leveraging a unique probabilistic sensitivity analysis approach accompanied by one-of-a-kind dominant influencer set computation, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure at strategic locations was evaluated so that proactive PV-based control strategies can be used to support operations under normal/outage scenarios. These CARE-PV project innovations were demonstrated on both small-scale IEEE and larger utility-scale testbeds (Thrust 4). Feedback from Industry Advisory Board members was used to formulate a commercialization pathway for a subset of CARE-PV technologies. These CARE-PV technologies will ultimately lead to reliable and secure, large-scale integration of renewable energy and mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of System and Interoperability Impact from Securing Communications for Distributed Energy Resources

As the power grid incorporates increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER) that provide new generation sources, new opportunities are created for improving operation of the grid while large challenges also arise for preserving grid reliability and security. To improve grid performance, DERs can be utilized to provide important support functionality, such as supporting frequency and voltage levels, especially if they are assisted by communication schemes as part of an advanced distribution management system (ADMS). Unfortunately, such connectivity and grid support functionality also creates additional cyber security risk with the potential for degradation of grid services, especially under conditions with high amounts of distributed generation. This paper will first discuss the communications needed by DERs to support system and interoperability objectives, as well as the security requirements and impact of securing these communications. Some common security mechanisms are discussed in relation to DERs, and a simulated 15-bus model of a distribution feeder is used to demonstrate aspects of the DER communications and impact to grid performance. These results help to advance understanding of the benefits, requirements, and mechanisms for securely implementing DER communications while ensuring that grid reliability is maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