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NASA NTRS2010

Optimized O'Neill/Glaser Model for Human Population of Space and its Impact on Survival Probabilities

Two contemporary issues foretell a shift from our historical Earth based industrial economy and habitation to a solar system based society. The first is the limits to Earth's carrying capacity, that is the maximum number of people that the Earth can support before a catastrophic impact to the health of the planet and human species occurs. The simple example of carrying capacity is that of a bacterial colony in a Petri dish with a limited amount of nutrient. The colony experiences exponential population growth until the carrying capacity is reached after which catastrophic depopulation often results. Estimates of the Earth s carrying capacity vary between 14 and 40 billion people. Although at current population growth rates we may have over a century before we reach Earth s carrying limit our influence on climate and resources on the planetary scale is becoming scientifically established. The second issue is the exponential growth of knowledge and technological power. The exponential growth of technology interacts with the exponential growth of population in a manner that is unique to a highly intelligent species. Thus, the predicted consequences (world famines etc.) of the limits to growth have been largely avoided due to technological advances. However, at the mid twentieth century a critical coincidence occurred in these two trends humanity obtained the technological ability to extinguish life on the planetary scale (by nuclear, chemical, biological means) and attained the ability to expand human life beyond Earth. This paper examines an optimized O Neill/Glaser model (O Neill 1975; Curreri 2007; Detweiler and Curreri 2008) for the economic human population of space. Critical to this model is the utilization of extraterrestrial resources, solar power and spaced based labor. A simple statistical analysis is then performed which predicts the robustness of a single planet based technological society versus that of multiple world (independent habitats) society.

Curreri, Peter A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Optimized O'Neill/Glaser Model for Human Population of Space and its Impact on Survival Probabilities

Two contemporary issues foretell a shift from our historical Earth based industrial economy and habitation to a solar system based society. The first is the limits to Earth s carrying capacity, that is the maximum number of people that the Earth can support before a catastrophic impact to the health of the planet and human species occurs. The simple example of carrying capacity is that of a bacterial colony in a Petri dish with a limited amount of nutrient. The colony experiences exponential population growth until the carrying capacity is reached after which catastrophic depopulation often results. Estimates of the Earth s carrying capacity vary between 14 and 40 billion people. Although at current population growth rates we may have over a century before we reach Earth s carrying limit our influence on climate and resources on the planetary scale is becoming scientifically established. The second issue is the exponential growth of knowledge and technological power. The exponential growth of technology interacts with the exponential growth of population in a manner that is unique to a highly intelligent species. Thus, the predicted consequences (world famines etc.) of the limits to growth have been largely avoided due to technological advances. However, at the mid twentieth century a critical coincidence occurred in these two trends humanity obtained the technological ability to extinguish life on the planetary scale (by nuclear, chemical, biological means) and attained the ability to expand human life beyond Earth. This paper examines an optimized O Neill/Glaser model (O Neill 1975; Curreri 2007; Detweiler and Curreri 2008) for the economic human population of space. Critical to this model is the utilization of extraterrestrial resources, solar power and spaced based labor. A simple statistical analysis is then performed which predicts the robustness of a single planet based technological society versus that of multiple world (independent habitats) society.

Curreri, Peter A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Use of Modal Acoustic Emission to Monitor Damage Progression in Carbon Fiber/Epoxy Tows and Implications for Composite Structures

This slide presentation reviews the use of Modal Acoustic Emission to monitor damage progression to carbon fiber/epoxy tows. There is a risk for catastrophic failure of composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) due to burst-before-leak (BBL) stress rupture (SR) failure of carbon-epoxy (C/Ep) COPVs. A lack of quantitative nondestructive evaluation (NDE) is causing problems in current and future spacecraft designs. It is therefore important to develop and demonstrate critical NDE that can be implemented during stages of the design process since the observed rupture can occur with little of no advanced warning. Therefore a program was required to develop quantitative acoustic emission (AE) procedures specific to C/Ep overwraps, but which also have utility for monitoring damage accumulation in composite structure in general, and to lay the groundwork for establishing critical thresholds for accumulated damage in composite structures, such as COPVs, so that precautionary or preemptive engineering steps can be implemented to minimize of obviate the risk of catastrophic failure. A computed Felicity Ratio (FR) coupled with fast Fourier Transform (FFT) frequency analysis shows promise as an analytical pass/fail criterion. The FR analysis and waveform and FFT analysis are reviewed

Waller, Jess M.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Icy Satellites of Saturn: Impact Cratering and Age Determination

