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Space Shuttle UHF Communications Performance Evaluation

An extension boom is to be installed on the starboard side of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (SSO) payload bay for thermal tile inspection and repairing. As a result, the Space Shuttle payload bay Ultra High Frequency (UHF) antenna will be under the boom. This study is to evaluate the Space Shuttle UHF communication performance for antenna at a suitable new location. To insure the RF coverage performance at proposed new locations, the link margin between the UHF payload bay antenna and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Astronauts at a range distance of 160 meters from the payload bay antenna was analyzed. The communication performance between Space Shuttle Orbiter and International Space Station (SSO-ISS) during rendezvous was also investigated. The multipath effects from payload bay structures surrounding the payload bay antenna were analyzed. The computer simulation tool based on the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction method (GTD) was used to compute the signal strengths. The total field strength was obtained by summing the direct fields from the antennas and the reflected and diffracted fields from the surrounding structures. The computed signal strengths were compared to the signal strength corresponding to the 0 dB link margin. Based on the results obtained in this study, RF coverage for SSO-EVA and SSO- ISS communication links was determined for the proposed payload bay antenna UHF locations. The RF radiation to the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) pyros, the payload bay avionics, and the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) from the new proposed UHF antenna location was also investigated to ensure the EMC/EMI compliances.

Hwu, Shian U.↗

Space Shuttle Hot Cabin Emergency Responses

Methods: Human thermal tolerance, countermeasures, and thermal model data were reviewed and compared to existing shuttle ECS failure temperature and humidity profiles for each failure mode. Increases in core temperature associated with cognitive impairment was identified, as was metabolic heat generation of crewmembers, temperature monitoring, and communication capabilities after partial power-down and other limiting factors. Orbiter landing strategies and a hydration and salt replacement protocol were developed to put wheels on deck in each failure mode prior to development of significant cognitive impairment or collapse of crewmembers. Thermal tradeoffs for use of the Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES), Liquid Cooling Garment, integrated G-suit and Quick Don Mask were examined. candidate solutions involved trade-offs or conflicts with cabin oxygen partial pressure limits, system power-downs to limit heat generation, risks of alternate and emergency landing sites or compromise of Mode V-VIII scenarios. Results: Rehydration and minimized cabin workloads are required in all failure modes. Temperature/humidity profiles increase rapidly in two failure modes, and deorbit is recommended without the ACES, ICU and g-suit. This latter configuration limits several shuttle approach and landing escape modes and requires communication modifications. Additional data requirements were identified and engineering simulations were recommended to develop more current shuttle temperature and humidity profiles. Discussion: After failure of the shuttle ECS, there is insufficient cooling capacity of the ACES to protect crewmembers from rising cabin temperature and humidity. The LCG is inadequate for cabin temperatures above 76 F. Current shuttle future life policy makes it unlikely that major engineering upgrades necessary to address this problem will occur.

Stepaniak, P.↗

Nitrile/Buna N Material Failure Assessment for an O-Ring used on the Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve (FCV) of the Space Shuttle Main Engine

After the rollout of Space Shuttle Discovery in April 2005 in preparation for return-to-flight, there was a failure of the Orbiter (OV-103) helium signature leak test in the gaseous hydrogen (GH2) system. Leakage was attributed to the Flow Control Valve (FCV) in Main Engine 3. The FCV determined to be the source of the leak for OV-103 is designated as LV-58. The nitrile/Buna N rubber O-ring seal was removed from LV-58, and failure analysis indicated radial cracks providing leak paths in one quadrant. Cracks were eventually found in 6 of 9 FCV O-rings among the three Shuttle Orbiters, though none were as severe as those for LV-58, OV-103. Testing by EM10 at MSFC on all 9 FCV O- rings included: laser dimensional, Shore A hardness and properties from a dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) and an Instron tensile machine. The following test data was obtained on the cracked quadrant of the LV-58, OV-103 O-ring: (1) the estimated compression set was only 9.5%, compared to none for the rest of the O-ring; (2) Shore A hardness for the O.D. was higher by almost 4 durometer points than for the rest of the O-ring; and (3) DMA data showed that the storage/elastic modulus E was almost 25% lower than for the rest of the O-ring. Of the 8 FCV O-rings tested on an Instron, 4 yielded tensile strengths that were below the MIL spec requirement of 1350 psi-a likely influence of rubber cracking. Comparisons were made between values of modulus determined by DNA (elastic) and Instron (Young s). Each nitrile/Buna N O-ring used in the FCV conforms to the MIL-P-25732C specification. A number of such O-rings taken from shelf storage at MSFC and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) were used to generate a reference curve of DMA glass transition temperature (Tg) vs. shelf storage time ranging from 8 to 26 years. A similar reference curve of TGA onset temperature (of rubber weight loss) vs. shelf storage time was also generated. The DMA and TGA data for the used FCV O-rings were compared to the reference curves. Correlations were also made between the DMA modulus (at 22 C) and Shore A hardness for all 9 of the FCV O-rings used among the three Shuttle Orbiters. The radial cracking in the FCV O-rings was determined to be due to ozone attack, as nitrile/Buna N rubber is susceptible to such attack. Nitrile/Buna N material under MIL-P25732C should be used in a hydraulic fluid environment to help protect it from cracking. However, the FCV O-rings were used in an air only environment. The FCV design has as much as a 9-mil gap that allows the O.D. of the O-ring to be directly exposed to ozone, pressurized air and some elevated temperatures, accelerating the weathering process that leads to O-ring cracking. Space Shuttle flights will likely not continue past 2010. Therefore, Shuttle management decided to continue using the nitrile/Buna N material for the FCVs, but have each O-ring replaced after 3 years to minimize any chances for crack initiation.

