Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “security vulnerabilities”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16

Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning for Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. This INL’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Plan (VARP) was developed to enable and sustain that mission while ensuring the viability of operations considering expected climate change impacts. The VARP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning Guidance, Version 1.2” document issued in February 2022. A prescribed process was used to identify mission-critical systems and components, determine historical and expected climate impacts, and develop resilient solutions. Experts from across INL, including operations staff, researchers, and climate scientists supplied input to the process. Analyses of climate modeling sources revealed that under scenarios of higher and lower greenhouse gas emissions (Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 and RCP 8.5), INL anticipates an increase in climate hazards, including drought, heat waves, wildfire, and precipitation. Increased frequency and duration of climatic hazards forecasts high impacts on certain mission-critical asset and infrastructure types. Utilizing the VARP Risk Assessment Tool, projected high climate hazard impacts across multiple asset and infrastructure types at the INL include energy generation and distribution systems, Site buildings, specialized or mission-critical equipment, and transportation and fleet infrastructure. Some of these mission-critical asset and infrastructure types maintain high adaptive capacity to climatic changes; however, others may need additional adaptive capacity to withstand increased frequency and duration of climate hazards. INL identified close to 300 resilient solutions that were consolidated into 11 solution categories to be tracked in the Department of Energy Sustainability Dashboard. The identified solutions are a starting point for future project development and analysis. These data are intended to inform decision makers on climate issues and potential solutions across INL and associated communities. The VARP is not intended to be a budget tool or project decision document on its own, but rather one of many tools used by decision makers to establish resilient priorities. This initial document provides the framework and foundation to resilient solutions. In the coming years, each solution needs to be fully developed, costed, and prioritized based on mission-critical risk and funding priorities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Building the Scientific Basis for Cyber Resilience of Critical Infrastructure

Rigorous methods and models are needed to quantify, measure, and increase the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure. An adversary may exploit vulnerabilities in the vital networks such as industrial control systems (ICS) associated with critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, financial, transportation, security), in order to achieve harmful consequences. In cyber systems, the number of vulnerabilities may be large, the attack surface changes over time, and the problem consists of both technical and non-technical factors (e.g., errors in software and human error). Given this complex and dynamic landscape, strategically mitigating risk is important, where “risk” considers both the probability of an event and the consequences if that event occurs. One way to decrease risk is to address consequences by ensuring that critical infrastructure is resilient. In this context, resilience is characterized by the magnitude and duration of a deviation from targeted performance levels, given a disruption. Increasing resilience decreases the consequences of a successful attack.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification

Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Women in Science: Fermilab cybersecurity analyst Jeny Teheran

With 11 February marking the International Day of Women and Girls in Science, female physicists, engineers and computer scientists from CERN and from Fermilab share their experiences of building a career in science. Jeny Teheran is a security analyst and cybersecurity researcher at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. That means keeping up with and taking care of hardware and software vulnerabilities so that the experiments can carry out their science in a secure manner. It's a fast-paced job where you have to come with the best solution you can put in place, right in the moment. "I would recommend this job because it challenges you. It pushes you to be on top of your game. You have to improve your analytical skills; you have to react fast; you have to communicate better." - Jeny says. Jeny came to Fermilab from the Caribbean coast of Colombia. She grew up in a house with few toys but lots of books, and says she has always felt close to science. With a degree in systems and computing engineering, she arrived at Fermilab four years ago as an intern to work on the offline production team for neutrino experiments. A year later, she was hired as a security analyst. "And I'm loving it," she says. Credits: Video production - Fermilab Creative Services Music Copyright: Universal Production Music Astral Light Chevalier Idea originally conceived by Tanya Levshina, Fermilab and Maria Dimou, CERN.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Secure Time Synchronization in Power Grids and Network HIL Synchrophasor Testing

Reliable and secure time synchronization underpins the monitoring and control functions of modern power grids. As GPS-based timing infrastructures grow more susceptible to spoofing and jamming, their vulnerabilities pose escalating risks to grid stability. This work investigates a secure, resilient timing framework that can serve as an alternative or redundant source for power grids, with a particular focus on synchrophasorbased applications. A candidate timing system architecture is evaluated to guarantee trustworthy time dissemination, even in degraded conditions. A network hardware-in-the-loop testing of two synchrophasors validates the concepts, demonstrating enhanced timing integrity, improved detection of timing anomalies, and sustained observability during adverse timing events.

Wu, Ori [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000326723410)↗

Cybersecurity Information Technology

As technology and security measures improve, hackers keep looking for new techniques and vulnerabilities that allow them to gain access to sensitive data. This includes but is not limited to: user accounts, personal information, databases, operating systems, developmental and testing systems, and operational systems. A hacker is an individual that uses technology such as computers, tablets, and phones for unauthorized access to data. As technology becomes more robust at preventing known attacks, new vulnerabilities always exists. These vulnerabilities usually go unnoticed by developers and could potentially be exploited by an attacker. To prevent hackers from stealing sensitive and potentially harmful information, we must protect our systems and data against these criminals by developing new methods to mitigate the damage caused by these vulnerabilities and prevent them from occurring in the first place. An excellent way to discover how hackers compromise systems is by identifying and analyzing existing vulnerabilities and patching them. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is one of the many federal agencies that operates under a constant threat by hackers. NASA puts a tremendous amount of effort to maintain and improve their security measures, protect critical systems, and secure sensitive information from attackers who would attempt to use it against our nation's interests.

