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NASA NTRS2005

A methodology of MSL breakup analysis for Earth accidental reentry and its application to breakup analysis for Mars off-nominal entry

Vehicle breakup analysis has been performed for missions that may carry nuclear fuel for heating or power purposes to assess nuclear safety in case of launch failure leading to atmospheric reentry. Also, failure scenarios exist which could lead to breakup during Entry / Descent / Landing (EDL) at Mars due to off-nominal entries, with implications for planetary protection requirements. Since the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) spacecraft may include a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG), an analysis of breakup in case of launch failure is required. Also, breakup during Mars EDL due to off-nominal entries could release the RTG heat source that has implications for planetary protection requirements. This paper presents a methodology of MSL breakup analysis for launch failure with application to Mars off-nominal entry.

nuclear safety↗

NASA NTRS2001

Integrating Public Perspectives in Sample Return Planning

Planning for extraterrestrial sample returns, whether from Mars or other solar system bodies, must be done in a way that integrates planetary protection concerns with the usual mission technical and scientific considerations. Understanding and addressing legitimate societal concerns about the possible risks of sample return will be a critical part of the public decision making process ahead. This paper presents the results of two studies, one with lay audiences, the other with expert microbiologists, designed to gather information, on attitudes and concerns about sample return risks and planetary protection. Focus group interviews with lay subjects, using generic information about Mars sample return and a preliminary environmental impact assessment, were designed to obtain an indication of how the factual content is perceived and understood by the public. A research survey of microbiologists gathered information on experts' views and attitudes about sample return, risk management approaches and space exploration risks. These findings, combined with earlier research results on risk perception, will be useful in identifying levels of concern and potential conflicts in understanding between experts and the public about sample return risks. The information will be helpful in guiding development of the environmental impact statement and also has applicability to proposals for sample return from other solar system bodies where scientific uncertainty about extraterrestrial life may persist at the time of mission planning.

Race, Margaret S.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Forward Contamination of the Moon and Mars: Implications for Future Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined new visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moon, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require that all spacecraft and instrumentation be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under COSPAR's current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft. Nonetheless, future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Molecular Identification of Microbial Contaminants

Microorganisms can have significant impacts on the success of NASA’s missions, including the integrity of materials, the reliability of scientific results, and maintenance of crew health. Robust cleaning and sterilization protocols are currently in place in NASA facilities, but agency experts agree that microbial contamination is unavoidable and its impact on NASA’s missions and science must be minimized. Therefore, it is critical to understand: 1) what specific microorganisms are present, 2) how they may impact scientific objectives, and 3) how to select appropriate mitigation strategies. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Planetary Protection (PP) microbiology lab historically relied solely upon enumeration of culturable microbial contamination associated with spacecraft materials or cleanrooms. However, this process is time consuming, many microbes cannot be cultured, and very few can be identified with any fidelity using NASA standard microbiological methods. The work described in this white paper includes the establishment of molecular identification capabilities at MSFC, including DNA isolation, amplification, purification, and Sanger sequencing. This capability will not only improve planetary protection efforts at MSFC (i.e. by identifying contaminating microorganisms in cleanrooms or on spacecraft) but also offers a service center-wide for the identification of contaminants that arise in other projects, processing locations, or during set up and roll out of spacecraft. This work also lays the foundation for higher throughput efforts to identify large populations of microbes across the lifetime of a project and serves as the starting point for future work into whole genome sequencing, non-culture based methods, or additional characterization studies. Ultimately, accurate identification informs appropriate mitigation strategies, increasing the chances of success for NASA’s missions and objectives.

