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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16

Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission Four (HST SM4) EVA Challenges for Safe Execution of STS-125

In May of 2009, the world-renowned Hubble Space Telescope (HST) received a suite of new instruments and a refurbished bus to enable science for many years to come. The restoration was conducted on-orbit by four space-walkers on five carefully scripted Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) days. Assuring the safety of the space-walkers and their crew-mates required careful attention to tool development, detailed procedures for every activity and many rehearsals with engineers and crew to ensure that everything worked together. Additionally, evolution of EVA requirements since the last servicing mission in 2002, and the broad scope of the mission demanded a much higher degree of safety participation in hardware design and risk acceptance than for previous servicing missions.

Dedalis, Robert P.↗

Optimum impulsive midcourse guidance with control dependent errors.

The problem of determining the optimum guidance policy for an interplanetary spacecraft is treated as a stochastic optimal control problem. An algorithm for computing the optimum velocity correction and the optimum execution time (with allowance for correction-dependent errors) is derived in the case of a single midcourse correction. The performance index was chosen to be an upper bound for the probability that the mission fails, and it is defined as a function of the maximum allowable velocity correction and the maximum allowable deviation of the terminal state. Numerical results obtained for a Jupiter fly-by mission indicate that the execution errors have a significant influence on the performance index, but an acceptably small upper bound on the probability of mission failure can be obtained for sufficiently small execution errors.

Tapley, B. D.↗

Communication Delays, Disruptions, and Blackouts for Crewed Mars Missions

As NASA continues to develop the Moon2Mars campaign, there are a number of challenges that must be addressed to execute a successful crewed mission to Mars. One of those challenges is delays, disruptions, and blackouts that crew will experience during their mission to Mars, and that is the challenge evaluated in this paper. Our analysis showed that communication delays will vary from 0 to 22 minutes over the course of a mission, peaking while the crew is at or just departed from Mars. The disruptions occur in a similar time frame and can last for several days up to several months, depending on the solar disturbance sensitivity of the communication band being used. The delays and disruptions will have an impact on crewed Mars missions, and determining mitigations is future work to be informed by this analysis.

Katherine T McBrayer↗

Definition of technology development missions for early space station, orbit transfer vehicle servicing. Volume 1: Executive summary

Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) servicing study scope, propellant transfer, storage and reliquefaction technology development missions (TDM), docking and berthing TDM, maintenance TDM, OTV/payload integration TDM, combined TDMS design, summary space station accomodations, programmatic analysis, and TDM equipment operational usage are discussed.

Source record↗

Extensibility of Human Asteroid Mission to Mars and Other Destinations

This paper will describe the benefits of execution of the Asteroid Redirect Mission as an early mission in deep space, demonstrating solar electric propulsion, deep space robotics, ground and on-board navigation, docking, and EVA. The paper will also discuss how staging in trans-lunar space and the elements associated with this mission are excellent building blocks for subsequent deep space missions to Mars or other destinations.

McDonald, Mark A.↗

Optimization of Maneuver Execution for Landsat-7 Routine Operations

Multiple mission constraints were satisfied during a lengthy, strategic ascent phase. Once routine operations begin, the ongoing concern of maintaining mission requirements becomes an immediate priority. The Landsat-7 mission has tight longitude control box and Earth imaging that requires sub-satellite descending nodal equator crossing times to occur in a narrow 30minute range fifteen (15) times daily. Operationally, spacecraft maneuvers must'be executed properly to maintain mission requirements. The paper will discuss the importance of optimizing the altitude raising and plane change maneuvers, amidst known constraints, to satisfy requirements throughout mission lifetime. Emphasis will be placed not only on maneuver size and frequency but also on changes in orbital elements that impact maneuver execution decisions. Any associated trade-off arising from operations contingencies will be discussed as well. Results of actual altitude and plane change maneuvers are presented to clarify actions taken.

