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A study was initiated to determine the root cause of failure for circuit board electrical connection pins that failed during vibRatory testing. The circuit board is part of an unmanned space probe, and the vibratory testing was performed to ensure component survival of launch loading conditions. The results of this study show that the pins failed as a result of fatigue loading.
A structural failure occurred on the main propulsion test stand at NSTL causing a hydrogen fire and damage to the engines to be used on the Orbiter Columbia. Scattered accelerometer measurements indicated very high response levels at 254 hertz and 311 hertz. The Engine Office at MSFC asked the Dynamics Test Branch to try and find out what caused the failure. All three nozzles were sent to Huntsville for testing. Modal test data revealed very quickly how the failure occurred in the steerhorn and also pointed out two other structural problems. A complete set of data is presented along with a narrative explanation of the steps taken to identify and verify the structural problem.
Space suit manloads are defined as the outer bounds of force that the human occupant of a suit is able to exert onto the suit during motion. They are defined on a suit-component basis as a unit of maximum force that the suit component in question must withstand without failure. Existing legacy manloads requirements are specific to the suit architecture of the EMU and were developed in an iterative fashion; however, future exploration needs dictate a new suit architecture with bearings, load paths, and entry capability not previously used in any flight suit. No capability currently exists to easily evaluate manloads imparted by a suited occupant, which would be required to develop requirements for a flight-rated design. However, sensor technology has now progressed to the point where an easily-deployable, repeatable and flexible manloads measuring technique could be developed leveraging recent advances in sensor technology. INNOVATION: This development positively impacts schedule, cost and safety risk associated with new suit exploration architectures. For a final flight design, a comprehensive and accurate man loads requirements set must be communicated to the contractor; failing that, a suit design which does not meet necessary manloads limits is prone to failure during testing or worse, during an EVA, which could cause catastrophic failure of the pressure garment posing risk to the crew. This work facilitates a viable means of developing manloads requirements using a range of human sizes & strengths. OUTCOME / RESULTS: Performed sensor market research. Highlighted three viable options (primary, secondary, and flexible packaging option). Designed/fabricated custom bracket to evaluate primary option on a single suit axial. Manned suited manload testing completed and general approach verified.
The precipitation-strengthened Nickel alloy Inconel® 740H® (IN740H) exhibits increased ductility at higher applied strain rates during quasi-static tensile tests at an elevated temperature of 760°C. The examination of fracture surfaces in this context reveals a noteworthy transition of underlying fracture mechanisms from transgranular to intergranular fracture as the applied strain rate decreases from 1×10 -3 / s to 0.83×10 -4 / s . To thoroughly understand the mechanical response of IN740H under these conditions, this study develops a crystal plasticity finite element (CPFE) model. Further, this model incorporates various deformation mechanisms including dislocation slips, climb, and grain boundary sliding, which are relevant to the test conditions. The model is calibrated using data from both tensile tests at different strain rates and creep tests across a broad stress range at 760°C, enabling the accurate determination of model parameters for each mechanism. Simulation results well captured the experimental observations of different failure modes. At higher strain rates, the model shows a dominance of dislocation slip leading to heterogeneous plastic deformation and formation of transgranular shear bands causing the failure, while at lower strain rates, an increased activity of grain boundary sliding causes grain boundaries crack leading to intergranular failure.
Delamination is the most commonly observed failure mode in composite rotorcraft dynamic components. Although delamination may not cause immediate failure of the composite part, it often precipitates component repair or replacement, which inhibits fleet readiness, and results in increased life cycle costs. A fracture mechanics approach for analyzing, characterizing, and designing against delamination will be outlined. Examples of delamination problems will be illustrated where the strain energy release rate associated with delamination growth was found to be a useful generic parameter, independent of thickness, layup, and delamination source, for characterizing delamination failure. Several analysis techniques for calculating strain energy release rates for delamination from a variety of sources will be outlined. Current efforts to develop ASTM standard test methods for measuring interlaminar fracture toughness and developing delamination failure criteria will be reviewed. A technique for quantifying delamination durability due to cyclic loading will be presented. The use of this technique for predicting fatigue life of composite laminates and developing a fatigue design philosophy for composite structural components will be reviewed.
This project is an overview and analysis of the past ten years (2013 – present) in global spaceflight, highlighting the orbital launches of countries, particularly the failures that occurred, the reasons they occurred, and a breakdown of the related statistics and background information. The analysis is conducted from a perspective of reliability and maintainability engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to formulate a quantifiable understanding of the data and how it is pertinent to Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in spaceflight. There is a breakdown by country or group, timelines, and number of launches. The failures over the years are categorized, all given a broad analysis of subsystem failures and details of events. A few failures are given a more in-depth analysis of root causes and failure modes determined by their unique or common nature. The data is retrieved from online, publicly available sources.
Three prototype 50 ampere-hour (Ah) nickel-hydrogen cells of the Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories (AWFAL) design were cycled to failure. A summary of the life cycling tests and failure analyses of the cells are presented. The cells were cycled in a simulated low earth orbit regime at depths of discharge ranging from 25 to 80 percent. Trend data, such as end of discharge voltage and cell capacity, was recorded during test. Cells 1, 2, and 3 completed 17167, 2473, and 10080 charge/discharge cycles, respectively, prior to failure. All failed due to internal shorts, and were disassembled to determine cause of failure.
Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure or guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. Although the theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be in reasonable agreement (4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively) the underlying sub-root cause scoring had significant disparities attributable to significant organizational changes and acquisitions. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.