C. D. Cassilly↗

NASA NTRS1989

Life sciences and space research XXIII(2): Planetary biology and origins of life; Proceedings of the Topical Meeting and Workshops XX, XXI and XXIII of the 27th COSPAR Plenary Meeting, Espoo, Finland, July 18-29, 1988

This volume includes chapters on exobiology in space, chemical and early biochemical evolution, life without oxygen, potential for chemical evolution in the early environment of Mars, planetary protection issues and sample return missions, and the modulation of biological evolution by astrophysical phenomena. Papers are presented on the results of spaceflight missions, the action of some factors of space medium on the abiogenic synthesis of nucleotides, early peptidic enzymes, microbiology and biochemistry of the methanogenic archaeobacteria, and present-day biogeochemical activities of anaerobic bacteria and their relevance to future exobiological investigations. Consideration is also given to the development of the Alba Patera volcano on Mars, biological nitrogen fixation under primordial Martian partial pressures of dinitrogen, the planetary protection issues in advance of human exploration of Mars, and the difficulty with astronomical explanations of periodic mass extinctions.

Schwartz, A. W.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide as Alternative to Dry Heat Microbial Reduction

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in conjunction with the NASA Planetary Protection Officer, has selected vapor phase hydrogen peroxide (VHP) sterilization process for continued development as a NASA approved sterilization technique for spacecraft subsystems and systems. The goal is to include this technique, with appropriate specification, in NPG8020.12C as a low temperature complementary technique to the dry heat sterilization process. A series of experiments were conducted in vacuum to determine VHP process parameters that provided significant reductions in spore viability while allowing survival of sufficient spores for statistically significant enumeration. With this knowledge of D values, sensible margins can be applied in a planetary protection specification. The outcome of this study provided an optimization of test sterilizer process conditions: VHP concentration, process duration, a process temperature range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, a process humidity range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, and robustness to selected spacecraft material substrates.

vapor hydrogen peroxide↗

NASA NTRS2018

The Importance of Contamination Knowledge - Insights into Mars Sample Return

The Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), in Houston, TX (henceforth Curation Office) manages the curation of all past, present, and future extraterrestrial samples returned by NASA missions and shared collections from international partners, preserving their integrity for future scientific study while providing the samples to the international community in a fair and unbiased way. The Curation Office also curates all reference and witness materials for each mission (e.g., flight and non-flight hardware coupons; lubricants; non-flight, flight-like, and flown witness plates). These reference and witness materials provide the scientific community with the fundamental ability to reconstruct the contamination/alteration history of the sample collection through the course of the mission, with the overall goal of strengthening the scientific conclusions drawn from the study of returned materials. The information gained from characterizing the physical, biological, inorganic, and organic chemical properties of reference and witness materials is defined as the Contamination Knowledge (CK) of the sample collection. Unlike the data collected for Contamination Control (CC) and Planetary Protection (PP), CK is exclusively concerned with preserving reference and witness materials for study by future scientists upon sample return. Although CC and PP data collected for sample integrity and forward contamination purposes can be complementary to CK, they are two separate data sets with distinct objectives. A robust collection of samples for CK is necessary to allow the extraterrestrial material in a returned sample to be distinguished from terrestrial contamination. Traditionally CK is utilized by sample scientists in order to accomplish the mission’s scientific objectives, however this information can also be utilized by the Office of Planetary Protection to help evaluate the presence of any back contamination. Mars 2020, the first phase of a potential multipart Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, is expected to contribute to NASA’s Mars Exploration Program Science Goals by filling in knowledge gaps concerning: 1) the existence of past or present life on Mars, 2) the past and present climate of Mars, 3) the geology of Mars, and 4) hazards associated with human exploration of Mars. Although there is debate concerning which samples will best answer these questions, the necessity for proper sample blanks is well-understood. The CC and PP requirements, driven by the restricted Class V mission designation, are the most stringent of any sample return mission in recent history. The extremely low levels of allowable terrestrial contamination on the spacecraft and rover can complicate these analyses given the detection limits of current analytical instrumentation, especially in the case of biological contamination. By collecting and curating unanalyzed samples specifically for CK, future sample scientists will not be relegated to: 1) relying on data collected using possibly obsolete tools and techniques for return sample blanks, or 2) using remnants of extracted and/or cultured samples from ATLO (Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations), which could be incompatible with the desired experimental endpoints or state-of-the-art techniques available at the time of sample return.The addition of biological experimental endpoints to a sample return campaign’s objectives broadens the requisite range in preservation environments (e.g. inert ultra-pure nitrogen gaseous environment at 18 degrees Centigrade versus less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade) and types of CK samples. As a result, the Curation Office will also curate the following CK samples at less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade for the Mars 2020 mission: 1) unanalyzed swabs and wipes in sterile containers, 2) all recirculation filters from the clean rooms used for sample and caching subsystem assembly and all filters from the laminar flow benches used to assemble sample intimate hardware, and 3) witness plates collecting airborne contamination within the assembly clean rooms. It has been Curation Office policy since the Apollo missions to preserve as many pristine samples as possible for future scientific research. Although CK is required to be collected for all stages of the MSR campaign, the CK for the Mars 2020 mission is the most critical for understanding contamination in the returned samples given the intimacy between the Martian samples and the Mars 2020 flight hardware. This presentation highlights the importance of CK for sample return missions as well as the traditional and novel types of CK samples required for a successful MSR campaign.