Wingard, Doug↗

Space Shuttle Underside Astronaut Communications Performance Evaluation

The Space Shuttle Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communications system is planned to provide Radio Frequency (RF) coverage for astronauts working underside of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (SSO) for thermal tile inspection and repairing. This study is to assess the Space Shuttle UHF communication performance for astronauts in the shadow region without line-of-sight (LOS) to the Space Shuttle and Space Station UHF antennas. To insure the RF coverage performance at anticipated astronaut worksites, the link margin between the UHF antennas and Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Astronauts with significant vehicle structure blockage was analyzed. A series of near-field measurements were performed using the NASA/JSC Anechoic Chamber Antenna test facilities. Computational investigations were also performed using the electromagnetic modeling techniques. The computer simulation tool based on the Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD) was used to compute the signal strengths. The signal strength was obtained by computing the reflected and diffracted fields along the propagation paths between the transmitting and receiving antennas. Based on the results obtained in this study, RF coverage for UHF communication links was determined for the anticipated astronaut worksite in the shadow region underneath the Space Shuttle.

Hwu, Shian U.↗

Metallic Concepts for Repair of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Space Shuttle Leading Edges

The Columbia accident has focused attention on the critical need for on-orbit repair concepts for wing leading edges in the event that potentially catastrophic damage is incurred during Space Shuttle Orbiter flight. The leading edge of the space shuttle wings consists of a series of eleven panels on each side of the orbiter. These panels are fabricated from reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) which is a light weight composite with attractive strength at very high temperatures. The damage that was responsible for the loss of the Colombia space shuttle was deemed due to formation of a large hole in one these RCC leading edge panels produced by the impact of a large piece of foam. However, even small cracks in the RCC are considered as potentially catastrophic because of the high temperature re-entry environment. After the Columbia accident, NASA has explored various means to perform on-orbit repairs in the event that damage is sustained in future shuttle flights. Although large areas of damage, such as that which doomed Columbia, are not anticipated to re-occur due to various improvements to the shuttle, especially the foam attachment, NASA has also explored various options for both small and large area repair. This paper reports one large area repair concept referred to as the "metallic over-wrap." Environmental conditions during re-entry of the orbiter impose extreme requirements on the RCC leading edges as well as on any repair concepts. These requirements include temperatures up to 3000 F (1650 C) for up to 15 minutes in the presence of an extremely oxidizing plasma environment. Figure 1 shows the temperature profile across one panel (#9) which is subject to the highest temperatures during re-entry. Although the RCC possesses adequate mechanical strength at these temperatures, it lacks oxidation resistance. Oxidation protection is afforded by converting the outer layers of the RCC to SiC by chemical vapor deposition (CVD). At high temperatures in an oxidizing environment, the SiC layer forms a protective SiO2 scale. However, CVD processing to form the SiC layer can result in the formation of small cracks in the outer surface. Hence, as a final fabrication step, a sodium silicate glass, known as "Type A," is applied as a sealant to fill any surface porosity and/or cracks in the coating and the outer portions of the RCC[1]. At relatively low temperatures, the Type A glass melts and flows into the cracks providing oxidation protection at the higher temperatures. In addition, the Type A coating, provides a "dark" coating with a high emissivity. This high emissivity allows the RCC to transfer heat by radiating outward to space as well as dispersing heat within the leading edge cavity. Lastly, the Type A possesses low catalycity which reduces surface temperatures by limiting oxygen recombination on the surface during re-entry.