Cox, E. Lucien, Jr.↗

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

Science Planning for the TROPIX Mission

The objective of the study grant was to undertake the planning needed to execute meaningful solar electric propulsion missions in the magnetosphere and beyond. The first mission examined was the Transfer Orbit Plasma Investigation Experiment (TROPIX) mission to spiral outward through the magnetosphere. The next mission examined was to the moon and an asteroid. Entitled Diana, it was proposed to NASA in October 1994. Two similar missions were conceived in 1996 entitled CNR for Comet Nucleus Rendezvous and MBAR for Main Belt Asteroid Rendezvous. The latter mission was again proposed in 1998. All four of these missions were unsuccessfully proposed to the NASA Discovery program. Nevertheless we were partially successful in that the Deep Space 1 (DS1) mission was eventually carried out nearly duplicating our CNR mission. Returning to the magnetosphere we studied and proposed to the Medium Class Explorer (MIDEX) program a MidEx mission called TEMPEST, in 1995. This mission included two solar electric spacecraft that spiraled outward in the magnetosphere: one at near 900 inclination and one in the equatorial plane. This mission was not selected for flight. Next we proposed a single SEP vehicle to carry Energetic Neutral Atom (ENA) imagers and inside observations to complement the IMAGE mission providing needed data to properly interpret the IMAGE data. This mission called SESAME was submitted unsuccessfully in 1997. One proposal was successful. A study grant was awarded to examine a four spacecraft solar electric mission, named Global Magnetospheric Dynamics. This study was completed and a report on this mission is attached but events overtook this design and a separate study team was selected to design a classical chemical mission as a Solar Terrestrial Probe. Competing proposals such as through the MIDEX opportunity were expressly forbidden. A bibliography is attached.

Russell, C. T.↗

User's guide to the Mission Analysis Evaluation and Space Trajectory Operations program (MAESTRO)

The MAESTRO system is a mission analysis tool designed to present to the user information necessary to make the various decisions required in the design and execution of a spaceflight mission. The system was designed so that it can be used in both the pre-launch mission planning phase of a mission and during the flight as an in-flight decision making tool. A description of each of the following modes is presented: (1) trajectory propagation mode; (2) retro-fire determination mode; (3) midcourse analysis determination mode; (4) Monte Carlo mode; (5) verification mode; (6) orbit stability mode; and (7) post injection trim mode. A description of the inputs necessary to run the program mode is given along with a sample case.

Lutzky, D.↗

Development of a Space Station Operations Management System

To enhance the productivity of operations aboard the Space Station, a means must be provided to augment, and frequently to supplant, human effort in support of mission operations and management, both on the ground and onboard. The Operations Management System (OMS), under development at the Johnson Space Center, is one such means. OMS comprises the tools and procedures to facilitate automation of station monitoring, control, and mission planning tasks. OMS mechanizes, and hence rationalizes, execution of tasks traditionally performed by mission planners, the mission control center team, onboard System Management software, and the flight crew.

Brandli, A. E.↗

Measurements of nitric acid, carboxylic acids, and selected aerosol species for the NASA/GTE Pacific Mission - West (PEM-WEST)

The research investigation funded through this grant to the University of New Hampshire was performed during a major field expedition conducted by the NASA Tropospheric Chemistry Program. The NASA Global Tropospheric Experiment (GTE) executed an airborne science mission (PEM-WEST A) aboard the NASA Ames DC-8 over the Pacific Ocean during Sep./Oct. 1981. The atmosphere over the central Pacific Ocean is the only major region in the Northern Hemisphere that is relatively free from direct anthropogenic influence. Thus, this environment is ideally suited to study the natural biogeochemical cycles of carbon, nitrogen, ozone, sulfur, and aerosols without serious confounding problems related to anthropogenic emissions. Asian sources account for about 17 percent of the global budgets of nitrogen oxides (NO(x)) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The Pacific Rim region therefore provides the opportunity to study the anthropogenic impact on natural atmospheric chemical cycles. The PEM-WEST A flights were focused on contrasting the chemistry of 'clean' air over the central Pacific with anthropogenically impacted air advected off the Asian continent. The principal objectives of PEM-WEST A were to investigate the atmospheric chemistry of ozone (O3) and its precursors, and to study important aspects of the atmospheric sulfur cycle over the western Pacific Ocean. Measurements conducted by the University of New Hampshire contributed directly to both of these objectives. Subsequent PEM-WEST field missions are planned by GTE in the mid-1990's to contrast atmospheric chemistry documented during PEM-WEST A with other time periods. This report presents preliminary findings from the PEM-WEST A field mission. Data interpretation is currently ongoing with the goal of manuscript submission of scientific results to a special issue of the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres in Feb. 1994. The reader is strongly encouraged to review this suite of profession articles to appreciate the overall scientific findings and benefits of the PEM-WEST A field mission.

