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Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber Threat Screening Using a Queuing-Based Game-Theoretic Approach

Dynamic and uncertain security environments, such as cyber systems, often involve strategic interactions among multiple decision-making agents. In this paper, we consider a cybersecurity setting where a system administrator (defender) has to screen malicious service requests of an attacker who seeks to exhaust available cyber resources and inconvenience users with normal requests. We propose a novel cyber-threat inspection model, based on Stackelberg games, that unies aspects of Threat Security Games with the Erlang-B queuing framework to provide equilibrium strategies for both the attacker and defender. In our proposed model, the defender seeks to determine the optimal number of inspection nodes required to maximize detection probability of malicious requests, while the attacker maximizes the probability of legitimate requests dropping out of the system. We derive analytical expressions of the equilibrium solutions of the proposed Stackelberg game under realistic assumptions on system observability and payoff structure of the players. A numerical case study is presented, and steps for further research are identified.

Cybersecurity, Stackelberg game, Erlang-B loss sys↗

Cyber100 Compass User Guide

This document provides an overview of the Cyber100 Compass tool and serves as a guide to users interested in understanding the cybersecurity risks facing their clean energy transition. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed the Cyber100 Compass tool for cyber risk assessment at the system-of-systems level for system planners trying to reach high levels of renewables. Two offices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - the Office of Electricity and the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response-funded NREL to develop this framework that will enable grid system planners to understand and mitigate cybersecurity risk for grids transitioning to high levels of renewable generation, including 100%. Cyber100 Compass can help systems planners apply the principle of security-by-design at scale. Investing in an upfront understanding of system-of-systems (where the constituent systems are operating entities of the different renewable resources) risks from high-renewable grids will result in a more resilient grid at a lower long-term cost.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Detecting and characterizing special nuclear material for nuclear nonproliferation applications

Abstract There is an urgent need for new, better instrumentation and techniques for detecting and characterizing special nuclear material (SNM), i.e., highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The development of improved instruments and techniques requires experiments performed with the SNM itself, which is of limited availability. This paper describes the findings of experiments performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center conducted using new instruments and techniques on unclassified, kg-quantity SNM objects. These experiments, performed in the framework of the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification, focused on detecting, characterizing, and localizing SNM samples with masses ranging from 3.3 to 13.8 kg, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium using prototype detectors and techniques. The work demonstrates SNM detection and characterization using recently-developed prototype detection systems. Specifically, we present new results in passive detection and imaging of plutonium and uranium objects using gamma-ray and dual particle (fast neutron and gamma-ray) imaging. We also present a new analysis of the delayed neutron emissions during active interrogation of uranium using a neutron generator.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Elucidating the geometric and electronic structure of a fully sulfided analog of an Anderson polyoxomolybdate cluster

The catalytic activity of transition metal sulfide (TMS) clusters in small molecule activation, redox transformations, and charge transfer has inspired the design of novel TMS-based materials for energy-related catalysis and chemical applications. Polyoxometalates (POMs), known for their structural diversity, can in principle be transformed into TMS clusters; however, fully sulfided analogs are rarely isolated, likely due to the strong tendency of uncapped TMS clusters to agglomerate. Here, we report the geometric and electronic structure of a capping ligand-free fully sulfided analog of heptamolybdate Anderson POM [Mo VI 7 O 24 ] 6− , synthesized through the sulfidation of a nanoconfined POM secured within a porous Zr-metal organic framework (NU-1000). A combined computational and experimental analysis indicates that the sulfided counterpart of the Anderson POM is geometrically and electronically more sophisticated than the parent POM. Comparison of experimental pair distribution function (PDF) data with computational simulations confirms that, unlike the oxygen-only [Mo VI 7 O 24 ] 6− cluster, the [Mo IV 7 (μ 3 -S) 6 (μ 2 -SH) 6 (S 2 ) 6 ] 2− polythiometalate (PTM) exhibits diverse sulfur anions (S 2− , HS − , S 2 2− ). DFT calculations indicate that H 2 S acts as a reducing agent, and together with terminal disulfide (S 2 2− ) ligands in the PTM structure, facilitates the complete reduction of all seven Mo VI centers in the parent POM to Mo IV . These findings are supported by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), which confirms exclusive Mo IV , and elemental analysis, which shows quantitative sulfur incorporation. Difference envelope density (DED) mapping further reveals that the PTM clusters are spatially confined within the MOF pores, preventing agglomeration and preserving molecular integrity.