Ritzert, Frank↗

Free Enterprise: Contributions of the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) Program to the Development of the Space Shuttle Orbiter

The space shuttle orbiter was the first spacecraft designed with the aerodynamic characteristics and in-atmosphere handling qualities of a conventional airplane. In order to evaluate the orbiter's flight control systems and subsonic handling characteristics, a series of flight tests were undertaken at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center in 1977. A modified Boeing 747 Shuttle Carrier Aircraft carried the Enterprise, a prototype orbiter, during eight captive tests to determine how well the two vehicles flew together and to test some of the orbiter s systems. The free-flight phase of the ALT program allowed shuttle pilots to explore the orbiter's low-speed flight and landing characteristics. The Enterprise provided realistic, in-flight simulations of how subsequent space shuttles would be flown at the end of an orbital mission. The fifth free flight, with the Enterprise landing on a concrete runway for the first time, revealed a problem with the space shuttle flight control system that made it susceptible to pilot-induced oscillation, a potentially dangerous control problem. Further research using various aircraft, particularly NASA Dryden's F-8 Digital-Fly-By-Wire testbed, led to correction of the problem before the first Orbital Test Flight.

Merlin, Peter W.↗

Shuttle plate braiding machine

A method and apparatus for moving yarn in a selected pattern to form a braided article. The apparatus includes a segmented grid of stationary support elements and a plurality of shuttles configured to carry yarn. The shuttles are supported for movement on the grid assembly and each shuttle includes a retractable plunger for engaging a reciprocating shuttle plate that moves below the grid assembly. Such engagement at selected times causes the shuttles to move about the grid assembly in a selected pattern to form a braided article of a particular geometry.

Huey, Jr., Cecil O.↗

Operational Use of GPS Navigation for Space Shuttle Entry

The STS-118 flight of the Space Shuttle Endeavour was the first shuttle mission flown with three Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers in place of the three legacy Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) units. This marked the conclusion of a 15 year effort involving procurement, missionization, integration, and flight testing of a GPS receiver and a parallel effort to formulate and implement shuttle computer software changes to support GPS. The use of GPS data from a single receiver in parallel with TACAN during entry was successfully demonstrated by the orbiters Discovery and Atlantis during four shuttle missions in 2006 and 2007. This provided the confidence needed before flying the first all GPS, no TACAN flight with Endeavour. A significant number of lessons were learned concerning the integration of a software intensive navigation unit into a legacy avionics system. These lessons have been taken into consideration during vehicle design by other flight programs, including the vehicle that will replace the Space Shuttle, Orion.

Goodman, John L.↗

Application of an Elongated Kelvin Model to Space Shuttle Foams

Spray-on foam insulation is applied to the exterior of the Space Shuttle s External Tank to limit propellant boil-off and to prevent ice formation. The Space Shuttle foams are rigid closed-cell polyurethane foams. The two foams used most extensively on the Space Shuttle External Tank are BX-265 and NCFI24-124. Since the catastrophic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, numerous studies have been conducted to mitigate the likelihood and the severity of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space. Due to the foaming and rising process, the foam microstructures are elongated in the rise direction. As a result, these two foams exhibit a non-isotropic mechanical behavior. In this paper, a detailed microstructural characterization of the two foams is presented. The key features of the foam cells are summarized and the average cell dimensions in the two foams are compared. Experimental studies to measure the room temperature mechanical response of the two foams in the two principal material directions (parallel to the rise and perpendicular to the rise) are also reported. The measured elastic modulus, proportional limit stress, ultimate tensile stress and the Poisson s ratios for the two foams are compared. The generalized elongated Kelvin foam model previously developed by the authors is reviewed and the equations which result from this model are presented. The resulting equations show that the ratio of the elastic modulus in the rise direction to that in the perpendicular-to-rise direction as well as the ratio of the strengths in the two material directions is only a function of the microstructural dimensions. Using the measured microstructural dimensions and the measured stiffness ratio, the foam tensile strength ratio and Poisson s ratios are predicted for both foams. The predicted tensile strength ratio is in close agreement with the measured strength ratios for both BX-265 and NCFI24-124. The comparison between the predicted Poisson s ratios and the measured values is not as favorable.