Talbot, Robert W.↗

Technology for manned Mars flight

It is important for NASA to begin development of the technologies and strategies necessary to support a Mars mission. Most of the technologies required are long lead time items and must be started now to preserve the option for Mars landings at the turn of the century. It is a common assumption that a piloted mission to Mars could be accomplished with current technology. Although this is probably true to some degree, the mass in low earth orbit would be so large that the mission would be impractical and maybe impossible. Technologies for advanced propulsion, advanced life support systems, aerobraking, and utilization of in situ resources can greatly enhance the ability to execute this class of mission.

Roberts, Barney B.↗

Decision Aid for Conjunction Risk Mitigation by Differential Drag

In the previous five years, the rate of conjunctions that the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team processed and analyzed has more than tripled. (NASA CARA, 2024) New missions in the early development phases are now required to plan for dealing with conjunctions under the present space environment, and also projecting forward into a future likely with even further increased utilization of the space environment. Some missions are investigating the possibility of using differential drag to remediate conjunctions without expending limited fuel or for missions without propulsive capabilities. The NASA CARA team studied the historical record of conjunctions to evaluate the circumstances under which differential drag may be successfully applied and have developed a series of tables to use as a decision aid for missions considering differential drag. Currently, if a CARA-protected mission with maneuvering capabilities is predicted to have a conjunction with probability of collision (Pc) greater than 7E-5 (the default value of the ‘yellow threshold’, which may have some other value agreed by CARA and the mission during the Orbital Collison Avoidance Planning (OCAP) process), CARA will use its Maneuver Trade Space (MTS) tool to evaluate and recommend options for the timing and magnitude of a risk mitigation maneuver (RMM), based on the mission’s capabilities. If the conjunction’s Pc is greater than 1E-4, the ‘red threshold’, then an RMM must be executed per NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8079.1 (NASA, 2023), although missions may execute an RMM even if the Pc is lower. The magnitude of the maneuver is typically a few cm/s, and CARA estimates how many will be required for the mission’s nominal lifetime – typically a few per year – during the OCAP process, to inform the mission’s delta-V requirement. For traditional satellites, this is usually smaller than other requirements for orbit insertion, maintenance, and disposal, but for CubeSats or other small satellite missions, a propulsion system may not provide much more than a few cm/s of delta-V or may not fit at all within the available budget of money, time, size, weight, and/or power (SWaP). Conversely, CubeSats often have deployable solar panels, which offer the capacity to have much higher areas facing some directions than others. Such a mission can instead use ‘differential drag’ to remediate a conjunction -- in other words, change its drag area (usually increasing) to deviate from the predicted collision course. This is how Planet’s Dove spacecraft maintain their formations and remediate conjunction risks without having on-board propulsion (Foster, et al., 2017) (Griffith, et al., 2021). CARA has been developing improvements to MTS to support differential-drag for NASA's missions -- where it is effective. CARA records all conjunctions of their protected payloads, with historical records starting in 2005 (with significant conjunction events starting to occur on or after 2013). From this record, approximately 7,300 had a Pc greater than 1E-4 at 3 days prior to the time of closest approach, the time analyzed for differential drag efficacy. Of those, approximately 4,300 had fully-defined covariance matrices stored for both the primary and secondary objects; this set of conjunctions is the basis for the analysis of this work. CARA’s MTS tool was used to propagate the primary satellite forward from that decision point with varying degrees of increase to ballistic coefficient (BC). Because these conjunctions came from multiple missions, the nondimensional ‘delta-BC’ factor was used to quantify and normalize the increase in ballistic coefficient, defined as follows: Delta-BC = BC_new / BC_old - 1 Positive delta-BC factors represent an increase in drag compared to the nominal attitude, while negative delta-BC factors (to a minimum of -1) represent a decrease in drag. At the conclusion of the differential-drag ‘maneuver’, the Pc was recalculated to evaluate whether or not the conjunction was mitigated (Pc < 3E-6). These results were then binned and sorted along several axes, including altitude, amount of delta-BC, and (pre-maneuver) rate of energy dissipation (EDR), to identify underlying patterns. The altitude plot is shown in Figure 1. To validate this analysis, we consulted the record of a NASA mission which uses differential drag to maintain its orbit and remediate conjunction risk. CARA’s empirical record of the mission’s orbit history suggests it achieves a delta-BC of 2.2. Of the twenty-one RMM plans that were submitted by this mission, eighteen were matched with conjunctions in the historical record; of those, twelve were successfully remediated (final measured Pc < 3E-6), and six were not. This is consistent with the expected efficacy for missions orbiting at that altitude. We are presently simulating this mission’s RMMs with MTS; this work is ongoing, but so far, the MTS results are qualitatively in agreement with the empirical results -- correctly predicting that a maneuver would or would not remediate a conjunction, if not exactly matching the final post-remediation Pc value. We found that differential drag was most successful for satellites with perigees below 560 km, and which could adopt an average delta-BC of 2 or greater (that is, increasing their ballistic coefficient by a factor of 3). However, this is a difficult threshold for a mission to clear; very few spacecraft are capable of adopting a high-drag configuration for 72 hours continuously. Planet’s Dove spacecraft use differential drag to remediate conjunctions (Griffith, et al., 2021), and they have a maximum delta-BC factor of 9, but in practice (with mission and charging constraints) they achieve a time-averaged delta-BC that is closer to 2 (Foster, et al., 2017). A mission’s differential drag utility strongly depends on the operational constraints that has the capacity to limit the time-averaged delta-BC. A mission with a high maximum delta-BC of 5 or more can have an effective delta-BC of less than 1 due to operational constraints such as instrument and solar panel pointing, especially if this constraint results in holding an intermediate drag value for most of its orbit. CARA has developed tables that can be used as decision aids to advise missions-in-development about the best way to utilize their differential drag capabilities. For missions below 560 km with the operational flexibility to devote multiple days to holding a high-drag configuration (or a sufficiently high drag ratio to compensate for limitations on that time), they are -- more likely than not -- able to successfully remediate high-risk conjunctions. Conversely, missions that do not meet these exacting criteria -- most missions -- can instead be advised to use on-board propulsion systems to perform RMMs, or to turn their minimum-area face towards the approach vector, thereby reducing Pc at the moment of conjunction due to the decreased Hard-Body Radius (HBR), that is a strongly correlated variable in the Pc calculations. (NASA, 2023)