Saturn is the first giant planet to be visited by an orbiting spacecraft that can transmit large amounts of data to Earth. Crater counts on satellites from Phoebe inward to the regular satellites and ring moons are providing unprecedented insights into the origin and time histories of the impacting populations. Many Voyager-era scientists concluded that the satellites had been struck by at least two populations of impactors. In this view, the Population I impactors, which were generally judged to be comets orbiting the Sun, formed most of the larger and older craters, while Population II impactors, interpreted as Saturn-orbiting ejecta from impacts on satellites, produced most of the smaller and younger craters. Voyager data also implied that all of the ring moons, and probably some of the midsized classical moons, had been catastrophically disrupted and reaccreted since they formed. We examine models of the primary impactor populations in the Saturn system. At the present time, ecliptic comets, which likely originate in the Kuiper belt/scattered disk, are predicted to dominate impacts on the regular satellites and ring moons, but the models require extrapolations in size (from the observed Kuiper belt objects to the much smaller bodies that produce the craters) or in distance (from the known active Jupiter family comets to 9.5 AU). Phoebe, Iapetus, and perhaps even moons closer to Saturn have been struck by irregular satellites as well. We describe the Nice model, which provides a plausible mechanism by which the entire Solar System might have experienced an era of heavy bombardment long after the planets formed. We then discuss the three cratering chronologies, including one based upon the Nice model, that have been used to infer surface ages from crater densities on the saturnian satellites. After reviewing scaling relations between the properties of impactors and the craters they produce, we provide model estimates of the present-day rate at which comets impact, and catastrophically disrupt, the saturnian moons. Finally, we present crater counts on the satellites from two different groups. Many of the heavily cratered terrains appear to be nearly saturated, so it is difficult to infer the provenance of the impactors from crater counts alone. More large craters have been found on Iapetus than on any other satellite. Enceladus displays an enormous range of surface ages, ranging from the old mid-latitude plains to the extremely young South Polar Terrain. Cassini images provide some evidence for the reality of Population II. Most of the observed craters may have formed in one or more cataclysms, but more work is needed to determine the roles of heliocentric and planetocentric bodies in creating the craters.

Dones, L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Predicting Ares I Reaction Control System Performance by Utilizing Analysis Anchored with Development Test Data

The Ares I launch vehicle is an integral part of NASA s Constellation Program, providing a foundation for a new era of space access. The Ares I is designed to lift the Orion Crew Module and will enable humans to return to the Moon as well as explore Mars.1 The Ares I is comprised of two inline stages: a Space Shuttle-derived five-segment Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) First Stage (FS) and an Upper Stage (US) powered by a Saturn V-derived J-2X engine. A dedicated Roll Control System (RoCS) located on the connecting interstage provides roll control prior to FS separation. Induced yaw and pitch moments are handled by the SRB nozzle vectoring. The FS SRB operates for approximately two minutes after which the US separates from the vehicle and the US Reaction Control System (ReCS) continues to provide reaction control for the remainder of the mission. A representation of the Ares I launch vehicle in the stacked configuration and including the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is shown in Figure 1. Each Reaction Control System (RCS) design incorporates a Gaseous Helium (GHe) pressurization system combined with a monopropellant Hydrazine (N2H4) propulsion system. Both systems have two diametrically opposed thruster modules. This architecture provides one failure tolerance for function and prevention of catastrophic hazards such as inadvertent thruster firing, bulk propellant leakage, and over-pressurization. The pressurization system on the RoCS includes two ambient pressure-referenced regulators on parallel strings in order to attain the required system level single Fault Tolerant (FT) design for function while the ReCS utilizes a blow-down approach. A single burst disk and relief valve assembly is also included on the RoCS to ensure single failure tolerance for must-not-occur catastrophic hazards. The Reaction Control Systems are designed to support simultaneously firing multiple thrusters as required

Stein, William B.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Diamond Heat-Spreader for Submillimeter-Wave Frequency Multipliers