Sullivan, Roy M.↗

Recent Shuttle Post Flight MMOD Inspection Highlights

Post flight inspections on the Space Shuttle Atlantis conducted after the STS-11.5 mission revealed a 0.11 inch (2.8 mm) hole in the outer face sheet of the starboard payload bay door radiator panel #4. The payload bay door radiators in this region are 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) thick aluminum honeycomb with 0.011 in (0.279 mm) thick aluminum face sheets topped with 0.005 in (0.127 mm) silver-Teflon tape. Inner face sheet damage included a 0.267 in (6.78 mm) long through crack with measureable deformation in the area of 0.2 in (5.1 mm). There was also a 0.031 in (0.787 nun) diameter hole in the rear face sheet. A large approximately l in (25 mm) diameter region of honeycomb was also destroyed. Since the radiators are located on the inside of the shuttle payload bay doors which are closed during ascent and reentry, the damage could only have occurred during the on-orbit portion of the mission. During the August 2007 STS-118 mission to the International Space Station, a micro-meteoroid or orbital debris (MMOD) particle impacted and completely penetrated one of shuttle Endeavour's radiator panels and the underlying thermal control system (TCS) blanket, leaving deposits on (but no damage to) the payload bay door. While it is not unusual for shuttle orbiters to be impacted by small MMOD particles, the damage from this impact is larger than any previously seen on the shuttle radiator panels. One of the largest impacts ever observed on a crew module window occurred during the November 2008 STS-126 mission to the International Space Station. Damage to the window was documented by the crew on orbit. Post flight inspection revealed a 0.4 in (10.8 mm) crater in the window pane, with a depth of 0.03 in (0.76 mm). The window pane was replaced due to the damage caused by this impact. Analysis performed on residue contained in dental mold impressions taken of the site indicated that a meteoroid particle produced this large damage site. The post flight inspection after the subsequent mission, STS-119 in March of 2009, produced a large MMOD impact feature in a wing leading edge reinforced carbon-carbon panel. The crater measured 0.18 in (4.5 nun) in diameter and was nearly 0.037 in (0.93 nun) deep. The thickness of the silicon carbide coating that protects the carbon substrate is nominally 0.02 in (0.5 nun) to 0.04 in (1 mm), making this a significant impact into the RCC. The damage occurred on the upper surface of the panel, which experiences lower heat loads on re-entry. This poster will document the data collected from the impact sites and will include results of the Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy Dispersive X-ray (SEM/EDX) analysis. Evidence will be presented that suggests a source of the impacts.

Hyed, James L.↗

Overview of Carbon Dioxide Control Issues During International Space Station/Space Shuttle Joint Docked Operations

Manned space vehicles have a common requirement to remove the Carbon Dioxide (CO2) created by the metabolic processes of the crew. The Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) each have systems in place to allow control and removal of CO2 from the habitable cabin environment. During periods where the Space Shuttle is docked to ISS, known as joint docked operations, the Space Shuttle and ISS share a common atmosphere environment. During this period there is an elevated production of CO2 caused by the combined metabolic activity of the Space Shuttle and ISS crew. This elevated CO2 production, combined with the large effective atmosphere created by the collective volumes of the docked vehicles, creates a unique set of requirements for CO2 removal. This paper will describe the individual CO2 control plans implemented by the Space Shuttle and ISS engineering teams, as well as the integrated plans used when both vehicles are docked. In addition, the paper will discuss some of the issues and anomalies experienced by both engineering teams.

Matty, Christopher M.↗

The Evolution of the Rendezvous Profile During the Space Shuttle Program

The rendezvous and proximity operations approach design techniques for space shuttle missions has changed significantly during the life of the program in response to new requirements that were not part of the original mission design. The flexibility of the shuttle onboard systems design and the mission planning process has allowed the program to meet these requirements. The design of the space shuttle and the shift from docking to grappling with a robotic ann prevented use of legacy Apollo rendezvous techniques. Over the life of the shuttle program the rendezvous profile has evolved due to several factors, including lowering propellant consumption and increasing flexibility in mission planning. Many of the spacecraft that the shuttle rendezvoused with had unique requirements that drove the creation of mission-unique proximity operations. The dockings to the Russian Mir space station and International Space Station (ISS) required further evolution of rendezvous and proximity operations techniques and additional sensors to enhance crew situational awareness. After the Columbia accident, a Rendezvous Pitch Maneuver (RPM) was added to allow tile photography from ISS. Lessons learned from these rendezvous design changes are applicable to future vehicle designs and operations concepts.