conjunction assessment↗

NASA/MOD Operations Impacts from Shuttle Program

Operations plays a pivotal role in the success of any human spaceflight program. This paper will highlight some of the core tenets of spaceflight operations from a systems perspective and use several examples from the Space Shuttle Program to highlight where the success and safety of a mission can hinge upon the preparedness and competency of the operations team. Further, awareness of the types of operations scenarios and impacts that can arise during human crewed space missions can help inform design and mission planning decisions long before a vehicle gets into orbit. A strong operations team is crucial to the development of future programs; capturing the lessons learned from the successes and failures of a past program will allow for safer, more efficient, and better designed programs in the future. No matter how well a vehicle is designed and constructed, there are always unexpected events or failures that occur during space flight missions. Preparation, training, real-time execution, and troubleshooting are skills and values of the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) flight controller; these operational standards have proven invaluable to the Space Shuttle Program. Understanding and mastery of these same skills will be required of any operations team as technology advances and new vehicles are developed. This paper will focus on individual Space Shuttle mission case studies where specific operational skills, techniques, and preparedness allowed for mission safety and success. It will detail the events leading up to the scenario or failure, how the operations team identified and dealt with the failure and its downstream impacts. The various options for real-time troubleshooting will be discussed along with the operations team final recommendation, execution, and outcome. Finally, the lessons learned will be summarized along with an explanation of how these lessons were used to improve the operational preparedness of future flight control teams.