The planar GaAs Shottky diode frequency multiplier is a critical technology for the local oscillator (LO) for submillimeter- wave heterodyne receivers due to low mass, tenability, long lifetime, and room-temperature operation. The use of a W-band (75-100 GHz) power amplifier followed by a frequency multiplier is the most common for submillimeter-wave sources. Its greatest challenge is to provide enough input power to the LO for instruments onboard future planetary missions. Recently, JPL produced 800 mW at 92.5 GHz by combining four MMICs in parallel in a balanced configuration. As more power at W-band is available to the multipliers, their power-handling capability be comes more important. High operating temperatures can lead to degradation of conversion efficiency or catastrophic failure. The goal of this innovation is to reduce the thermal resistance by attaching diamond film as a heat-spreader on the backside of multipliers to improve their power-handling capability. Polycrystalline diamond is deposited by hot-filament chemical vapor deposition (CVD). This diamond film acts as a heat-spreader to both the existing 250- and 300-GHz triplers, and has a high thermal conductivity (1,000-1,200 W/mK). It is approximately 2.5 times greater than copper (401 W/mK) and 20 times greater than GaAs (46 W/mK). It is an electrical insulator (resistivity approx. equals 10(exp 15) Ohms-cm), and has a low relative dielectric constant of 5.7. Diamond heat-spreaders reduce by at least 200 C at 250 mW of input power, compared to the tripler without diamond, according to thermal simulation. This superior thermal management provides a 100-percent increase in power-handling capability. For example, with this innovation, 40-mW output power has been achieved from a 250-GHz tripler at 350-mW input power, while the previous triplers, without diamond, suffered catastrophic failures. This breakthrough provides a stepping-stone for frequency multipliers-based LO up to 3 THz. The future work for this design is to apply the high output power from both the 250 and 300 GHz to multiple chains in order to generate milliwatts at 2.3 THz. Using the first generation of results for this innovation, 40 mW of output power were produced from a 240-GHz tripler at 350-mW input power, and 27- mW output power was produced from a 300-GHz tripler at 408-mW input power. This is two times higher than the current state-of-the-art output power capability. A finite-element thermal simulation also shows that 30-microns thick diamond dropped the temperature of the anodes by at least 200 C.

Lin, Robert H.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Optimized O'Neill/Glaser Model for Human Population of Space and its Impact on Survival Probabilities

Two contemporary issues foretell a shift from our historical Earth based industrial economy and habitation to a solar system based society. The first is the limits to Earth s carrying capacity, that is the maximum number of people that the Earth can support before a catastrophic impact to the health of the planet and human species occurs. The simple example of carrying capacity is that of a bacterial colony in a Petri dish with a limited amount of nutrient. The colony experiences exponential population growth until the carrying capacity is reached after which catastrophic depopulation often results. Estimates of the Earth s carrying capacity vary between 14 and 40 billion people. Although at current population growth rates we may have over a century before we reach Earth s carrying limit our influence on climate and resources on the planetary scale is becoming scientifically established. The second issue is the exponential growth of knowledge and technological power. The exponential growth of technology interacts with the exponential growth of population in a manner that is unique to a highly intelligent species. Thus, the predicted consequences (world famines etc.) of the limits to growth have been largely avoided due to technological advances. However, at the mid twentieth century a critical coincidence occurred in these two trends humanity obtained the technological ability to extinguish life on the planetary scale (by nuclear, chemical, biological means) and attained the ability to expand human life beyond Earth. This paper examines an optimized O'Neill/Glaser model (O Neill 1975; Curreri 2007; Detweiler and Curreri 2008) for the economic human population of space. Critical to this model is the utilization of extraterrestrial resources, solar power and spaced based labor. A simple statistical analysis is then performed which predicts the robustness of a single planet based technological society versus that of multiple world (independent habitats) society.

Curreri, Peter A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Design, Analysis and Testing of a PRSEUS Pressure Cube to Investigate Assembly Joints

Due to its potential to significantly increase fuel efficiency, the current focus of NASA's Environmentally Responsible Aviation Program is the hybrid wing body (HWB) aircraft. Due to the complex load condition that exists in HWB structure, as compared to traditional aircraft configurations, light-weight, cost-effective and manufacturable structural concepts are required to enable the HWB. The Pultruded Rod Stitched Efficient Unitized Structure (PRSEUS) concept is one such structural concept. A building block approach for technology development of the PRSEUS concept is being conducted. As part of this approach, a PRSEUS pressure cube was developed as a risk reduction test article to examine a new integral cap joint concept. This paper describes the design, analysis and testing of the PRSEUS pressure cube test article. The pressure cube was required to withstand a 2P, 18.4 psi, overpressure load requirement. The pristine pressure cube was tested to 2.2P with no catastrophic failure. After the addition of barely visible impact damage, the cube was pressure loaded to 48 psi where catastrophic failure occurred, meeting the scale-up requirement. Comparison of pretest and posttest analyses with the cube test response agree well, and indicate that current analysis methods can be used to accurately analyze PRSEUS structure for initial failure response.