Harrington, A. D.↗

NASA NTRS2017

X-Ray Computed Tomography: The First Step in Mars Sample Return Processing

The Mars 2020 rover mission will collect and cache samples from the martian surface for possible retrieval and subsequent return to Earth. If the samples are returned, that mission would likely present an opportunity to analyze returned Mars samples within a geologic context on Mars. In addition, it may provide definitive information about the existence of past or present life on Mars. Mars sample return presents unique challenges for the collection, containment, transport, curation and processing of samples [1] Foremost in the processing of returned samples are the closely paired considerations of life detection and Planetary Protection. In order to achieve Mars Sample Return (MSR) science goals, reliable analyses will depend on overcoming some challenging signal/noise-related issues where sparse martian organic compounds must be reliably analyzed against the contamination background. While reliable analyses will depend on initial clean acquisition and robust documentation of all aspects of developing and managing the cache [2], there needs to be a reliable sample handling and analysis procedure that accounts for a variety of materials which may or may not contain evidence of past or present martian life. A recent report [3] suggests that a defined set of measurements should be made to effectively inform both science and Planetary Protection, when applied in the context of the two competing null hypotheses: 1) that there is no detectable life in the samples; or 2) that there is martian life in the samples. The defined measurements would include a phased approach that would be accepted by the community to preserve the bulk of the material, but provide unambiguous science data that can be used and interpreted by various disciplines. Fore-most is the concern that the initial steps would ensure the pristine nature of the samples. Preliminary, non-invasive techniques such as computed X-ray tomography (XCT) have been suggested as the first method to interrogate and characterize the cached samples without altering the materials [1,2]. A recent report [4] indicates that XCT may minimally alter samples for some techniques, and work is needed to quantify these effects, maximizing science return from XCT initial analysis while minimizing effects.

Welzenbach, L. C.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Dynamic Simulation Probabalistic Risk Assessment Model for an Enceladus Sample Return Mission

Enceladus, a moon of Saturn, has geyser-like jets that spray plumes of material into orbit. These jets could enable a free-flying spacecraft to collect samples and return them to Earth for study to determine if they contain the building blocks of life. The Office of Planetary Protection at NASA requires containment of any unsterilized samples and prohibits destructive impact of the spacecraft upon return to Earth, with a sample release probability of less than 1 in 1,000,000 as a recommended goal. This paper describes a probabilistic risk assessment model that uses dynamic simulation techniques to capture the physics-based, time- and state-dependent interactions between the sample return system and the environment, which drive the risk of sample release. The dynamic approach uses a Monte Carlo-style simulation to integrate the many phases and sources of risk for a sample return mission. The model is used to assess the achievability of the planetary protection reliability goal. This is accomplished by performing sensitivity studies assessing the impact of modeling assumptions to identify where uncertainties drive the risk. These results, in turn, are used to examine the feasibility of meeting key design and performance parameters that are needed to achieve the reliability goal for a given architecture with existing technologies.