Rabbani, S. M. Gulam [The Ohio State University, C↗

Sirepo for Synchrotron Radiation Workshop

Sirepo is an open source framework for cloud computing. The graphical user interface (GUI) for Sirepo, also known as the client, executes in any HTML5 compliant web browser on any computing platform, including tablets. The client is built in JavaScript, making use of the following open source libraries: Bootstrap, which is fundamental for cross-platform web applications; AngularJS, which provides a model–view–controller (MVC) architecture and GUI components; and D3.js, which provides interactive plots and data-driven transformations. The Sirepo server is built on the following Python technologies: Flask, which is a lightweight framework for web development; Jinja, which is a secure and widely used templating language; and Werkzeug, a utility library that is compliant with the WSGI standard. We use Nginx as the HTTP server and proxy, which provides a scalable event-driven architecture. The physics codes supported by Sirepo execute inside a Docker container. One of the codes supported by Sirepo is the Synchrotron Radiation Workshop (SRW). SRW computes synchrotron radiation from relativistic electrons in arbitrary magnetic fields and propagates the radiation wavefronts through optical beamlines. SRW is open source and is primarily supported by Dr. Oleg Chubar of NSLS-II at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Nagler, Robert↗

Global Access-controlled Transfer e-frame (GATe)

Global Access-controlled Transfer e-frame (GATe) was designed to take advantage of the patterns that occur during an electronic record transfer process. The e-frame (or electronic framework or platform) is the foundation for developing secure information transfer to meet classified and unclassified business processes and is particularly useful when there is a need to share information with various entities in a controlled and secure environment. It can share, search, upload, download and retrieve sensitive information, as well as provides reporting capabilities.

Forsmann, Hope↗

Methodology Development for Cybersecurity Robustness and Vulnerability Assessment of University Research Reactors

In 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formed a working group in collaboration with the Test, Research and Training Reactors (TRTR) group to review cyber security programs at US nuclear nonpower reactor (NPR) facilities. Following their review of cyber security at four different university NPR (i.e. university research reactor (URR)) facilities, the NRC staff made recommendations for improvements at URR including 1) augmenting the URR licensees’ understanding of the protective features provided with their physical security systems, 2) educating URR facility staff on cyber security issues, and 3) developing guidance to help the URR facilities maintain adequate cyber security going forward. This three-year project to develop and implement a cyber-security risk assessment methodology and defense-in-depth mitigation strategy for application at URR facilities provides solutions effectively addressing each of the recommendations given in the NRC review referenced above. In support of this project, cyber security documentation and guidance from the NRC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were reviewed. Most of this documentation did not take the unique resources, configuration, and infrastructure associated with URR facilities into account. The NRC-TRTR effective practices document provides useful guidance for implementing cyber security protections at URR, but lacks a structured framework for systematically auditing facility digital control assets (DCA) and evaluating associated cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. The outcomes from this project, therefore, seek to build on the general resources above by providing a straightforward DCA auditing and risk assessment methodology, as well as mitigation strategies, that may be implemented to address the risk of cyber-attack at URR facilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity for Energy Systems: Foundational Concepts for Bangladesh Electric Utilities [Slides]

This slide deck was developed for a training for the Northern Electricity Supply Company (NESCO) in Rajshahi, Bangladesh. The topics include: understanding the cybersecurity landscape in power utilities, fundamentals of cybersecurity for power utilities, regulatory compliance and standards, and best practices and strategies. The concepts in this slide deck are relevant for electric utilities throughout Bangladesh.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sirepo for Synchrotron Radiation Workshop

Sirepo is an open source framework for cloud computing. The graphical user interface (GUI) for Sirepo, also known as the client, executes in any HTML5 compliant web browser on any computing platform, including tablets. The client is built in JavaScript, making use of the following open source libraries: Bootstrap, which is fundamental for cross-platform web applications; AngularJS, which provides a model–view–controller (MVC) architecture and GUI components; and D3.js, which provides interactive plots and data-driven transformations. The Sirepo server is built on the following Python technologies: Flask, which is a lightweight framework for web development; Jinja, which is a secure and widely used templating language; and Werkzeug, a utility library that is compliant with the WSGI standard. We use Nginx as the HTTP server and proxy, which provides a scalable event-driven architecture. The physics codes supported by Sirepo execute inside a Docker container. One of the codes supported by Sirepo is the Synchrotron Radiation Workshop (SRW). SRW computes synchrotron radiation from relativistic electrons in arbitrary magnetic fields and propagates the radiation wavefronts through optical beamlines. SRW is open source and is primarily supported by Dr. Oleg Chubar of NSLS-II at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Nagler, Robert↗

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗

Combining Traditional Cyber Security Audit Data with Psychosocial Data: Towards Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation

The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the combination of traditional cyber security audit data with psychosocial data, so as to move from an insider threat detection stance to one that enables prediction of potential insider presence. Two distinctive aspects of the approach are the objective of predicting or anticipating potential risks and the use of organizational data in addition to cyber data to support the analysis. The chapter describes the challenges of this endeavor and progress in defining a usable set of predictive indicators, developing a framework for integrating the analysis of organizational and cyber security data to yield predictions about possible insider exploits, and developing the knowledge base and reasoning capability of the system. We also outline the types of errors that one expects in a predictive system versus a detection system and discuss how those errors can affect the usefulness of the results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Experimentally feasible security check for n-qubit quantum secret sharing