Yovanof, Nicolette↗

NASA NTRS2012

Structural Health Monitoring with Fiber Bragg Grating and Piezo Arrays

Structural health monitoring (SHM) is one of the most important tools available for the maintenance, safety, and integrity of aerospace structural systems. Lightweight, electromagnetic-interference- immune, fiber-optic sensor-based SHM will play an increasing role in more secure air transportation systems. Manufacturers and maintenance personnel have pressing needs for significantly improving safety and reliability while providing for lower inspection and maintenance costs. Undetected or untreated damage may grow and lead to catastrophic structural failure. Damage can originate from the strain/stress history of the material, imperfections of domain boundaries in metals, delamination in multi-layer materials, or the impact of machine tools in the manufacturing process. Damage can likewise develop during service life from wear and tear, or under extraordinary circumstances such as with unusual forces, temperature cycling, or impact of flying objects. Monitoring and early detection are key to preventing a catastrophic failure of structures, especially when these are expected to perform near their limit conditions.

Black, Richard J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Next Generation Wiring

Wiring is a major operational component on aerospace hardware that accounts for substantial weight and volumetric space. Over time wire insulation can age and fail, often leading to catastrophic events such as system failure or fire. The next generation of wiring must be reliable and sustainable over long periods of time. These features will be achieved by the development of a wire insulation capable of autonomous self-healing that mitigates failure before it reaches a catastrophic level. In order to develop a self-healing insulation material, three steps must occur. First, methods of bonding similar materials must be developed that are capable of being initiated autonomously. This process will lead to the development of a manual repair system for polyimide wire insulation. Second, ways to initiate these bonding methods that lead to materials that are similar to the primary insulation must be developed. Finally, steps one and two must be integrated to produce a material that has no residues from the process that degrades the insulating properties of the final repaired insulation. The self-healing technology, teamed with the ability to identify and locate damage, will greatly improve reliability and safety of electrical wiring of critical systems. This paper will address these topics, discuss the results of preliminary testing, and remaining development issues related to self-healing wire insulation.

Medelius, Petro↗

NASA NTRS2014

Can Cell to Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation be Prevented in a Li-ion Battery Module?

Increasing cell spacing decreased adjacent cell damage center dotElectrically connected adjacent cells drained more than physically adjacent cells center dotRadiant barrier prevents propagation when fully installed between BP cells center dotBP cells vent rapidly and expel contents at 100% SOC -Slower vent with flame/smoke at 50% -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 160 degC center dotLG cells vent but do not expel contents -Thermal runaway event typically occurs at 200 degC center dotSKC LFP modules did not propagate; fuses on negative terminal of cell may provide a benefit in reducing cell to cell damage propagation. New requirement in NASA-Battery Safety Requirements document: JSC 20793 Rev C 5.1.5.1 Requirements - Thermal Runaway Propagation a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and environment. NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols. This prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures. This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event highly improbable. b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could appreciably reduce that severity. In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the severity of a possible thermal runaway event. Programs should assess whether there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of the outcome. Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled contaminates, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard.

Jeevarajan, Judith↗

NASA NTRS2014

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri↗

NASA NTRS2016

Radiation Failures in Intel 14nm Microprocessors

In this study the 14 nm Intel Broadwell 5th generation core series 5005U-i3 and 5200U-i5 was mounted on Dell Inspiron laptops, MSI Cubi and Gigabyte Brix barebones and tested with Windows 8 and CentOS7 at idle. Heavy-ion-induced hard- and catastrophic failures do not appear to be related to the Intel 14nm Tri-Gate FinFET process. They originate from a small (9 m 140 m) area on the 32nm planar PCH die (not the CPU) as initially speculated. The hard failures seem to be due to a SEE but the exact physical mechanism has yet to be identified. Some possibilities include latch-ups, charge ion trapping or implantation, ion channels, or a combination of those (in biased conditions). The mechanism of the catastrophic failures seems related to the presence of electric power (1.05V core voltage). The 1064 nm laser mimics ionization radiation and induces soft- and hard failures as a direct result of electron-hole pair production, not heat. The 14nm FinFET processes continue to look promising for space radiation environments.

Microprocessors↗

NASA NTRS2017

NASA's Ground-Based Observing Campaigns of Rocket Bodies with the UKIRT and NASA ES-MCAT Telescopes

Rocket bodies comprise a class of human-made space debris that are at the same time essential for launching every spacecraft from the Earth, but are also a significant source of debris both as intact objects, as well as fragmented debris. Unspent fuel has been long theorized as a potential cause of catastrophic rocket body break-ups. Given typical orbital speeds range from approximately 2-3 kilometers per second at Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) and up to 15 kilometers per second in low Earth orbit (LEO), collisions with uncatalogued and undetected debris can also cause catastrophic breakups. Understanding break-ups is a necessary step in preventing them, and one key step in that process is to correlate and characterize daughter fragments with their parent bodies. Two very different methods include (1) conducting photometric surveys to correlate an object's motion and orbital elements to the parent body, and (2) characterizing what materials comprise the target to determine whether those materials are consistent with the parent body or like objects. With this in mind, photometric data were taken shortly after the breakup of one rocket body for short-term orbital studies, and a suite of spectral data were taken of rocket bodies that are fully intact to compare with debris, for characterization studies. Targets included Titan Transtage, Briz-M, and Ariane rocket bodies and debris. Spectra of each sub-class of rocket body were very similar within their rocket body type, but differed distinctly from one type to the next, supporting the effectiveness of this approach.