Dynamic Simulation↗

NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2a (Sterilization)

The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council provided a series of recommendations to NASA on planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions. One of the Board's key findings suggested, although current evidence of the martian surface suggests that life as we know it would not tolerate the planet's harsh environment, there remain 'plausible scenarios for extant microbial life on Mars.' Based on this conclusion, all samples returned from Mars should be considered potentially hazardous until it has been demonstrated that they are not. In response to the National Research Council's findings and recommendations, NASA has undertaken a series of workshops to address issues regarding NASA's proposed sample return missions. Work was previously undertaken at the Mars Sample Handling and Protocol Workshop 1 (March 2000) to formulate recommendations on effective methods for life detection and/or biohazard testing on returned samples. The NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened the Mars Sample Sterilization Workshop, the third in the Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series, on November 28-30, 2000 at the Holiday Inn Rosslyn Westpark, Arlington, Virginia. Because of the short timeframe between this Workshop and the second Workshop in the Series, which was convened in October 2000 in Bethesda, Maryland, they were developed in parallel, so the Sterilization Workshop and its report have therefore been designated as '2a'). The focus of Workshop 2a was to make recommendations for effective sterilization procedures for all phases of Mars sample return missions, and to answer the question of whether we can sterilize samples in such a way that the geological characteristics of the samples are not significantly altered.

Rummel, John D.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Keeping the Air Clean and Safe: An Anthrax Smoke Detector

Scientists at work in the Planetary Protection division at NASA s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sterilize everything before blasting it to the Red Planet. They take great pains to ensure that all spacecraft are void of bacterial life, especially the microscopic bacteria that can live hundreds of years in their spore states. No one is quite sure what Earthly germs would do on Mars, but scientists agree that it is safest to keep the Martian terrain as undisturbed as possible. Errant Earth germs would also render useless the instruments placed on exploration rovers to look for signs of life, as the life that they registered would be life that came with them from Earth. A team at JPL, headed by Dr. Adrian Ponce, developed a bacterial spore-detection system that uses a simple and robust chemical reaction that visually alerts Planetary Protection crews. It is a simple air filter that traps micron-sized bacterial spores and then submits them to the chemical reaction. When the solution is then viewed under an ultraviolet light, the mixture will glow green if it is contaminated by bacteria. Scientists can then return to the scrubbing and cleaning stages of the sterilization process to remove these harmful bacteria. The detection system is the space-bound equivalent of having your hands checked for cleanliness before being allowed to the table; and although intended to keep terrestrial germs from space, this technology has awesome applications here on Mother Earth. The bacterial spore-detection unit can recognize anthrax and other harmful, spore-forming bacteria and alert people of the impending danger. As evidenced in the anthrax mailings of fall 2001 in the United States, the first sign of anthrax exposure was when people experienced flu-like symptoms, which unfortunately, can take as much as a week to develop after contamination. Anthrax cost 5 people their lives and infected 19 others; and the threat of bioterrorism became a routine concern, with new threats popping up nearly everyday. The attacks threatened the safety that so many Americans took for granted, as the very air that people breathed became suspect. Any building with a circulation system, where large groups congregate, was now a potential target.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2019

Analysis of Bioreduction Strategies for a Solid Rocket Motor on an Interplanetary Mission to Europa

The Europa Lander De-Orbit stage braking motor must comply with the Planetary Protection requirements established for a category IV mission. In its mission to Europa, a motor that hasn’t gone through bioreduction environments will carry microbial spores and other biosignature molecules that might jeopardize a mission of astrobiological concern as well as future missions to come. A motor with solid rocket propellant represents exclusive challenges associated to the calculation of high numbers of an encapsulated bioburden hidden behind a nozzle plug. Existing techniques for bioburden reduction are analysed in perspective to motor assembly facilities and the series of events that are involved in manufacturing a solid rocket motor. These techniques include antimicrobial effects of chemical components already present within the motor and bioreduction due to assembly and operational environments induced in the motor. Analysis of the manufacturing process, adhered bioburden and recent investigations into the effectiveness of microbiological techniques in finding inherent antimicrobial properties have generated a step by step outline of Planetary Protection for lander mission associated solid rocket motors.