Summa, William R.↗

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Reliability and Analysis Evolution

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is a large thrust class, reusable, staged combustion cycle rocket engine employing liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants. A cluster of three SSMEs is used on every space shuttle mission to propel the space shuttle orbiter vehicle into low earth orbit. Development of the SSME began in the early 70 s and the first flight of the space shuttle occurred in 1981. Today, the SSME has accrued over one million seconds of ground test and flight operational time, launching 129 space shuttle missions. Given that the SSME is used to launch a manned vehicle, its reliability must be commensurate for the task. At the same time, the SSME is a high performance, high power density engine which traditionally does not lend itself towards high reliability. Furthermore, throughout its history, the SSME operational envelope has been explored and expanded leading to several major test failures. Hence, assessing the reliability of the SSME throughout its history has been a challenging undertaking. This paper provides a review and discussion of SSME reliability assessment techniques and results over its history. Basic reliability drivers such as engine design, test program, major failures, redesigns and upgrades will also be discussed.

Stephens, Walter E.↗

History of Space Shuttle Main Engine Turbopump Bearing Testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center

The Space Shuttle is propelled into orbit by two solid rocket motors and three liquid fed main engines. After the solid motors fall away, the shuttle engines continue to run for a total time of 8 minutes. These engines are fed propellants by low and high pressure turbopumps. A critical part of the turbopump is the main shaft that supports the drive turbine and the pump inducer and impeller. Rolling element bearings hold the shaft in place during rotation. If the bearings were to fail, the shaft would move, allowing components to rub in a liquid oxygen or hydrogen environment, which could have catastrophic results. These bearings are required to spin at very high speeds, support radial and axial loads, and have high wear resistance without the benefit of a conventional means of lubrication. The Rocketdyne built Shuttle turbopumps demonstrated their capability to perform during launches; however, the seven hour life requirement was not being met. One of the limiting factors was the bearings. In the late 1970's, an engineering team was formed at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), to develop a test rig and plan for testing the Shuttle s main engine high pressure oxygen turbopump (HPOTP) bearings. The goals of the program were to better understand the operation of bearings in a cryogenic environment and to further develop and refine existing computer models used to predict the operational limits of these bearings. In 1982, testing began in a rig named the Bearing and Seal Material Tester or BSMT as it was commonly called. The first testing investigated the thermal margin and thermal runaway limits of the HPOTP bearings. The test rig was later used to explore potential bearing improvements in the area of increased race curvatures, new cage materials for better lubrication, new wear resistant rolling element materials, and other ideas to improve wear life. The most notable improvements during this tester s time was the incorporation of silicon nitride balls and bronze filled polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) cage inserts into the bearings and the anchoring of the SHABERTH bearing model and SINDA thermal computer model for cryogenic bearing analysis. In the mid 1990's, Pratt and Whitney (P&W) won the contract to deliver new high pressure turbopumps for the Shuttle s engines. P&W used two new bearing materials for the rings, Cronidur 30 and AISI 9310 steel and testing was needed on these new materials. A test rig had been designed and delivered to MSFC for testing hydrostatic bearings but with the need by Pratt to validate their bearings, the rig was reconfigured for testing of two ball bearings or a ball bearing and a roller bearing. The P&W bearings are larger than the Rocketdyne bearings and could not be installed in the BSMT. This new test rig was called the LH2 test rig and began operation in 1995. The LH2 test rig accumulated 75,000 seconds of run time in hydrogen. This test rig was valuable in two areas: validating the use of silicon nitride balls and rollers in Alternate Turbopump Development (ATD) bearings, which Pratt eventually used, and in proving the robustness of the balls and rollers after river marks appeared on the surface of the rolling elements. Individual test reports have been presented at conferences and symposiums throughout the years. This paper is a comprehensive report of all the bearing testing done at Marshall. It represents thousands of hours of dedication and labor in all engineering and technical fields that made this program a success.