A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis has been performed on the aft slot region of the Titan 4 Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SRMU). This analysis was performed in conjunction with MSFC structural modeling of the propellant grain to determine if the flow field induced stresses would adversely alter the propellant geometry to the extent of causing motor failure. The results of the coupled CFD/stress analysis have shown that there is a continual increase of flow field resistance at the aft slot due to the aft segment propellant grain being progressively moved radially toward the centerline of the motor port. This 'bootstrapping' effect between grain radial movement and internal flow resistance is conducive to causing a rapid motor failure.
The cycle life tests to determine the performance capabilities of packs of cells under different loads and temperature conditions are reported. Results are summarized, and the failure of 14 failed cells is analyzed. It was found that the main cause of failure was separator deterioration and migration of the negative plate material.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.
The compression strength of a stitched and a toughened matrix graphite/epoxy composite was determined and compared to a baseline unstitched untoughened composite. Two different layups with a variety of test lengths were tested under both ambient and hot/wet conditions. No significant difference in strength was seen for the different materials when the gage lengths of the specimens were long enough to lead to a buckling failure. For shorter specimens, a 30 percent reduction in strength from the baseline was seen due to stitching for both a 48-ply quasi-isotropic and a (0/45/0/-45/90/-45/0/45/0)s laminate. Analysis of the results suggested that the decrease in strength was due to increased fiber misalignment due to the stitches. An observed increasing strength with decreasing gage length, which was seen for all materials, was explained with a size effect model. The model assumed a random distribution of flaws (misaligned fibers). The toughened materials showed a small increase in strength over the baseline material for both laminates presumably due to the compensating effects of a more compliant matrix and straighter fibers in the toughened material. The hot/wet strength of the stitched and baseline material fell 30 percent below their ambient strengths for shorter, nonbuckling specimen, while the strength of the toughened matrix material only fell 20 percent. Video images of the failing specimen were recorded and showed local failures prior to global collapse of the specimen. These images support the theory of a random distribution of flaws controlling composite failure. Failed specimen appearance, however, seems to be a misleading indication of the cause of failure.
The compression strength of a stitched and a toughened matrix graphite/epoxy composite was determined and compared to a baseline unstitched untoughened composite. Two different layups with a variety of test lengths were tested under both ambient and hot/wet conditions. No significant difference in strength was seen for the different materials when the gage lengths of the specimens were long enough to lead to a buckling failure. For shorter specimens, a 30% reduction in strength from the baseline was seen due to stitching for both a 48-ply quasi-isotropic and a (0/45/0/-45/90/-45/0/45/0)s laminate. Analysis of the results suggested that the decrease in strength was due to increased fiber misalignment due to the stitches. An observed increasing strength with decreasing gage length, which was seen for all materials, was explained with a size effect model. The model assumed a random distribution of flaws (misaligned fibers). The toughened material showed a small increase in strength over the baseline material for both laminates presumably due to the compensating effects of a more compliant matrix and straighter fibers in the toughened material. The hot/wet strength of the stitched and baseline material fell 30% below their ambient strengths for shorter, non-buckling specimen, while the strength of the toughened matrix material only fell 20%. Video images of the failing specimen were recorded and showed local failures prior to global collapse of the specimen. These images support the theory of a random distribution of flaws controlling composite failure. Failed specimen appearance however, seems to be a misleading indication of the cause of failure.
Weather events cause most grid failures. Often, we even get notifications on our phones to take cover or be prepared for an imminent event. If electric grid utilities had a similar warning that also included probable scenarios and the equipment involved, they could prepare and minimize the effects. Recent research at Idaho National Laboratory into electric grid risk analysis methods resulted in a tool that allows for the development of the most likely scenarios given failure probabilities of grid components. INL has a project with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) program to develop a Grid Alert application that receives messages from the existing emergency alert system, filters and determines components possibly affected by the emergency event, calculates probable scenarios uses MASTERRI and then notifies the utility if there is significant risk. Historical failure data of elements that comprise the U.S. electric grid have been compiled by utilities and organizations such as the international regulatory body North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Nominal failure rates are obtained from this data. To make this tool possible, estimated failure rates are needed for different component types given the alert type, severity, and location. Historic weather-related grid element failures are correlated with historic weather events from Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS). These correlated events and failures are used along with Bayesian updates from the historical norms to provide a modified failure rate for grid elements in the alert areas and calculate probable scenarios. This discusses the Grid Alert project plan but focuses on the data gathered and process used in determining failure rates for possible grid failure scenarios.
Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.
Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure and guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. The theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be 4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.
Failure reports for flight model-1 of the thematic mapper are summarized showing the symptom and cause of failure as well as the corrective action taken. Each report is keyed to the major subsystem against which the failure occurred. Requests for deviation/waiver are listed by number, description, and current status. Copies of engineering proposals are included.
Delamination failure in a unidirectional curved composite laminate was investigated. The curved laminate failed unstably by delaminations developing around the curved region of the laminate at different depths through the thickness until virtually all bending stiffness was lost. Delamination was assumed to initiate at the location of the highest radial stress in the curved region. A closed form curved beam elasticity solution and a 2-D finite element analysis (FEA) were conducted to determine this location. The variation in the strain energy release rate, G, with delamination growth was then determined using the FEA. A strength-based failure criteria adequately predicted the interlaminar tension failure which caused initial delamination onset. Using the G analysis the delamination was predicted to extend into the arm and leg of the laminate, predominantly in mode I. As the initial delamination grew arould the curved region, the maximum radial stress in the newly formed inner sublaminate increased to a level sufficient to cause a new delamination to initiate in the sublaminate with no increase in applied load. This failure progression was observed experimentally.