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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Hybrid Modeling in the Era of Smart Manufacturing

Smart manufacturing (SM) is a new paradigm that allows manufacturing to enter its fourth revolution by exploiting state-of-the art sensing, communication and computation as the Industrial Internet of Things (IioT). Via the use of high-performance computing and advanced modeling, SM aims to improve the flexibility and adaptability of manufacturing. This paper addresses this trend by reviewing the combined use of data-driven and knowledge-enabled hybrid models (HM), and discusses how such techniques seamlessly fit in the SM platform. Furthermore, a discussion of the new paradigms of HM enabled by the SM platform is given, highlighting their importance in future large-scale applications of the SM platform.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Communication-efficient certificate revocation management for Advanced Metering Infrastructure and IoT Integration

Advanced Metering Infrastructure forms a communication network for the collection of power data from smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication between smart meters could be secured utilizing public-key cryptography, however, public-key cryptography still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation and management particularly related distribution and storage overhead of revoked certificates. To address this challenge, in this work, we propose a novel revocation management approach by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which reduces the space requirements for revocation information significantly and thus enables efficient distribution of such information to all smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach on both ns-3 network simulator and a testbed. We demonstrated its superior performance with respect to traditional methods for revocation management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Medium-scale to large-scale implementation of cyber-physical human experiments in live traffic

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) such as cars and trucks are being developed and tested as Cyber-Physical Human systems while the technology improves. Before these systems can achieve full autonomy, some serve as tools in the form of adaptive cruise control. The CIRCLES Consortium investigates the potential for AVs to increase fuel efficiency of highway traffic by smoothing “stop-and-go” traffic waves that result from normal human driving behavior in congestion. We have performed an experiment to evaluate the real world effects of implementing this strategy. A medium-scale experiment was performed on I-24 near Nashville, TN in August 2021. This was a precursor to a larger experiment that will take place November 2022. We examine how the human part of the experiment will change as we scale up from an 11 vehicle test (four AVs) to 100 AVs. There are many solutions to problems of the medium-scale experiment that would be inconvenient, complicate the experience, or not be practicable. The medium-scale experiment involved 11 cars of which four had a custom control algorithm installed to be engaged by the driver. The large-scale experiment will have 100 cars, all with custom control algorithm installed to act on traffic when the controller is engaged. We examine key choices made for the medium experiment, and how some will be different for the large experiment. Our experience performing the medium-scale experiment has made it clear that repeating our methods from this smaller one are inefficient or impossible if used for the large-scale experiment and will be improved.

McQuade, Sean T.↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Real-Time Implementation and Validation of Federated Learning for Grid Services

Grid-edge devices are becoming increasingly important in the energy transition. Preserving privacy was not previously considered an important aspect for power grid operations, but with the increased proliferation of customer-owned assets, it is now an essential consideration. Several mechanisms have been proposed to provide privacy for non-utility owned assets in the power grid. Federated learning (FL) is one method gaining prominence in this area. Although FL has been used for other applications, such as auto-complete in phones, there has not been much investigation into whether these approaches are feasible for grid applications. In this work, we use a research platform with real-time simulators and hardware-in-the-loop capabilities to investigate how FL can be applied to grid-edge devices, and we present the potential grid services that can be derived for these devices. We discuss the computational challenges with deploying complex FL approaches, and we explore several grid services, including participation in retail electricity markets, voltage control, and resilience-driven reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hybrid Attack Graph Generation with Graph Convolutional Deep-Q Learning

Critical infrastructures such as power grids have become increasingly complex, connected, and vulnerable to adverse scenarios, including cyber and physical attacks and faults. Effective risk mitigation for such cyber-physical energy systems (CPES), requires preemptive knowledge of likely adversarial attack scenarios. Hybrid Attack Graph (HAG) is a structured way to represent an adversarial scenario as an attack sequence using a threat model. However, the scarcity of documented attack sequences hinders analysts and CPES planners’ ability to identify credible attack scenarios for a given CPES. We propose a data-driven Graph Convolutional Deep-Q Network (GCDQ) to address this data challenge through generating HAGs. By leveraging limited real-world observations from the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, our GCDQ model synthesizes realistic graphs with the targeted attribute of minimum detectability via reinforcement learning. This generative model is the first step in creating a tool to substantially boost the attack sequence dataset and enhance the performance of CPS defense-related tasks by providing insights into likely attack sequences with given attributes.

deep learning, artificial intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2026

MARIAH PCAP data for Validation Demonstration

This dataset holds simulated PCAP (packet capture) data from the SCEPTRE validation demonstration model as a set of pairwise communications between devices via specific protocols. All connections should be assumed to be symmetric, as this data is an aggregation of the true PCAP. A mapping is also provided associating each IP address with its true device type.

cyber-physical system↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2021

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices Version 2.0

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2022

Smart Microgrids

The Nation’s electrical power depends on one bulk power grid to support security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Threat Assessment of 2020, the largest cyber threat to homeland security is potential disruption to critical infrastructure, including power grids. Critical infrastructure includes the physical and cyber systems which generate, transmit, and distribute electricity with an impact on economic security, public health, or safety. The surety of the Nation’s power grid is vital for providing essential services and would put the population at risk if disrupted. Power outages can have catastrophic consequences for critical organizations such as hospitals and military installations. Additionally, the current fossil-fuel dependent power grid is extremely fragile and vulnerable to overloads, storms that destroy power lines, and cyber-attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Oakland University Cybersecurity Center (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