Gibson, Howard↗

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Developing Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Introducing composite vessels into the Space Shuttle Program represented a significant technical achievement. Each Orbiter vehicle contains 24 (nominally) Kevlar tanks for storage of pressurized helium (for propulsion) and nitrogen (for life support). The use of composite cylinders saved 752 pounds per Orbiter vehicle compared with all-metal tanks. The weight savings is significant considering each Shuttle flight can deliver 54,000 pounds of payload to the International Space Station. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return to Flight activities, the Space Shuttle Program, in 2005, re-examined COPV hardware certification. Incorporating COPV data that had been generated over the last 30 years and recognizing differences between initial Shuttle Program requirements and current operation, a new failure mode was identified, as composite stress rupture was deemed credible. The Orbiter Project undertook a comprehensive investigation to quantify and mitigate this risk. First, the engineering team considered and later deemed as unfeasible the option to replace existing all flight tanks. Second, operational improvements to flight procedures were instituted to reduce the flight risk and the danger to personnel. Third, an Orbiter reliability model was developed to quantify flight risk. Laser profilometry inspection of several flight COPVs identified deep (up to 20 mil) depressions on the tank interior. A comprehensive analysis was performed and it confirmed that these observed depressions were far less than the criterion which was established as necessary to lead to liner buckling. Existing fleet vessels were exonerated from this failure mechanism. Because full validation of the Orbiter Reliability Model was not possible given limited hardware resources, an Accelerated Stress Rupture Test of a flown flight vessel was performed to provide increased confidence. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to evaluate possible test results with respect to the model credibility and thus flight rationale for continued operation of the Space Shuttle with existing flight hardware. A non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure the overwrap residual stress state. Preliminary results provide optimistic results that patterns of fluctuation in fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface could be directly correlated with increased fiber stress ratios and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

Correlation of Space Shuttle Landing Performance with Post-Flight Cardiovascular Dysfunction

Introduction: Microgravity induces cardiovascular adaptations resulting in orthostatic intolerance on re-exposure to normal gravity. Orthostasis could interfere with performance of complex tasks during the re-entry phase of Shuttle landings. This study correlated measures of Shuttle landing performance with post-flight indicators of orthostatic intolerance. Methods: Relevant Shuttle landing performance parameters routinely recorded at touchdown by NASA included downrange and crossrange distances, airspeed, and vertical speed. Measures of cardiovascular changes were calculated from operational stand tests performed in the immediate post-flight period on mission commanders from STS-41 to STS-66. Stand test data analyzed included maximum standing heart rate, mean increase in maximum heart rate, minimum standing systolic blood pressure, and mean decrease in standing systolic blood pressure. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated with the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant linear correlation between stand test results and Shuttle landing performance. A correlation coefficient? 0.5 with a p<0.05 was considered significant. Results: There were no significant linear correlations between landing performance and measures of post-flight cardiovascular dysfunction. Discussion: There was no evidence that post-flight cardiovascular stand test data correlated with Shuttle landing performance. This implies that variations in landing performance were not due to space flight-induced orthostatic intolerance.

McCluskey, R.↗

Space Shuttle Navigation in the GPS Era

The Space Shuttle navigation architecture was originally designed in the 1970s. A variety of on-board and ground based navigation sensors and computers are used during the ascent, orbit coast, rendezvous, (including proximity operations and docking) and entry flight phases. With the advent of GPS navigation and tightly coupled GPS/INS Units employing strapdown sensors, opportunities to improve and streamline the Shuttle navigation process are being pursued. These improvements can potentially result in increased safety, reliability, and cost savings in maintenance through the replacement of older technologies and elimination of ground support systems (such as Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN), Microwave Landing System (MLS) and ground radar). Selection and missionization of "off the shelf" GPS and GPS/INS units pose a unique challenge since the units in question were not originally designed for the Space Shuttle application. Various options for integrating GPS and GPS/INS units with the existing orbiter avionics system were considered in light of budget constraints, software quality concerns, and schedule limitations. An overview of Shuttle navigation methodology from 1981 to the present is given, along with how GPS and GPS/INS technology will change, or not change, the way Space Shuttle navigation is performed in the 21 5 century.

Goodman, John L.↗

An Engineering Look at Space Shuttle and ISS Operations

This slide presentation, in Spanish, is an overview of NASA's Space Shuttle operations and preparations for serving the International Space Station. There is information and or views of the shuttle's design, the propulsion system, the external tanks, the foam insulation, the reusable solid rocket motors, the vehicle assembly building (VAB), the mobile launcher platform being moved from the VAB to the launch pad. There is a presentation of some of the current issues with the space shuttle: cracks in the LH2 flow lines, corrosion and pitting, the thermal protection system, and inspection of the thermal protection system while in orbit. The shuttle system has served for more than 20 years, it is still a challenge to re-certify the vehicles for flight. Materials and material science remain as chief concerns for the shuttle,

Hernandez, Jose M.↗