In this article we present a general security strategy for quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols based on the scheme presented by Hillery, Buzek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999)]. We focus on a generalization of the HBB protocol to n communication parties thus including n-partite Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states. We show that the multipartite version of the HBB scheme is insecure in certain settings and impractical when going to large n. To provide security for such QSS schemes in general we use the framework presented by some of the authors [M. Huber, F. Mintert, A. Gabriel, B. C. Hiesmayr, Phys. Rev. Lett. 104, 210501 (2010)] to detect certain genuine n-partite entanglement between the communication parties. In particular, we present a simple inequality which tests the security.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

The International Nuclear Material Transport Security Regime: A. Multi-Modal Tapestry of Conventions and Agreements

The international legal framework for transporting nuclear material is complex. The tapestry of conventions and agreements in place vary based on the material in transport, the mode or modes of transport used, and the location where the transport is taking place. The instruments range in scale from the international Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the Amendment to regional conventions and agreements such as those for rail transport (RID), inland waterway (ADN), and road (ADR). As part of their international commitments under the various conventions and agreements, signatories are required to abide by and harmonize their regulations to these international instruments. The challenge for Competent Authorities in drafting regulations consistent with a Member States obligation under international law can be complex. In addition to ensuring their own authority to draft regulations consistent with these conventions, a Competent Authority may need to coordinate with other ministries, departments, or agencies in mapping the various conventions, their annexes, the requirements therein, and understanding how to develop regulations that align both to international law and domestic law. This paper addresses each of these conventions and agreements; providing a summary description of what each means to individual entities that are transporting nuclear material, provide the total number of States Party to each, provide a graphical framework for unpacking the legal complexities at the international level to assist users and competent authorities in orienting themselves to the international instruments and how they apply to specific shipments. A detailed evaluation has been made of the various international and regional conventions and agreements that help govern the security during the international and in some cases the domestic transport of nuclear material, therein providing a tool for understanding the international transport regime for moving these materials.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

A surety engineering framework to reduce cognitive systems risks.

Cognitive science research investigates the advancement of human cognition and neuroscience capabilities. Addressing risks associated with these advancements can counter potential program failures, legal and ethical issues, constraints to scientific research, and product vulnerabilities. Survey results, focus group discussions, cognitive science experts, and surety researchers concur technical risks exist that could impact cognitive science research in areas such as medicine, privacy, human enhancement, law and policy, military applications, and national security (SAND2006-6895). This SAND report documents a surety engineering framework and a process for identifying cognitive system technical, ethical, legal and societal risks and applying appropriate surety methods to reduce such risks. The framework consists of several models: Specification, Design, Evaluation, Risk, and Maturity. Two detailed case studies are included to illustrate the use of the process and framework. Several Appendices provide detailed information on existing cognitive system architectures; ethical, legal, and societal risk research; surety methods and technologies; and educing information research with a case study vignette. The process and framework provide a model for how cognitive systems research and full-scale product development can apply surety engineering to reduce perceived and actual risks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Enhancing Cloud Cybersecurity: Prescriptive Controls for Operational Technology

This whitepaper provides strategic insights and recommendations into security cloud-based solutions for electric utilities, encompassing operational technology (OT), virtual power plants (VPP), distributed energy resources (DERs), applications, networks, and data storage as they transition to and leverage cloud infrastructure through managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). Principles derived from established frameworks serve as a foundation for best practices across cybersecurity projects and remove the constraints of settling on a single framework. For organizations that prefer not to integrate a specific framework altogether, elements of the proposed approach could be adopted or tailored to best fit defined requirements and expected functionalities. The Cirrus assessment, a utility cloud feasibility tool, and the roadmap it provides serve as a precursor to this paper, which seeks to be a valuable resource for defining next steps following cloud technology integration feasibility appraisal. With its comprehensive approach to adoption, the Cirrus framework offers strategic guidance on responsibly preparing for or deploying a utility cloud solution. The previously published whitepaper, “Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration,” details the guiding strategy, research, and deployment of cloud solutions within electric and interconnected grid systems. Before implementing the controls suggested in this document, it is recommended that stakeholders complete Cirrus's cloud integration assessment and pair the results with their unique cybersecurity controls to form a comprehensive cloud-based utility cybersecurity plan. The Cirrus outcome will consider a series of future architectures for the grid before and after the energy transition and evaluate the arguments for and against cloud applications for each electric and interconnected grid layer. This document is a companion to the original whitepaper, "Use Case-Informed Framework for Utility Cloud Migration" to further identify and recommend security controls based on Cirrus’s cloud integration assessment output. The following whitepaper outlines the cybersecurity controls that secure cloud-service models pertinent to the electric sector using the predefined categories identify, protect, detect, and respond and recover. The objective is to outline prescriptive security controls based on the type of architecture and data stored in the cloud. The focus includes dissecting the shared responsibility model and elucidating what on-premises Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) entail. A pivotal consideration in this context is allocating responsibility for foundational cybersecurity aspects—having used Cirrus for the cloud integration assessment. The ensuing controls detailed herein also represent a checklist of controls necessary for a secure cloud transition, equipping utilities with the knowledge to navigate this digital transformation with confidence and strategic foresight in a safe and responsible manner.

42 ENGINEERING↗