This report summarizes the outcomes of Award DE-CR0000023, “Oakland University Cybersecurity Center,” a 31-month project funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). The project addressed cybersecurity risks facing small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) transitioning to Industry 4.0. The project integrated customer discovery, applied research, and cybersecurity training development. A total of 51 cybersecurity assessments identified significant gaps in baseline practices, incident response, and workforce capability. Research efforts produced a scalable mitigation framework tailored to SMM environments, and workforce analysis identified persistent talent gaps. Eight cybersecurity training modules were developed and deployed via Oakland University’s Professional and Continuing Education (PACE) platform. All objectives were completed, with 98.93% federal budget utilization and cost share exceeding requirements. The project establishes a scalable model for strengthening cybersecurity resilience and workforce capacity across U.S. manufacturing supply chains.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

On the Feasibility of Market Manipulation and Energy Storage Arbitrage via Load-Altering Attacks

Around the globe, electric power networks are transforming into complex cyber–physical energy systems (CPES) due to the accelerating integration of both information and communication technologies (ICT) and distributed energy resources. While this integration improves power grid operations, the growing number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) controllers and high-wattage appliances being connected to the electric grid is creating new attack vectors, largely inherited from the IoT ecosystem, that could lead to disruptions and potentially energy market manipulation via coordinated load-altering attacks (LAAs). In this article, we explore the feasibility and effects of a realistic LAA targeted at IoT high-wattage loads connected at the distribution system level, designed to manipulate local energy markets and perform energy storage (ES) arbitrage. Realistic integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) systems are used to demonstrate the effects that LAAs have on locational marginal prices at the transmission level and in distribution systems adjacent to the targeted network.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber-physical Resilient Interoperable Microgrid Networks

The paper presents the results of an industry-academic collaboration between ABB, Duke Energy and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) that has developed and demonstrated a cyberphysical resilient control and communication architecture for deployment of multiple microgrid networks, as well as retrofitting the existing distribution grids by increasing DER penetration levels.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture Design Using Force-on-Force Cyber-Physical Modeling

Currently, nuclear power plant physical security systems are highly dependent on air-gaps as a protective measure against cyber-threats. Cyber-physical threats become more likely as advanced cyber-threat capabilities to jump air-gaps transition into common use. Defending against the emerging threat of cyber-enabled physical intrusions is poorly understood. The consequence of these cyber-physical attacks has no quantitative analysis method to inform risk-informed, performance-based cybersecurity approaches. By modifying the physical security simulation tool Dante, cyber-physical threat consequence was able to be analyzed on a notional facility. The results of this analysis are used to design a Defensive Cybersecurity Architecture (DCSA) for the physical security system to produce example resilience measures for this notional facility. A DCSA defines security levels to provide a graded approach for defending plant functions, and security zones for trusted communication between systems. This approach can be applied to real world systems to produce physical protection systems and response measures that are resilient to cyber-physical threats.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Game-Theoretic Strategies for Cyber-Physical Infrastructures Under Component Disruptions

In this work, networked infrastructures of recursively defined systems composed of discrete cyber and physical components are considered. The components of basic systems at the finest levels can be disrupted by cyber or physical means, and can be reinforced to survive at certain costs. A problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance is formulated as a game between a provider and an attacker, who probabilistically choose components to reinforce and attack, respectively. The disruptions of this infrastructure are characterized using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the conditional failure probability of the infrastructure given the failure of an individual system at that level. The survival probabilities of basic systems satisfy simple product-form, first-order differential equations expressed in terms of the multiplier functions. The utility functions of the provider and attacker are composed of the reward and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the component reinforcement and attack probabilities. The Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized, along with the sensitivity functions of the survival probabilities of basic systems that highlight their dependence individually on the cost-benefit terms, the correlation functions, and the multiplier functions. These results are illustrated using simplified models of a distributed cloud servers infrastructure, a 5G data network infrastructure, a high performance computing federation, and a smart energy grid infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System

SAND2023-05661O The proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) provides grid-edge situational awareness for cybersecurity defense by capturing real-time distributed energy resource (DER) network traffic and performance data with a novel approach that improves the detection and prevention of cyber-physical attacks. The PIDMS addresses the grid-edge security gap with real-time analysis of both network traffic and photovoltaic performance data to deliver a novel, cyber-physical intrusion detection system (IDS) approach that increases the accuracy and effectiveness of detection and mitigation. This hybrid IDS analysis enables dual monitoring that increases the workload of the adversary; both cyber and physical data would have to be simultaneously spoofed to evade detection. Furthermore, monitoring and analyzing cyber data are insufficient in some cases. For example, in an insider threat aimed at disrupting inverter grid-support functions where proper credentials and authentication are achieved, only the altered PV performance would indicate abnormal behavior. All in all, the PIDMS provides novel capabilities for: • Distributed, real-time cyber-physical detection and mitigation analysis • Cybersecurity defense for grid-edge systems • Analysis framework that can provide situational awareness across the transmission, distribution, and DER systems The PIDMS sensor is designed to collect cyber-physical data, process the data using machine-learning algorithms, detect abnormal events, and deploy mitigations. With these goals, the main functional PIDMS objectives are: • Capability to collect cyber-physical data • Onboard storage of cyber-physical data • Peer-to-peer communication • Computationally efficient machine-learning algorithms • Online cyber-physical data analysis • Alerting/visualization capabilities • Mitigation deployment capability with bump-in-the-wire (BITW) implementation Each of these functional objectives enable PIDMS to perform effective cyber-physical intrusion detection and mitigation. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Jones, Christian↗