Lederer, Susan M.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additively Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

This paper describes how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to “fracture critical” additively manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing NASA standards and is required on all human-rated space structures. As legacy spacecraft structures have been built using primarily metallic and composite materials manufactured using well established methods, guidance for application of fracture control to parts composed of these material types has been established and is documented in several NASA requirements. Additive manufactured structures offer advantages in design flexibility and manufacturing efficiency and as a result are expected to continue to be used more and more in the future. Recently, relevant guidance has been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control are not addressed yet in any requirements or guidance document. While use of additive manufactured parts in non-critical scenarios may be of relatively low concern in current structural certification processes, there is a need for new fracture control guidance in order to use and certify additively manufacture hardware that is “fracture critical” where failure of the part may result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Assurance of damage tolerance, i.e., that as-built flaws in a given part either do not exist or will not grow to become catastrophic, is of particular interest to the fracture control community. This poses a challenge due to the fact that damage tolerance behavior is not well understood in additive manufactured parts compared to legacy material types and manufacturing techniques. The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large. Different hardware types (e.g., pressure vessel, structural member) are described to highlight specific challenges and solutions for each. The discussion concludes with considering specific disciplines within fracture control (non-destructive evaluation, materials & processes, fracture mechanics, and structural certification) in a proposed extension of existing fracture control requirements to additive manufactured parts.

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

McElroy, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2012

TPSAS-NF1676L-13678-DND

An area that shows promise in enhancing structural integrity of aircraft and aerospace structures is integral stitched composite technology. The most recent generation of this technology is the Pultruded Rod Stitched Efficient Unitized Structure (PRSEUS) concept. The goal of the PRSEUS concept is to provide damage-containment capability for composite structures while reducing overall structural weight. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Boeing Company, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have partnered in an effort to assess the damage-containment features of a full-scale curved PRSEUS panel using the FAA Full-Scale Aircraft Structural Test Evaluation and Research facility. The background, test plan, fixture modifications, pre-test analysis, and planned experimental procedure were presented at the 2011 Aircraft Airworthiness and Sustainment Conference. This follow-on paper and presentation will provide details of the experimental procedure, test results, nondestructive inspection results, and preliminary test analysis comparison. The test program included three phases of loading and inspections: Phase I, as-built; Phase II, with barely visible impact damage (BVID); and Phase III, with a two-bay notch severing the central stiffener. Axial tension, internal pressure, and combined axial tension and internal pressure load conditions were applied during each phase using load levels that demonstrate compliance with the strength, deformation, and damage-tolerance requirements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25. Pressure loads were based on an operating pressure of 9.2 psi, designated as 1P, and the axial loads were based on a design limit load (DLL) of 227 kip. The Phase I test results provided a baseline. First, 50 percent limit-load levels were applied for each of the three load cases to verify proper load introduction and repeatability by examining strain and displacement results. Next, three limit-load cases were applied: limit pressure of 12.2 psi (1.33 P), axial DLL of 227 kip, and combined 1P pressure and axial DLL. Linear strain and displacement results were observed in all load cases. For Phase-II testing, the panel was impacted to introduce BVID with an energy of 40 ft-lb, with the impact located between the central stringer stitch line and flange edge. The impact created non-penetrating visual damage with fiber breaks and delamination between the skin and stringer flange. Limit-load conditions were applied followed by pressure overload of 18.4 psi (2P) and ultimate load conditions, defined as 1.5 times DLL. Inspections were performed after each load case; no damage growth was observed. For Phase-III testing, a two-bay notch was machined severing the central stiffener. The panel was then subjected to limit-load conditions, followed by combined 1P pressure while increasing axial tension load to catastrophic failure. As limit combined loads were approached, damage initiation was observed in the form of 45? splitting at 1P + 79% DLL. Axial loading was increased to 1P + 150 percent DLL causing damage to propagate to the adjacent stringer flanges. Damage was contained within the two-bay region by the stitching rows up to 1P + 176% DLL. Axial load was further increased until catastrophic failure, when a stringer rod failed at 1P + 192% DLL. These test results further verify the damage containment features of the PRSEUS concept and suggest its appropriateness for future flight vehicles.

Andrew Bergan↗