Hackers↗

Resilience in an Age of Increasing Electrification

The purpose of this paper is to outline considerations of global electrification trends that include the resultant system-wide and nation-wide impacts. How we incorporate resilience into the electrification plans that transition a nation from conventional energy sources to secure clean energy sources can impact the success of those transitions. Electrification of energy systems has the potential to impact power system planning, emissions, and security; however, little research has been done on comprehensive solutions for incorporating resilience into the electrification process. Research has been conducted on aspects of the energy system and electrification, but not holistically across disciplines and related to the interdependencies of different components of the grid system. This gap in research provides an opportunity for more analysis and a collection of best practices to incorporate resilience into electrification plans. Although clean energy is the goal of an increasing number of nations worldwide, there are many considerations in designing clean energy transitions and increased electrification. Resilience must be factored into clean energy transitions from planning, market design, and policies to modernized grid structures and new, location-specific dispersed energy and energy storage technologies.

clean energy↗

VAST 2009 Challenge: An Insider Threat

The 4th year of the VAST Challenge offered participating teams the opportunity to analyze three mini challenges and to combine the data and analyses and enter the Grand challenge. In this paper we provide a description of the data collections used, the overall scenario and the specific questions asked in the mini challenges. We also discuss the infrastructure developed to evaluate accuracy measures in this year’s social network mini challenge. We provide a few examples of visualizations that merited awards. As in previous year, The VAST 2009 Challenge was held in conjunction with the 2009 IEEE VAST Symposium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Risks to the DOW Mission From Global Advanced Energy Adoption

Advanced energy technologies have the potential to enhance energy security and resilience; however, they can introduce new vulnerabilities even as they mitigate existing ones. This dichotomy highlights that both action and inaction carry strategic risks in a contested and logistically complex operating environment. Regardless of U.S. civilian or military adoption of such technologies, key allies and adversaries are on adoption paths that will impact the U.S. military at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. The global adoption of advanced energy technologies presents the potential for both positive and negative consequences for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) missions in the next 10-20 years. Three categories of risk drivers are presented in this analysis: infrastructure-related, adoption-related, and response-related. Each risk type can generate consequences for DOD, including power disruptions, suboptimal DOD mission performance and operational effectiveness, higher costs and shortages for both legacy and advanced energy technologies, and loss of U.S. influence and strategic deterrent value. Specific impacts could include tactical impacts, operational impacts, and strategic impacts. Mitigation strategies could include energy resource and technology planning, cybersecurity, supply chain resilience, workforce development, exercises and simulations, investments in commercialized technology, operational testing and pilot programs, research into emerging technologies, partnerships and working groups, common standards, budget planning, and repurposing infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Residential Vehicle-to-Home Backup Power Capabilities: Key Findings from a ComEd Beneficial Electrification R&D Pilot

This report summarizes key findings from a collaborative technical study of residential, non-grid-tied vehicle-to-home (V2H) backup power systems in Commonwealth Edison’s (ComEd’s) service territory. The work integrates (1) a feeder-level technoeconomic analysis (TEA) using historical outage-event data and simulated electric-vehicle (EV) driving/charging profiles to estimate potential reliability and customer interruption-cost impacts under V2H and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) adoption scenarios; (2) controlled laboratory performance testing of a representative V2H backup ecosystem to characterize transfer-to-backup behavior, sustained power delivery, efficiency trends, and repeatable reliability limitations; and (3) a cybersecurity assessment aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 and ISO/SAE 21434 to evaluate interface-level risk drivers and identify program-relevant mitigations. Results indicate that V2H can provide measurable resilience value, but outcomes are strongly context dependent on outage patterns and the share of events that are “V2H-applicable.” Typical transfer-to-backup behavior clustered on the order of minutes, but rare long-delay edge cases were observed (including an event approaching 30 minutes) and should be treated as a reliability risk. High-power testing showed that peak-rated output is not necessarily continuously deliverable; stable operation may require operation below nameplate ratings and attention to thermal and installation constraints. The cybersecurity assessment highlights a broad attack surface spanning commissioning, home networks, embedded services, and cloud/OTA pathways, motivating minimum controls for secure onboarding, signed updates, patch cadence, and coordinated vulnerability response for any scaled deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

Cybersecurity↗

Identifying security checkpoints locations to protect the major U.S. urban areas

Transit networks are integral to the economy and to society, but at the same time they could allow terrorists to transport weapons of mass destruction into any city. Road networks are especially vulnerable, because they lack natural checkpoints unlike air networks that have security measures in place at all major airports. One approach to mitigate this risk is ensuring that every road route passes through at least one security checkpoint. Using the Ford-Fulkerson maximum-flow algorithm, we generate a minimum set of checkpoint locations within a ring-shaped buffer area surrounding the 50 largest US urban areas. We study how the number of checkpoints changes as we increase the buffer width to perform a cost-benefit analysis and to identify groups of cities that behave similarly. The set of required checkpoints is surprisingly small (10-124) despite the hundreds of thousands of road arcs in those areas, making it feasible to protect all major cities.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Towards Improving Container Security by Preventing Runtime Escapes

Container escapes enable the adversary to execute code on the host from inside an isolated container. Notably, these high severity escape vulnerabilities originate from three sources: (1) container profile misconfigurations, (2) Linux kernel bugs, and (3) container runtime vulnerabilities. While the first two cases have been studied in the literature, no works have investigated the impact of container runtime vulnerabilities. In this paper, to fill this gap, we study 59 CVEs for 11 different container runtimes. As a result of our study, we found that five of the 11 runtimes had nine publicly available PoC container escape exploits covering 13 CVEs. Our further analysis revealed all nine exploits are the result of a host component leaked into the container. Here, we apply a user namespace container defense to prevent the adversary from leveraging leaked host components and demonstrate that the defense stops seven of the nine container escape exploits.

42 ENGINEERING↗