Velez-Justiniano, Yo-Ann↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Thinking Inside the Box: A Hands-on Student Activity for Building a Contamination Containment Glovebox to Encourage Problem Solving in a Collaborative Environment

Engineers from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and education experts from the Virginia Space Grant Consortium (VSGC) partnered together to create a hands-on student activity to teach students about problem solving, working in a collaborative environment, and about the unique career fields of contamination control and planetary protection. The activity focuses on contamination containment gloveboxes, which are sealed containers where operators outside the glovebox can safely manipulate hazardous or contamination-sensitive materials inside the glovebox through glove ports on the container. The activity utilizes common household materials and teams of students work together to design and build a glovebox using the materials provided. Once the glovebox has been constructed, students perform a task under a time constraint by using their glovebox to assemble a puzzle “contaminated” with corn starch. In a post-activity debrief, teams discuss lessons learned such as how the actual built glovebox differed from the sketched design, the challenge of managing a budget for materials, how the team dealt with surprises, and if their glovebox allowed enough room for the operator to perform the task. This activity has been part of VSGC’s Virginia Earth System Science Scholars (VESSS) summer academy program for high school students since 2016, and has been an engaging method to teach students teamwork, creativity, hands-on experimentation, communication, and reasoning skills while also teaching them about unique engineering fields such as contamination control and planetary protection.

Student activity↗

NASA NTRS2017

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Facilities for Meeting Restricted Earth Return Containment Requirements

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample containment and biohazard testing in a receiving laboratory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8020.12D - ensuring the preservation and protection of Earth and the sample. Currently, NPR 8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Enceladus with the caveat that future proposed mission locations could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of biohazards progresses. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 standards and protocols are used to study the most dangerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological agents on Earth. Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United States; of theses, 8 are operational. In the last two decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the facility requirements and size. Previous mission concept studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facility with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As an alternative option, we have recently conducted an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a faction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in approximately 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional construction methods without compromising the preservation of the sample or Earth.

Calaway, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗

NASA NTRS2021

Thermal Analysis of Landers using Radioisotope Power Systems on Ice Worlds

The surfaces of Ice Worlds record evidence of interior processes, chemical potential, habitability, and potentially life within the interior. Volatile and organic chemistry at the surface is critical in determining habitability and detecting the presence of past or extant life. Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) could be an enabling technology for in situ missions to ice worlds, providing both power and heat for long durations where solar power would not be feasible. However, it is necessary to understand the potential impact of RPS upon the local environment, to ensure that the rejected heat from RPS does not compromise science measurements or planetary protection requirements. To address these concerns, an RPS Ice World Lander Study was carried out in 2019 to investigate possible requirements on RPS surface mission concepts and approaches to excess heat management. The study focused on two destinations that are representative of the range of potential environments: Europa and Enceladus.Initial analysis showed that, due to the very low pressures on the surfaces of most ice world targets, surface melting does not occur because the water ice does not meet the triple-point. A 4 kW heat source suspended above the surface of Europa or Enceladus would not cause any melting, only sublimation.The study used a surface sublimation limit of 10 cm over a two-year period (the baseline for the recent Europa Lander study). To stay within this limit, Europa, with its relatively warm surface, could tolerate only 10 W/m2 of surface heat flux. Enceladus, with its relatively cold pure ice composition, could tolerate up to 100 W/m2.Various lander and heat shield configurations were analyzed for their heat flux radiated from the RPS to the surface. For a given heat shield configuration, the study team determined the minimum height of the RPS above the surface for which the heat flux would be within the accepted parameters for Europa and for Enceladus. Based on these thermal analyses, such RPS-powered landers could remain compliant with science investigation and planetary protection requirements with only modest mass allocated to spacecraft thermal accommodations.

Perl, Scott↗

NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