Fitzpatrick, Michael↗

Architecture Study on Telemetry Coverage for Immediate Post-Separation Phase

This paper presents the preliminary results of an architecture study that provides continuous telemetry coverage for NASA missions for immediate post-separation phase. This study is a collaboration effort between Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). After launch when the spacecraft separated from the upper stage, the spacecraft typically executes a number of mission-critical operations prior to the deployment of solar panels and the activation of the primary communication subsystem. JPL, GSFC, and APL have similar design principle statements that require continuous coverage of mission-critical telemetry during the immediate post-separation phase. To conform to these design principles, an architecture that consists of a separate spacecraft transmitter and a robust communication network capable of tracking the spacecraft signals is needed.This paper presents the preliminary results of an architecture study that provides continuous telemetry coverage for NASA missions for immediate post-separation phase. This study is a collaboration effort between Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). After launch when the spacecraft separated from the upper stage, the spacecraft typically executes a number of mission-critical operations prior to the deployment of solar panels and the activation of the primary communication subsystem. JPL, GSFC, and APL have similar design principle statements that require continuous coverage of mission-critical telemetry during the immediate post-separation phase. To conform to these design principles, an architecture that consists of a separate spacecraft transmitter and a robust communication network capable of tracking the spacecraft signals is needed. The main results of this study are as follows: 1) At low altitude (< 10000 km) when most post-separation critical operations are executed, Earth-based network (e.g. Deep Space Network (DSN)) can only provide limited coverage, whereas space-based network (e.g. Space Network (SN)) can provide continuous coverage. 2) Commercial-off-the-shelf SN compatible transmitters are available for small satellite applications. In this paper we present the detailed coverage analysis of Earth-based and Space-based networks. We identify the key functional and performance requirements of the architecture, and describe the proposed selection criteria of the spacecraft transmitter. We conclude the paper with a proposed forward plan.

architecture↗

Pioneer Venus orbiter

The orbiter mission of the Pioneer Venus probe is discussed. In accordance with the low-cost Pioneer Venus concept, NASA intends to use the same basic spacecraft, known as the bus, for the execution of the two missions. The bus will be equipped with all of the subsystems common to the probe and orbiter missions (for example, thermal control, solar cells and power supply, attitude measurement and control, telemetry and communication electronics, and auxiliary propulsion unit). For the 1977 mission, the bus will be equipped with the large and small probes and a special antenna system. For the orbiter mission, the bus will be equipped with a retro-propulsion motor and a high-gain antenna. A diagram of the system envisaged is shown.

Source record↗

Shuttle and Spacelab flight operations

The Space Transportation System (STS) will provide easier access to space for a wider range of users than ever before. Within the capabilities provided by the STS, a new mode of space flight operation will be offered: the Shuttle/Spacelab sortie. The object of this paper is to characterize the flight operations process for a Shuttle mission from planning through execution with particular attention to the Shuttle/Spacelab sortie mode and the involvement of the user. The partnership between the operators of the STS and the user organization is traced through a typical mission scenario which describes the functions and responsibilities of the flight operations planning elements, the flightcrew, and the flight control team. A description of the Mission Control Center (MCC) and payload support capabilities is given to complete the overview of Shuttle flight operations.

Oneill, J. W.↗

Flight Planning Branch Space Shuttle Lessons Learned

Planning products and procedures that allow the mission flight control teams and the astronaut crews to plan, train and fly every Space Shuttle mission have been developed by the Flight Planning Branch at the NASA Johnson Space Center. As the Space Shuttle Program ends, lessons learned have been collected from each phase of the successful execution of these Shuttle missions. Specific examples of how roles and responsibilities of console positions that develop the crew and vehicle attitude timelines will be discussed, as well as techniques and methods used to solve complex spacecraft and instrument orientation problems. Additionally, the relationships and procedural hurdles experienced through international collaboration have molded operations. These facets will be explored and related to current and future operations with the International Space Station and future vehicles. Along with these important aspects, the evolution of technology and continual improvement of data transfer tools between the shuttle and ground team has also defined specific lessons used in the improving the control teams effectiveness. Methodologies to communicate and transmit messages, images, and files from Mission Control to the Orbiter evolved over several years. These lessons have been vital in shaping the effectiveness of safe and successful mission planning that have been applied to current mission planning work in addition to being incorporated into future space flight planning. The critical lessons from all aspects of previous plan, train, and fly phases of shuttle flight missions are not only documented in this paper, but are also discussed as how they pertain to changes in process and consideration for future space flight planning.

Price, Jennifer B.↗